EDUCATIONAL DISENGAGEMENT

UNDERMINING ACADEMIC QUALITY AT A CHINESE UNIVERSITY

MICHAEL AGELASTO

Copyright © 1998 by Michael Agelasto

To the SZU community,
deserving of the best university possible

CONTENTS

Preface viii
Abbreviations x
List of stories, tables, figures and boxes xi
Introduction....... 1
  The why and how of this book....... 1
  Sources....... 3
  Translation....... 6
  Story 1: Arrival, Wang Lingling (1985) 7
1. A university in perspective 11
  Education in Shenzhen....... 12
  University founding....... 16
  Story 2: Pioneer Meng Tao....... 23
  Changing educational policies....... 26
    Luo’s focus on students....... 26
    Rectification under Wei-Wu 34
    Policies under Cai Delin 42
  Concluding thoughts 50
  Story 3: The bankers Deng 54
2. Students....... 58
  Will the real student please stand up?....... 59
  Adult and continuing education....... 62
  SZU enrollment planning history 65
  Tuition 73
  Student quality 74
  Local versus non-local students 79
  Recommended and test-exempt students....... 83
  Compatriot students 84
  Daipei....... 86
  Benke-zhuanke ratio 87
  Politics and recruitment....... 89
  Concluding thoughts 91
  Story 4: Teacher Niu Ye....... 98
3. Teachers and staff 101
  Staff-student ratio....... 102
  Employment contract system 110
  Disemployment 112
  1988 personnel policy revisions....... 114
  Story 5: Teacher Han, returned overseas student....... 117

Ability-qualification system ... 120
1992 Staffing reform ... 123
Mobility ... 124
Teacher team construction ... 128
Expectations for teachers ... 131
Concerns over teaching ... 134
Creating a teaching élite ... 141
Remuneration ... 144
Concluding thoughts ... 149
Story 6: Xiao, retired teacher ... 158

4. Knowledge structure ... 159
  Architecture ... 169
  Chemistry ... 181
  Chinese ... 189
  Civil Engineering ... 198
  Story 7: Li Laoshi, visiting after 10 years ... 206
  Design ... 210
  Economics ... 213
  Foreign Language ... 229
  International Finance and Trade ... 247
  Law ... 254
  Story 8: Recruited teacher Zhang Xiaoli ... 262
  Management ... 266
  Mathematics ... 275
  Mechanical Engineering ... 280
  Physical Education ... 285
  Physics ... 292
  Public Administration ... 301
  Conclusions ... 305
  Story 9: Student Xie Zhongwen, four treasures of the study ... 326

5. Pedagogy ... 329
  Experiments in pedagogy ... 334
    Oral English ... 334
    Composition ... 337
    Listening and culture courses ... 340
    Communicative English for Chinese learners (CECL) ... 341
    Cooperative learning ... 346
  Creativity ... 347
    Western research approaches to creativity ... 348
    Creativity and Chinese education ... 349
    The individual in Chinese culture ... 351
  Conclusions ... 355
  Story 10: Hong Kong student Kennedy Ng ... 363

6. Foreign things ... 366
  The credit system ... 368

- History of the CS in China 369
- American influence 370
- The American CS in China 373
- SZU’s credit system 376
- Educational issues raised 383
- Conclusions on the credit system 386

Foreigners at SZU 387
- Management over foreign affairs 388
- Foreign students 390
- Foreign teachers 393

Academic Exchange 414
- Leadership delegations 415
- Teacher travel 418

Story 11: René LeBlanc,, foreign student 420
- Twinning programs 423
  - Lancashire 424
  - Edmonds 426
  - Victoria University of Technology 432

Concluding thoughts 443
Story 12: Yang Fang, as told by Cao Zhichang 453

7. Output 455

Departures 455
Research 455
Story 13: Lu Bing, overseas student, clinic-basher 464
Campus business and side-businesses 467
Student achievement 474
- American studies on underachievement 474
- Underachievement at SZU 476
- Employment after graduation 478
- Public perception of student underachievement 482
- SZU student underachievement 483

Concluding thoughts 490

8. Conclusion: misadventure in education 495

References 504

Index 521

Preface

Educational Disengagement is the most comprehensive study written to date about education at a Chinese university, or for that matter any university. Through considerably rich detail, it portrays the life and times of Shenzhen University (SZU), an institution built in the first years of China's economic reforms under Deng Xiaoping. The study is the culmination of ten years of participant-observation research and relies on the analysis of hundreds of restricted (*neibu*) documents. Along with the author's companion study, *University in Turmoil: The Political Economy of Shenzhen University*, this volume provides insight into the university's pedagogy and knowledge structure and the foreign influences that have shaped the institution.

Each of the book's chapters is preceded by an ethnographic story, told from the informant's points of view. Stories include those of students annoyed at the quality of education they received and teachers who themselves have disengaged from the educational process. Most teachers at SZU over the school's first decade and a half have lost their enthusiasm for academic life. Many became involved in various types of money-making activities and paid only sufficient enough attention to their teaching and research to retain their faculty positions. Others left the university altogether; teacher turnover exceeded 30%, many departing for overseas study and emigration. Those who remained stopped undertaking scholarly research, which fell dramatically after it had peaked in 1989.

The book starts off with a chapter that puts SZU in perspective. Designed as an experimental institution in China's experimental Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, SZU was initially envisioned by the Shenzhen municipality as an economics college. Educational authorities in Guangdong Province, however, wanted a comprehensive university. Once developed, the university only superficially offered courses in the humanities and natural sciences. The university's focus was on business studies. The second part of this chapter examines SZU's policies on education, which differed substantially under the university's first three administrations. Some of this information presented here necessarily duplicates material in *University in Turmoil*, where politics and governance at SZU are discussed in more depth (the total overlap between the two books is under 3%).

Chapter Two discusses SZU's students and admissions process. Data from SZU's internal journals indicate that students' entrance examination scores plummeted from a high attained in 1989. At the same time the university started to focus on short-cycle courses, paying less and less attention to undergraduates who had been enrolled on the basis of their performances on the uniform college entrance test. This chapter explores the differences between the enrollment plans and actual student intake. Government-approved enrollment plans were exceeded so that fee-paying students could be admitted. These self-financed students had lower examination scores than normal students.

The next chapter examines university staff. Initially, through nationwide recruitment, SZU hired the best and brightest among Chinese academics. Some 10,000 people applied for 200 positions. After initial staffing, however, hiring was done on the basis of personal relationships (*guanxi*), and the quality of staff declined. This chapter details policies designed to manage teachers, policies that changed with the school's different administrations.

Chapter Four provides a detailed examination of the university's knowledge structure, giving the reader a tour through each of the university's academic departments. These micro-level descriptions help to provide insight into the profound influence politics played on educational policy, one of the recurring themes in SZU history. They also show how various teaching departments grappled with defining knowledge. Many departments preferred to specialize their curricula rather than provide courses that could build solid foundations for students.

The next chapter discusses pedagogy and examines the drawbacks of the university's standard "talk and chalk" teaching method, especially in terms of its inability to generate creative and critical thinking among students. This discussion brings out the importance of individualism in education. The general absence of attention paid in the classroom to the needs of the individual student had a profoundly negative effect on SZU's educational quality. Students became exhausted as they sat through 30 hours of classes a week, for 18 weeks a semester. Pedagogy was further constrained by the emphasis placed on exams. Virtually no courses had writing requirements; only in the applied sciences of Architecture and Electronics were students prodded to be creative. In general, students undertook little preparation for class; most intellectual activity went into cramming for final exams.

Chapter Six examines foreign influences on SZU. It explores the role of "foreign teachers" as well as the influence of the American credit system. It looks at the attention given to overseas delegation travel and to several of the university's international exchanges. It concludes that these efforts did little to advance the quality of education at the university.

Chapter Seven discusses output. The organizational spine of this book is the input-throughput-output analogy, viz., student and teachers (as input), pedagogy and foreign influence (as throughput) and disengagement (as output). Part of this chapter examines the university's graduates, most of whom work as employees of enterprises or financial institutions in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.

The book's concluding chapter describes SZU's history as a "misadventure in education" and with the benefit of hindsight questions the wisdom of attempting to create a comprehensive university as opposed to a business college.

The study was written for multiple audiences. Sinologists will appreciate a solid scholarly investigation, using inductive techniques, that relies on years of participant-observation research and the digestion of over a million characters of *neibu* documents. Educationalists—not just those interested in Chinese higher education—will be attracted to a study that details the inner workings of a Chinese university. Ethnographers will be interested in the dozen or so 1,000-word ethnographic accounts. The general reader who is not an educator or China expert will appreciate a narrative work that tells a story and presents the Middle Kingdom on a very human basis.

The Chinese idiom *pao zhuan yin yu* captures the intention of this study: "toss out a brick in order to attract jade." I am offering my analysis knowing that it is merely a brick, far from perfect, far from precious. I toss it out in the hope that other researchers will follow suit and that their contributions will be of jade quality. If my work encourages in-depth discussion of the issues I raise, then its purpose will have been accomplished.

Many people supported this research and helped me keep afloat against a tide of opposition that came largely from the university officials whose policies I discuss. In my companion volume I have already thanked them, as well as my informants, who must remain anonymous, lest they draw recriminations from SZU's past and present leaders.

Despite all the help I received, any errors, of course, are mine alone. Comments on this volume are welcome. I can be reached by electronic mail at *agelasto@hotmail.com*.

Michael Agelasto
Hong Kong
November 1998

Abbreviations

AAO	Academic Affairs Office
A/V	Audio Visual Center
BBR	big bad record, severe negative disciplinary note
Beida	Beijing University (Peking University)
BR	bad record, negative disciplinary notation
CAD	computer-aided design
CECL	Communicative English for Chinese Learners
CHC	Confucian-heritage cultures
CCP/CPC	Chinese Communist Party, or Party
CS	credit system
CYL	Communist Youth League
ESL	English as a Second Language
FAO	Foreign Affairs Office
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FLD	Foreign Language Department
FTE	full-time equivalent
GPA	grade point average
IFT	International Finance and Trade Department
ISD	International Software Development Company
MIS	management information system
MOE	Ministry of Education
PE	Physical Education Department
PRC	People’s Republic of China
PSB	Public Security Bureau
SAO	Student Affairs Office
SC	Student Council
SEdC	State Education Commission
SEZ	Special Economic Zone
Shenda	Shenzhen University
SO	(SZU) Security Office
SSDC	Student Self-Disciplinary Committee
SU	Student Union
SZU	Shenzhen University/ *Shenzhen daxue*, or Shenda
TAFE	Technical and Further Education
TOEFL	Test of English as a Foreign Language
VUT	Victoria University of Technology (Melbourne)

List of stories, tables, figures and boxes

Story 1: Arrival, Wang Lingling (1985) 7
Story 2: Pioneer Meng Tao 23
Story 3: The Bankers Deng 54
Story 4: Teacher Niu Ye 98
Story 5: Teacher Han, returned overseas student 117
Story 6: Xiao, retired teacher 158
Story 7: Li Laoshi, visiting after 10 years 206
Story 8: Recruited teacher Zhang Xiaoli 262
Story 9: Student Xie Zhongwen, four treasures of the study 326
Story 10: Hong Kong student Kennedy Ng 363
Story 11: René LeBlanc,, foreign student 420
Story 12: Yang Fang, as told by Cao Zhichang 453
Story 13: Lu Bing, overseas student, clinic-basher 464

Table 1.1: Educational enrollment in Shenzhen 13
Table 1.2: Public educational expenditures, Shenzhen 15
Table 1.3: Planned/actual major setting 19

Table 2.1: Parents' occupation, percentage 58
Table 2.2: Dialect spoken at home (percent) 59
Table 2.3: Parents' education level (percent) 59
Table 2.4: Adult education enrolled students and graduates 63
Table 2.5: Adult education targets set in 1991 64
Table 2.6: 1990 student population (September 1990) 66
Table 2.7: 1991 projected enrollment for 1995 and 2000 67
Table 2.8: Entering class enrollment in state plan, 1983-1996, by student type 68
Table 2.9: Data inconsistencies, 1987 state plan entrants 70
Table 2.10: Statistics on graduates, by year enrolled 72
Table 2.11: Plan versus actual enrollment 74
Table 2.12: Tuition and accommodation charges 75
Table 2.13: Tuition at selected Chinese universities, 1996 (in ¥)76
Table 2.14: *Benke* entrance examination scores 78
Table 2.15: *Benke* local recruitment and scores 82
Table 2.16: *Benke-zhuanke* score comparison—arts 90
Table 2.17: *Benke-zhuanke* score comparison—sciences 91

Table 3.1: SZU Staff-Student ratio 103
Table 3.2: Teacher-student (FTE) ratios, national averages 104
Table 3.3: 1985 staff expenditure for selected Guangdong universities 105
Table 3.4: Staff education level, 1986 108
Table 3.5: 1995 staff, by category 108

Table 3.6: 1995 professional staff, by category 109
Table 3.7: Comparative statistic for teaching staff ranks among universities 111
Table 3.8: Staff hiring 124
Table 3.9: Status of teachers hired, 1983-1994 125
Table 3.10: Teacher qualification ranking, 1987 and 1994 127
Table 3.11: Teachers holding advanced degrees (percentage, selected years) 128
Table 3.12: Teacher-student ratio 130
Table 3.13: Teacher training fund (¥) 140
Table 3.14: Salary (¥), associate professor, 1997 144
Table 3.15: Salary (¥), assistant lecturer, 1997 146
Table 3.16: Position subsidy ranks, 1993 146

Table 4.1: Arts entrance examination scores, ranked by major and year 160
Table 4.2: Science entrance examination scores, ranked by major and year 161
Table 4.3: Department benke student population flows, 1988-1991 163
Table 4.4: Department female teaching staff (percentage, 1994) 166
Table 4.5: Department fixed teaching staff size (1994) 166
Table 4.6: Age of departmental teaching staff, ranked by departments (1994) 167
Table 4.7: Per teacher research output, 1988-1992, ranked by department 167
Table 4.8: Professional rank of departmental teaching staff (1994) 168
Table 4.9: Student gender by department (percent female, selected years) 168
Table 4.10: Student fail rates, 1988-1990 entering *benke* classes (percentage) 169
Table 4.11: Teacher senior ranking (percentage) 175
Table 4.12: Economics Department specializations 214
Table 4.13: Band 4 passing rate for non-English majors 235
Table 4.14: Band 6 passing rate for non-English majors 236
Table 4.15: Band 2 test scores for *zhuanke* students 237
Table 4.16: IFT student opinion on practical education (percentage) 250
Table 4.17: Enrollment in the Management Department, 1988 268
Table 4.18: Test results, 1995 SEdC accreditation tests results 297

Table 5.1: Hours of required classes, *benke* Management majors, 1992 and 1993 .. 329
Table 5.2: CECL results, first semester 1990-1991 344

Table 6.1: SZU credit allocation by course type (percentage) 377
Table 6.2: Optional courses 380
Table 6.3: Public-optional courses actually offered by department, 1992-3 384
Table 6.4: Expatriate salary (in ¥) 399
Table 6.5: 1996 travel abroad by the SZU community 418

Table 7.1: Reported research output 456
Table 7.2: Ratio of research to teaching staff 456
Table 7.3: Research per capita output 457
Table 7.4: Where research was published (1986-1993) 458
Table 7.5: Research funding 459
Table 7.6: Academic research fund 463
Table 7.7: SZU-affiliated enterprises 468

Table 7.8: 1994 Graduates Working at Graduation by Gender................................477
Table 7.9: Self-reported class rank, 1993 benke graduates......................................483
Table 7.10: Guanxi in job procurement, by class standing, 1993 484
Table 7.11: Class standing by gender..484

Figure 2.1: Student population, *benke* and *zhuanke*, 1983-1996 60
Figure 2.2: SZU state plan undergraduate enrollment, 1983-1996............................62
Figure 2.3: *Benke* and *zhuanke* enrollment..66
Figure 2.4: Percentage change in recruitment, 1984-1996..73
Figure 2.5: SZU entrants scoring above provincial score-line (percentage)..............80

Figure 3.1: Staff-student ratio 103
Figure 3.2: Changes in enrollment and staffing..106

Figure 4.1:Entrance exam comparisons, arts 162
Figure 4.2: Entrance exam comparisons, sciences 162
Figure 4.3: 1993 seniors' opinion of SZU education by department........................164
Figure 4.4: Chemistry Department research output 186
Figure 4.5: Electronics Department research output 228
Figure 4.6: Management Department research output 272
Figure 4.7: SZU research output 308

Figure 5.1: Cultural theory 352

Figure 6.1: Optional courses as a percent of total offerings 380
Figure 6.2: SZU credit system continuum, flexibility over time..............................382
Figure 6.3: Inflow of foreign visitors 389
Figure 6.4: Foreign student enrollment..391
Figure 6.5: Variables affecting foreign teachers' effectiveness 408
Figure 6.6: Foreign exchange types 414

Figure 7.1: Total research output...457

Box 1.1: Xu Jiyang, student/manager 30
Box 1.2: 1988 punishable offences under Luo Zhengqi...36
Box 1.3: 1989 penalties for dormitory violations...37

Box 3.1: Teacher Xing, irregular teacher...102
Box 3.2: Employment contract for Student Affairs Office leader, 1988..................107
Box 3.3: The eventual arrival of Teacher Lin 112
Box 3.4: Teaching qualification point system (1987) 121
Box 3.5: Employment certificate for Professor Luo Yunzhu..................................132

Box 6.1: Jane, young whirlwind 394
Box 6.2: Jim, pensioner...396
Box 6.3: Dr. Roberts, professional teacher..398
Box 6.4: William, preacher 400

Box 7.1: Students Ding and Xiao, underachievers 486

Introduction

The why and how of this book

When I taught at Shenzhen University (SZU) from 1988-1994, I explained to my students in research writing class that writers try to define their intended audience before putting words to paper. I tried to stress that my own students' audience should not be me, the teacher, but rather they, themselves, the writers. This was a bit idealistic, they objected, since I was the one handing out grades. Nevertheless, with the writer as primary audience, I argued, he or she should be true to self. This translates *inter alia* as honest analysis, no plagiarism, and the best job that can be done given all the constraints that the writer faces.

Of course, a monograph like *Educational Disengagement* is not a term paper. It should enjoy a wider audience of scholars and academics and perhaps even readers from the general public. But concerns for integrity and honesty still apply. Honesty, however, must be understood in the context of the ramifications it may produce. No bystanders, so-to-speak, should suffer because the research becomes public. Thus, in order to lessen the negative impact on individual informants in participant-observation research, sources are usually disguised, personal names withheld, or mis-identified. In many cases, the identity of the subject itself—in this case Shenzhen University—would be disguised. This book adheres to the first practice but rejects the second.

In terms of individual sources, several hundred students, staff and teachers related their personal stories to me over the six-years I was part of the SZU community. Their stories *are* the university. They provide human faces to the institution. To recount the history of Shenzhen University without revealing the richness of their lives would do an injustice both to them and to the school itself. Certain aspects of my research are extremely sensitive. These include discussions of university politics, the Communist Party, corruption, as well as certain academic and managerial practices. Experience has taught me that my analysis is not appreciated by some people associated with the university, and I fear that anyone who can be identified as helping me could be ill-treated, indeed punished, as the result of the publication of my research. Thus, to hold these informants harmless, neither their real names nor any identifying traits are presented. That is not to say, however, that individuals in positions of leadership—*lingdao* in Chinese—are not named or referred to in a factual manner that identifies them. Their words—in their statements to me or from published sources—are quoted, and their names are not changed.

For the most part, the personal stories appear as chapter preludes in *italics* font. These ethnographic accounts are written as either first or third person narratives; sometimes they are integrated within chapters. When ethnographic sources are referred to in the text, they are *always* mis-identified or referred to in such a vague way that no reader will be able to pinpoint their identity. The information in the narratives is taken from my notes or recollections, but the individuals themselves are fictitious. In other words, the people telling their stories are composites, not real individuals. The reason for taking what might be considered a generous "writer's license" is to protect individual informants. This scholarly work should not be used as fodder in settling old scores or continuing personal vendettas.

While educational anthropologists generally agree that individuals should not be identified in ethnographic studies, even if they request that their names be used, the issue of whether to use SZU's actual name proves more problematic. Academics have debated whether institutions which are the subjects of academic studies should be identified by name. In some published academic articles (in both China and elsewhere) I have on occasion disguised SZU. A piece on foreign teachers that appeared in a Mainland China journal did not include the university's name.[1] In an article on corruption published in a European law review, I identified SZU only as "Southern Tertiary."[2] As I started to write this book, however, I realized it would be pointless to disguise the university's name without also disguising the name of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ). The Shenzhen SEZ greatly influences many aspects of the university and its culture. To refer to SZU as something like "Leechee University" in the "Leechee Special Economic Zone" is easily accomplished: a global search-and-replace in the word-processor.[3] Yet, this provides but a nominal ruse, for academics in the field of Chinese education studies, both in China and abroad, are well aware that my decade of research has focused on one individual institution, SZU. My misgivings about identifying SZU by name stem from the possibility that the research may be misused, as noted above. Also, although the SZU story is far too complex to enable one simply to cast some participants as gods while others are designated as devils, this is often how the story has been told. Facts, figures and even analysis may be used out-of-context and interpreted in such a way as to damage the university's reputation. My writing could diminish the value of degrees held by alumni or the status of positions held by staff and teachers. That is not my intent. My purpose in telling the SZU story is academic, practical, and personal. Academic in that scholars in China studies and comparative education, through a detailed case study, may better understand the systems that make up a Chinese university. Practical in that educators in China may learn lessons from SZU which will help them improve educational quality and management in their own institutions. Personal in that the students and staff of SZU deserve to have their stories told.

Sources

Many sources were used in the writing of this book. The university, itself, publishes a wealth of documents. Its yearbooks contain valuable data and opinion; they present the university administration's official views as well as the views of office heads who submit reports to the leadership. Not to be confused with yearbooks in North American schools and universities—the type that contain pictures of seniors in cap and gown—the SZU yearbook more resembles an annual report, whose target audience is the municipal government, the major provider of university funding. In order to manage all these data, the yearbooks were translated into English and input electronically so they could be searched by name or term. The electronic file contained over 200,000 words.

The university also publishes a quarterly in-house journal, *Shenda Tongxun*, which at times has allowed for faculty and staff to express their opinions frankly. This journal is not-for-sale and at times has been considered *neibu*, or internal, just as the yearbooks.[4] Some documents in China which are labeled *neibu* are considered top secret, highly sensitive or confidential. Disclosing their contents is a breach of national security; violations can result in imprisonment. Regarding *Shenda Tongxun*, however, various university officials have over the years assured me that the *neibu* classification did not preclude me from citing the journal's contents, a practice employed by Chinese academics. (I once even published an article in *Shenda Tongxun*).[5] Another information source was the mimeographed *News in Brief* that was issued two or three times a week during the academic year. Starting in 1996, the *News in Brief* even appeared for a few months on the WWW homepage of the university (*http://www.szu.edu.cn*). The website itself provides useful information for a researcher.

1993 graduates survey

In addition to interviews, data on students came from a survey that was undertaken as part of my dissertation research. Each year after returning to school from spring festival [Chinese new year] break, SZU seniors complete their graduation theses and immediately hunt for jobs. Most students are working full time by the date of graduation, which is the third week in June. Over the two-day period before the graduation ceremony, seniors are processed out of school. They are given a form that must be certified (by red stamp [chop]) by more than a dozen departments. For example, the library verifies that students have no outstanding books or fines; the housing office certifies as acceptable the condition of dormitory furniture. The academic departments document that the student has completed all requirements for graduation; other school authorities verify that identification cards and railway discount passes have been returned.

After making several requests to the university president and vice-presidents, I was given permission to survey graduating seniors in order to obtain data on how they found jobs, my dissertation topic. I suggested that seniors complete a questionnaire as part of the exit procedure described above. This request was not disapproved, although one vice-president objected to my asking sociological and political questions. Most of these, which were not germane to my dissertation's primary research question, were removed, but I especially wanted to leave in a question concerning parents' Communist Party (CCP) affiliation. Fortunately, when the disapproving vice-president was hospitalized with a digestion ailment, I secured the other vice-president's approval. I had the questionnaire privately printed, as none of the officials I was dealing with wanted his office to pay the ¥900 cost (about U.S. $100), and I was reluctant to pursue this issue as it offered more opportunities for others to examine (and delay) the survey.

The Student Affairs Office director, whom I had met only once in an unsuccessful attempt to get his office to set up an alumni data base, agreed to have his staff distribute the instruments to each academic department with instructions that students complete and return them during the exit procedure. His favorable decision was crucial and possibly influenced by three factors. I presented him with a signed note (*kai tiaozi*) from my supportive vice-president requesting the lower official's assistance. Second, distributing the survey incurred little time or effort of the part of his staff. Third, his approval was a sort of compensation for his refusing my earlier requests that his office get more involved in alumni affairs.

During the two days of exit procedure, I sat at the Academic Affairs Office (AAO) table and chopped students' forms after they submitted a completed questionnaire. (I had bought a chop that read *pi zhun*, meaning approved.) I refused to chop forms from those who had not completed the survey; I accepted, however, all completed forms, even those in which respondents had "straight lined" (e.g., "55555" or "44444") attitude responses. (Straight line or other patterned responses (e.g., "12341234") were later recoded as missing data.)

The instrument was originally composed in English and translated into Chinese, the teaching medium of all departments at SZU, except for Foreign Language. It was "back-translated" into English to ensure that the original meanings survived translation. The questionnaire was then pre-tested on several graduating seniors and on six alumni working in Shenzhen. It became apparent that few students had ever been exposed to a survey instrument. Consequently, a revision included a more fully worded clause promising confidentiality, as well as additional instructions on how to respond to a Likert-type five point-scale for attitude questions, and specific instructions to "mark only one choice" for most questions.

Over ninety percent of graduating seniors completed valid questionnaires, making the "survey" more of a census. Although seniors have several weeks from after graduation to submit a chopped exit form, most seem eager to conclude their obligations with the university as immediately as possible. The completed responses included 549 in the *benke* (baccalaureate track) and 239 in the *zhuanke* (specialized, short-cycle) program. No bias appears to characterize the five or so percent who failed to complete their forms before graduation day. Some seniors had returned to their hometowns; others were too busy in their jobs to return to campus for commencement ceremonies.

The instrument examined 129 variables, of which 35 were attitude questions.[6] The responses had to be coded, then readied for the computer. Six students did these tasks. SZU sophomores and juniors were required to undertake two weeks of "social investigation/practice" (*shehui shijian*) during summer vacation. They had to give the university a form chopped and certified by an employer (*danwei* or work-unit). Many *danwei* in Shenzhen do not want to have SZU students hanging around their offices, and many students cannot get their forms chopped. Thus, this requirement has become subject to broad interpretation. My department head permitted me to use sophomore students for coding if I could find a Shenzhen employer who would chop their forms (thus relieving the department of such an obligation). This task was handled by several of my former students who themselves had access to chops or were able to get their fathers to chop the forms. In total, my six sophomore students took about 300 hours to code the data and ready it for "keypunching." I input the data myself, and thus was able to correct some coding errors.

The following year, in June 1994, I composed a greatly shortened questionnaire for graduating seniors. I again had the questionnaires printed privately. I did not seek university approval, partly because an administrative reshuffle had relocated all the staff who had been so helpful the year before. Thus, out of fear that the newly appointed vice-president in charge of student affairs and others would not approve, I simply deposited the questionnaires with the worker in the Student Affairs Office who had been involved in the previous effort and hoped for the best. During the exit procedure, I occasionally visited but eventually turned the entire process over to the staff from Academic Affairs. Again, I feared that my open involvement might prompt a veto among newly appointed officials. After the exit procedure, during the time when all university officials were attending the commencement ceremony, I went to the office where the questionnaires were deposited and claimed them, with no protest offered by the lower ranked cadres who, excluded from the commencement ceremonies, were on break in the office.

Translation

Almost all documentary sources used for this book were written in the Chinese language. For this book, their titles and any quoted text have been translated into English. Converting Chinese grammar, vocabulary, and literary style into good English, however, involves much judgment. My translators (especially Simon Young to whom I am greatly indebted) and I, through paraphrasial translation, have attempted to avoid the rather unpleasant English that often results from literal translation of Chinese. We have tried to be faithful to the original texts. In an attempt to improve readability, the italicized ethnographic accounts have been reshaped to conform to a standard style.

---

1. Agelasto, "Maximizing the effectiveness of western English faculty at a Chinese university," 1993.
2. Agelasto, "Cellularism, *guanxiwang*, and corruption," 1996.
3. Shenzhen has an annual leechee festival, with a parade that includes a float presenting the leechee festival beauty queen. The fruit is a major agricultural export, selling locally for about US $3 per pound.
4. The *Shenda Tongxun* was labeled *neibu* for its first 12 issues. Issues #13-27 (May 1991-Winter 1994) were issued under municipal license as "Shenzhen news public serial #042," not a *neibu* classification. The *neibu* status was reinstated for subsequent issues, which were licensed as "Shenzhen news public *neibu* serial #003." At the same time the non-*neibu* #042 classification was transferred to a new bi-weekly campus newspaper, *Shenzhen daxue bao* (*Shenzhen University Gazette*), which was sponsored by the CCP Propaganda Office.
5. Agelasto, "What is important for improving library quality," 1994.
6. The English and Chinese versions of the questionnaire are appendices to my dissertation, *Social Relationships and Job Procurement by Graduates,* 1998.

Story 1: Arrival, Wang Lingling (1985)

Arriving on the Shenzhen University campus the first week of September, 1987, was a most special event in my life. I, the third daughter born of a peasant family, am the first child of my generation to go to university. My first elder brother, who is ten years older than me, was considered bright enough to go to college, but he was born at the wrong time. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution interrupted his study. When he returned home from the commune where he had been assigned in a distant part of our vast country, he felt he was too old to still be a student. Anyway, he had the duty as eldest son to take care of our parents, who had almost starved to death during that period we call "the ten chaotic years." So now he, his wife and children live with our elderly parents; he manages the crops and does a little business on the side.

My second elder brother, who is just ten months older than me, studied hard in primary school. My parents wanted him to get the education they never had. In fact, my parents do not read or write, but they are good people. My second elder brother studied hard at school. Because he did well in the tests, he was advanced to the best junior primary school in our township. He studied hard to get good test scores for high school entrance. But he failed. Not many places in the county's Number One High School are reserved for pupils from Hidden Rock Village. Only four pupils from Second Elder Brother's class were accepted his year. If the high school had been larger, he might have been the fifth. Both my elder sisters dropped out of school; it was unusual in the 1970s for girls to continue their education. One left school in order to take care of our grandparents (they are now dead) and help out on the farm. The other was married to a worker's family in a neighboring village. When I say I am the first daughter to go to university, I mean I am the first girl of our entire village to go past high school.

I got the highest score in primary school and was sent to boarding school when I was nine years old. I continued to score well on entrance tests. To go to university would be a true honor, not just to my parents and my ancestors, but to myself also. I try never to show how proud I am of myself. My parents and brothers will give me their life savings so I can afford this education. I am the pride of Hidden Rock Village.

It takes sixteen hours by long distance bus from our village to the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone. I had met only one person who had ever *been to Shenzhen, which was created by the "opening-up and reform" policy of Deng Xiaoping, the greatest leader of modern China. When my family learned that I was thinking about going to university in either Guangzhou [the capital of Guangdong Province] or Shenzhen, a distant relative introduced me to a man who had once visited Shenzhen. The man told of a marvelous world that imitated Hong Kong, the British colony that was just next door. Everyone had telephones, televisions and washing machines. Shenzhen was a place where people were so rich that if someone dropped a ¥10 note in the street, no one would stoop to pick it up because in Shenzhen money of such small denominations was only good for toilet paper. My relative's friend was on his second or third bottle of baijiu ["white lightening," a distilled spirits made from sorghum], so I figured he was given to exaggeration. Still, I thought Shenzhen people would probably not pick up a ¥5 note, and I imagined going downtown on the weekends to pick up discarded bank notes. Maybe that was the way I could make ends meet.*

Near the end of the bus ride, we slowed down and joined a queue of vehicles. We were ushered off the bus and told to show our identification. No one was allowed into the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone without proper authorization. At that time, of course, I did not have a Shenzhen ID card, but I produced my university admissions letter. The frontier guard waved me into a city that, more than any other place in China, proves the national willpower to achieve the Four Modernizations.

When the long distance bus arrived at the Shenzhen terminus, I was greeted by two sophomores. As a sort of "help out new students" policy, the university sent upperclassmen to meet freshmen at the railway station and long distance bus station. I am glad they did; I had never been in such a cosmopolitan place. We took a mini-bus to get to the university, which was about 30 kilometers away. Passing through the streets of Shenzhen city, I noticed that the streets were not exactly paved with gold, but everyone was very smartly dressed. There were a few skyscrapers with their tops just below the clouds. All the office buildings were new, for just a half dozen years earlier Shenzhen had been a village not much larger than the one I had grown up in. Now, however, there were very few peasants to be seen on the streets, and everyone wore bright colors. Many of the women wore dresses; I remembered that I owned but a single dress. Shenzhen in 1985 was a boom town. Dozens of families and hundreds of factory and construction workers were arriving every single day. The construction crane was considered the mascot of the city. We quickly left downtown, *which was only several kilometers long. After that the country was open, with rice paddies and vegetable fields to the side of the road, just like back home. Occasionally, factories or worker housing appeared, and we passed the future site of the Shenzhen Golf Club. I had heard that golf was some sort of sport of Scotland; I did not think Chinese knew how to play.*

Shenzhen University was my first choice. My test scores were so high that I could have gone to almost any university in China. I had thought about going to Beijing or Shanghai to a famous brand school, but if I had gone up there, I did not know where I would end up after graduation. University graduates in China were allocated to jobs upon their graduation. If I had gone to Qinghua University, China's best school in mechanical engineering, my field of study, I might have been assigned a job in the remote regions of China—Tibet or Inner Mongolia. Shenzhen University did not assign jobs. Students had to find them themselves. That was a bit scary, but I had enough faith in myself to take the risk. I wanted to be able to visit my aging parents easily, and all my friends and relatives live in Southern China. Maybe Shenzhen's streets were not filled with money, but Shenzhen offered opportunities because of the opening-up and reform. These are opportunities that people of my parent's generation could hardly imagine. My elder brothers also told me to go to the new economic zone and once I had made it they and our parents would follow.

When we climbed down from the mini-bus, I found myself in the middle of a field of weeds. September can be a month of typhoons, but on this day it was hot and humid, much hotter and more humid than in my small mountain village. There was a water buffalo tethered to a power pole. A few hundred meters away was Shenzhen University, a set of new buildings that glistened in the hot, tropical sun. I could see no sign; there was no fence, no gate. I knew Shenda was an open university. Shenda is Shenzhen University's abbreviation. Shen *stands for, of course, Shenzhen, which pays for the university.* Da *stands for* da xue, *literally big school. Primary schools in China are called* xiao xue *(small schools) and secondary schools are called* zhong xue *(middle schools) It is a privilege to be among the 2% of China's 1.2 billion people who go to* da xue.

We dragged my suitcase across the weeds, the same suitcase that my brother had used when he returned from the Cultural Revolution. We walked through the campus to get to the dorms, which were located just behind the teaching building. The Shenda campus looks much different from the older schools in China. For one thing, there is a lot of open space. The center of the campus is a shallow pool the size of a football *field, with fountains that shoot water in several different places. Set back from the pool on three sides are massive buildings. The center building is the university library. On its left are the teaching buildings, four connecting classroom buildings that are known as Teaching Blocks A, B, C and D. On the right side of the library is the administration building and just behind it the Science Building, which was still under construction when I arrived. The Library was opened just a few weeks after I came to campus.*

Shenda is not a crowded campus. Older universities have been forced to convert all their open space into buildings. Shenda was planned so as to avoid this from ever happening. Construction began in early 1984 and the first phase was finished in time for classes to begin in the autumn. Nor is Shenda a rambling campus. It took me just ten minutes (suitcase and all) to reach the girls' dormitory area. I was housed in a dorm with my classmates in Mechanical Engineering, with only one roommate. Most universities in China put six or eight students to a dorm room, sometimes in triple-deck bunks. But Shenda treats her students as people, not as animals in cages. I am glad I chose Shenzhen University.

1. A university in perspective

When Wang Lingling arrived in Shenzhen on that muggy day in 1985 to embark on her college experience, her amazement at the modern, glistening city she encountered is hardly surprising. Shenzhen is the largest new town built in the shortest time in the history of human settlement, and downtown Shenzhen—the heart of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ)—is a miracle even among many miracles in China's recent struggle to become modern.

China, known to the Chinese as *zhong guo* (literally, center country) which is often translated by foreigners as the Middle Kingdom, is the result of over fifty centuries of development. Ancient China, a series of dynastic empires, was at various times the most modern place on earth. The Tang (AD 618-888) and Ming (AD 1368-1644) Dynasties, considered by many the height of Chinese cultural and scientific development respectively, reached achievements centuries before the same accomplishments came to medieval Europe. These included gunpowder, the compass, paper-making and moveable type. But feudalism, poverty, famine, and foreign invasion took their toll on the Middle Kingdom, and by the dawn of the Twentieth Century, the nation as personified by the Qing emperors was weak, and China was ruled to a large extent by feuding warlords.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was founded on 1 October 1949. Following the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, China embarked on a modernization drive under the paramount leadership of Deng Xiaoping. One aspect of Dengist reform was the creating of special economic zones (SEZ), of which the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone was the largest.

The Shenzhen SEZ abuts Hong Kong, which for over a century was a British colony until 1 July 1997 when sovereignty was transferred to the PRC. Hong Kong's influence on Shenzhen is obvious. Fashion resembles Hong Kong or what is portrayed as Hong Kong style on Hong Kong television (two Cantonese and two English stations), which is freely accessible in the zone (but mostly not elsewhere in China). Much investment in Shenzhen enterprises comes from Hong Kong. Tens of thousands of Hong Kong businessmen/women are in Shenzhen on any given day. Many Hong Kong people have purchased apartments in Shenzhen, something which is often blamed for inflating the price of housing as well as increasing the number of prostitutes and mistresses. (Both Hong Kong and Shenzhen newspapers occasionally describe the “second families” of Hong Kong men who own flats in sections referred to as “villages of mistresses.”) Shenzhen also serves as a vacation spot for Hong Kong people.

With over 300 hotels and 550 guest-houses, the zone provides a convenient weekend retreat for tourists from both Hong Kong and elsewhere in China.[1] Restaurant and hotel prices are from half to two-thirds of the comparable costs in Hong Kong. Shenzhen has numerous attractions, including a safari theme park, a collection of villages depicting China’s cultural minorities, a park with China’s famous sites replicated in miniature (surrounded by a miniature Great Wall), and a “Window to the World” which displays miniaturized Western attractions at one-third scale, such as the Eiffel Tower, the Coliseum, Mount Rushmore, the Golden Gate Bridge and Red Square. The largest influences from Hong Kong are probably its culture and business ethos. A popular criticism of Hong Kong (by those in Hong Kong themselves) is the complaint that the city is a cultural wasteland, with people only caring about money. Many Mainland Chinese, especially those from the North, offer the same criticism of Shenzhen *ren* (people), if not all of those in Guangdong, China’s most economically prosperous province. Average per-capita annual income for Shenzhen is reported as ¥10,117.70 (US $1,200), the highest in China. The ¥120 (US $14) billion in total savings deposited in Shenzhen banks (i.e., excluding deposits in foreign banks) ranks the municipality as fourth among Chinese cities.[2]

Education in Shenzhen

Although people often think of Chinese culture as emphasizing education, only recently has education been available to most of the population. Universal basic education has been a dream of Chinese politicians across the Twentieth Century; only in the last two decades, however, has the government been able to provide ways to deliver schooling to most rural children. Education has always been special in China, primarily because it was so hard to acquire. Similar to the situation in other poor countries, higher education was considered a vehicle for entry into the civil service. In feudal China, this took the form of independent study which was geared to passing the civil service exam. China did not have universities until about 100 years ago.[3]

Table 1.1: Educational enrollment in Shenzhen[4]

	primary		general secondary		vocational and technical secondary		higher education	
	schools	students	schools	students	schools	students	schools	students
1979	226	47,022	24	13,686	1	80		
1980	238	29,168	24	12,296	1	142		
1981	244	51,560	26	13,088	4	133		
1982	246	54,538	28	17,080	5	262		
1983	248	56,319	30	20,982	4	366	1	216
1984	260	62,021	35	27,636	10	2,009	2	1,236
1985	258	70,277	38	35,334	10	3,766	2	3,206
1986	257	77,884	40	40,208	11	5,225	2	3,478
1987	255	84,601	43	44,910	12	7,257	2	4,330
1988	257	96,474	47	43,267	12	9,696	2	4,710
1989	264	104,041	47	45,056	15	10,247	2	4,419
1990	263	111,711	49	46,473	15	11,428	2	3,964
1991	260	118,460	51	50,625	16	10,657	2	3,779
1992	261	127,978	53	55,857	15	11,766	2	3,653
1993	267	139,272	51	60,337	23	12,353	3	3,680
1994	269	147,186	56	66,037	23	12,954	3	4,227
1995	274	157,210	62	71,540	28	13,393	2	5,291

Another general feature of Chinese education is its focus on practicality. Education should serve the motherland by producing productive members of society. The purpose of education is not to develop *individuals* per se. Its purpose is to develop individuals *so that they can serve society*. In terms of higher education, this means producing *rencai* (talented people) for the workforce. In the early 1980s as Shenzhen was being built, it became apparent that the special zone needed a pool of well-trained managerial and professional personnel at both senior and mid-level positions.

> The [Shenzhen] labour pool in the early 1980s was unable to meet these demands, either in terms of required job-skills or absolute size of the needed workforce. For instance, in 1979, of the 6,865 cadres in Baoan County, only 325 (4.7%) were technical/professional personnel. By 1984, cadres had almost

> quadrupled to 26,767 or about 8.2% of the total workforce. Among them, technical/professional personnel accounted for about 4% of the total workforce. Among these cadres, 27% had post-secondary degrees…[5]

Schools in Shenzhen before 1980 provided only primary and very limited secondary schooling. For a dozen years straddling the 1970s, no Shenzhen resident had been admitted to university. Unless Shenzhen was prepared to rely solely on immigrants for its workforce, this phenomenon had to change. Accordingly, the zone started building new schools and expanding existing facilities (see Table 1.1). Shenzhen University became part of this educational expansion. In 1982 only 3.2% of Shenzhen exam-takers went to university. The corresponding figures for the years 1983 and 1984 were 19.5% and 62.8%, respectively.[6] By 1996, the tertiary sector of Shenzhen's education (which included SZU and two smaller institutions—a teachers college and a polytechnic institute) accounted for 1.7% of students at all levels in municipally financed educational institutions (compared to 1.5% in the tertiary sector for the nation as a whole). Other students went to kindergarten (20.3%), primary (50.5%), lower secondary (17.7%) and upper secondary (9.9%).[7] Education, of course, carries with it a price tag, for which Shenzhen government footed most of the bill. Public educational expenditures are presented in Table 1.2.

Shenzhen University has consumed most of the Shenzhen's expenditure in the higher education category. Often, for statistical purposes during some years, the Shenzhen Radio and Television University has been considered a higher education institution. The Shenzhen Teachers College is another higher educational institution. It consisted of two entities—the Shenzhen Education College and the Shenzhen Teachers [Normal] *Zhuanke* College. The former offered courses for adults; the latter offered curricula that led to *zhuanke*, or specialized, short-cycle certificates. In 1993 the Shenzhen Higher Vocational/Technical College (Shenzhen Polytech)[8] was added, and the following year saw the Teachers College merge into SZU. Students in education prior to 1994 were restricted to taking three-year *zhuanke* programs. Curricula at the Teachers College from 1994 included both a five-year *benke* and a three-year *zhuanke* program. The five-year program aimed to award a double degree—a Bachelors of Education and a Bachelors in a particular teaching subject (e.g., mathematics, Chinese, physics, etc.).

Table 1.2: Public educational expenditures, Shenzhen[9]

	total (million ¥ in 1978 price)	capital expenditure (%)	recurrent expenditure (%)	as % of public expenditure[a]	as % of GDP	higher education as % of total education
1979	2.99	na	na	14.0	1.52	na
1980	4.37	na	na	14.0	1.71	na
1981	5.84	na	na	14.0	1.39	na
1982	5.14	na	na	14.0	0.79	na
1983	9.87	na	na	14.0	0.98	na
1984	56.12	na	na	14.0	3.27	51.6
1985	29.04	34.6	63.4	8.3	1.47	na
1986	22.71	34.6	65.4	6.0	1.14	na
1987	na	na	na	na	na	38.8
1988	60.91	42.9	57.1	14.7	2.21	31.8
1989	64.91	43.1	56.9	10.6	2.23	na
1990	64.81	30.2	69.8	11.8	1.47	na
1991	82.18	na	na	12.3	1.32	15.5
1992	100.77	35.6	64.4	9.4	1.25	11.4
1993	144.82	26.2	73.8	12.4	1.49	10.5
1994	177.99	25.1	74.9	14.03	1.55	15.5
1995	270.04	29.97	70.03	na	1.86	na

Although published data on higher education is not disaggregated according to institution, SZU appears to have gotten about 7/8 of all higher education funding, prior to 1994. This proportion is derived by comparing figures for fixed assets. According to the *1991 Shenzhen Yearbook*, a type of municipal annual report that the city makes available to upper levels of authority as well as to the public, SZU's fixed assets were ¥140 million, while fixed assets for all Shenzhen higher education were reported to be ¥160 million.[10]

University founding

Just as the Shenzhen SEZ grew from plans that were initially quite modest, SZU itself was not originally intended to be a comprehensive university. China sanctions only about fifty comprehensive universities out of a total of around 1,050 institutions of higher education. Thus, Chinese colleges and universities are for the most part specialized, usually in engineering or the sciences. The first half of the 1980s was a time of great educational expansion in China as the nation strove toward the Four Modernizations in agriculture, industry, national defense and science/technology. Over 400 new institutions of higher education were founded at that time, only a few of which were designated comprehensive. All new institutions required the approval of the State Council, China's executive cabinet. The chain in decision-making for setting up a university also included the immediate level of government which would supervise the school as well as the ministry or province that would oversee its operation.

Given the emphasis on specialization in Chinese education, it was not surprising that the Shenzhen government at first sought to set up a business/commercial college rather than a comprehensive university. Provincial authorities, however, recommended building an institution of a more comprehensive nature—but one that would not duplicate what already existed in inland China. From conception, the university's *raison d'être* was to provide *rencai* for the Shenzhen SEZ. The stress on practicality and the focus away from theoretical study were features that would always characterize SZU's academics.

Inspection team report

In 1982 the Party Committee of the Shenzhen municipality suggested the establishment of a Shenzhen economics college. Such a request was forwarded to Guangdong Province and given to the provincial Higher Education Bureau, which was in charge of colleges and universities. The request from Shenzhen received a quite detailed response from the Bureau's eight-person investigative team which visited Shenzhen in late 1982.[11] The provincial educationalists suggested the building of a comprehensive university rather than an economics college, offering the following reasons:

- The special economic zone needs not only economics personnel but also people from other majors, like law, industrial and commercial enterprise management, architecture, tourism, foreign language, etc.

- A ‘comprehensive university’ is more appealing than an ‘economics college,’ and this appeal will help to get good teachers and support from home and abroad and to develop academic exchanges with Hong Kong and foreign countries.
- Guangdong already has a foreign trade college; there is an economics college in Jinan University. Zhongshan University is planning to change its economics department into an economics college. Shantou University has determined to set up an economics department. Hainan University is planning an economics department. Recently, Guangdong has approved the establishment of Guangdong Finance and Economics College. Thus, Guangdong will have four economics colleges and two economics departments. If we establish Shenzhen Economics College, there apparently will be too many economics colleges or departments in Guangdong, and it will not be easy to get government support to set up another such college.

The report then turned itself to explaining why the Shenzhen SEZ should build its own university rather than recruit its personnel (*rencai*) from China’s existing universities that were run by provinces or ministries. This practice of having institutions train current or future staff was called *daipei*. The inspection team focused on the “special-ness” of the *rencai* that would be needed by the SEZ and wrote what amounted to an indictment of China’s existing universities:

- The business of the SEZ is highly foreign-related; these enterprises need personnel who know both socialism and capitalism and can handle matters both domestic and foreign-related. This type of *rencai* is difficult to train in common inland institutions, which don’t have foreign-related courses and foreign-related teaching materials, not to mention a place for job practice. Therefore, the SEZ should have its own comprehensive university and train its own people, set up its own courses and edit its own teaching materials. The SEZ and Hong Kong can be the base for job practice and some teachers can be hired from Hong Kong and overseas. The economic nature of the SEZ is varied: a state-run economy, a collective economy, and a combination of the two, as well as private businesses, joint ventures, and a capitalist economy which involves sole foreign investment. In the future the SEZ will become a free market without tariffs. And there is the possibility of a special currency for the SEZ. Some non foreign-related personnel can be trained by inland universities, e.g., doctors and teachers.

- SEZ needs personnel who are ‘occupation-oriented’ which means students take jobs immediately upon graduation. But graduates from inland universities are more theoretical and have few professional skills.
- Adult education is an outstanding task for SEZ education because many cadres and workers badly need further training. It is not practical to send them outside the SEZ for training since most will study on a part-time basis.
- Research on foreign-related issues is an important task of SEZ construction. The SEZ foreign-related work concerns complicated struggles, and the nature of these struggles is similar to the struggle between capitalism and socialism. It is important for us to study the capitalism of Hong Kong and foreign countries. [Using an idiom from Sun Zi’s *Art of War*] ‘If you know yourself and your enemy, you are invincible.’ Research work should be done by higher education institutions. It is very necessary for the SEZ to have a comprehensive university.
- The development of the SEZ is at a rapid speed, and eventually it will need all sorts of personnel. If eventually the zone will need to train these, why not be comprehensive from the very beginning? A comprehensive university will help improve the local culture and education.

The expert group of policy advisors developed a quite detailed vision of the future SZU. Students would be drawn from province-wide recruitment; upon graduation they would be expected to work in Shenzhen or other SEZs. The group drew a picture of a school that would encompass multiple types of education: regular undergraduate, adult education, and correspondence, with long- and short-term programs in various subjects. The experts suggested that a *zhuanke* certificate programs be initiated first, followed by degree-awarding *benke* programs. The setting of majors should be based on the needs of the SEZ; SZU should not mimic patterns used by inland universities. SZU’s majors should be unique; for common majors, inland universities could train SEZ *rencai* through *daipei*. Using the terms “long-thread” and “short-thread” to differentiate between theoretical- and practical-oriented education, the advisors recommended the latter, going so far as to say that SZU should offer only foreign-related or short-thread courses. Foundation study in arts and sciences could be offered, but majors in those disciplines should not be available. The team envisioned a campus located close to downtown Shenzhen, serving mostly commuters from Shenzhen, with accommodation and food services handled by organizations from outside the university. The province would oversee SZU’s academics; other areas would be handled by Shenzhen municipality, which would be responsible for funding the university.

Finally, the inspection team saw a bright future for Shenzhen University, which could tap support from Hong Kong and overseas. It was labeled an "experimental school" that would benefit not only the SEZ but also China's educational system by offering an "experience in educational reform." It stressed that favorable conditions then existed at the three key levels of government: municipal, provincial and central government. Implicit in this suggestion was that Shenzhen should act immediately if it wanted to build a university.

Table 1.3: Planned/actual major setting[12]

major	year to be initiated	actual initiation
foreign trade	'84 -86	'83
finance	'83	'83
tourist economy	'84 -86	-
English	'83	'83
law	'83	'83
fine arts [Chinese]	'84 -86	'84
petroleum chemistry	'87	-
planning and statistics	'84 -'86	-
industrial economic management	'83	'83
commercial economic management	'83	'83
industrial finance and accounting	'84 -'86	'85
commercial finance and accounting	'84 -'86	'85
electronics technology or electronic components	'87	'84
architectural material engineering	'87	'83
food processing technology [chemistry]	'87	'86
industrial enterprise management engineering	'87	'85
mechanical engineering	-	'85
civil engineering	-	'85
physics	-	'85
mathematics	-	'85

Government approval

Within about two months of first receiving the provincial report, Shenzhen formally responded to the province.[13] The city accepted virtually all the expert team's recommendations, including them in its own document. Some suggestions were further flushed out. In the opening paragraphs of its response, the municipal government explicitly defined the "principle of SZU to be training advanced personnel in economic management, foreign trade, foreign language, industry, commerce, law, and tourism." The setting of subjects and majors would be determined by the needs of the SEZ. Initially, sixteen majors were to be phased in, so that by 1986 eleven finance and arts majors would be in place; five science majors would be added in 1987 (see Table 1.3, previous page). In addition, research centers were planned in several areas: SEZ economy, world economy, international law, economic law, Hong Kong-Taiwan law, management modernization, science and technology information, and petro-chemistry.

The city document reiterated that the university would be under the dual leadership of province and municipality authorities, with the city providing funding. A campus site was chosen about 25 kilometers away from downtown Shenzhen, in contrast to somewhere in the central city, the type of location recommended by the expert group. SZU would recruit students province-wide and teachers nation-wide. The university would practice the presidential responsibility system under the leadership of the school Party Committee. SZU would train graduates for work in Shenzhen or other economics zones, but the document omitted the possibility that graduates could be employed in inland China, as suggested by the expert group. It alluded to several possible educational reforms, including students finding their own jobs (as opposed to China's job allocation system), a scholarship rather than a stipend system, and the credit system.

In February, Guangdong Province formally requested that the State Council establish SZU.[14] The provincial request, an abbreviated version of the document that Shenzhen had sent to Guangdong, presented a time schedule for funding, which it also included in a separate message to the municipality.[15] In March, confident of central government approval, Guangdong publicly announced its intention to set up SZU.[16] Within two months, on 10 May 1983, The Ministry of Education (MOE, the forerunner of the SEdC) issued a document announcing the State Council's approval of establishing SZU and other universities.[17] As stated in previous documents, classes were to begin in September, then only four months away.

The temporary campus was housed on the site of the Shenzhen radio/television university, which was located in an old section of Shenzhen (near the present-day Diwang twin-tower skyscraper). During the university's first academic year in 1983, the over 200 SZU students used these facilities, which included a seven-story classroom building. Students lived two or three to a room in a dozen two-story dormitory buildings located about one-half kilometer away. After the university moved to its new campus, the radio/television university buildings were turned over to SZU's Adult Education Department which based its operations there.

The MOE selected Zhang Wei, the first vice-president of Qinghua University in Beijing, to become the founding president of SZU. Zhang Wei shared the aspirations of the provincial investigators. A few weeks after the university opened, Zhang enumerated for a local journalist what he envisioned as SZU's defining characteristics.[18] First, the German-educated scholar preferred broad majors which permitted students to take many optional courses. Practice should be stressed over theory; reduced hours of instruction would allow for an education outside of classroom walls. Second, Zhang did not want to see students initially pigeon-holed into majors or specializations. He preferred broad categories of recruitment (e.g., economics or management rather than commercial enterprise management or industrial enterprise management). Students should be permitted to change departments in the sophomore or junior year. Third, students were to be enrolled for five years, but they would be permitted to graduate early or late. Flexibility would allow arts students to take courses in science, and vice-versa. All students should take foreign language and management courses. Fourth, upon graduation students would find their own jobs; there would be no job assignment (*fenpei* or allocation) of the type experienced by Niu Ye (Story 4). This radical departure from the *fenpei* system that ensured all university graduates of jobs with the State was not mentioned in the inspection team's report, which in fact uses the very term *fenpei*.[19] This proposed innovation was consistent with the belief held by many intellectuals in China that the country needed to break the iron rice bowl (*daguofan*), a term which had come to symbolize the individual's dependency on the state. Zhang Wei's fifth characteristic was also an innovation. Students would no longer receive automatic stipends (*zhu xuejin*, or student helping money), but rather would have to qualify for scholarships (*jiang xuejin*) earned on the basis of performance. The university should be able to provide loans for students who faced financial difficulties; students could take leaves-of-absence and return to continue their studies.

Because of his commitments at Qinghua, Zhang Wei could only be in residence at SZU for several months a year. Most of the work of building the new university fell on the shoulders of Luo Zhengqi, the Party secretary and first vice-president. A graduate of the Qinghua Architecture Department, Luo took direct charge over university operations, including supervising the design of the new campus. Lacking support from upper level leaders, however, Luo was removed from office in the wake of events surrounding 4 June 1989, at which time the months-long confrontation between students and government ended in violence at Tiananmen Square, Beijing. The new SZU leadership team that replaced Luo canceled many of his innovations, placing more emphasis on traditional moral/political education. Those leaders—Wei Youhai as president and Wu Zewei as Party secretary—remained in power for about three years. After they departed, their positions were assumed by a single man, Cai Delin, who himself was removed from office in July 1996. Cai resurrected many of Luo's educational reforms while maintaining the political elements that the Wei-Wu team had introduced. The political history of SZU, characterized by politics in charge, has been described in detail elsewhere.[20] The present volume, therefore, will focus only on those aspects of administration that relate most directly to the university's principal mission of teaching, learning and research. Suffice it to say that SZU in its first dozen years experienced a series of traumas caused by changing leaders and their policies. These events, over a dozen years, concussed education, negatively impacting quality. The next section, following Story 2, examines the educational policies of SZU's first three administrations.

Story 2: Pioneer Meng Tao

I am from the Class of 1983. In China, the year of your class is the year you enter, rather than the year you graduate. The class of 1983 had only 215 students—the first 215 students at Shenda; we were made to feel very special.

For *the first year we lived at the temporary campus located downtown, taking over the buildings that were used for the Radio and Television University. We had lovely accommodations: for the first time in my life I had my own bed. I can never remember a time when I did not share a bed with one of my brothers. Actually, I thought everyone in China shared beds. My parents slept together; Meimei [younger sister] slept with our grandmother; a pair of brothers slept together; and another sister slept with the cat (she often wet her bed and the cat was the only one who did not mind). Fortunately, we had a small family: parents, six children and a grandmother. With only one roommate at Shenda (and no one aside me in bed!), the first few nights were very difficult. Eventually, I got used to the loneliness.*

Overall, Shenda was not lonely. The first year was like living with a big family. We knew everyone by name, and we even knew all the romances between students. We often saw the President, Luo Zhengqi, eating in the canteen. Actually, President Luo was only a vice-president the first year, but we all knew he was the one really running the school. He often asked us what we liked and what we disliked. You could say anything to him; he was like a favorite uncle.

Even before we took our first class on the temporary campus, we were driven by bus to the new campus. Well, not exactly a campus; more like an abandoned farm with a lot of dead fruit trees. It was in the middle of nowhere. It really smelled bad. One area of the campus was a huge graveyard. We were not impressed, until President Luo gave us a tour and told us where the buildings would go. He was so enthusiastic; he made the abandoned farm come alive. He described a beautiful, grassy campus with reflecting pools and a dozen places to eat. With the mountains behind and the sea in front, the new buildings would definitely have good fengshui *[literally, wind water].* Fengshui *is an ancient Chinese art that ensures buildings are built in accord with nature. There are stories about architects in Hong Kong having to hire* fengshui *masters to help them redesign skyscrapers because no business wants to rent an office that offers bad* fengshui. *Luo, of course, did not mention* fengshui*, which is not officially condoned (and often condemned as superstition) in the People's Republic. But everyone knows the importance of* fengshui*; we do not need to talk about it.*

Why did I choose Shenda? Well, to be honest, I was not accepted by any of the schools I listed as my first choices. My primary and secondary schooling was not very good. I can cite you chapter and verse from the quotations of Chairman Mao, but by the time I took the college entrance examination, other subjects, like Chinese, mathematics and physics, had become more important. My score was not very high; but I wanted to go somewhere to college. Shenda gave me a chance. I did not know much about Shenda. My teachers read to us the school's introduction and encouraged us to list it as our last choice. I had heard about Shenzhen which was supposed to be like Hong Kong, Singapore or Taibei [Taipei, Taiwan]; I knew that the economic zones were China's future. You might say that I came to Shenzhen, rather than Shenda. Shenda was just a way to get to Shenzhen.

My family is of average wealth, in other words, poor. In my early years I remember living on a collective farm. I would work in the fields with my baby sister strapped to my back. Now, my father has a good job with the railroad as a night watchman, but they still have a lot of mouths to feed. My father had borrowed money from the railway so I could have the first semester's tuition (¥25) and accommodation fees (¥5), and almost ¥100 for food and books. But I went to Shenda not knowing how I would even pay for the next semester or how I would ever pay my father back. Obviously, the school understood our money problems, and almost from the beginning, we had many opportunities for making money. We went to the site of the future campus on weekends, and we were paid ¥1 for every tree we planted. Even the girls could plant at least ten trees per visit; the strongest boy planted 35 during a single visit and had his picture taken with President Luo. (He is now a millionaire in Shenzhen). Another job at the new campus involved digging a lake. We were paid ¥4 for two hours' work. At different times, I worked both as a security guard (¥60 per month for several hours a night) and as a toilet cleaner (¥30 per month, for an hour a day). This taught me that nothing is free in the New China, but that if you work hard, you can get ahead.

I studied business at Shenda. Because of my poor foundation, I had to study hard. Most of my teachers were temporarily employed, and they did not stay many years at Shenda. I entered Shenda expecting the college ex-

perience to last five years, but the rules were changed so that all students, except for those in Architecture, studied for only four years. We were supposed to graduate in 1988, but actually our diploma is dated December 1987. From summer 1987, however, almost all of us had full-time jobs. We were encouraged to have job practice before we actually graduated. I started working for a large state-run company. After five years there, I set up my own toy export business. I employ just one other person, but with hard work I have managed to create a good, small company. My wife works for a state company, and together we have been able to buy a flat. My company owns a car and a mobile phone. I am just an average business success. Shenda gave me a chance; for that I will be eternally grateful. By the way, after my first semester I reimbursed my father ¥150 when I returned home for Spring Festival. That feeling of personal success, doing honor to my family, I shall never forget.

Changing educational policies

Policies on educational structure as well as on teacher and student management and curriculum changed at SZU from administration to administration. Luo Zhengqi, who formally became SZU president on 17 March 1987, had a very clear vision of the type of educational institution SZU should develop into, and he had definite ideas on how to achieve this vision, painted with broad strokes: student and faculty participation and self-management, Party integration, an open management style, and an institutional focus on students. It was these elements, as much as specific reforms—no job allocation, a credit system, student work-study—that characterized his tenure. His successors, the Wei-Wu team, considered almost all of Luo's policies to be problematic. Many of his systems were altogether abandoned; others were put on hiatus, to be partly resurrected by Cai Delin, who replaced Wei-Wu. Over these periods of reform and rectification, students and teachers were sometimes notified in advance of policy changes; most often they were not. These policy about-faces helped create a university in the state of turmoil.

Luo's focus on students

That SZU should focus on students might seem patently obvious to an observer not familiar with China's educational cosmos. In fact, one might argue that Chinese universities do not focus on students. In one view, students provide only the *raison d'être* and rationale for operating the school. In other words, students are the justification for having universities. Institutions of higher learning are necessary for China's modernization. Graduates who serve the motherland are part of the process of developing China into a world economic and political power. If China could develop in this direction without higher education, it might well do so! Indeed, alternative forms of education have been tried since 1949, most notably education through labor. In the Cultural Revolution the intellectual élite was disparaged; according to the view of that time, education should not elevate one's status; to the contrary, intellectuals—anyone with a secondary education or above—were considered the "stinking ninth group." Today, higher education affects only a small portion of the Chinese population; even if correspondence courses and distance learning through radio and television are taken into account, under 5% of the Chinese people experience post-secondary education (compared to over 30% in the U.S). Another view that supports the belief that Chinese universities do not focus on students argues that universities in China are more concerned about their employees than students. The students serve merely as a justification for running an institution that provides public sector employment and welfare. The old joke that schools in China have more employees than students is only a slight exaggeration. Even today, after nearly two decades of educational reforms geared at improving efficiency, staff-student ratios in China are at least double their counterpart statistics in other countries.

Luo Zhengqi firmly believed that the entire university should serve its students.[21] He referred to Zhang Guangdou, a vice-president from Qinghua, who had once said: "students are the ones who give me food and clothes." According to Luo,

> all the sub-systems of a university should begin and end with students. This is clear for primary and secondary schools, but not for universities. The staff and families often outnumber students by several times. A lot of systems are self-service, taking care of themselves: eating, drinking, going to the toilet. A smaller proportion of school energy goes to students; new buildings and departments are not for students.

Luo's views were not shared by many staff and teachers in the SZU community, who felt that they, themselves, should be the focus of the university. Luo addressed these concerns:[22]

> Some argue that putting the student as the central focus degrades the teachers' position. They think the students are masters and teachers become only servants—that students become emperors. We emphasize that students are the main focus and teachers are the main guides. Students, teachers and staff are all masters of the school.

Luo's beliefs were reflected in the motto of the university located in a footprint-shaped relief in the lobby of the administration building: *zili, zilü, ziqiang*, self-autonomy, self-discipline, self-strengthening. The Three Selves philosophy was the foundation for student management and the basis of learning. Students through their organizations governed and disciplined themselves. Students, alone, determined whether they attended classes. Students were permitted to skip classes, study on their own, and take the final exam of a course.

Counseling center

Three years after SZU's founding, the Student Psychological Counseling Center (*xuesheng xinli yu xingwei zhidao*) was set up.[23] Fifteen teachers of various ranks and from a wide spectrum of disciplines worked as part-time counselors; all conversations with students were held confidential. The center also gave 978 students admitted in 1987 and 1988 international questionnaires that led to compiling personality profiles.[24] These tests were also confidential and were not included in the dossiers (*dangan*) that would accompany the students to their work-units. (For *dangan* purposes, universities such as SZU are considered the students' work-units.) Students were given access to their personality profiles and were supposed to be able to keep them upon graduation. According to the Counseling Center, the tests on 1988 freshmen showed a "better" psychological quality (meaning bolder and with a strong pioneering spirit) than in the previous year.[25] The center's analysis found that two students had abnormal behavior and that 58 students inclined toward abnormal psychology, evidencing either an inferiority complex, manic depression, or anti-social behavior; 18 inclined toward aggressive behavior as manifested in attacks on others. Therapy was started for ten students. Over 1988, individual consultations were given to 485 students.

The amateur counselors imparted mostly common sense advice and served as people whom the students could talk to. Most students sought advice on interpersonal relationships, especially in matters involving parents and significant others. For example, one female student came to the center distraught over the fact that her parents were not getting along. The counselor advised her to ignore her parents and suggested that the student live her own life. Another reported case involved a group of women who alleged that a certain male student was harassing them. This matter was investigated by the Students' Self-Disciplinary Committee. On his own, the male student went to the Counseling Center where he received advice. He was told that although his desires were quite natural, his patterns were neither suitable nor legal. He was given reading material, and several days later the center arranged for him to meet with representatives of the female students. He apologized for his behavior, and the girls forgave him.[26]

In general, students were made responsible for their own performances. SZU was the first university in China to cancel automatic subsidies and replace this form of "iron rice bowl" with a scholarship system. Students received scholarships based on their individual academic achievement. Students with a grade point average (GPA) over 85 (out of 100%) and who ranked in the top 3% of their major and grade received a first grade scholarship, which translated as ¥100 per month. Lower scholarships provided less money, with about half the students at any one time receiving merit-based awards.

Work-study program

Part of Luo Zhengqi's educational philosophy concerned the university's full participation in society. Grounded in the discipline of architecture, Luo saw education as practical and shared the general view in China that schooling should benefit the collective; benefits to individuals were secondary. The attempt to have the school serve society took several forms. The setting of majors and the curriculum at large served the needs of the SEZ. While studying at the university, students took part-time jobs, something which exposed them to the real world. The university itself ran factories and enterprises that produced goods and services for both export and domestic use. And the university's major output—its graduates—was to serve society when these *rencai* entered the workforce.

Work-study allowed full-time *benke* students to take part-time campus jobs in their spare time. Night school students in the part-time *zhuanke* program were able to take day-time jobs on campus. University officials were pleased with work-study because it yielded a "double harvest" for students. They learned skills and acquired on-the-job experience, and they put what they had learned in the classroom to practical use on the job. The work-study program served as a bridge between academia and society. Students could leave the "ivory pagoda" and learn about the real world. Luo Zhengqi, himself, considered the work-study program to be one of the university's most important reforms.[27]

Indeed, one of the well-publicized, defining features of pre-1989 SZU was its work-study program.[28] Combining work with study had existed in China before 1949, but then it had disappeared. Work-study at SZU was initiated for very practical purposes. In the early 1980s, almost all SZU students (like Wang and Meng in Stories 1 and 2) were poor and needed ways to earn money for living expenses and to pay the costs of their education. Luo used the Cantonese colloquialism "looking for food" to describe this aspect of work-study. Second, the new university had a lot of jobs that required workers, but it did not want to be saddled with excessive permanent employees (called "fixed staff") and their families. Generally, a Chinese work-unit takes care of not only its employees but their entire families, by

Box 1.1: Xu Jiyang, student/manager[29]

I manage a hostel of four floors, 48 rooms and 21 staff. I am a 1985 freshman, majoring in Mechanical Engineering. I used to be a spoiled daughter; I did not even wash my own clothes. Now, in order to get familiar with hotel management, I've learned to make beds, wash windows, mop floors, and clean toilets. I used to be willful; now I have to learn to smile at guests even those who nit-pick my work . Even when I am scolded I have to be pleasant. My staff includes both benke *and* zhuanke *students. Most* benke *students are girls who come to work in the afternoon.* Zhuanke *are all boys who work in the morning. These men are less easy to get along with. When I try to be strict with them, they complain I am nit-picking. One day, their foreman formally approached me, wondering if I was going to fire them. I told them they would have to meet my strict requirements. They asked: 'What is your standard? What can we do to satisfy you?' I said: 'Don't expect me to be satisfied. I will never be satisfied unless I am no longer the manager.' 'Then give us a model room,' they demanded. I told them: 'I must admit that I cannot do better than you in tidying the rooms. I have a standard of the model room but I cannot do it myself. I am there to manage. The school leaders cannot do better than you, but they want better. They are stricter than even me.'*

providing them housing and welfare benefits. Spouses and children of employees are often hired in positions created just for them. To use students as temporary employees would thus ease the school's long-run financial burden. Third, work-study was considered a "minor area" from which to initiate other reforms; it could proceed quickly because it generated little opposition. It served as a prototype to prove how reforms could start small and mature into new, workable systems. In providing students a source of income, its very existence helped mitigate the need for a stipend system characterized by automatic distribution. In this way, a little reform lead to a bigger improvement. Work-study was considered an ideal prototype because it combined other systems: teaching, ideology, management. After just a few months in operation, it became obvious to the school leadership that work-study was about more than just "looking for food." It served as a "second classroom," teaching students to be independent and not to be parasites. It was adopted as a formal part of the curriculum; students earned academic credits for their work.

The part-time work program served Luo's main thesis that a university should be about students and that all staff should support the training of students, who in turn serve society's needs. Administrative and support staff would be in constant contact with students who worked part-time in their offices and work-units. In contrast, in most Chinese universities non-teaching staff rarely interacted with students. Most staff were less educated than students; the two groups had little in common, and they were not exposed to each other in the work place. Given their very different educational levels, they often could not work together on tasks to pursue common objectives. Having SZU students interact with less-educated staff would give them useful experience for the real world.

According to Luo, part-time jobs helped point out some short-comings of SZU's education. Students lacked sufficient training for jobs. Their moral education was abstract and not linked to reality; it did not adequately teach behavior and work ethics. Their understanding of economic concepts was vague; often concern over finance was considered to be only money-worshipping. There was an absence of leadership and management training; students were not always able to handle interpersonal relations. SZU's experience with part-time jobs led the school to strengthen these weak areas. Students developed more responsible attitudes in their jobs and accepted the consequences of their mistakes. Even those holding high positions could be punished. The chair of the Student Union, for example, got into a fist fight with other students and was punished by the Student Self-disciplinary Committee. An editor of a student newspaper also got into a fight and was fired from his job. Later, he took a job cleaning the teachers' dormitory area.[30] The system of part-time work permitted students to take risks and make mistakes. Students ran many of the school's businesses: the bookstore, laundry, post office, bank, hotels. For some this activity cut into study, although *benke* students were not supposed to work more than 12 hours per week and part-time *zhuanke* students were limited to 6 hours per workday. In Luo's view, part-time work did not usually compete with study. He used the comparison of a store increasing its product line. "Carrying hardware does not hurt grocery sales." In some cases, students who were busy being managers lost their academic-based scholarships. "But should we cancel a course just because some students fail it?" Luo asked. "Having several classrooms (traditional instruction, part-time jobs, extra-curricular activities) allows one to make up for the short-comings of another."

Another benefit from work-study was that students developed pride in work and acquired a sense of humility. Work-study was the ideological opposite of the "iron-rice bowl," in which payment was guaranteed, regardless of productivity. In the early years of SZU, virtually all students held part-time jobs sometime during their university experience. Some became reluctant to accept money from their parents, preferring an income from their part-time jobs which gave them a sense of self-independence and the feeling of being a full adult (see Story 2).[31] In its early years, SZU received municipal funds earmarked as ¥7 per student monthly subsidy, an amount that would have at the time covered tuition and room costs. The university, instead, put this money towards scholarships and work-study payments, a decision that student leaders had supported.[32] Payment in work-study was earned, often at jobs that were less than glamorous. Underclassmen/women took jobs involving manual labor, such as cleaning toilets, mopping classrooms and removing rubbish. They were not provided uniforms or even given adequate tools. Still, they took pride in their work. Luo recounted the story of once visiting the toilet when a student was cleaning it. The student showed visible embarrassment. Several weeks later, the student was no longer embarrassed. Once Luo received a list of suggestions from a student, who signed it “the cleaner of a certain dorm area.” Senior students often took jobs in offices or enterprises. Some job selection involved competition. When the university set up a student laundry, for example, it accepted proposals and allowed students to compete with one another.

Flexibility in Education

Luo adopted and expanded upon the liberal educational policies of his predecessor, Zhang Wei.[33] The university used the credit system, and students were allowed to graduate early as soon as they earned enough credits to meet graduation requirements.[34] Students who did not earn sufficient credits to graduate within four years were permitted to remain another year as fee-paying students; or they could choose to take a completion certificate (*jie ye zheng*), but not a diploma. Then, while employed, they could study by themselves, pass the exams, and get a diploma.

Students, as in other universities in China, were admitted to SZU by major. After completing their first year, however, SZU students could apply to change majors, with the approval of both departments if departments were also changed. SZU was probably the first university in China to permit changes in major, as Chinese institutions of higher education generally adhered to the European system which was less flexible in these regards than its North American counterpart (or more disciplined depending on point of view).

Starting with the class that entered in 1987, students were permitted to take double degrees if they met certain requirements by their third year—an accumulated GPA of at least 80 (on a 100% scale), credits within the first major that exceeded the requirement, and two recommendation letters from teachers ranked lecturer or above. A student who strove to take a second degree but failed to acquire sufficient credits could convert the intended second degree into a minor, or could take an extra year to obtain the second degree.

Attendance was required for courses with much practice, such as laboratories, military training, physical education, computing, design, foreign language basics and social investigation. Students who were absent from these courses more than one-third of the time were to fail the course. Other courses did not have mandatory attendance. The Luo administration also encouraged departments to offer self-study courses, based on reading lists and periodic group discussions. Teachers were permitted to exempt students from courses, upon request, or allow students to "test out" of a course by passing an exam within a month of the beginning of the course. Thus, in this way some students were able to graduate in three rather than four years by studying over the vacations and passing exams that allowed for exemptions.

The academic system included a set of rewards and punishments.[35] Merit-based scholarships accompanied individual ¥100 awards given for particular subjects or achievements. The top graduates in every department received a ¥200 gift, and anyone who graduated early also received ¥200. Punishments included academic probation, the result of a failing GPA (below 60), too few accumulated credits, or failing three or more courses. Students faced expulsion if their GPA for the semester was below 44. Under some conditions, students who failed courses were permitted to take make-up exams. Only one make-up was given for required courses. No make-ups were allowed for students who failed over three courses in a semester, had a GPA below 40 for the semester, failed to attend the exam without a proper excuse, or were caught cheating.

An expansive view of education

Formal education in China in one sense is comprehensive. It is often described as a three-part system that addresses the intellectual, moral and physical needs of students. (Students who excel in each area are known as Three Good students). Luo subscribed to this expansive view of education and further developed it. He believed SZU should include Three Classrooms as opposed to the Five Ones.[36] The first classroom, of course, was the traditional classroom. The second classroom (*di er ketang*) consisted of part-time jobs, and in many ways it was considered more useful and more important than the first classroom, which was still plagued by ineffective pedagogy—where much time was wasted in useless meetings and ideological studies. The third classroom consisted of student extracurricular activities, including clubs and voluntary societies, as well as self-management organs of student government.

SZU itself included more than just teaching and research. There were various school-run enterprises on campus that earned money for the school. Some students worked in these units, which provided them real life work experiences. One student's story appears in Box 1.1. The enterprises provided a major source of revenue without which the university would have had run annual deficits since it always overspent city-allocated funds.

Consistent with SZU's opposition to the iron ricebowl mode of operation was the policy that departments should learn to take care of themselves. Teachers and staff were encouraged to run side-businesses so they would become less dependent on hand-outs from the university, which itself depended on subsidies from the city government.

Rectification under Wei-Wu

Luo's successors, Wei Youhai and Wu Ziwei, found abhorrent his policy of the Three Selves— self-independence, self-discipline, self-strengthening. The new administration found this attitude irresponsible on the part of the university; it closed the Psychological Counseling Center. In its place, it established a network of political tutors and conducted annual "learn from Lei Feng" exercises, in which the life of the model soldier made famous by Mao Zedong was studied. This education, along with tightened discipline, produced positive results as measured by number of disciplinary cases. More students were punished in 1990 than in previous years; the next year the number of disciplinary cases decreased (presumably as the result of better behavior rather than weaker enforcement), and no students had to be punished.

Dorm management

Regulations on student dorm management, as first promulgated in 1987, had presented general guidelines such as instructing students not to rent out their rooms or entertain overnight visitors (Persons of the opposite sex were not allowed to stay past 11 p.m.).[37] In addressing slack dorm discipline, the Luo administration issued regulations in 1988 that identified possible dorm violations and established five levels of punishment.[38] The mildest punishment was a warning, followed by a negative notation (bad record—BR), a severe negative notation (big bad record—BBR), probation and finally expulsion. Punishments by 1988 categories appear in Box 1.2. As far back as 1986, the Luo administration had recognized a deterioration of campus study atmosphere (*xue feng*). This concern continued through the remainder Luo's tenure, but it is impossible the access what effect, if any, the 1988 regulations had on improving study atmosphere, given that Tiananmen changed administrations, rules and attitudes.

Regulations introduced by the Wei-Wu team within months after they arrived on campus in 1989 attempted to strengthen the existing rules by specifying monetary penalties for violations, in other words hitting problem students where it would be felt—in the pocket book.[39] Penalties generally reflected a ranking of misbehavior in terms of severity consistent with the Luo administration's view, except that one area—sleep-overs with the opposite sex—commanded harsher penalties. In addition to fines, a point-deducting system was employed, as presented in Box 1.3, so that the basic scholarship (¥30/month) would be canceled for students whose point total exceeded 20. This system largely replaced the work of the Student Self-disciplinary Committee, whose status became unclear after Wei-Wu took over, and its members were allowed to act as a sort of vigilante group. More offenses were added to the 1989 list, including gang fighting (BBR or expulsion), noise after midnight (warning), taking advantage of power/water failures to initiate a riot, smashing bottles or starting fires (BR or above), smuggling and marketing forbidden commodities (Public Security notified), prostitution or rape (expulsion or sent to Public Security). Eating in a restaurant and refusing to pay, *bawanfan* or general rice, a practice that exempts leaders from paying for food, earned a BBR.[40]

Box 1.2: 1988 punishable offenses under Luo Zhengqi[41]

Fighting: All fighters get at least a warning; those providing weapons get warnings; initiators get bad records (BR). If a fighter enters in the name of stopping the fight but is in fact taking sides and makes the fight more serious, s/he gets a BR. If fighters are drunk and hurt others, BR; fight with weapons, big bad record (BBR); injuring others seriously or cause handicaps gets BBR; serious fights even earn more serious punishments.

Thefts or financial crimes: if under ¥50, warning; ¥50-100, BR; ¥100-200, BBR; ¥200-300, probation; over ¥500, Public Security is informed. For corruption or embezzlement, under ¥100, BR; ¥100-300 BBR; ¥300-500 probation; above ¥500, Public Security is informed. In the event of looting or taking advantage of catastrophe, like a fire, BBR or worse.

Damage to public or private property: If damage is by mistake, offender is criticized by public announcement and if serious, must repay and get warning or BR. If damage is on purpose, must repay and gets BBR; if purposeful and it hurts others, get BBR or worse.

Gambling: first offense, warning; repeatedly, BR or BBR; a gambling organizer gets BBR; all gambling equipment confiscated.

Obscene material: for distributing, copying or reading pornography or viewing pornographic videos: first offense, warning; several times, BR, BBR. If pornography is profit-making, probation or worse; all literature is confiscated.

Unauthorized habitation: violators are fined and driven out; providers of housing are punished by warning or BR.

Sexual impropriety: cohabitation or unlawful sexual behavior, probation; messy sexually obsession (*yin luan*) [an imprecise term that might include just about anything except vaginal sex between a married couple], probation or above.

Property crimes: violations that result in property damage, medical charges, days off job, traveling or nutrition expenses are shared by violators, with proportions corresponding to responsibilities. Damage must be repaid. For fencing property, BR, BBR or probation. All income is confiscated; if owner is unknown, value of fenced property goes to the student activity fund.

Cheating: if by oneself, BR; if helping others or substitute test-taking, BBR. All cheaters get zeros in the course, with no make-up exam given.

Obstruction of justice/character defamation/false testimony: if one interferes or attempts to stop staff from carrying out their duties (*fangai zhixing gongwu),* warning, BR, or BBR. Slander, rumor or humiliation against others, warning, BR. Deceit to protect others, like providing false alibi, warning, BR.

Box 1.3: 1989 penalties for dormitory violations[42]

offense	fine	point loss	remarks
changing rooms without permission	¥20	5	name publicized
letting others bed down in room	¥20/day	2/day	
renting room out	¥50	10	denied right to live on campus
structural changes to room or furniture		3	publicize name in department
damage to dorm property	¥10	2	reimburse repair costs
purposeful damage to dorm property	¥50-100	5	serious warning
posting bills or dirtying wall/ceilings	¥10	1	must pay repair costs
spitting or discharging waste water/ rubbish from widows/balcony	¥10	3	if jettisons hurt others, responsible for medical charges.
if act/ intend to create a riot	¥100	10	warning.
Blocking sewerage pipe with rubbish	¥10	2	reimburse repair charges.
guests linger after 10 p.m. curfew			repeated violations get more serious punishment.
staying out overnight without permission			1 point per violation
returning after lights-out		½	after first time, 1 point
a person of opposite sex stays overnight	¥200	20	additional penalty of probation or expulsion possible if more serious
same sex overnight visitors without permission	¥50	5	publicized on campus and serious warning;
gambling in dorm			penalty unspecified
overuse electricity and water			pay double charge; 1point loss if waste purposeful
insult, curse or beat up dorm managers	¥50	5	
taking revenge on those who report violations		10	additional penalties possible

Student behavior changed, but probably not because of these rules. The dorms had never been places for solitude or contemplation. Students believed those purposes to be the library's. The dorms, instead, were for relaxation and letting off steam. They were noisy, but a description written by a Wu associate probably exaggerated the situation:[43]

> In the past SZU students could freely choose roommates, regardless of class, major or year. Therefore, students drank and sang late into the night and played mahjongg all night long. Some students stayed in bed until the sun was high in the sky. Even students of different sex stayed together overnight.

In any case, dorms in 1990 became quieter at night, and their exterior perimeters gathered less rubbish. The other problems addressed in the new regulations had not existed to any great degree. For example, few students (at least until the 1990s) had had sexual experiences, nor did they habitually "insult, curse or beat up dorm managers." Defacing the dorms was not widespread, either. Ironically, damage did not occur until students were forced to change rooms in adherence to a new 1990 policy that required them to room together as a unit by department, year and class. Previously, the selection of roommates was not restricted to one's own classmates. The 1990 forced relocations angered many students, who damaged the rooms they were leaving by breaking windows, yanking out wiring, jamming door locks, and dissembling furniture. Repairs cost the university over ¥170,000, a loss that Wu attributed to Luo's lax ideological education.[44] Room relocations the next year were closely supervised; no excessive damage was reported.

Psychological counseling center closed

No public reasons were ever given for closing the Psychological Counseling Center. Informants report that the new school leaders suspected that members of the amateur counselors team had been "black hands" behind the student demonstrations in May. These charges were informally investigated, but no evidence ever surfaced that proved the suspicions valid. Nevertheless, the center was closed at the opening of the 1989 fall term. Department heads were informed that students who needed counseling should be handled by their assigned political tutors. Individual departments were thus made responsible for the psychological health of their students. Political tutors were usually recent college graduates. They were untrained for dealing with others' problems, but unlike the amateur counseling team, the young political tutors lacked life experiences to guide them as counselors. Ironically, as SZU disengaged from centralized counseling, other Chinese universities were beginning to realize the importance of structured-in counseling for students.

College students everywhere in the world are at a transitional point in life, but Chinese college students in recent years have faced even greater worries about their futures, for they feel they cannot foresee China's future in the rapidly changing environment that engulfs them. The closure of the Counseling Center meant that SZU's students had few places to turn to for advice. Students were reluctant to approach their teachers with their own personal problems. In primary and secondary school, teachers enjoy close bonds with students that sometimes last a lifetime. In many Chinese universities, the teacher-student relationship is a solid one that lasts many years. This, however, was generally not the case at SZU. By 1990 the separation between teacher and student was rather firm. Students rarely visited with teachers outside the classroom. In the early years of the university, teachers would invite whole classes to their homes or out for a meal. As the school got older, however, teachers became more concerned with their own personal finances. They stopped pursuing academic interests and started to improve their quality of life through part-time and second jobs. Some students turned to their overseas teachers, especially on issues of emigration, religious faith and romance; but in most cases students could find few channels of help.

The national trauma that occurred in spring 1989 left an especially profound effect on university communities around China. Only seldom, if at all, were the events of that time written about in the Chinese press in an objective way; discussions almost never deviated from the official line. Media remarks had a tone of propaganda, not analysis. Chinese newspapers and magazines in their entirety are state-supervised. Generally, higher authorities do not mico-manage publications; rather, editors sift through upper-level policy documents as they attempt to discern the constraints they should operate under. When journalists err, penalties are severe. Sometimes, newspapers are closed, as was the case in the 1980s in both Shenzhen and Shekou (the special industrial zone closest to SZU).[45] This has reinforced a degree of self-censorship which is just as insidious to freedom-of-the-press as state-imposed censorship.

Students, in the weeks and months after Tiananmen had nowhere "safe" to express their ideas and explore their feelings. According to a perceptive report in the *Los Angeles Times* six months after 4 June, students in Beijing evidenced quiet defiance or open despair; some went in pursuit of a way out.[46] Intimidated by a government for which they had lost respect, politicized students turned cynical. The *Times* article recounted a commonly heard witticism that classified three kinds of college students: the dancers, who spend all their time looking for lovers; the mahjongg players, who have given up hope of doing anything significant with their lives; and the English-studiers, who dream only of going abroad. This pattern generally fit SZU. Few SZU students were ever very politicized, as most put their faith in money, not politics. Love affairs (mostly platonic until the 1990s) was a major recreational pursuit, with about half of the students paired off in relationships by the time of graduation. Many students were business-oriented and looked for futures that could make them rich. Others put effort into emigrating. Precise figures are not available, but an estimated 10-20% of SZU students and teachers have left China for a life abroad. In sum, a confidential counseling service that operated after June 1989 may well have continued to provide students a venue for dealing with psychological problems.

Within the four-year period after the Counseling Center was closed, the university community witnessed at least three suicides, two murders, several incidents of mayhem, and two other campus deaths-by-misadventure. Three deaths occurred around 1 October 1991. A female student jumped out of her dorm window after she saw her boyfriend walking hand-in-hand with another female student. In the second incident, a young man who had been drinking fell to his death as he attempted to climb a ladder to get into an upper floor dormitory room. The third incident occurred just after freshmen military training was completed. Prior to Wei-Wu's arrival, military training had been held in a rural location an hour's drive from campus. From 1989, however, freshmen were trained at SZU, with the team from the People's Liberation Army staying on campus with the students. Just after autumn 1991's training had finished, one of the army instructors hanged himself. An investigation concluded that his three-week stay at SZU had sent him into a deep depression. A few years previously, the instructor had himself failed to gain admission to a university; his stay at SZU had made him confront his sense of personal inadequacy. His ultimate solution—to hang himself in the student dormitory—had a sadly ironic twist.

Educational management

Being busy creating a new SZU CCP and developing systems to regulate the campus and the members of the university community left the post-Tiananmen leaders little time to reform education. Educational reforms—

ones that more directly involve teaching and learning than do CCP restructuring or personnel management—took a back seat to the other changes. The major academic reforms of Wei-Wu came in the form of terminating or suspending various systems that Luo Zhengqi had put in place. Some of these abandoned reforms were later reinstated after the Wei-Wu transitional team was retired.

Inflexibility established

Luo's system had permitted a high degree of flexibility. Under lenient conditions, students could change majors, graduate ahead of time or delay graduation. Students were not required to attend most classes. Double majors and double degrees were allowed. Since students could study on their own and get credit for a course by passing the final exam, they could sign up for several courses given at the same time. This allowed some students to register for as many as 60 hours of class a week (tuition was standard, not based on class hours). The philosophy of the Three Classrooms implied that the traditional classroom was not the only source of education for university students. As educational traditionalists, however, Wei-Wu found these policies abhorrent; Luo's reforms were in effect all canceled.[47] New regulations did not specifically prohibit students from changing majors, but this is what in fact happened as department heads, acting in spontaneous unison, refused to permit changes. The cancellation of double degrees was enforced retroactively so that several dozen students who had enrolled in 1987 and had obtained sufficient credits for double majors or double degrees were denied them when they graduated in 1991. Lengthy regulations affected examinations by instituting numerous detailed changes but offered little of substantive value.[48] Detailed regulations concerning the postponing of exams were subsequently implemented; a grade of zero was given for incompletes (which could only be changed through an involved process); exam absences were permitted only with medical verification.[49]

Permitting students to skip classes was seen as an anathema by the new administration. In an article published in the university's internal journal and reprinted in the *1989-1990 Yearbook,* the leaders used a pen name when they pointed out the weakened study atmosphere.[50]

> SZU's classroom management has always been bad. Students could freely be absent from classes and arrive or leave the classroom freely. Student affairs management has not been serious. If you failed *benke,* you can go to *zhuanke.* If you failed *zhuanke,* you could go to night school. Therefore, there exist

> bearded [old] students. Students do not care about grades at all. This time we expelled over 20 students who failed courses, and many students were shocked.

In their first year in office, the Wei-Wu team negated most of Luo's reforms that had directly affected students. In their second year, they promulgated only one regulation that related to *xuefeng*: students were prohibited from taking pagers into classrooms.[51]

Closing the second classroom

The Wei-Wu administration did not formally terminate the part-time jobs program. Students, as late as 1991, were still cleaning classrooms at night; but few other jobs were made available. Eventually, no jobs existed, although the work-study program was still on the books. A major "adjustment" to the program prohibited students from becoming managers. The new school leaders forbade students from running school-enterprises under contract.[52] Thus, the student-run print-shop, laundry, beauty salons, hostels, café, and stores were all turned over to teachers and staff. These enterprises had earned student managers as much as ¥3,000 per month; running them was quite appealing to SZU staff who were themselves looking for part-time jobs to offset the zone's high living costs. The rationale for these policy changes was to eliminate the student attitude of emphasizing business, while neglecting study. Wei-Wu also attempted to rid the students of their money-worshipping philosophy—seeing everything only in terms of money (*yi qie xiang qian kan*).[53]

Policies under Cai Delin

Cai Delin had been a vice-president at Anhui Daxue in Hefei, the capital of Anhui Province. Arriving at SZU in fall 1991, Cai served as vice-president and deputy Party secretary for a year, during which time he learned how the university operated. When he became president in fall 1992 (he assumed the role of Party secretary in early 1994), he launched Ten Measures of Comprehensive Reform.[54] These reforms addressed the staff employment system and offered ways to modify the delivery of campus services. An attempt was made to de-emphasize the money-making practices of the various teaching departments while increasing teacher/staff payments from school-run enterprises. Although none of Cai's reforms directly addressed pedagogy, the president proposed to increase foreign exchanges as a way to indirectly improve SZU education. Another measure discussed adjusting majors. It recognized that SZU could not complete with established, inland universities which had been offering and perfecting certain majors over many years. Rather, SZU should have its own majors, such as real estate development, enterprise culture, or tourism. The latter two were offered by the Chinese Department, which had moved away from teaching language, literature and culture.

Another reform measure aimed to enhance competition in teaching and study. This measure marked the partial return to the flexible curriculum setting that had existed in the Luo years, as characterized by double-degrees, early/late graduation, and double majors. Two keys to Luo's policy, however, were never resurrected. Neither changing majors after admission nor receiving credit for part-time jobs was ever reinstated. Cai shared the Wei-Wu view that part-time work was inconsistent with full-time study. In the reform document, Cai specifically mentioned that optional courses "with SEZ characteristics" had been stopped because the teachers involved had not taken them seriously. In fact, optional courses were always relatively unimportant in terms of credits generated. Departments preferred to focus on degree requirements and generally did not provide courses to non-majors, the type of classes that were usually optional courses. Cai's policy was ambiguous on the issue of whether SZU should have the sort of open curricula that characterized American general education or should follow the European (and former Soviet) model that was more geared toward specialization. Cai never confronted these educational issues directly; his credit system reform in 1993 reconfirmed the existing system that preferred specialization to general education. In discussing teaching and study, Cai reprimanded students for lacking a good foundation. "Inland students find it hard to adapt themselves to the workplace, but they have strong foundations; SZU graduates are just the opposite." Specifically, he criticized students' writing abilities. "The calligraphy of most SZU students is horrible," he noted. Student's oral English was very good, he said, but their English writing was below that of their peers in inland universities.

Two other reform measures considered educational issues. One was concerned with improving academic research quality and increasing academic achievements. From 1989 for several years, the research output of SZU faculty had declined dramatically. In attempting to reverse this trend, Cai formulated a policy that would tie promotion more closely to publications. He also established three new research entities that would not have ties to teaching. These included architecture/construction, communications/electronics, and bio-chemistry. Another of the Ten Measures was concerned with improving adult education. This policy attempted to narrow the quality gap at SZU which existed between regular university education (where students were mostly admitted according to examination scores) and adult education (where students in the various programs were admitted through disparate channels). Cai proposed using the credit system for night school students and expanding regular adult education to include special programs in which *zhuanke* graduates could top off their certificates with more courses, thus achieving a *benke* bachelors degree. Wei-Wu had attempted to rectify adult education by consolidating three course-offering units and ensuring that all certificates had value. They contended, in a report filed with the city in spring 1992, that they had remedied the situation in which "academic merchants" engage in "rampant certificate-giving" in adult education and as well as in side-course that fell outside the state-approved plan.[55] At that time, the most fragrant abuses had stopped, but the adult education degree was still held in low regard, especially relative to degrees offered at most other institutions. During Cai's tenure, however, the SZU system began to confirm with the China-wide adult education system, in which students had to take standard exams on completion of each subject.

Focus on education

The Ten Measures suggest Cai's shotgun approach to reform. Cai took aim at a lot of targets, not singling out any one in particular. This approach suited Cai who, unlike some of his predecessors, was not a "detail person." He preferred to come up with grand-designs which lower levels, in this case departments, were told to implement. With so many irons in the fire and with two months of each year occupied with foreign travel and entertaining incoming delegations, however, Cai had little time to follow-up on his reforms. As time passed, Cai's speeches began to focus on what he perceived to be his broad achievements. His biography on the SZU homepage summarized his accomplishments:[56]

> He has led teachers and students of the whole school to correct and unite teaching principles and to adhere to the principle of 'teaching is the fundamental aspect of the school.' SZU should emphasize scientific research and work out a balance between the market economy and educational principles. There should also be an equalization between practical teaching and study and the building of foundation knowledge. We should balance specialization with general education norms, upgrade teaching quality and research levels, and

> raise the standard of educational layers and educational training. Cai Delin has made a prominent contribution in building SZU into a first grade special zone university, which trains first grade people; a window university that promotes international, cultural, educational and technological exchange and cooperation; and an experimental university that explores reforms for other Chinese institutions of higher learning.

Cai Delin wanted to be known as the education president of SZU. Luo Zhengqi had been the university's architect; Wei-Wu were its political reformers. Cai's role, as he defined it, was to raise the quality of teaching and learning, by putting additional resources into these areas and by raising teachers' salaries.

1995 SEdC accreditation

Cai's greatest achievement was his success at guiding SZU through an accreditation by the SEdC. In 1995, the central government began an accreditation process in which all universities established in the post-Mao reform period would be closely examined. Some of the 400 institutions in this group were small, with only a few hundred students. Some had been converted from existing teachers colleges or in some cases from high schools. It was these types of institutions, many of them under-resourced by the cities which funded them, that were expected to come under the most intense scrutiny. SZU was placed in the first batch of 100 chosen for evaluation.[57]

There was never much doubt that SZU would get accredited, given the generosity of the Shenzhen government which provided an additional ¥10 million to ensure success. The only possible hitch was the requirement that students were to be tested in select areas. The specific majors/years and subjects to be tested were not supposed to be known until just before the examinations were given. In order for students to prepare for these tests, regular education at SZU was all but suspended for fall semester 1995 so that students could cram for any exam that they might *possibly* be given in November. A week before the exams, an official from the SEdC phoned SZU to inform the university leadership exactly which classes would be tested in which subjects. During the following week, while students who were not to be tested returned to their regular curriculum, students facing tests spent their entire schedules on the subjects on which they were to be examined. They took repeated practice exams and had evening tutorials. Teachers from Mathematics, for example, were required to work overtime tutoring students. Whether students needed this extra attention is unclear;

each group passed the tests, some by wide margins. The university received accreditation.

Student management

Student management became a major concern to Cai Delin, especially after two on-campus murders occurred in spring 1993. These so-called "accidents," although hardly ever officially mentioned, were in the back of everyone's minds. In a December 1993 report, Cai noted that an effective student management system had still not been established.[58] Dorm regulations were often breached, he said, and students were often idle because campus part-time jobs for students—which presumably kept them out-of-trouble—had shrunk because of the employment of temporary workers. In one of the few public mentions of the murders, Cai reported that they had exposed problems and weak links of management and said "this lesson is very painful." Cai's bottom line was that problems were the result of loose discipline. Like Wei-Wu, and in contrast to Luo, Cai did not advocate self-discipline. He supported tighter enforcement of regulations.

Punishment regulations

During their final months, Wei-Wu published a detailed set of punishment regulations to supplement those already in existence.[59] The rules were consistent with Cai's philosophy that tighter regulations could produce better disciplined students. The new rules abandoned the earlier Wei-Wu approach that had tied offenses to fines and a point system (see Table 2.3). This complicated system had not been enforced, as neither student political tutors nor the pensioners who were hired as dorm guardians were inclined to serve as police and alienate the young men and women who were put under their charge. Luo's five-stage system of punishments that ranged from warning to expulsion was reinstated, although the categories bad record and big bad record were renamed serious warning and bad record.

New provisions concerning absences, tardiness and student attire were added. Punishments for class absence ranged in severity according to the cumulative total absent hours during a semester: 10-19 hours equaled a warning; 20-29, serious warning; 30-50, bad record; over 50, suspension. Arriving back on campus 2-3 days late after a vacation could result in a warning or serious warning; 4-7 days late meant bad record/probation; and late return over one week called for automatic suspension. Students caught in class three times either barefoot, smoking, or wearing slippers/singlets were given a warning. Another new clause punished graduates who damaged school property at the time of graduation. This was a direct response to events in 1991. The annual graduation ceremony in mid-June of that year was followed by the traditional lunch-time banquet, at the conclusion of which students—both men and women—showed their contempt for the university administration by breaking several hundred beer bottles on the canteen's cement floor. Hence, the regulations were promulgated in May 1992.

Other items were treated more strictly. Twice breaking the 11:30 p.m. curfew generated a serious warning, compared to 1989 when it earned just ½ penalty point (20 points meant loss of the ¥30 month basic subsidy). Mahjongg—the most popular board game in Southern China—was now prohibited; and mahjongg with gambling resulted in suspension. Renting out the dorm room resulted in a bad record (compared with 10 points previously). Punishments for theft were regrouped, perhaps to reflect inflation. Stealing under ¥100 could result in a serious warning or bad record; ¥100-300, probation; over ¥300 or three incidents, expulsion.

It is uncertain to what extent students generally paid attention to new regulations, or even if they knew about them. Yet, the detailed changes provide insight into the state of mind of the administrators who wrote and approved them. The new rules, for example, took a different view of cheating. The 1988 regulations had differentiated cheating by whether it was done alone (bad record as punishment) or involved a partnership or conspiracy (big bad record). The 1992 regulations also saw cheating as context-related, but here the context became the importance of the test. Cheaters in quizzes received a verbal admonishment; cheating in mid-terms recorded a warning and cheating during final exams earned the violator a bad record. Being caught twice put a cheater on probation.

Comprehensive evaluation of students

One way to improve student management became the comprehensive evaluation of students. From the founding of the university, students completed self-evaluations. This endeavor became more serious after Tiananmen. During SZU's middle years, self-evaluation forms were discussed among an evaluation group of students appointed by department leaders for each class, then reviewed by the political tutor and the department head, and forwarded to the Student Affairs Office. Students were permitted to comment on the reviews. During Cai's tenure the evaluation acquired a high level of detail.[60] Scores were computed on a 100 point basis (20% for moral quality, 70% of academics achievements, 10% for physical prowess). Instructions were issued to prevent students from inflating their marks, and the number of points was specified for various activities. Contests that students won at the city level, school level or department level, for example, received 8, 5, and 2 points, respectively. If SZU had awarded a student by publicizing his/her name, 2-5 additional points accrued. An early pass of Band 4 (the province-wide test of English which was a graduation requirement for non-English majors) achieved 3 points; passing the more difficult Band 6 earned 6 points. Good deeds like fighting hooligans, rescue work during a natural disaster, finding and returning property, or helping the handicapped or wounded could result in 1-10 additional points. Conversely, points were deducted for bad deeds. Being criticized by SZU or one of its departments brought a 2-5 point deduction. A Party or Youth League reprimand cost 10 points; a serious warning, 15 points; a bad record, 20 points; probation, 40 points; expulsion from the CCP, 60. Damaging public property resulted in 5-10 points' deduction. Students lost 2 points if they were caught being absent from public activities such as tree-planting or Lei Feng-type activities, but if they belonged to an arts or athletic team they earned 3-5 points. Students with good evaluations were encouraged to show them to prospective employers.

Four keys

Cai attempted to develop the university's academic reputation by constructing Four Keys. These were key courses, key subjects, key labs and key teachers to be trained.[61] The concept of key (*zhongdian*) is found throughout Chinese education. High schools which send large numbers of graduates to college become key high schools, and receive preferential funding by cities. The nomenclature of key primary and junior secondary schools was abandoned by SEdC edit in the early 1980s, although *de facto* key schools still exist at these levels. At the university level, of course, key is an important tag, setting high admission standards. Key institutions receive superior teaching and research facilities that attract the highest quality among the nation's intellectuals. Key status also defines prestige in terms of the way the public recognizes the values of various institutions' diplomas. Degrees from Beijing University or Qinghua University are *ipso facto* the best in China.

The concept of key carries with it an implied degree of stratification. When initially presenting his proposals, Cai admitted, "Since our foundation is weak, only if we get the keys, can we bring up the whole condition." This is a commonly accepted notion in China, a massive country with one-quarter of the earth's population. It was part of Deng Xiaoping's reform philosophy that some people will get rich before others. It is capsulized in the Chinese idiom: *ti gang xie ling*, which refers to grasping an entirety by first taking the most important part. The idiom specifically relates to grabbing a coat by first hooking its tag. Cai's idea was to identify outstanding teachers as "key teachers for training." They would be given special salaries and book funds and also permitted special study leaves abroad. This proposal coincided with Cai's policies to upgrade all teachers' salaries and his regulations that permitted most teachers to travel abroad for conferences or research. All teachers were better off; some were just becoming more better off than others.

At the department level, Cai suggested that certain "fist" (*quan tou*, an old fashioned term) majors, fist subjects and fist courses be identified. They were to receive special attention and special departmental allocations, which totaled ¥250,000 (US $43,000) in 1993. The best teachers were to be assigned to teach them. SZU identified key courses in each department and sought eventual provincial recognition of the quality of these courses. The improvement of teaching was also tied to these key courses.

International exchange

SZU's reputation, it was widely believed, would be enhanced by international exchange. Since 1986 SZU had had a relationship with Lancashire Polytech, which in the 1990s became known as University of Central Lancashire, when the U.K. upgraded polytechnic institutions to university status. About a half dozen students and teachers had gone to Lancashire for research or study; all emigrated from China. SZU had faculty or student exchanges with other schools, including Manchester University (U.K.) and Kumamoto University of Commerce (Japan), but most of the over 30 cooperation agreements did not result in exchanges of students or faculty. Generally, cooperation first involved the exchange of visiting delegations of leaders. Cai continued President Wei's goal of expanding international exchanges, which emphasized delegation travel. In 1992-93, cooperation agreements were signed with 16 foreign institutions. During the same period SZU received 2,400 visitors from abroad, most of whom were given campus tours by the Foreign Affairs Office. In addition, several major exchange programs were embarked upon. They resulted in several dozen students going from SZU to Edmonds Community College, Seattle, and to Lancashire. Another large-scale "twinning program" involved Victoria University of

Technology, in Melbourne. These and other exchange programs are evaluated in a later chapter.

Concluding thoughts

Over its first dozen years, SZU experienced abrupt changes in educational policies as each administration attempted to put its stamp on the university. Given the university's political dynamics, SZU lacked a consistent educational policy with a clearly defined focus. This often led to confusion among students and staff, and many in the university community became alienated. Take students, for example. Several of the first students I taught, in the Foreign Language Department in 1988, were interested in taking courses in other departments in order to pursue a well-rounded education as well as to acquire special knowledge. Luo's policy allowed them to do this. The students I taught five years later, however, had all but given up trying to take many courses in other departments. The policies had changed every semester since they had entered the university. Just to get enrolled in a course could involve several hours of chasing down signatures on the requisite forms. Some students felt that the only way they could avoid the red tape was to give gifts to teachers as a way of encouraging them to streamline the bureaucracy. Most students, however, threw in the towel and stuck with courses in their own major. Policies on teacher promotion often changed, also. From one year to the next, there was little consistency in the number or type of publications required for promotion. At least one teacher who had been denied a promotion one year decided not even to try the following year because the new rules had excluded from consideration publications that head been accepted the prior year. There is no way to quantify the extent to which policy chaos negative influenced student and teacher morale, but it appears to be a crucial factor that led to their disengagement from the academy.

---

1. Seventy of the 300 hotels have star designation (e.g., 5-star hotel, 4-star, etc.) and another 85 were placed in the "pre-star" category, which presumably means they are striving for stardom. Total beds include 540,000 in hotels and 260,000 in guest-houses. *1995 Shenzhen Yearbook*, p. 346.
2. *1995 Shenzhen Yearbook*, p. 120. US dollar equivalencies are based on official exchange rates for the particular years discussed.
3. For the history of universities in China, see Hayhoe, *China's Universities*, 1996.

4. Source: Xiao, "Vocational/technical education in Shenzhen," 1997, Table 2. The vocational and technical secondary category includes both specialized secondary schools and other vocational/technical secondary schools. Data for 1995 is from the Shenzhen Education Department.
5. *Ibid.*
6. "Higher education," *1986 Shenzhen Yearbook*, p. 169.
7. Xiao, "Vocational/technical education in Shenzhen, China," 1997, Figure 1.
8. *Shenzhen (gaodeng) zhiye xueyuan*. By fall 1997 "higher" (*gaodeng*) was removed from the name for unspecified reasons.
9. Source: Xiao, "Vocational/technical education in Shenzhen," 1997, Table 4. Extreme right column: Shenzhen Yearbooks. Public expenditure rates for 1979-1984 provided by government.
10. *1991 Shenzhen Yearbook*, pp. 381-2.
11. Guangdong Higher Education Bureau, "Investigative report on the founding of SZU, 16 November 1982," *1986 Yearbook*, pp. 149-52.
12. Source: Shenzhen Municipality and Party Committee, "Report to Guangdong Province on creating Shenzhen University," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 154.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Guangdong Province, "Report to State Council on the founding of SZU, 26 February 1983," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 159.
15. Guangdong Province, "Reply to Shenzhen on SZU's approval, 8 March 1983," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 160.
16. Guangdong provincial radio, 1983.
17. Ministry of Education, "1983 Document 079, 10 May 1983," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 161.
18. "Zhang Wei on how to run SZU, interview with *Shenzhen News and Briefs*, 17 October 1983," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, p. 8.
19. The first public announcement on establishing SZU stated that "graduates will be assigned to work in Shenzhen City." Guangdong provincial radio, as reported in "Plans formed for setting up Shenzhen University," *FBIS*-CHI-83-052 (16 March 1983), p. P1.
20. Agelasto, *University in Turmoil*, 1998, pp. 21-116, 173-213.
21. Luo Zhengqi, "Part-time jobs bring big changes to SZU, 16 July 1986," *1986 Yearbook*, pp. 83-93.
22. *Ibid.*
23. Zhong Jialing, "Psychological counseling center," *1987 Yearbook*, p. 119, *1988 Yearbook*, pp. 121-4; Chen Hao, *New Thoughts, New Explorations, New Patterns*, 1989, pp. 77-80.
24. Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, p. 278.
25. Zhong Jialing, "Psychological counseling center," *1988 Yearbook*, p. 123.

26. Chen Hao, *New Thoughts, New Explorations, New Patterns*, 1989, p. 80.
27. Luo Zhengqi, "Part-time jobs bring big changes to SZU, 16 July 1986," *1986 Yearbook*, pp. 83-93.
28. Chen Hao, *New Thoughts, New Explorations, New Patterns*, pp. 33-44; Luo Zhengqi, "Profound change caused by the work-study program in SZU," *Shenzhen University Journal* (1986, no. 3), pp. 1-11; *Guangming Ribao*, 17/21 October 1987; Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, pp. 289-90.
29. Xu Jiyang, "I am a student and a manager," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, p. 289.
30. Shao Binjun, "Seek self-independence in competition," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, p. 290. From his diary: "October 14, 1986. Weather fine. Tuesday. About 6 p.m. I am in my room alone; no one knows I am starving now because I have only a 40 cent meal ticket left. My economic crisis has lasted for half a month. As long as I can pass this crisis, I will be a hero. My family is quite rich, but the first day I entered SZU I wrote them in my first letter that I wanted them to send me not a single cent. With part-time jobs, scholarship, and payments for writing, I have been supporting myself for about 30 months."
31. Chen Hao, *New Thoughts, New Explorations, New Patterns*, 1989, p. 35.
32. Chen Xiaobo, "A symphony of spring breeze turns to rain," 1986, p. 16.
33. "Regulations on students' study, 3 August 1987," *1987 Yearbook*, pp. 123-9.
34. The credit system is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
35. "Regulations on students' study, 3 August 1987," *1987 Yearbook*, pp. 123-9.
36. One classroom, one teacher, one teaching material, one piece of chalk, and one notebook.
37. "Student dorm regulations, 21 May 1987," *1987 Yearbook*, pp. 152-5.
38. "Punishments, 30 November 1988," *1988 Yearbook*, pp. 201-3.
39. "Draft student dorm management regulations implementation plan, Oct 1989," *1989-90 Yearbook*, pp. 213-4.
40. "Punishments for violating regulations," *1989-90 Yearbook*, pp. 217-9.
41. Source: "Punishments, 30 November 1988," *1988 Yearbook*, pp. 201-3.
42. Source: "Draft student dorm management regulations implementation plan, October 1989," *1989-90 Yearbook*, pp. 213-4.
43. Li Zao, March 1990, "Truly enhance Party leadership over the school," *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 30.
44. Zhang Bigong, "All for the cultivation of students," *1991 Yearbook*, p. 199.
45. A Shekou newspaper was closed after it reported a labor strike; *Zone Workers Daily* and *Shenzhen Youth News* were both closed in 1987 for carrying articles by leading political reformers. See Crane, *The Political Economy of China's Special Economic Zones*, 1990, p. 133.

---

46. Holley, “Quiet defiance, open despair and pursuit of a way out,” 1989.
47. “Student affairs management regulations, October 1989,” *1989-90 Yearbook*, pp. 198-203.
48. “Examination regulations, 1 December 1989,” *1989-90 Yearbook*, pp. 206-9.
49. “Procedures for postponing final exams, 26 June 1990,” *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 211.
50. Li Zao, March 1990, “Truly enhance Party leadership over the school,” *Shenda Tongxun* (no. 9, 1990), p. 7, reprinted in *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 30.
51. “No beepers in class, 30 November 1991,” *1991 Yearbook*, p. 252.
52. “Work plan for SZU part-time jobs, 13 March 1991,” *1991 Yearbook*, p. 238.
53. “Freshen up you spirits, march forward boldly: Party Committee’s work prospects for 1990,” *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 15.
54. These measures are repeated in three separate essays in the *1992-93 Yearbook*. See, “Ten measures on comprehensive reform,” pp. 31-41; Cai Delin, “Deepening the reform, strengthening management and promoting development, report to the teachers representatives conference, 17 December,” pp. 60-1; “Ten measures to further deepen the reform at SZU, July 1992,” pp. 77-81.
55. “Major points of SZU work report, 30 April 1992,” *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 24.
56. *http://www.szu.edu.cn/cdl.html*, retrieved June 1996.
57. For more information see Agelasto, *Turmoil in Education*, 1998, pp. 260-5.
58. Cai Delin, “Deepening the reform, strengthening management and promoting development, report to the teachers representatives conference,” *1992-93 Yearbook*, 17 December, p. 58.
59. “Punishment regulations,” *1992-93 Yearbook*, pp. 126-8.
60. “Comprehensive evaluation of students, May 1992,” *1992-93 Yearbook*, pp. 119-22.
61. Cai Delin, “Deepening the reform, strengthening management and promoting development, report to the teachers representatives conference,” *1992-93 Yearbook*, 17 December, p. 60.

Story 3: The Bankers Deng

Deng*: My name is Deng Nan and my wife is Huang Jianguo, but you can call her Deng Tai* [Tai means wife, thus Mrs. Deng]. *We met at Shenda, but we were from different departments, and she is one year younger than me. We are both bankers in Shenzhen.*

Deng Tai*: When we were at Shenda, all the boys looked for girlfriends. For some of them it was a full-time job. Deng Nan started pursuing me right after I arrived on campus. We met at a dance that was held for Shenda people from our hometown, a city in Eastern Guangdong. There are only about a dozen Shenda undergraduates from our hometown, but there are several hundred auditors, part-time night school or self-study students. Deng Nan was so pleased to meet a* benke *student from his hometown.*

Deng*: Even though we hail from the same city, we had not met before Shenda. My wife went to the city's best high school. I went to the second best.*

Deng Tai*: My first choice of college was Beijing Foreign Trade and Economics College, but in my year only two students from Guangdong were selected for this university. International Trade at Shenda was my second choice.*

Deng*: Shenda was my first choice, although I did not get the major I wanted. I had studied hard in high school. I did not want to make the same mistake I had made in junior high, when I had not been a serious student and consequently did not get into the city's key high school. I had to study harder because I went to an inferior high school. Students who go to the best high schools get the best teachers and have the best facilities. I studied hard. I got a high enough score on the college entrance exam to get into a Shenda arts major like English, Chinese or Law, but I was not good enough for any of the business majors: management, international trade, international finance, economics. There was a rumor when I entered Shenda that students could change majors, but that policy had been abandoned after 1989. As soon as I arrived at SZU, I lost my interest in study.*

Deng Tai*: Deng Nan pursued me full-time. If he had put that much energy in study, he would have had the best grades in the school!*

Deng*: Studies never occupied much of my time. I liked to go around with my friends and meet new friends. Not much was demanded of us as students. As long as I went to class and studied a few weeks before the ex-*

ams, I could pass everything. In my four years, I only failed one course, although many teachers threatened to fail me. Sometimes, I had to give them gifts—a ¥50 boxed package of Nescafé and Nescafé creamer was a most reliable gift. Some students gave imported cognac, but I was not that rich. If you're stupid enough to spend that much money on a teacher, you deserve to fail.

Deng Tai*: Of course, I never bribed any of my teachers. I was one of the best students in my major, international trade. I did not have to study hard. Like Deng Nan says, just go to class and prepare well for the exams. I spent only a few hours on homework a night, preparing for the next day's classes. Teachers rarely asked us questions; but you understand more if you prepare in advance for the lecture. Usually, the teacher just explains what is in the textbook. So I went to the library and read what the teacher was going to read the next day. When Deng Nan and I started dating, I required him to go to the library with me if he wanted to see me at night. He just read novels, though.*

Deng*: I love to read. Why waste time doing homework, reading what the teacher is going to say in class the next day?*

Deng Tai*: Preparation put me at the top of the class, not the bottom! That's why you study. Good students should get better jobs.*

Deng*: Nah. Two things are important in getting jobs. Connections—*guanxi*—and luck. When I was hired by "China National Bank," a large state-owned bank, no one cared about my grades or even whether I got a bachelors degree (If you fail three courses, you can get only a certificate, not a degree). They cared that I had social skills and how I would get along with my office mates. They didn't care about my grades, and only asked about my major. It was my introduction that was important. I had a reference from someone they trusted—a friend of my manager.*

Deng Tai*: I got my job based on my academic performance, not connections. I work in the "Special Zone Bank" which is run almost like a private bank. It pays much higher wages than "China National Bank" or any of the state-run banks. I am not considered a state employee so I don't get welfare like housing or health. My salary averages about ¥5-6,000 per month, but the exact amount is hard to compute. The bank makes payments directly into my account, and sometimes I will get a bonus, or get double salary right before Spring Festival [Chinese new year]. Sometimes they give us money and we don't know what it is for. It is like they are trying to confuse us. My husband makes only ¥3,000, including bonuses.*

Deng*: I get housing, but my wife doesn't. I am allowed to purchase a house…*

Deng Tai*: We are allowed.*

Deng*: We are allowed to purchase an apartment. We need a down-payment of ¥50,000, mostly money we have saved out of my wife's salary. (She keeps the family accounts and gives me a small allowance for cigarettes). We will then have a 10-year mortgage, with monthly payments of ¥1,000. Housing for state employees is greatly subsidized. If I leave the bank, I must reimburse the subsidy, which will amount to ¥100,000 by the time the mortgage is paid off. After we are free of mortgage, I could sell the apartment to someone eligible for state-subsidized housing and keep any profit, after paying the government back for the subsidy, of course. When my manager told me that married China National employees of my rank could sign up for housing, we immediately got married. Among my friends, there are two reasons to get married: to get housing or because a baby is coming.*

Deng Tai*: I am not pregnant.*

Deng [privately, away from Deng Tai]: *My wife and I became intimate my senior year at Shenda. Most of the boys who had girlfriends convinced them to sleep with them. I used to take turns with my roommate so our girlfriends could visit overnight. One of us would bunk in a neighbor's room so the other could entertain his girlfriend. My girlfriend and I slept together for six months before we had real sex [intercourse]. Neither of us has been with anyone else. When my girl got a job in Shenzhen, she moved in with me directly, so we have been husband and wife, in fact, for several years. This is very common among Shenda graduates.*

Deng Tai*: Even though we both work for banks, we have very different jobs. Deng Nan works in trade and settlement, while I handle savings and deposits. I have so much work every day that I must often work overtime and through lunch hour. In our bank, we have the saying that each of us has to do the job of a person and a half. In my husband's bank, each employee does the job of a half a person.*

Deng*: It's true. My work does not keep me very busy. Usually, I can do what needs to be done (including meetings) in about four hours. The rest of the time I spend reading, chatting and drinking tea. Our bank subscribes to a lot of papers. Each day I usually read the* Shenzhen Tequ Bao, Shenzhen Shangbao, Shenzhen Evening News, Shenzhen Legal Newspaper, *the national sports paper, the Shenzhen stock and securities paper, the* Da Gong Bao *and* Wen Hui Bao, *both from Hong Kong. Also, I am pursuing a* *bachelors degree in business through the national self-study adult education program. Fortunately, I can study on the job and during our 2½ hour lunch break. I take three classes every term and attend tutorials given several nights a week, as well as on Saturday and Sunday. My wife also helps me. For each course I must pass a national exam. I feel I can use the knowledge from these courses in my banking career. I took the wrong courses at Shenda. Many of the business courses I wanted to take at Shenda were only open to students in business majors. In any case, I learn much more in self-study than I would have at Shenda sitting in boring lectures.*

Deng Tai*: Deng Nan is right. The classes were boring. Sometimes we were lucky to get a teacher who gave us illustrations from his own experiences and brought in information from outside the textbooks. This was rare. Most of the courses I could have taught myself. I know how to read aloud from the text.*

Deng*: So do I.*

2. Students

SZU's full-time undergraduates, referred to as *benke,* came generally from urban, upper middle-class families. Data from the class of 1989, collected at the time they graduated in 1993, show that 61% of the students' families lived in Shenzhen. Slightly over 53% graduated from secondary schools in Shenzhen—suggesting that the families of 8% of the students moved to Shenzhen while their sons and daughters studied at SZU. The families held high socio-economic status as indicated by parents' employment and education level (see Table 2.1 and Table 2.3.) Two-thirds of the students were male. In terms of language groups, about one-third of the students spoke *putonghua* (Mandarin or common Chinese) at home with family members and a third spoke Cantonese (see Table 2.2). More than 75% of SZU's *benke* students came from key secondary schools—those which received extra local funding, had the best teachers and sent proportionally more of their students to university than non-key schools. For key schools, the Shenzhen municipality allocated about three times as much funding per student than it spent on pupils in ordinary school. Students in the former had higher aspirations than their counterparts in non-key schools, came from households of higher socio-economic status, and spent more time on homework.[2]

Table 2.1: Parents' occupation, percentage[1]

occupation	father	mother
legislators & administrator	26.5	12.4
professionals & technical	39.2	38.1
clerk	6.4	10.6
commerce	5.8	2.9
service	4.7	6.2
farmer	1.5	2.9
worker	4.9	10.3
others	9.3	11.5
jobless	1.7	5.0
total	100.0	100.0

Table 2.2: Dialect spoken at home (percent)[4]

Putonghua	32.0
Guangdonghua (Cantonese)	33.0
Kejiahua (Hakka)	13.0
Chaozhouhua (Chiu Chao)	10.6
Shanghaihua	2.0
other	9.4
total	100.0

Table 2.3: Parents' education level (percent)[3]

education level	father	mother
primary school	4.1	10.4
junior school	8.0	12.4
high school	11.3	13.3
technical school	9.8	16.2
dazhuan certificate	15.0	16.9
benke or above	50.0	28.8
other	1.7	2.0
total	100.0	100.0

Will the real student please stand up?

The seemingly straight-forward question "how many students did SZU have?" is not easily answered, even after the researcher takes a trip through data hell. Accurate data are hard to pinpoint and often must be gleaned from narrative reports, which suffer from selective, *ad hoc* use of statistics, excessive rounding of figures and typographical errors. Furthermore, data in plans sometimes misrepresent themselves as actuality; unfortunately, plans often do not reflect reality.

In contemporary China, how exactly is university student (*daxue xuesheng*) defined? The term normally refers to the several thousand full-time undergraduates who live in campus dorms and receive bachelors degrees at the completion of their studies. Like their counterparts elsewhere in China and around the globe, these SZU students usually advanced to university directly from high school. The fact that they have met strict admissions requirements puts them in the élite of the population (2% in China's case).[5] The enrollment of this type of student is represented in Figure 2.1.

This élite group, in fact, represented only about half of the SZU student population. In the evenings, while these "regular" young adults studied, worked or relaxed, their classrooms were filled with older students in adult education programs that provided degrees which were supposedly equivalent to the regular diploma. Most of these older students, usually in their mid- to upper-twenties, commuted to the main or branch campus several evenings a week. Some were in degree-granting programs; some are in arrangements that conferred junior college (*zhuanke*) certificates. Others attended short-

Figure 2.1: Student population, *benke* and *zhuanke*, 1983-1997[6]



term, intensive training programs designed to provide local personnel (*rencai)* with continuing education. The most prestigious of these were referred to as cadre training classes (*ganbu zhuanxiu*) designed to give advanced knowledge to managers and senior staff in state industry and businesses. Adult education at SZU took place during the daytime as well as at night and served both full- and part-time students, with most in the latter category.

In addition, a variety of correspondence programs added large numbers of "students." For example, in 1985-86 5,000 people were enrolled in a finance and accounting correspondence course run by SZU's Part-time *Zhuanke* College. The university also conducted distance learning for Yunnan and Sichuan factory managers. In 1987 10,000 students took correspondence classes in Industrial/commercial Enterprise Management and Civil Service Development, both operated by the Adult Education Department. Public Administration's correspondence offering attracted 18,000 students.

These divisions—-immediate high school leavers versus mature students; or full-time versus part-time—help categorize the student population, but their simplicity obscures the complexity of China's admissions process. The policy is commonly referred to as the recruitment plan (*zhaosheng jihua*). The translated term *recruitment* is somewhat a misnomer; for the most part students were not sought after or actively recruited. When taking the college entrance examination (CEE), they make university choices; then in a unified province-wide process, they are assigned by specialization to university departments according to test score.

Determining the actual size of any university's student body is complicated by a host of factors, especially the existence of part-time and adult education students. The preferred western term “full-time equivalent” (FTE) is not generally used in China. From the early years of the People’s Republic, under centralized planning most university students have been full-time undergraduates. Postgraduate programs were initiated only in the 1970s; even then much advanced training remained the preserve of Soviet-styled research institutes that were unaffiliated with universities. Continuing education for adults was the domain of work-units; political and ideological education was handled at Party schools. Thus, most discussions of student population have focused on those who gained admittance through the CEE, taken at the end of senior year in high school. In this regard, Figure 2.2 shows the student population for these regular undergraduates. Data come from the SZU yearbooks and exclude adult education students and those in the part-time *zhuanke* program. The computations take into account that *zhuanke* programs ran for two or three years and that Architecture took five. Enrollment figures are based on actual enrollment, not that stated in the plan, and they are not adjusted to reflect late matriculations as suggested by graduation statistics that are sometimes larger than recruitment figures (This phenomenon is discussed later in the chapter).

For only one year did SZU publish a figure for total enrollment (as opposed to the year’s recruitment of new students). In its self-evaluation report prepared for the 1995 accreditation, SZU put its regular (full-time *benke* and *zhuanke*) student population at 3,583 students. Based on published recruitment figures, however, the student body should have consisted of 2,596 individuals. The 3,583 figure is thus highly suspect and may have been fabricated in order to conform with SEdC policy. For the sake of internal efficiency in higher education, the SEdC had recommended that Chinese institutions of higher education enroll at least 3,500 full-time undergraduates.[7] SZU’s actual 1995 enrollment around 3,000 fell below the average for Chinese higher education institutions (3,622), excluding arts and sports institutes. But in terms of FTE, SZU was above average in size. Overall, China’s colleges and universities in 1994 had an enrollment of 3,270 FTE. SZU’s FTE for 1995 was 4,085.[8] Equivalent figures, as reported by Chinese authorities, were 3,852 for the U.S. and 4,528 for Taiwan.[9] All this suggests a small-in-the-day, big-at-night phenomenon at SZU. During daylight hours, SZU was smaller than the average Chinese higher education institution (excluding those specializing in arts and sports), but at night when adult education was underway, SZU became larger than average.

Figure 2.2: SZU state plan undergraduate enrollment, 1983-1997



Enrollment categories, until the Chinese enrollment system was reformed in the mid-1990s, included four major groupings. The prime classifications were *benke* (undergraduates in a bachelors degree program) and *zhuanke* (a short-cycle non-degree, usually specialized, certificate-awarding program that is sometimes referred to as junior college). These “regular” students received a state subsidy. Their attending university was treated very much like a job; in a sense they worked for the state, receiving advanced education as an in-kind payment. A minority of students belonged to the *zifei*, or self-paying, group. These fee-payers scored somewhat below the cut-off line for *benke* admission, a figure that varied from major to major, year to year. Another category, *daipei*, also referred to entrance exam takers who scored below the qualifying line. In contrast with self-paying *zifei*, the tuition and fees of *daipei* students were paid by work-units (*danwei*) with whom the students were contracted. After graduation, a *daipei* student was expected to work for this *danwei*. Reforms that began with a 1993 policy document put an end to these categories. The new policy became effective at SZU in 1994, and the *daipei* and *zifei* categories were abandoned; from September 1994 all SZU undergraduates were charged tuition, which included fees for housing and utilities. Figure 2.2 shows the relative enrollment in these categories for the years 1983-1997.

Adult and continuing education

The preparatory document issued by the provincial Higher Education Bureau before SZU’s founding stated: “Adult education is an outstanding task for

Table 2.4: Adult education enrolled students and graduates[11]

	newly enrolled	graduates
1984	385	na
1985	569	na
1986	696	282
1987	1,249	394
1988	1,100	306
1989	na	500
1990	na	613
1991	1,042	na
1992	1,125	na
1993	1,200	na
1994	na	na
1995	958	na
1996	na	na
1997	1,887	na

special zone education because many cadres and workers badly need further training. It is not practical to send them outside the zone for training since most will study on a part-time basis."[10] As a consequence, about half of SZU students have been enrolled in part-time adult and continuing education courses and as such are not included in Figures 2.1 or 2.2.

Over time several different administrative units have managed these students, who are outside the regular *benke* and *zhuanke* tracks—students who are usually referred to as adult or mature students. SZU's Adult Education Department (later known as the Open College) was founded on 3 November 1983 at the university's start-up to manage night and correspondence courses. About one-third of its students were cadres or staff from outside Shenzhen. In 1984, when the university moved to the new campus, Adult Education stayed behind in the downtown location. That same year, the Night College, later called the Part-time *Zhuanke* College, was established. Its students included workers and cadres from Shenzhen whose employers often reimbursed the costs of continuing education. Others were unemployed, self-paying students who lived off-campus.

A third grouping of adult students populated the part-time *zhuanke* program. This group consisted of campus residents, each of whom worked for the university during the day and attended night classes. Their wages were low; they were required to work at office jobs that paid ¥1.50 (US 40›) per hour, as a condition of maintaining their Shenzhen *hukou* (residency permit) and their enrollment. Most of these students were under age 25 and had not scored high enough on the college entrance exam to enroll in the university program of their choice. Some, however, may have chosen SZU's part-time program as a way of emigrating to the SEZ.

Table 2.5: Adult education targets set in 1991[12]

target year	4-year program	2-year program	total
1995	400	3,600	4,000
2000	600	4,400	5,000

In October 1986 the Off-campus Courses Department was set up. It handled training and correspondence courses (but in 1988 was also in charge of regular *benke* students' social investigation, a graduation requirement to ensure that students had experienced society before they left SZU). With some 30,000 students, it had a non-completion/non-certification rate over 30%, and as high as 50% for some courses. The Open College was established in July 1988, a merger of Adult Education and the Open Foreign Language College, and enrolled 4,000 students the first year. A reorganization in 1991 merged the Part-time *Zhuanke* College, Open College and Off-campus Courses Department into a single Adult Education Department, with an intention to focus more on *benke* and graduate programs.

Adult education grew steadily from the start. At first most students participated in correspondence courses and short-term training classes, with only about 10% of the students enrolled in the certificate track part-time *zhuanke* program. Over the first three years, 1984-1986, almost 2,000 students enrolled in adult education programs, including 1,838 in the *zhuanke* track. By the early nineties, about 3,000 students were enrolled at any one time just in the part-time *zhuanke* program (see Table 2.4). Over the Night School's first dozen years, 8,421 students were awarded graduation certificates. In 1996, 2,677 students were enrolled, which included 2,438 in the *zhuanke* program and 239 second major students. It operated 25 majors and had 35 administrative staff.

Given that these students proceeded at their own pace, it is difficult to ascertain when the enrolled students actually graduated, if they did indeed finish the program. Completion rate was reported as slightly above 70%. The university's long-term development plan of 1991 set a goal of training 1,000 students in the 4-year program and 10,000 in the 2-year program for the 1990s decade (see Table 2.5). Estimates provided five years later during the SEdC accreditation decreased by 1,000 the 5,000 enrollment target that was set in 1991 for the year 2000. Major changes in adult education that year were intended to provide it with more rigor and structure. Not only were the three units responsible for adults consolidated into one, but they were directed to take care of problems that had resulted from "randomly of-

Table 2.6: 1990 student population (September 1990)[15]

program	students	full-time equivalent	%
benke	2,988	2,988	46
zhuanke	519	519	8
Part-time *Zhuanke* College	3,200	1,280	20
Open College	2,871	1,148	18
short-term training programs and correspondence	10,000	500	8
Total		6,435	100

Figure 2.3: *Benke* and *zhuanke* enrollment



fering courses without careful consideration."[13] In 1996 Adult Education underwent an evaluation by the Guangdong Higher Education Bureau. It passed with an "excellent" rating.[14]

SZU enrollment planning history

The university's creators in 1983 envisioned the scale of SZU by 1986 to be 2,000 undergraduate (*benke*) students and 4,000 undergraduate and junior college (*zhuanke*) students by 1990.[16] An unspecified number of students were to be in adult education and short-term training programs. What really happened?

At the end of 1986, SZU had 2,352 *benke* students, about 15% over expectation. By the fall of 1990, there were 3,507 *benke* and *zhuanke* students, about 12% short of the initial target.[17] At that time, however, over 6,000 students were enrolled in adult education: 3,200 in the Part-time *Zhuanke* College and 2,871 in SZU's Open College (see Table 2.6). An estimated

Table 2.7: 1991 projected enrollment for 1995 and 2000[19]

Target year	1995	% annual increase	2000	% annual increase	(1990-2000)
benke	3,320	5.2	4,550	6.3	8,000
zhuanke	680	8.1	1,250	10.5	3,500
adult education *benke*	400		600		1,000
adult education *zhuanke*	3,600		4,400		10,000
graduate	60		120		260
total					22,760

10,000 people were participating in short-term training and correspondence classes.[18] In all, full-time and part-time students combined to equal about 6,500 full-time students, slightly over half of whom were state-plan undergraduate and college students.

Still, *benke* has remained the major student category, both in terms of size and prestige. Higher entrance exam scores were demanded of *benke* students; the students were more demanding and challenging to teach. *Zhuanke* enrollment began in 1987 and rose over the next seven years. During the same period *benke* experienced a downward trend (see Figure 2.3).

Revisions of projections

In 1991 enrollment figures were revised in the university's Ten-year Development Plan. Despite its flawed arithmetic, the plan called for increasing *benke* and *zhuanke*, 5.5% and 9% respectively. The adult education population was projected to rise 10% and 5% for *benke* and *zhuanke*, respectively (see Table 2.7). These projections came after a failed attempt by municipal educators to substantially downsize the university. The city government's 1991 *Strategic Report on Shenzhen's Educational Development* forecast the economic zone's needing 90,000 *rencai* with university degrees over the decade.[20] Only 6,200 of these were expected to come from SZU, the rest being trained at inland universities. This report drew intense criticism from a SZU official, who wrote his objections in a letter to the editor of the *Shenzhen Tequ Bao*. The report's policy recommendations concerning SZU were never effected.[21]

A second revision of the enrollment plan appeared at the time of the 1995 accreditation.[22] Going into the evaluation, the following targets were set: 5,000 *benke*, 3,000 *zhuanke*, 4,000 adult education, 200 graduate students, and 200 foreign students. Based on a criticism from the SEdC accreditation team that too many resources were being given over to junior college, *zhuanke* enrollment was revised and cut to half of *benke*, making it in other words one-third of the total.[23] The university appears to have accepted this new policy. For example, the newly created Economics College (an umbrella over the Economics Department and the International Finance and Trade Department) in its 1997-2000 budget estimated that *zhuanke* enrollment would decrease over a four-year period, from 39% in 1997 to 26% in the year 2000.[24]

Recruitment plan

The recruitment plan is a hold-over from the days when central planning dictated university admissions. For most universities in China, those days ended in the early 1990s. For SZU the plan controlled actual admissions only during the school's first several years, since the official plan addresses only *benke* and full-time *zhuanke* student intake. By the mid-1980s, actual enrollment comprised adult education, training classes and fee-paying "out-of-plan" students, categories that accounted for about half of the students. Still, the plan has continued to dominate discussions of admissions, although it provided the framework for letting in only a part of the student population. Enrollment data according to state plan are presented in Table 2.8, which shows that over SZU's history about 18% of the students have been either *daipei* (9.3%) or *zifei* (8.6%). In this regard SZU exceeded the national average. In 1993, for example, fee-paying students in China accounted for 14% of admissions,[25] but they represented 27% of SZU students.

From the 1950s to the late 1980s enrollment policy in China was closely connected to job allocation (*fenpei*); educational authorities admitted students in anticipation of labor needs four years later at time of graduation. The traditional plan refers to full-time "in plan" (*jihua nei*) undergraduates for both degree (*benke*) and certificate (*zhuanke*) programs of shorter duration—two or three years. A few self-paying (*zifei*) students were included as well as *daipei* students whose future employers were paying for their education. Nationally the *zifei* category permitted enrolling students whose examination scores were no more than 20 points below the *benke* cutoff.[26] A separate SZU plan dealt with students in the formal adult education programs.

None of the enrollment plans, however, covered the various fee-paying programs, which were referred to as outside-plan (*jihua wai*) or side-businesses (*banban banxue).* In addition, departments allowed non-registered

Table 2.8: Entering class enrollment in state plan, 1983-1997, by student type[27]

year	regular		*daipei*		*zifei*		total	%
	benke	*zhuanke*	*benke*	*zhuanke*	*benke*	*zhuanke*		change
1983[a]	212						212	
1984[b]	488						488	130.2
1985[c]	609		301				910	86.5
1986[d]	589		132		21		742	-18.5
1987[e]	557	202	202	54	38	96	1,149	54.9
1988[f]	554	205	123	6	56	98	1,042	-9.3
1989[g]	499	203	55	5	33	51	846	-18.8
1990[h]	459	236	40	1	18	23	777	-8.2
1991[i]	501	225	29	2	24	82	863	11.1
1992[j]	495	297	16	18	17	122	965	11.8
1993[k]	465	245	14	34	102	179	1,039	7.7
1994[l]	653	580					1,233	18.7
1995[m]	570	329					899	-27.1
1996[n]	784	556					1,340	49.1
1997[o]	804	441					1,245	-7.1
total	8,239	3,519	912	120	309	651	13,750	20.1 ave

Notations [a] through [o] are in Endnote 27.

students to audit courses. They were referred to with terms like *sui du* (accompanying study) or *pang ting* (side-listening) and were not officially recognized by the university. Such students in the Foreign Language Department, for example, were charged ¥1,050 (US $182) for tuition per term in 1993—five times what in-plan students paid; they were also made to pay market rent for on-campus accommodation, and they had to negotiate with various offices for such items as meal tickets and library cards. One auditor reported paying the SZU Housing Office ¥500 per month for a single dorm room, which was about double what the same-sized room would have cost one kilometer from campus.

The annual state plan, at SZU as well as at other Chinese universities, covered only the four formal categories *benke*, *zhuanke*, *daipei* and *zifei*. It was submitted to the upper level (in SZU's case, formally to the Provincial Higher Education Bureau and also to the municipality) and implemented, unless specifically disapproved. Some negotiation occurred, but provincial

Table 2.9: Data inconsistencies, 1987 state plan entrants[28]

	State Plan		*Daipei*		*Zifei*		sub-total		grand total
Source	*bk*	*zk*	*bk*	*zk*	*bk*	*zk*	*bk*	*zk*	
State Plan[a]	544	160	204	60	30		778	220	998
Source 1[b]	557	202	202	54	38	96	797	352	1,149
Source 2[c]	563	202	203	53	37	97	803	352	1,155
Source 3[d]	563	204	203	59	37	1	803	264	1,067
Source4[e]	558	220	202	54	33	85	793	359	1,152
Graduates[f]							761[g]	247	1,008

bk = *benke*; zk = *zhuanke*; notations [a] through [g] are in Endnote 28.

authorities oversaw too many institutions to micro-manage the admissions of any individual school. Although the plan has continued to be called the "state" plan, during the post-Mao era most authority has devolved to individual schools, which have been given freedom to determine departments and specializations, as well as to decide which types of students are to be chosen.

Data inconsistencies

Even for the categories to which they were limited, the recruitment plans, as published in the SZU annuals and internal journal, are confusing.[29] A standard chart was not used, and many of the data were presented in prose, embedded in reports and speeches by leaders. Terms often lacked precision. *Graduates* usually referred to those who received degrees, but on occasion the term included those who did not actually meet the qualifications for graduation and were awarded only diplomas, not bachelors degrees. The year 1987, as Table 2.9 indicates, proves a particular troubling year for the data collector. Students from Hong Kong and Macau, who were admitted by different criteria from Mainland students, were exempt from the college entrance exam. In some data, they were placed within the state plan as either regular students or fee-paying (whether they had to pay fees depended on a quality assessment by admissions officers). Since these compatriot students did not take the entrance exam, however, they should not have been included in data that pertained to college entrance scores; nevertheless, they were sometimes included. Furthermore, data are not internally consistent. The published chart of the recruitment plan in the *1987 Yearbook* listed no students in the junior college, fee-paying (*zhuanke zifei*) category, but 96 students belonged to this group according to actual enrollment figures presented on another page in the same yearbook. Another table in that yearbook listed only one student in this category. The Academic Affairs Office's published report in the university's internal magazine placed the number at 85. All these figures conflicted with data provided to the author by AAO which reported 97 students enrolled as *zhuanke zifei*.

Output figures on graduates do not clarify the confusion for 1987. Each year the SZU yearbook included name lists of graduates for the *benke* and *zhuanke* programs. Data in Table 2.9 reflect an attrition rate, as would be expected. The 761 names on the list of *benke* 1987 graduates are fewer than the enrollment figures according to any of the sources. The *zhuanke* total is less than any actual enrollment (but more than the plan). SZU students failed to complete their studies on time (or at all) for various reasons. Some dropped out; others went abroad after only a year or two at SZU. The '87 entrants who graduated early would have had their names for the purpose of graduation lists included with the '86 entrants. In contrast, those who delayed graduation would have been listed with '88 entrants, or with later classes. A few graduates received double degrees (on average less than a dozen per year until this flexibility was suspended altogether in 1991); these students would be listed twice as graduates, but only once as enrollees. Some students transferred from *zhuanke* to *benke*; others were demoted from *benke* to *zhuanke*. A few students transferred in from other schools. (There were no reported cases of SZU enrollees leaving for other universities in China).

Each year, many graduates did not receive degrees (column 4, Table 2.10, next page). About 23% of the students who entered SZU from 1987-1992 left with a certificate but not a bachelors diploma. These included students who failed to meet graduation requirements—those who acquired insufficient credits, failed compulsory courses, exceeded the number of permitted failures, or failed the graduation thesis/design. The group also included students who were not formally enrolled according to state plans, e.g., transfers. Auditors and other "irregular students" may also have been included. These inconsistencies indicate a looseness associated with the keeping of data. They also suggest a policy of augmenting enrollment in excess of quotas set by the state plan.

Table 2.10: Statistics on graduates, by year enrolled[30]

	benke						*zhuanke*	
	enroll (1)	grads with degree (2)	% (3)	grads w/o degree (4)	total (5)	% (6)	enroll (7)	grads (8)
1983	212							
1984	488	486[a]	99		486	99		
1985	910	651[b]	72		651	72		426[j]
1986	742	684[c]	92		684	92		
1987	797	486[d]	61	275[e]	761	95	352	247[k]
1988	733	561[f]	77	152	713	97	309	166[l]
1989	587	477[g]	81	104	581	99	259	152[m]
1990	517	421[h]	81	82	503	97	260	252[n]
1991	554	402[i]	73	121	523	94	309	290[o]
1992	528	453[r]	86	121[s]	574	1.09	437	421[p]
1993	581	481[t]	83	152	633	1.09	458	446[q]
1994	653						580	523[u]
1995	570						329	315
average %			80					

Notations [a] through [u] in Endnote 30.

Many of the extra graduates—those who do not show up in enrollment data—were in the Economics Department and International Finance and Trade Department. The former enrolled *daipei zhuanke* students who transferred into the *benke* program; the latter was a "hot" major with students knocking at the front and back doors (*hou men*, a colloquialism suggesting corrupt practices) to get into it. Other departments saw attrition in their *benke* classes entering between 1988 and 1991. This leads to the conclusion that most of the hidden enrollment occurred in the *zhuanke* program, at least for those four years. In a few reported cases, some students simply materialized, ready to graduate. One departmental staff member observed that a student who had enrolled as *zhuanke* had actually taken all the courses needed for a *benke* degree. The department was not concerned with this until it had to decide how to give a degree to a student who had never formally entered the program but had completed the requirements. Intense negotiations occurred with AAO; the student was finally awarded a degree.

Figure 2.4: Percentage change in recruitment, 1984-1997



Another source of these mysterious extra students is explained by a set of 1992 regulations.[31] These rules permitted the enrolling of training students (*jin xiu*), but the same rules were moot on whether such students could ever graduate. The regulations allowed cadres or workers with Shenzhen *hukou* or temporary residence and with the “necessary education foundation” to take at least 20 credits per semester (below the regular student’s requirement of 25-30). They were charged fees according to the number of credits taken, with a minimum charge for 20 credits. The *jin xiu* student was required to have clear intentions for study, a reference letter from a work-unit, and a guarantor who was a SZU teacher. Conditions like these would require the student to employ *guanxi* (social relations), a factor that at SZU contributed to corrupt practices.[32]

Enrollment trends

Figure 2.2 shows the state plan enrollment for *benke* and *zhuanke* by the categories of regular, *zifei*, and *daipei*. Another way of looking at these numbers is to examine the percent change in recruitment, which appears in Figure 2.4. There were three periods of negative growth: 1986, the 1988-1990 years, and 1995. Student population expanded rapidly in the early years; the years 1991-1994 saw slow, steady growth.

Table 2.11: Plan versus actual enrollment[33]

year	regular				daipei				zifei				total	
	benke		zhuanke		benke		zhuanke		benke		zhuanke		total	
1983	**(212)**	212											**(212)**	212
1984	**(488)**	488											**(488)**	488
1985	**(609)**	609				301							**(609)**	910
1986	**560**	589			**129**	132				21			**689**	742
1987	**544**	557	**160**	202	**204**	202	**60**	54	**30**	38		96	**998**	1,149
1988	**510**	554	**200**	205		123		6	**52**	56	**80**	98	**842**	1,042
1989	**500**	499	**180**	203	**80**	55	**25**	5	**20**	33	**30**	51	**835**	846
1990	**500**	459	**200**	236	**60**	40	**20**	1	**25**	18	**45**	23	**850**	777
1991	**500**	501	**245**	225	**60**	29	**30**	2	**25**	24	**20**	82	**880**	863
1992	**(495)**	495	**(297)**	297		16		18		17		122	**(792)**	965
1993	**(465)**	465	**(245)**	245		14		34		102		179	**(710)**	1,039
1994	**700**	653	**560**	580									**1,260**	1,233
1995	**620**	570	**340**	329									**960**	899
1996	**800**	784	**580**	556									**1,380**	1,340
1997	**880**	804	**400**	441									**1,280**	1,245
total	**8,383**	8,239	**3,407**	3,519	**533**	912	**135**	120	**152**	309	**175**	651	**12,785**	13,750

Plan data in **bold**. Actual data, in parentheses, substitute for plan when latter are unknown.

How did actual enrollment compare with the plan approved by provincial and municipal authorities? This information, provided in Table 2.11, indicates that for almost every category in every year actual enrollment exceeded the plan. Over 14 years, SZU took in 7.5% more students than permitted by the state approved plan. Overall, Chinese universities admit 17% more students than the approved plans call for.[34] Generally, the SZU plan overestimated *benke* recruitment. Although *daipei* data for only a few years are available, the number of contracted students also appears to have fallen short of the recruitment target. In contrast, *zhuanke* and *zifei* exceeded expectations.

Tuition

Table 2.12 shows tuition and accommodation charges for SZU students in the degree tracks. To conform to nationwide policy,[35] the university in 1994 abandoned the categories of *zifei* and *daipei*, and all students were charged

Table 2.12: Tuition and accommodation charges[36]

	1986	1987	1988	1989	1991	1994	1996
tuition (¥) per semester by student type:							
regular	20	30	100	300	200	3,500-4,000	4,000-5,000
zifei		600		1,050	1,050		
zifei transfer to *benke* (total)		2,400					
daipei transfer to *benke* (total)		4,700					
on campus adult		40					
accommodation (¥) per semester by student type:							
regular:	5	7.5	10	50	50		
zifei		150		200	200		
zifei transfer to *benke*		600					
on campus adult		10					

tuition. SZU's tuition structure was the highest of any university in China (see Table 2.13).

Student quality

Universities in China are categorized by the administrative level to which they report. Many schools directly under the control of the SEdC and state ministries are referred to as state-run institutions and are generally the most prestigious educational units in the country. They are followed by the lower status *gao xiao* (tertiary institution) which are overseen by provinces or provincial level municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin).[37] Finally, units run by local officials generally rest at the bottom of the prestige pyramid. Institutions near the top usually receive the most funding and attract the best teachers and researchers. Even more important, they receive the best students.

Table 2.13: Tuition at selected Chinese universities, 1996 (in ¥)[38]

Beijing University	1,500
Qinghua University	1,200
Chinese People's University	1,200
Fudan University	900-2,300
Shanghai Jiaotong University	2,000-2,500
Tongji University	2,400-3,400
Chongqing University	1,400-2,100
Southwest University of Politics and Law	1,700-2,000
Southwest Jiatong University	1,400-1,600
Xi'an Jiaotong University	1,100-1,400
Lanzhou University	1,400-2,100
Central China Normal University	400-1,900
Wuhan University	2,000-3,000
Nanjing University	1,300-2,100
Zhejiang University	1,600-2,400
Xiamen University	1,500-2,000
Nankai University	1,900-2,300
Zhongshan University	1,500-3,500
South China Polytechnic University	2,500-3,500
Guangdong Foreign Language and Foreign Trade University	3,500-4,000
Zhongshan Medical University	3,000-3,500
Shenzhen University	4,000-4,500

Before taking the college entrance exam, high school seniors completed a form, under close supervision of their tutors and parents, on which they indicated their preferences for tertiary education. The form consisted of three boxes into which institutional preferences were written. The upper box was for key schools, such as Beijing and Zhongshan University; the middle, for average institutions, including SZU; and the lower, for *zhuanke* and other lower status programs. Each grouping was associated with a "score line" which represented the lowest score for which a candidate would be accepted for admission. High school seniors who expected to do well on the college entrance test would likely put their preference in the top box. Tutors discouraged seniors of lesser ability from attempting to enter this level. In contrast, some seniors of high ability preferred to go to a specific institution in the middle category; they would leave the top box empty. Yet the ultimate decision of school choice rested not with the student, who was able to give

Table 2.14: Benke entrance examination scores[39]

year	arts average			science average			Guangdong key score line		
	high	low	ave.	high	low	ave.	arts	science	% SZU students above
1986	530			581			455	510	53
1987	552		515	643		543	513	535	62
1988	823		705	853		682	691	656	63
1989	892		707			677	698	649	69.3
1990	867		700	811		670			64.5
1991	757	675	702	736	642	678			55.8
1992			703			667	698	649	56.2
1993			703			658	699	648	48.6
1994	801		681	761		637	666	630	44.6
1995	831		670	790		638	668	628	50.8
1996	766	592	652	785	443	615			33
1997	725		645	734		612			

only a preference. He or she was assigned an institution during the uniform recruitment process, which lasted several weeks in a Guangzhou hotel.

Each year in the first half of August, SZU transported department leaders and admissions staff by school bus to Guangzhou for recruitment. In 1986 a 35-person contingent spent one week at the Zhujiang Hotel. As SZU expanded departments and majors, the process lengthened, to 11 days in 1992 and then to 15 days in 1993. The procedure was overseen by the vice-president in charge of academics. In 1992 President Wei and his designated successor Cai Delin took time to visit the recruitment and lend their moral support. In 1989 Wu Zewei, then the new Party secretary, visited to lend political support. Except for the advent of computers, unified recruitment has not changed much for several decades. It was a tedious process with each department head reviewing hundreds of applicants. The AAO reported that recruiters worked overtime, during meals and in the evenings. The computer staff, which included several students, slept on couches, not in their hotel rooms, and each worked past 2 a.m. inputting data.

In general, recruited students were sometimes taken on the basis of the college entrance exam scores, although other factors such as gender and geographic distribution were taken into account. Key schools were given the first pick of students, those who scored above the score-line for key schools. Many of the files SZU recruiters examined were for students who were not accepted into the top category. These hand-me-downs came from key schools which would have examined the files before SZU got them. In turn, folders rejected by SZU for *benke* programs were later culled through by recruiters from schools in the bottom classification, which included *zhuanke* and teacher education programs. Students put their preferences by major for a specific department and university, but the admissions process was done by department so some flexibility was possible in large departments that offered multiple majors. At the advent of the recruitment process, score-lines were set: the key school score-line, a threshold for middle category schools such as SZU, and a bottom line for third category schools. Universities tried not to take students below the score-line in their category, except when permitted in the case of *daipei* and *zifei* students. The quality of an entering class, thus, was measured by their scores relative to other's institutions during the same year; this percentage can be compared annually.

Some of the details of the exam procedures varied by year, but in general the picture looked as follows: From 1988, exams have been scored on the basis of 900 points. Students in Shenzhen high schools studied in several groupings: arts, sciences, foreign language, and most recently design arts. Altogether, students took exams in politics, geography, history, Chinese, English, math and sciences, but the arts and sciences majors took a different collection of tests over the two-day examination period which occurred in July. Also, the English exam for foreign language majors included an oral component. Each individual test was scored on a 900 point basis; the test scores were then averaged together. Since their components differed, arts and sciences test scores are not comparable. The tests varied a bit in difficulty from year to year so the averages were not strictly comparable over time either, as are the SATs[40] in the U.S. Consequently, the most accurate comparison is restricted to any particular year, comparing a school's average score with the score-line for key schools that year (see Table 2.14 and Figure 2.5).

Figure 2.5: SZU entrants scoring above provincial score-line (percentage)



As noted, for the purposes of recruitment, SZU was placed in the middle category. Many students, especially those from Shenzhen who wished to remain in the SEZ close to their family, had sufficiently high test scores to gain admission to key schools. Instead, they chose SZU.

The dramatic decline in scores in 1996 indicates SZU's inability to attract high scoring high school seniors. This is attributed, in part, to the fact that students went to other universities where tuition was lower. SZU's Teachers College, however, was able to attract higher quality students than those admitted to many of SZU's *benke* programs. In fact, entrance test scores for almost all Teachers College majors in 1996 and 1997 were higher than the average scores for freshmen in corresponding majors in the regular *benke* degree program.[41] The students at Teachers College came from outside the SEZ; and most of these students, because they were studying to become teachers, were not charged tuition. (A small number of students, all design majors, paid tuition because their study did not involve teacher training). Teachers College students were part of a sandwich class. Those from low-income families could not afford SZU's *benke* tuition; at the same time they did not score high enough on the entrance exam to get scholarships to key universities. Even though they might not want to become teachers, they were sandwiched in by income and test score, and Teachers College offered them an alternative. It allowed them to live in the SEZ and go to college tuition-free.

Local versus non-local students

When SZU was created it was permitted to recruit province-wide and even nationwide in order to accomplish its prime directive: generate *rencai* [human talent] for the SEZ. During its early years recruitment outside Shenzhen was necessary because the zone's population was small and its middle schools undeveloped. The SEZ catchment area was unable to provide enough high quality students for the university. The latter years saw increasing numbers of better qualified students applying from outside the economic zone. The ratio of local to non-local students fluctuated over the years, as indicated in Table 2.15, next page. From the late 1980s, the municipality required that at least 70% of SZU students be Shenzhen residents. Given this quota, qualified non-locals were denied admission in favor of Shenzhen residents who had lower scores on the entrance exam.

From the start, SZU was keen to get non-local students, those from outside Shenzhen as well as from outside Guangdong. The presence of non-locals enhanced the school's reputation, for generally only key universities undertook nationwide recruitment. At the very least, province-wide recruitment could reinforce the perception that the school was a provincial-level university, although actually it was under municipal leadership. Authorized by the SEdC to recruit across China, SZU took in non-Guangdong students from 1983-86. After an eight-year hiatus the policy resumed in 1994 when the municipal government approved the school's request to recruit outside Guangdong.

In 1986 all regular *benke* students hailed from Guangdong, but about two-thirds of the *daipei* (employer-contracted) students came from the North. These students did not take the regular Guangdong entrance exam; rather, they took the appropriate local provincial exam, which was scored somewhat differently from the Guangdong exam. In planning for 1987 recruitment, the admissions group vowed to undertake better nationwide promotion; as a result *daipei* students for that year came from 23 provinces or province-level cities. But, by 1988, active recruitment of non-Guangdong residents stopped, apparently in response to the city's desire that SZU spend its resources to recruit and educate graduates of local high schools. When extra-Guangdong recruitment resumed in 1994, 44 students (80% in science) were taken from Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang. In 1995, 95 students were taken from Beijing, Shandong, Liaoning, Hebei, Hubei, Hunan and Anhui. Most of these were to enroll in the newly established SZU Teachers College. The 1996 plan also included 60 regular *benke* students from Bei-

Table 2.15: Benke local recruitment and scores[42]

year	% from SEZ	% above Guangdong score-line	
		SEZ	non-SEZ
1988	50	na	na
1989	67	na	na
1990	71	na	na
1991	68	55	58
1992	65	51	66
1993	64	44	55
1994	71	31	74
1995	66	na	na
1996	54	na	na

jing, Hubei, Tianjin, Futian, Jilin and Anhui, allocated strictly by department. For example, Architecture according to the plan was given one student from Tianjin; Mechanical Engineering got two from Anhui; Chemistry, two from Hubei. The Teachers College took freshmen from Guangdong, Hunan, Henan, Anhui, Sichuan, Jiangxi, Jilin and Shanghai.

The university's conflict with the municipality over local/non-local admissions was continuous. It occurred each year during the annual negotiation over the recruitment plan. In 1987 high school seniors from around the province showed a keen interest in SZU, with 900 students making the university their first choice, the equivalent to a rise in applications in the North American context. "Applications" were 1.7 times actual enrollment, a 40% increase over 1986. For that year, all SZU applicants who passed the threshold were recruited, but "many" non-local students with better scores were rejected. In its report to the city, the university suggested that the local-non-local quota should be 40:60. The next year's increase in applications was exponential. Ten times (10,000) more exam-takers chose SZU as their first choice in 1988 than in 1987. For that year, the city had agreed to a 50:50 local/non-local ratio.

In 1989 the municipality required that all local applicants who scored above the threshold be accepted. That year's total planned enrollment was lowered 20% as the result of national policy in the wake of 4 June. In order to attract as many Shenzhen residents as possible, adjustments between categories were made. The regular *benke* quota was increased; *daipei* was minimized and shifted to *zifei*. Sixty-eight of the 84 fee-paying students were from Shenzhen. Before actual recruitment, the Academic Affairs Office input the names, location, scores, and major preference of all who chose SZU into a computer program and required departments to take any Shenzhen student who scored above the threshold. This was done so that departments could not fill their quotas with high scoring non-residents, automatically rejecting lower scoring Shenzhen students. Since SZU had not announced a quota in advance, many non-locals selected SZU as their first choice, figuring that a high score would automatically gain them admittance. Some students even left blank the key school preference and listed SZU as their first choice. Thus, 180 non-locals above the key score line were rejected; some ended up as *zhuanke* at other institutions. As a result, rejected students, their parents and high school counselors as well as provincial authorities were upset with SZU's recruitment. In its annual report, which reads like a self-criticism, AAO admitted that recruitment "had not been done well." Some departments ended up with too many students, others too few. Also, AAO had not consulted with the municipal Planning Bureau when it sought and received Guangdong's approval to increase the *benke* quota by 20, resulting in the taking of more non-locals. From 1990, the university became more deferential to municipal planners.

The AAO expected that non-local students' interest in SZU would sharply decline in 1990 as many would be "scared" of choosing SZU as a result of 4 June.[43] As a counter-attack it decided to print recruitment information early, and it made video programs. The publicity materials explained the attraction of SZU for non-Shenzhen residents. It mentioned that all graduates recruited by Shenzhen work-units were given automatic residency in the SEZ and that the Shenzhen Personnel Bureau would provide them cadre status, something important for obtaining housing and welfare benefits. That year, once again, the AAO recommended a 60:40 local/non-local split and said that local students should be chosen from high to low score. It opposed automatic recruitment of locals just because the threshold was reached. It also recommended that 10% of the *zhuanke* quota be reserved for non-locals, in order to increase quality in that program. In reality, the 1990 recruitment plan used the 70:30 ratio, as mandated by Shenzhen. In 1991 SZU continued to argue for the 60:40 ratio, mentioning that, although excellent students from Shenzhen could go out to attend key universities, SZU was being unfairly restricted from taking good students from outside the economic zone. At the same time it adopted the somewhat contradictory policy that children of SZU staff be allowed to enter if their scores were only 20 points below the cutoff.

In 1992 and 1993 recruiters were unable to fill the 70% local quota with students above the key score line, resulting in shortfalls of 60 and 40 students, respectively. The line was lowered for 34 local students admitted in 1992. *Zhuanke* became popular among fee-payers and was enlarged. Its popularity was due, according to the AAO report, because the alternative for these applicants would be a Guangdong teachers college (the score lines were identical). Paying one's own money to go to SZU to get a short-cycle certificate was much more appealing than tuition-free study outside the SEZ to become a credentialed teacher. In 1994 SZU suggested that the geographic ratio be eliminated altogether. That year's shortfall of 40 local students was related to the fact that 170 high school seniors in Shenzhen chose universities outside the zone. The quota restriction continued in 1995, with SZU again criticizing the policy, which that year resulted in SZU's rejecting 200 "very qualified" non-local students. This was the greatest disparity to date: 30% of SEZ students scoring above the key score line, compared to 74% of non-locals. That year delegations of recruiters went to Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang; 58% of these northern students recruited passed the key score line.

Over the years recruitment inside Guangdong took various forms, always with efforts to "enlarge the applicant pool and thus improve quality." In the early years, SZU sent its own students with flyers back to their high schools in order to recruit freshmen. This was done during the week-long break around the time of the 1 May national holiday. In 1986 at the end of May the heads of 17 key middle schools were invited to SZU. The same year, in the month between the date scores were reported and actual recruitment began, President Luo Zhengqi sent university officials to visit eight key high schools in order to generate interest and meet with possible applicants. In 1987 the Guangdong and Shenzhen television stations and newspapers provided the university publicity. The school also printed up a fancier brochure with pictures, which emphasized the beauty of the garden-like campus and its freshness and innovation.

In 1989 key middle school principals were also invited to campus for a seminar. The university printed a flyer called "Friend of Exam Takers Who Aim for SZU." The revised brochure updated the inventory, listing details for its language labs, computer center and library, as well as information on tuition, academic staff and scholarships. It described the Social Science Foundation Department, the entity at that time responsible for the post-4

June political/ideological education courses, as “not an academic department, but a service department with the same status as the library and computer and audio visual centers.” Perhaps this discussion was added in an attempt to arrest the fears of prospective students who had heard about the university’s rectification and political re-education. Or, on the other hand, perhaps the mention of political education was intended to scare away any high school seniors who were expecting SZU to be a seedbed for dissidents. Like the earlier brochure, it was also directed to exam-exempt students.

In 1991 public relations work advanced further. In April principals of key middle schools visited; and during the spring, local high school seniors visited in large groups, touring the library and taking lunch in the student canteen. Over 10,000 brochures were printed for a June education fair in Guangzhou during which the SZU recruiters received over 1,000 parents and students. In late June 1992 admissions officials went to eight key high schools in Guangzhou and six Shenzhen high schools for recruitment, on the look-out especially for athletes and students with singing or dancing talents.[44] This routine continued for the next several years, supplemented by visits to a half dozen key high schools—including Guangya in Guangzhou, Zhuhai #1, Foshan #1, Jiangmen #1 and Zhaoqing Secondary in western Guangdong. Another 10,000 flyers were printed in 1992 and 5,000 the next year. By1994 Guangdong recruitment efforts had become routine. By 1996 SZU’s homepage on the Internet appeared, and new efforts were made to recruit students from northern China, Hong Kong and Macau. Recruitment booklets lost their glossy edge and became more fact-oriented, presenting introductions to academic departments and university facilities.[45]

Recommended and test-exempt students

SZU faced difficulty in recruiting students during its first years before a reputation of any sort had been established. Thus, school leaders asked high schools to recommend students (*tui jian*). Some of these “excellent” students recommended by their high schools became exempt from the college entrance exam; a select few were allowed to arrive on campus several weeks before the other freshmen so they could take special English and computer courses.[46]

In 1986, one-quarter—182 students—were exempted from taking the CEE. Some departments had to forego high-scoring students to make room for recommended ones. Electrical Engineering, for example, could have obtained a freshman class with 90% of its students scoring above the key score-line. But given recommended students, the figure reached only 80%. Another problem was that many different schools were recommending students. The 41 new students in the Chinese Department came from 28 high schools. One school had recommended seven of these students, five of whom scored below the departmental average. With the university's reputation improving, Academic Affairs saw the need to control the number of recommended students; "otherwise they will bring more harm than benefit." The AAO instructed department heads to strictly review recommended students. In no case should they accept low-scoring students recommended *after* the entrance exam. However, departments were permitted to take students as regular *benke* who scored 15 points below the recruiting average, as long as the score was above the threshold for second level institutions. If applicants scored more than 15 points below, they would become self-paying *benke* or be placed into the *zhuanke* program.

The AAO continued to voice concerns in 1987, writing in its annual report that too many students entered through the back-door (*hou men*), something that negatively affected recruitment work. It stressed that recommended students still had to take the entrance test. Exam-exempt students that year were required to be interviewed in English by a SZU teacher. Test-exempt students averaged about one per class, 35 in 1987 and 25 in 1988. Thirty-eight of 60 candidates interviewed were selected in 1989. Beginning in 1990, test-exempt places were set at 20, and SZU teachers no longer went to interview the students at their middle schools. Instead, the students were required to come to the campus. In 1991, 20 of 37 candidates were selected. In 1992 SZU was prohibited by the local government from accepting test-exempt students from places other than Shenzhen.[47] (That year two students from Shenzhen were enrolled without taking exams.) By 1996 test exemption existed only for Teachers College freshmen (11% in *benke*, 3% *zhuanke*).

Compatriot students

From its inception the university was eager to recruit students from Hong Kong and Macau. In the 1980s Hong Kong had only two major universities—Hong Kong University and the Chinese University of Hong Kong. (Macau's single university was not up to either Chinese nor international standards.) More Hong Kong residents went abroad for tertiary education than stayed in the colony, especially those who went to high school abroad or to the international schools in Hong Kong which adhered to North American or European curricula. The U.K., Australia, Canada and the U.S. were popular with many Hong Kong students. Others went to Mainland universities, especially Jinan University in Guangzhou.

In 1984 SZU received 300 applications from Hong Kong and Macau (about one-third of the total number of students who applied to Mainland schools). Of those, 90 listed SZU as their first choice. Over 50 attended the university (Story 10 relates the tale of one such student). After that, however, the number began to dwindle: 16 in 1986, 4 in 1987, 1 in both 1989 and 1991, 6 in 1994, 1 in 1995, and 1 (from Taiwan) in 1996. The drastic drop can be explained by several factors. The most important reason for the decline in compatriot enrollment was that Hong Kong expanded its own post-secondary education and began upgrading its colleges and polytechnic institutions into universities, following the pattern that occurred at the same time in the U.K. By the mid-1990s, Hong Kong had seven universities, and secondary school students faced less competition in striving for university degrees. Another possible factor concerned SZU's reputation, largely based on word-of-mouth. SZU's students from Hong Kong went back home almost every weekend, able to enter and leave with no more identification than their Hong Kong ID card. What they said about SZU remains unknown, but their statements were apparently not sufficient to lure more students in the following years.

Despite annual remonstrations from AAO that more intense recruitment of compatriots was needed, the years 1986 and 1987 provided the only effective recruitment of students from Hong Kong and Macau. Hong Kong students who wished to study at SZU followed the same arrangements set for seven key universities: Beijing, Qinghua, Fudan, Zhongshan, Zhongshan Medical, Huanan Polytech and Xiamen. High school seniors who applied to these schools or to SZU put down their choices and were recruited according to test score. Applicants deemed "especially qualified" by SZU could, however, be exempt from the test. A brochure summarized the formal application procedure and described the majors which accepted Hong Kong students. All applicants were given interviews. The brochure stated the grades required on the Hong Kong tertiary qualifying exams as well as the high school courses required of Hong Kong applicants. Tuition was set the same as for domestic students— ¥20 tuition and ¥5 accommodation—but it had to be paid in foreign exchange. This was a small fraction of the cost of Hong Kong tertiary education at that time.[48] Hong Kong students were treated basically the same as other students. They were eligible for all majors except Household Appliances, Chinese Secretary and Statistics.

Daipei

Daipei provided one of the ways to enroll students from outside the economic zone. In 1986 one-third of all *daipei benke* students came from Guangdong; the rest hailed from 15 provinces and provincial-level cities. Most *daipei* students had contracted to work for the Ministry of Water and Power, the China Petroleum Company, or the state-owned Ocean Petroleum Company. The school found it easier to get students from Guangdong than from outside the province where[49]

> parents are not familiar with SZU and have mistaken ideas that it charges more than other universities, that it has special regulations, or that it recruits only from Hong Kong and Macau. Some worry about the high consumption level, that part-time work will affect study and that there is no job assignment.

Still, SZU was able to recruit *daipei* with respectable test results, using score lines higher than the thresholds in the various provinces. The two arts *daipei* recruits that year from Guizhou Province, for example, scored 467 and 455, well above the 424 provincial threshold. Clearly, the problem in 1986 was insufficient quantity—not quality—of *daipei*. The following year presented a different picture.

In 1987 admissions officials raised concerns about a quality gap between regular and *daipei benke*, given that the latter were permitted 30 points lower on test scores. For example, the average science score in International Finance and Trade was 126 points higher than the *daipei* average, and 68 points higher in arts. The quality problem had corrected itself by 1989 when the school reported that *daipei* obtained higher scores than the regular *benke* score line of their own provinces. As a result of post-4 June concerns, only four of the 41 *daipei* entrants came from Guangdong. Admissions officials repeated their earlier suggestion that the *daipei* quota be lowered and that the slots be used instead for fee-paying students. Ocean Petroleum had notified SZU that it was bowing out of *daipei*; the school announced it would generally curtail the program; the contracts SZU signed with the employers of future *daipei* recruits would be revised. At the same time, the school said it preferred fee-payers. It argued that *zifei* students worked as hard as, or even harder than, regular *benke* and that they were “much better” than *daipei*.

Another concern over *daipei* rested not with test scores but with the students’ psychology. The head of Economics, the department which took most of the *daipei* students,[50] represented the concerns of many of his colleagues:

Table 2.16: Benke-zhuanke score comparison—arts[52]

major/department	*benke*	*zhuanke*	difference
Chinese secretary (Chinese)	687.0	606	81.0
Accounting (Economics)	689.5	614	75.5
IFT	730.5	616	114.5
Management	662.5	595	67.5
English (FLD)	651.0	630	21.0
Public Administration	683.0	600	83.0

> We have two types of students: those from Shenzhen and those from inland. Shenzhen students get greater care from their parents and do not have to worry about money. Since they have to find their own jobs, they study hard and perform well academically. Their problem is that they don't care much about the big events of the country. Inland students don't get enough money from their family, and they are not ready for part-time jobs. They admire Shenzhen's work conditions and salary, but they are on *daipei* [and cannot stay here]. They are not balanced psychologically. They take part in a lot of fights and play mahjongg. Some who are punished or persuaded to drop out are this type of student. But even *daipei* students are improving.[51]

Several events helped force *daipei* into extinction. In July 1992 the Shekou Public Security Bureau arrested a *daipei* graduate as the leader of a counterfeiting ring that produced bogus SZU degrees. Around the same time, the Shenzhen Planning Bureau told the university it would no longer be responsible for providing food subsidies for *daipei* or paying for transferring their *hukou*, shifting these burdens directly onto the university. Thus, as concerns over student quality, psychological imbalance, and costs conflated, *daipei* at SZU was terminated after 1993.

Benke-zhuanke ratio

Just below the surface of the debate on local versus non-local students was the issue of whether SZU should focus on the *benke* or the *zhuanke* program. The resolution of the issue was mostly beyond university control. An insufficient number of high-scoring students applied to SZU to make the case for expanding *benke* majors. Meanwhile, local high school graduates were expressing greater interest in *zhuanke*. Secondary schools in the SEZ were producing more graduates who aspired to go to university, but there remained only one comprehensive university in Shenzhen, and its limited expansion

Table 2.17: *Benke*-zhuanke score comparison—sciences[54]

major/department	*benke*	*zhuanke*	difference
Mechanical Engineering	633.5	591	42.5
Electronics	660.5	576	84.5
Physics	633.0	582	51.0
Chemistry	629.5	589	40.5

was nowhere near the rate of increase for the zone's ballooning population. *Zhuanke* students scored lower on the college entrance exams than their *benke* peers. Tables 2.16 and 2.17 compare *benke* and *zhuanke* exam scores for 1993, taken at the time of recruitment.

Zhuanke students were believed to require a lower level of teaching and were considered easier to teach and less costly to manager than four-year students. Thus, *benke* declined as *zhuanke* expanded. This trend was obvious by 1990, when the municipal government published its strategy for educational development. An article in the report characterized the structure of the SEZ's higher education as "unreasonable," criticizing the *benke-zhuanke* ratio as "improper."[53] The author, a staff member of the Shenzhen Planning Bureau, argued that there were too few majors in the SEZ higher education system, which included teacher and adult education as well as SZU. The system offered only 53 unique majors, while the labor market demanded *rencai* for a total of 82 fields. Moreover, an imbalance existed between sciences and management majors in Shenzhen's higher education. The science-to-management ratio in Shenzhen was 1:1.1, thus under emphasizing science, as compared with ratios in foreign countries (Japan 2.4:1; U.S. 1.5:1; West Germany 3.9:1; South Korea 1.8:1).

The above-cited article, as well as the 1990 report itself, appeared to be calling for more practical and technical higher education. At that time the SEZ was planning to build a vocational/technical university. If this were not built, the report suggested, then SZU should bear the burden of training technical *rencai*. This became a moot point since the vocational/technical university was in fact built. Yet the underlying message of the report was quite visible: that SZU's main duty was to train skilled personnel for the SEZ. The report strongly implied that this objective was best accomplished through the *zhuanke* mechanism. *Benke*, which supplied more general education, was not as relevant to SEZ needs. Any re-orientation toward *zhuanke* and specialization, however, flew in the face of national trends as well as SEdC policy. By the late 1990s China's educational planners anticipate that *zhuanke* enrollment will drop from 63.9% of tertiary students in 1995, to 63.4% in the year 2000 and 56.5% in 2010.[55]

Politics and recruitment

To some extent politics is embedded in Chinese higher education, and one might expect politics to influence enrollment in terms of quantity and type of students admitted. Elsewhere in China, enrollment related to job allocation. As China's experimental university, SZU was free from this constraint. Nevertheless, enrollment proceeded as if it were the initial stage of an allocation system. The quotas for majors and types of students—regular, fee-paying, contracted students, degree track, junior college—were set by a plan that was the product of negotiation between the university and the Shenzhen Planning Bureau, with ratification by the Guangdong Higher Education Bureau. In so far as negotiation is the essence of politics, politics thus becomes an integral part of the enrollment system. Spring 1989 was a time the university tried to act independently by going around the municipal Planning Bureau, directly to provincial authorities, in an attempt to increase the *benke* quota by 20 places. The staff of the Planning Bureau became livid when they learned of the university's subterfuge. Nevertheless, there is not much evidence to suggest that the Planning Bureau often tried to micro-manage enrollment; on the contrary, the university was given great leeway in academic matters such as creating new majors. The only blatant political intervention of any sort came in 1989 when SZU, like other universities in the PRC, was forced to revise recruitment plans downward by 20%. This was the single, dramatic political intervention in enrollment planning, a national response to the student and faculty protests of the spring.

Enrollment at SZU was tied to national politics in so far as it related to the Shenzhen SEZ. During 1980-1981 secondary school education in Shenzhen was so underdeveloped that few students took the college entrance exams.[56] Discussions to develop the special zone's education, including higher education, proceeded from that time. However, considerations on establishing a university did not occur until later, over a brief period—from the province-issued preparatory document in late 1982 to the State Council's approval of SZU on 10 May 1983.

For the first few years of the 1980s decade, the future of the special zones remained in doubt, for Shenzhen especially was not living up to expectations. The peak of criticism occurred in early 1982.[57] At that time the political climate in Beijing would not have permitted so large an educational investment as a university in Shenzhen. In June 1982 the State Council created a Special Economic Zone Affairs Office, headed by the Premier Zhao Ziyang, a move that "provided SEZ policy with a firmer bureaucratic foundation in the capital against potential rivals in other established ministries."[58] By the end of the year, when discussions over SZU occurred, criticism of Shenzhen was ebbing. The CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang visited the zone in early 1983 and endorsed its further economic growth. The university's very establishment was made possible in a window of opportunity characterized by political support for the zone. Otherwise, enrollment—indeed the university's very establishment—might not have occurred at that time.

Ironically, the university's founding, on 27 September 1983, came but several days after the launch of a national anti-spiritual pollution campaign that followed speeches by CCP ideologist Deng Liqun.[59] Shenzhen, however, was largely shielded from the on-slaught of the campaign, and the university enrolled its first students at that time. The next peak of national criticism of the economic zones came in early 1985 about the time that enrollment planning was underway at SZU. Although enrollment grew, the rate of growth declined for that year (see Table 2.4). Early 1986 saw another low peak in criticism. At this time SZU took in a small group of fee-paying students, a radical departure from higher education's Marxist orientation which had excluded such a category. The political climate was right for such an innovation. Enrollment growth declined for this year, something not in response to political factors, but attributed instead to lack of effective publicity and the university's overall inexperience in recruiting. Student demonstrations at SZU and other universities in December 1986 did not adversely affect success in 1987's recruitment. The period immediately following the protests was another peak of anti-economic zone debate at the state level. By mid-1987, when recruitment was approved by municipal and provincial authorities, the protests were a thing of the past and a new, more realistic strategy for the special zones was emerging.[60] In the absence of state-level criticism, the SEZ was entering an era of expansion. This was reflected in SZU enrollment policy for 1987. Enrollment in 1988 almost maintained the level of the previous year and witnessed the beginning of the decline in *daipei*. The year marked a low peak in state-level criticism of the special zones. Following the enrollment decline of 1989, as noted above, enrollment growth steadily rose for the next five years. Deng Xiaoping's inspection tour of Shenzhen in early 1992 marked the patriarch's last major public outing before his death, an attempt to silence critics of his economic reform policy.

By that time, SZU's recruitment policy was firm and had moved beyond political influence from the state level. The higher education reforms of 1993 phased out the various enrollment categories based on state subsidy. Tuition was instituted for almost all students. The expansion of *zifei* and the decline of *daipei* in 1992-93 predated and accompanied this policy change.

Concluding thoughts

Regardless of the influence of external political factors, SZU never exercised much control over the quality of students it enrolled. Exam-takers had to state a preference specifically for SZU; a small pool of applicants (which happened the first four years) necessarily resulted in fewer high scoring students. An unknown (but presumably high) number of each freshmen class failed to get into key universities, and many of these "rejects" ended up settling for SZU. Despite efforts to attract higher scoring enrollees, student quality as measured by test scores declined. In part, this phenomenon resulted from interference by the upper levels of government. The Shenzhen government especially wanted a more technical institution offering short-cycle *zhuanke* programs, which were allowed to admit lower scoring students.

Several factors led to lower standards for incoming students at SZU. In the 1980s the university was forced to reject high scoring applicants from outside the SEZ in favor of lower scoring test-takers from Shenzhen. Year after year SZU fought against this policy, to no avail. The municipality, as SZU's primary financial backer, insisted on this type of affirmative action to favor local residents. Thus, from 1989 SZU experienced a decline in student quality, as measured by CEE scores. The extent to which this decline could have been slowed down if the city's affirmative action policy had not existed is unknown. Also contributing to the decline was the university's willingness to take test-exempt students who were recommended by their secondary schools. An emphasis on *zhuanke,* which by definition takes less qualified students than *benke,* also contributed to lowering overall student quality. Finally, when universities began charging tuition, fees at SZU became the highest in China. To some extent this excluded, or at least discouraged, poor but well-qualified students from applying to SZU. On the books at least the university operates a loan scheme to help underprivileged students, but none of the university's public documents has ever assessed this program. According to at least one political tutor I spoke with, even students who held loans or scholarships did not have sufficient income to be like normal students from Shenzhen, who enjoy a high standard of living. Compounding all the factors mentioned above is the university's reputation for having "ninth rate students" despite good facilities. SZU's entrants are still in the top one-quarter of the nation's secondary graduates, but correcting this public perception of poor student quality will perhaps be as difficult as improving student quality itself.

---

1. Source: 1993 *benke* graduates survey. Percent totals may not sum due to rounding.
2. Huang, *The Determinants of Institutional Effectiveness of the Senior High Schools in Shenzhen Municipality*, 1993.
3. Source: 1993 *benke* graduates survey. Percent totals may not sum due to rounding.
4. Source: 1993 *benke* graduates survey.
5. The enrollment rate for university students in China (aged 18-21) [i.e., percentage of the population cohort going into tertiary education] was 3.4%, 6.8% and 7%, for the years 1990, 1995 and 1996 respectively. Based on the state plan, that figure is expected to increase to 11-12% by the year 2010: Hu Ruiwen, "Educational development in China in the 1990s," 1997, p. 5, 11-2. The increase in college enrollment is shown in the following figures: The number of full-time college students per 10,000 population increased from 11.5 in 1980 to 18.5 in 1990, and to 25 in 1996: Min, "Major strategic issues for Chinese higher education development for the twenty-first century," 1997, p. 8.
6. Sources: SZU yearbooks. Data include Teachers College recruitment for 1994 and 1995 and exclude part-time *zhuanke* students.
7. Hu Ruiwen, "Chinese higher education," 1996, p. 3. This conference paper provides the national data that are used in this and the following paragraph.
8. 3,115 + 970. The latter figure was provided by SZU in its self-evaluation report for the 1995 accreditation. In FTE computations, three part-time *zhuanke* students equal one full-time equivalent.
9. Hu Ruiwen, "Chinese higher education," 1996, p. 3. The U.S. figure is consistent with data compiled by the U.S. Department of Education.
10. Shenzhen Municipality and Party Committee, "Report to Guangdong Province on creating Shenzhen University," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 154.
11. *1986 Yearbook*, p. 131; *1987 Yearbook*, p. 244; *1988 Yearbook*, p. 168; *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 83; *1991 Yearbook*, p. 168; *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 192; *1995 Yearbook*, p. 146; *1997 Yearbook*, pp. 137-8.
12. Source: SZU yearbooks.
13. SZU CCP, "Freshen up your spirits, march forward boldly, March 1990," *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 16.

---

14. "SZU Night University self-evaluation report," *1996 Yearbook*, pp. 16-26.
15. The *benke* figure is based on graduation figures for the classes which were enrolled. Student population based on enrollment figures is 2,686. Both figures include 52 Architecture majors who enrolled in the five-year program in 1986. A multiplier of .4 is used to compute FTEs. Part-time students in these programs take 2-4 times longer than full-time students to complete their studies. The estimate for the training and correspondence figure is based on an even distribution over nine years. These courses last about two weeks. A multiplier of .05 is used to compute FTEs.
16. Shenzhen Municipality and Party Committee, "Report to Guangdong Province on creating Shenzhen University," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 154. Guangdong Province and the state Ministry of Education approved these figures in documents dated 8 March 1983 and 10 May 1983, respectively, *1986 Yearbook*, pp. 160-1.
17. The year 1990 happens to be, coincidentally, the only year for which published data exist in all enrollment categories of Table 2.6.
18. By 1991 the school reported that 100,000 persons had received short-term training over nine years, *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 46. Assuming these courses average two weeks in duration, that approximates 500 FTEs.
19. Source: "Ten-year development plan and eighth five-year plan," *1991 Yearbook*, pp. 11-8. The percent increases were not correctly computed in the original.
20. Shenzhen Educational Science Research Institute, *Research on the Strategy of Shenzhen's Educational Development,* 1991, p. 126.
21. Liang Shuping, "Opinions on the strategic report on Shenzhen's educational development," *1989-90 Yearbook,* p. 46-8.
22. "Self-evaluation report, 12 October 1995," *1995 Yearbook*, p. 61.
23. "Teaching work adjustment measures, 20 November 1995," *1995 Yearbook*, p. 62
24. "SZU Economics College reform and development plan, 1997-2000," *1997 Yearbook*, pp. 153-9.
25. Liu Renjing, "Combining tracks," 1995. The corresponding figure for 1994 was 13.2%: *1995 Education Statistics Yearbook of China*, p. 20.
26. Y.J. Liu, *Book of Major Educational Events in China, 1949-1990, vol. 2,* p. 1511.
27. A: *1986 Yearbook*, p. 197. The figure 208 is reported in *1987 Yearbook*, p.216. The figure 216 is reported in the *Shenzhen 1985 Yearbook*, p. 177;
    B: *1986 Yearbook* , p. 197. The figure 481 is reported in 1987*Yearbook*, p. 216. *Benke* total for 1983-1984 is reported as 689 in *Shenzhen 1985 Yearbook*, p. 493; C: *1986 Yearbook*, p. 197. *Benke* figures in *1987 Yearbook*, p. 216: 612 regular, 84 *daipei*, 3 *zifei*;

C: *1986 Yearbook*, p. 197. *Benke* figures in *1987 Yearbook*, p. 216: 612 regular, 84 *daipei*, 3 *zifei*;
D: *1986 Yearbook*, p. 197, 201. Regular *benke* includes 14 from Macau. *Benke* figures in *1987 Yearbook*, p. 216: 751 regular, 135 *daipei*, 30 *zifei*; 31 *zifei* reported in *1986 Yearbook*, p. 197;
E: *1987 Yearbook*, p. 242. *Benke* figures reported in 1987 yearbook, p. 216: 563 regular, 203 *daipei;*
F*: 1988 Yearbook*, pp. 68-9 (data internally inconsistent);
G: *1989-1990 Yearbook*, p. 117;
H: Huang Shuhua, "A summary of 1990 recruitment," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 11 (1990), p. 26;
I: *1991 Yearbook*, p. 258;
J: *1992-1993 Yearbook*, p. 266. The total number of *benke* and *zhuanke* given as 760 in *Brief # 215* (5 Sept. 1992);
K: *1992-1993 Yearbook*, p. 269. Excludes 44 teaching college *benke;*
L: *1994 Yearbook*, p. 204. Data are inconsistent with earlier figures: (a) 679 benke, 521 *zhuanke*, reported by Chen Guangguan, 1994 Recruitment, *Shenda Tongxun*, 26 (1994), p. 16, and (b) 635 *benke* [excluding 44 in Teachers College], 561 *zhuanke*, *Brief # 343* (1 Sept. 1994);
M: *1995 Yearbook*, p. 265. Edmonds College "*zhuanke daipei*" not included.
N: *1996 Yearbook*, p. 216. Figure does not include 160 Teachers College *benke* freshmen and 87 Teachers College *zhuanke* freshmen
O: *1997 Yearbook*, p. 173. Figure does not include 178 Teachers College *benke* and 91 Teachers College *zhuanke*.

28. A: *1987 Yearbook*, p. 224;
B. *1987 Yearbook*, p. 242;
C: Correspondence, Academic Affairs Office, 1995;
D*: 1987 Yearbook*, p. 216;
Han Yun, "Recruitment summary," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 1 (1987), p. 13. Data within the article are inconsistent. The total figure given is 1,132, which is less than the sum of its components*;*
F: 1985 *zhuanke* (*1989-90 Yearbook*, 249),'87 *benke* (*1991 Yearbook*, 203), '87 Architecture (*1992-3 Yearbook*), p. 267.
G: 486 with bachelors, 275 without.

29. The confusion is not clarified by other data published on Shenzhen education in *A Collection of Social Development Achievements in Shenzhen 1979-1994*, 1996, pp. 176-9. Like the Shenzhen yearbooks, the data do not disaggregate higher education institutions in Shenzhen.

30. Source: graduates name lists, includes regular, *daipei* and *zifei*. Enrollment data from Table 2.8. Col. (3) is computed as col. (2) ö col. (1), or the percentage of enrolled students who graduate with a bachelors degree. Col. (6) is

col. (5) ö col. (1), or the percent of enrolled students who graduate (with or without a degree). SZU *zhuanke* operates in both two- and three-year programs. In this table some enrolled students may be assigned to the incorrect years for graduation. For the years 1987-1995 it appears that the *zhuanke* graduation rate was about 85%, higher than for *benke*.

A: *1988 Yearbook*, p. 124; *1989 Yearbook*, p. 244 (for 5 year Architecture);

B: *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 244, 254;

C: *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 251 (includes estimated 33 Architecture graduates for which data are unavailable);

D: "1991 AAO report," *1991Yearbook*; *1992 Yearbook*, p. 367;

E: *Ibid.*;

F: *1992 Yearbook*, p. 366, 372;

G: *1992 Yearbook*, p. 371; Cai Delin, "Teaching work," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 45;

H: *1994 Yearbook*, p. 296;

I: *1995, 1996 Yearbook* (includes '91 Architecture who graduated in 1996);

J: *1988 Yearbook*, p. 127. In enrollment figures, these students appear as *benke daipei*;

K: *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 249;

L: *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 257;

M: "1991 AAO report," *1991Yearbook;*

N: *1992 Yearbook*, p. 369*;*

O: *1992 Yearbook*, p. 374. Includes 32 graduates among 41 enrolled in the three-year 1991 *zhuanke* Household Appliance major;

P: *1994 Yearbook*, p. 299. Includes 91 graduates in Household Appliance, and 15 Physics 1995 graduates in the three-year *zhuanke* program;

Q: *1995 Yearbook*, p. 335; 1996 *Yearbook*, pp. 295-7. Includes students who enrolled in three-year *zhuanke* programs in 1993, who graduated in 1996;

R: *1996 Yearbook*, p. 292-3; includes 1992 Architecture students who graduated in 1997;

S: *1996 Yearbook*, p. 294;

T: *1997 Yearbook*, p. 343-5; Includes 40 Architecture students enrolled in 1992 and scheduled to graduate in 1999. Data for col. (1) and col. (4) assume that 26% of them will obtain a degree, based on the 6-year average from Table 2.9;

U: *1997 Yearbook*, p. 346-8; by the mid-1990s most *zhuanke* programs in science and engineering lasted three years; arts programs took two years.

31. "Accepting training students, 25 April 1992," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 361.
32. This is discussed in Agelasto, *University in Turmoil*, Chapter Eight.
33. Sources: Same as Table 2.8; *1987 Yearbook*, p. 224; *1988 Yearbook*, p. 62; *1991 Yearbook*, p. 257; *1986 Yearbook*, p. 198, reports 669 regular and 109

daipei benke in plan.

34. Data for 1993. Liu Renjing, "Combining tracks," 1994, p. 13.
35. For general discussion, see "The toll bridge into university," *China News Analysis*, no. 1602, 15 January 1998.
36. Sources: *1987 Yearbook*, p. 135, 224, 240; *1988 Yearbook*, p. 62, 198; *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 122; *1991 Yearbook*, p. 256; *1994 Yearbook*, p. 27; 1996 SZU homepage. Data for 1989 regular student tuition appear to be inaccurate. In 1996 students from Guangdong who were recruited to IFT, Economics, Electronics, Architecture and Design paid ¥4,500, while those in other departments paid ¥4,000. Students from other provinces were charged ¥2,000 and those from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, HK $4,000. Students to SZU Teachers College in teaching specialties did not pay tuition; those in non-teaching acting and drama majors paid ¥6,000 if from Guangdong and ¥3,500 if from other provinces.
37. Chongqing, China's largest city, was elevated to provincial-level municipality in 1996.
38. Source: *Dalu qiaobao*, reprinted in *Dangjian wenhui* (Shenyang) October 1996, no. 10, p. 24, cited in Rosen, "The impact of economic reform on Chinese education," 1997.
39. Sources: SZU yearbooks; Huang Shuhua, "A summary of 1990 recruitment," *Shenda Tongxun* 11 (1990), p. 26; Han Yun, "Recruitment summary," *Shenda Tongxun* 1 (1987), p. 13. These data report the average high/low scores among departments. Individual departments, therefore, can have higher or lower scores than the average high/low. *Brief* # 343 (1 Sept. 1994) reported that 46.3% of SZU students scored above provincial score line.
40. Standard Achievements Tests, or college boards.
41. Teachers College scored higher averages each year; only for Physics in 1997 was the mark below the *benke* counterpart (by two points).
42. Sources: SZU yearbooks. Figures for 1995 and 1996 assume that all non-Guangdong recruits are attached to the Teachers College.
43. Recruitment report, *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 120.
44. *Brief # 210* (2 July 1992).
45. See *1996 Recruitment Introduction*; and information on the SZU homepage.
46. "Regulations on teaching reform and improving teaching quality, 4 July 1986," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 61.
47. *Brief #210* (2 July 1992).
48. At that time Hong Kong universities charged about 10% of their North American counterparts; even in the late 1990s after the Hong Kong government began removing some of its subsidies for higher education, tuition remained about one-fourth that of the average American school.
49. *1986 Yearbook*, p. 203.

---

50. E.g., 33% of 1987 *benke*, 87% of the 1987 *zhuanke*, 75% of 1990 *benke*.
51. Zhang Minru, *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 54; the head of the Psychological Counseling Center reported that *daipei* were involved in many campus fights, *1988 Yearbook*, p. 121. Many informants confirmed the view that Northern Chinese students were trouble-makers.
52. Source: AAO computer print-outs, 5 September 1993, 4 October 1993. Several department majors have been averaged for Accounting, IFT and Management *benke*.
53. Chen Luhong, "Educational structure reform," 1991.
54. Source: *Ibid*. Department majors have been averaged for *benke* Mechanical Engineering, *benke* Electronics and *zhuanke* Electronics.
55. Hu Ruiwen, "Educational development in China in the 1990s," 1997, p. 3.
56. Crane, *The Political Economy of China's Special Economic Zones*, 1990, p. 37.
57. *Ibid*.
58. *Ibid*., p. 55.
59. Zhang, *Ideology and Economic Reform under Deng Xiaoping 1978-1993*, 1996, p. 85.
60. *Ibid*., p. 143.

Story 4: Teacher Niu Ye

*My coming to Shenda was in a way very simple. No interviews, no letters. I was a top student and somewhat an eccentric character at Beijing Famous University. (My name means wild ox). I was a "*zhuangyuan*" or number one in the university entrance exam in my home city in Harbin, Heilongjiang Province. So when I first entered Beijing Famous, I was appointed "class monitor" or class leader. At that time [1981], college life was such that a "political advisor" was assigned to "take care of" all the students of the grade. The political advisor had supreme power over all the students as he was in charge of all aspects of students' life other than academic; particularly he had power in the final decision where each student would be "placed" or "assigned" a job after his/her graduation. This particular advisor was nice to me at the beginning as he wanted to train me so I could belong to his group and come out "politically correct." So he urged me to join the Communist Party by the end of the first year. Now, this should have been taken as a compliment as it showed that the "leader" had interest and trust in me. But the early 1980s was a time in China when the "reform" spirit ran high, and I guess I was by nature a "rebel," so I was so naïve to say to him, bluntly, that I was not sure that joining the Party was such a glorious thing and that I had reservations about the Party, and that I needed to think over his proposal (which in China is wording that means "forget it.") After that, he somehow became distant towards me, and I began to despise him more and more, so by and by we became somehow bitter enemies.*

To be a "good student" and to ensure a good future career at that time meant you had to be both "red" (politically) and "excellent" (academically)" I was a top student academically but by no means "red." In the last year, we faced the challenge of our fate as students' placement was decided and we were assigned by the department. This was based largely on the recommendation of the "political advisor." I thought my future would be doomed and that I would be punished (the usual punishment was to be assigned to a far-away frontier province like Xinjiang or Gansu). But you see, my luck was not that bad, as the general political climate was changing as a whole in the country, and we had a new department chair, who was an academic professor and who was active in student affairs. There must have been a lot of students besides me who went to him and complained about this "political advisor" who was playing favor-

ites in job assignment. So perhaps for this reason and others I do not know, this political advisor was taken care of. As he was about to exercise his final power in deciding the future careers of students, he himself got replaced! So we got a new advisor who was much fairer and who listened to students including me. The procedure was such that we students let him know our wishes and where we wanted to go. The final decision rested with the department.

Usually, the graduates of Famous University were "assigned" to various ministries of the central government (Graduates of our department went to one ministry in particular). Most of the students wanted to stay in Beijing, as the majority of us came from various provinces. At that time, as a kind of an "eccentric," I did not know where I wanted to go and what I wanted to do. I was kind of fed up with Beijing, as I thought the political climate was suffocating, and I did not want to become a paper-pushing civil servant, as was the vanity of most students. Neither did I want to go to a big trade company (usually belonging to a certain ministry) as it was the new fad; nor did I want to go back to my province which I believed was not so graceful a backward retreat. So I thought: Shenzhen! Shenzhen to me at that time represented "new," "adventurous," "capitalist!" But as I was not interested in "business," so I said "Shenda." At that time I knew nothing about Shenda and knew nobody in Shenzhen. I made my "wish" clear to the new advisor and got my wish in the end. I have no idea how exactly it worked. But I think it must be like this: I made my wish to the Department, the Department contacted the Ministry of Education to see if there was a need by Shenzhen University, and Shenda, as it was only three years old, must have been hungry for faculty from the best department in my field in the country, so it matched us.

It must be said that the decision to come to Shenzhen in 1985 was considered a "daring move," because Shenzhen at that time was suffering a depression and crisis after its first jump in the early 1980s. Its political fate was by no means clear. Anyway, I was the only one to come to Shenda from Famous University, and in a new, young faculty I was among the best, if not the best, in terms of achievements in my academic field. Again, I was kind of too naïve and cocky, and later some old professors and chairs became quite jealous and resentful, and they got me into trouble. But that's in the past now. I left Shenda after Tiananmen to pursue a Ph.D. abroad and have been trying my guts out to prove myself in the Western academic world.

I met Luo Zhengqi on several occasions. You never knew where you would see him. Unannounced, he would pop into classes or visit with *teachers out of class. Luo was often criticized for caring too much for the students and not enough for the teachers. I had been a student only a few years before and I certainly appreciated the respect Luo showed to youth. The president, himself, was under fifty when he arrived at Shenda. He seemed to understand so many of the problems that plagued China's famous universities: the overbearing and negative influence of politics and an ancient curriculum that did not address modern needs. He left teaching and academics to us teachers. What more could a teacher ask for?*

3. Teachers and staff

Similar to the data on student input, published statistics on teachers and staff are less than perfect, but they still present an accurate sketch. In practice, the hiring process at SZU was less restricted by a government-approved plan than was enrollment; the former enjoyed even more flexibility and autonomy on the part of the school authorities. Just as with students, staff have been both “regular” and “irregular.” The former were those paid by the Finance Office, in other words, those whose positions were included in the staffing plan approved by the Shenzhen Planning Bureau. In contrast, irregular staff did not have their personnel files (*dangan*) formally registered with the university. In most cases, their files remained with their previous work-units. They held contracts with SZU, but since they were not permanent staff, they were not eligible for various subsidies, most notably housing. Their *hukou* (residence permit) were not transferred to Shenzhen. Between 10-20% of the staff over the years have fit into the irregular category. This group also included those who had gone abroad for study but had not formally resigned from the university staff, as well as those staff who took up jobs with companies in Shenzhen. These phantom staff were kept on the books although they no longer in fact worked at the school. Each had to reimburse the school one and a half times his/her salary in order to remain in the school’s employ.[1] In exchange, they were allowed to maintain their household registration and personnel file at SZU. In this way they qualified for welfare benefits and housing. In some official presentations of data these staff were considered “regular;” unfortunately, their inclusion obviously distorts statistics such as staff-student ratio or average work load.

During the early years, somewhat under 10% of the staff at any given time were classified as irregular, e.g., officially reported as 6.9% and 7.5% in 1986 and 1987, respectively. As noted, the group included personnel who had not received formal municipal approval. In many cases, these teachers were eventually formally hired when the municipal Planning Bureau increased the quota, something which normally occurred once a year. In later years, the *regular-irregular* nomenclature was abandoned in favor of the term *working staff*. That is not to say, however, that irregular staff ceased to exist. In 1991, the Finance Office reported 1,192 working staff, only 832 of whom were paid by Finance. The first figure included full-time and part-time staff as well as night school students in the part-time *zhuanke* program (Three of the latter equated to one full-time fixed staff). The first figure was

Box 3.1: Teacher Xing, irregular teacher

Hired in 1988, Teacher Xing came to SZU from Tianjin where he had had an established career teaching university English. He worked in SZU's Foreign Language Department as an irregular teacher. He was given a full work load and he participated in departmental activities, most notably in athletic contests, where he led the department's tug-of-war team to a semi-final victory in Teachers Sport Day. Xing was considered an exceptionally good teacher, and in 1990 he was one of the two teachers assigned to the innovative core course for freshmen English majors. Xing, 48, lived in a 15 square meter dormitory room in a teachers residential block, but since his *hukou* and *dangan* had not been formally transferred, he was unable to obtain residence for his wife and son. The family remained separated. By 1992 Xing saw shifts in university policy resulting in the downsizing of irregular staff and the installing of more political criteria in hiring. He realized that he would not be formally transferred, despite earlier promises, given certain hiring practices of the FLD that were based on personal connections, not merit. He accepted a senior staff position with a university-run enterprise, the Reflective Materials Factory, and was thus able to transfer his *hukou*, *dangan*, and family to Shenzhen.[4] The FLD had lost a teacher who was generally acknowledged as one of the best in the department.

also likely to include about 300 temporary workers who worked in landscaping, security, food services and transportation.[2] In contrast with earlier years, by the 1990s fewer of the irregular staff were teachers.[3] The case of Teacher Xing illustrates the change in policy (see Box 3.1).

Staff-student ratio

Keeping down staff numbers was a major concern of university officials during the school's first seven years. Employing as few staff as possible was one of the dozen key points in the "president running school" system.[5] The university in its first set of reform proposals in 1984 set a 1:3.5 target for its staff-student ratio.[6] This goal was supposed to be achieved by 1990, rising gradually from a 1:3 ratio in 1985, by annual increments of .1.

A ratio tends to be a very problematic statistic because it depends on the accuracy of each of its components. If both student enrollment and staff size are off, the individual inaccuracies may sometimes balance themselves off, e.g., if both are too high or both are too low. However, if one side of the fraction is too high and the other too low, the inaccuracy becomes acute. A

Figure 3.1: Staff-student ratio[9]



Table 3.1: SZU Staff-Student ratio[7]

year	ratio	notes
1985	2.8	
1986	3.5	regular staff only
	3.2	includes irregular staff
1987	3.9	regular staff only
	3.6	includes irregular staff
1991	3.6	staff paid by Finance Office
	2.5	all working staff
1993	3.3	
1995	2.5	

staff-student ratio can be calculated for only the several years for which sufficient data are available. Different ratios for the same year appear in university documents, depending on whether regular or irregular staff were included in computations (see Table 3.1). Data for regular staff (in shaded boxes of Table 3.1) suggest that changes in the ratio reflect changes in regular student enrollment. Student population peaked in 1988 and 1993 after which it fell (see Figure 2.1). Correspondingly, the staff-student ratio peaked in 1987 and 1992 and then fell substantially (Figure 3.1)

As reality suggests, this ratio was not something that could be easily managed, such as in .1 annual increments, given its two independent components. No documents published after 1984 suggested any attempt to manage the staff-student ratio per se. It was merely assumed, and sometimes reported, that SZU enjoyed the lowest staff-student ratio in China.[8]

.

Table 3.2: Teacher-student (FTE) ratios, national averages and for selected universities, circa 1996[10]

Universities with complete data	teacher-student ratio	staff-student ratio
Wuyi U.	15.9	8.8
Hubei U.	12.0	5.7
Guangzhou U of Tech	11.9	4.8
Jinan U	9.2	
Chongqing Zianzhu U.	8.3	
Zhengzhou U.	7.9	3.3
institutions under local jurisdiction	7.9	3.3
Liaoning U.	7.3	
Shenzhen U.	7.7	3.4
all institutions in China	7.3	2.8
Hefei U of Tech	7.0	2.8
Jilin U.	6.9	
ministry-run institutions	6.9	2.5
Beijing Polytech U	6.6	
China U. of Geosciences (Wuhan)	6.2	1.9
SEdC institutions	5.8	1.9
Jilin U. of Technology	5.7	
Shanghai U.	5.7	
agricultural universities (1993)	5.6	
Zhongnan U Finance & Economics	5.3	
U. of Science & Tech, Beijing	5.1	1.9
China U. of Mining & Tech	5.0	
Zhejiang U.	3.3	

Given that the staff-student ratio is a troublesome statistic, comparing this measure between universities is even more problematic. Should the student part of the fraction include adults in continuing education classes? If so, how many adult students are equivalent to one full-time student? If FTE is used (at three adults equal to one FTE), it is possible to compute staff-student ratios in a way that makes for fair comparison among Chinese universities. Data included by universities on their websites may be used. In SZU's case, there were 3,566 FTE in 1995, resulting in a staff-student ratio of 1:3.4 and a teacher-student ratio of 1:7.7.[11] The national average staff-

Table 3.3: 1985 staff expenditure as a percentage of total expenditures for selected Guangdong universities[13]

Jinan	28.9%
Zhongshan	51
Huanan Industrial	46
Huanan Teachers	49.4
SZU	16.2
SZU (excluding equipment)	26.2

student ratio in 1995 was 1:7.3, compared with 1:5.2 in 1990.[12] SZU's comparison with other universities is presented in Table 3.2. The teacher-student ratio is discussed later in this chapter.

In a 1986 report to Shenzhen municipality, the university noted that it employed far fewer staff that other universities in Guangdong. Citing that its own 1:2.84 staff-student ratio favorably compared with the provincial average of 1:1.57, SZU computed that it employed 508 fewer staff.[14] This analysis was not presented in the form of a request for more staff, however. Rather, the data were used to stress the university's efficiency. The same document also reported that SZU proportionally spent much less on staffing than its fellow institutions spent (see Table 3.3). This efficiency was lauded by provincial officials.[15]

In its documents before 1994, the university never complained about a lack of teachers or other staff. As can be seen clearly from the data, staff and teacher quotas did not keep pace with enrollment. For example, the period 1986-1987 saw a 40% rise in student enrollment, but only a 26% staff increase and only a 20% teacher increase (see Figure 2.2). The approved plan for 1986 provided funds for 994 staff. By the end of that year, there were only 891 on board, a 10% shortfall. Over time the staff shortage abated slightly; irregular staff continued to be relied upon. By 1991 the number of working staff actually exceeded the quota by 13%. By 1994 it was clear that SZU wanted more staff than the municipal government was willing to provide. The Shenzhen Personnel Office gave SZU 25 new staff quota for that year and an additional 12 positions at the university's request at the end of the calendar year. Through bookkeeping adjustment it was able to get another 14 positions after removing unemployed personnel who had transferred out but still remained on the books, presumably after the maximum allowable three years had elapsed. In the same year, it tightened up regulations on personnel transfer telling departments to balance staff number

Figure 2.2: Changes in enrollment and staffing[18]



with the assigned quota.[16] Sub-work-units (i.e., departments and offices) with unused quota were told to hire more personnel and those with a quota shortage were told to get rid of staff. Failing university-run enterprises, especially, were told to stop hiring new staff. New recruits were required to have at least masters degrees and be law-abiding, morally good and attractive looking.[17] Each sub-work-unit was to have a 3-5 person staff recruitment review committee consisting of administrative and Party leaders. "Each member of the group should give his/her own opinions," a veiled reference to previous practice in which leaders, not group members, wielded power. Hiring decisions were forwarded to the Personnel Office and then given to the president who had ultimate approval. New staff who changed jobs within SZU inside of three years or who quit the job (to go to another *danwei* or to study abroad) within five years would be fined an unspecified amount. The regulations also discouraged sub-work-units from hiring unemployed spouses of staff members, something which had been a common practice in some departments, including the Foreign Language Department where most support staff were related to teaching staff.

The quota problem had another dimension. Some staff, either newly recruited or promoted, qualified for positions (e.g., associate professor) but the school lacked sufficient quota. Since they could not be put into the proper position, their salary could not match their qualifications. To get around this problem, the university itself made up the difference from income generated from SZU-run enterprises or from side-course offerings.[19] This payment was called a "qualification subsidy" (*zhi wu jin tie*). In 1994, 37 teachers each received an additional ¥300 per month of this type so they could get the salary entitled them by their position.[20] This policy continued through 1995.

Box 3.2: Employment contract for Student Affairs Office leader, 1988[22]

You are hired as vice-director of the Student Affairs Guidance Committee and director of the Part-Time Work Guidance Center from 2 March 1988 to 2 March 1990. If a cadre wants to discontinue or not renew his contract, he must give SZU three months notice. The heads of administrative offices should not be over 55 when hired. The average age of heads and vice-heads usually should not exceed 50. Assistants to office heads should not be over 40. Leaders should be economical in their life style and work and should not treat guests with banquets. The staff of each office should be strictly controlled, not be over age 40, and have at least a *zhuanke* degree. Staff should study political/ideological education and write at least one article each year. Cadres under age 35 should learn Office English's 500 Sentences and be able to operate a computer. Those cadres who do not learn and progress will not be promoted.

To further solve the quota problem, SZU permitted retiring staff to "borrow quotas from other work-units" so that their SZU slots could be filled before they retired. Staff receiving certain state subsidies approved by the State Council as well as staff under age 40 holding a Ph.D. and associate senior qualification were altogether exempt from needing a quota. In addition, the Personnel Office captured the quotas of 20 staff who had failed to return from study abroad. These administrative changes meliorated the quota problem.[21]

The university sought young staff, as illustrated in the employment contract of a leader of the Student Affairs Office (See Box 3.2). In 1986 the average staff age was 37. The teaching staff, especially, was young. The average age of teachers in 1990 was 38.9, with 49% under age 35 and 30% in the age range 36-50. The national averages for that year were 45% and 15%, respectively.[23] The entire staff, not just teachers, were required to be well-educated. As a result, SZU's employees attained the highest schooling of staff in any school in China (see Table 3.4). Using a scoring method commonly employed in China, SZU's staff educational level in 1986 rated 3.75, compared with 2.0 for the average Chinese university.[24] By the early 1990s, SZU teachers' age had risen. For 1994 the teachers' average age was up to slightly under 41, which is about one year *above* the national average. SZU was bucking the national trend over the 1980s and 1990s. Elsewhere in China, the teaching staff were getting younger while at SZU they were aging.[25]

Table 3.4: Staff education level, 1986[26]

education level	number	percent
college and above	616	73.4
senior/vocational high school	199	23.7
junior high school	24	2.9
below junior high school	0	0

Table 3.5: 1995 staff, by category[27]

professional	cadres	workers	unemployed	total
730	178	121	32	1,057
69%	17%	11%	3%	100%

For administrative, statistical and practical purposes, the prime divisions among a Chinese university's staff occur along the lines of professional/non-professional and teaching/non-teaching. The non-professional staff comprises cadres, workers, both blue-collar and office workers, and the unemployed. Cadres are administrative staff with university education or sufficient work experience to admit them into this classification. New graduates from Chinese universities automatically receive cadre status, which is transferred with them (via their *dangan*) when they are employed by state companies and government entities. Status and various benefits accrue with cadre status, a by-product of tertiary education, from which most graduates traditionally have gone into government jobs. Post-Mao free market reforms, however, have allowed graduates to work in other than state work-units (e.g., self-employment, private Chinese companies, foreign-capitalized or joint-venture firms). Cadre status in the 1990s, therefore, was not universally possessed among recent college graduates. But among government controlled entities, such as SZU, employees still held cadre status, and it provided a way to upgrade worker qualifications. Holders of *zhuanke* certificates who furthered their education were allowed to be re-qualified as cadres and to receive promotions. The professional class includes teachers and non-teachers. The latter classification comprised those with advanced qualifications who work in support units, such as the computer and audio/visual centers, the library, research institutes, and other administrative offices.

Table 3.6: 1995 professional staff, by category[28]

- 462 teachers (63%)
    - 37 professor (8%)
    - 151 associate professor (33%)
    - 206 lecturer (45%)
    - 68 assistant lecturer (15%)

- 120 teaching assisting (16%)
    - 18 senior (15%)
    - 68 mid-level (57%)
    - 34 initial (28%)

- 85 science and technical (12%)
    - 27 senior (32%)
    - 37 mid-level (44%)
    - 21 initial (25%)

- 63 other (9%)
    - 20 senior (32%)
    - 16 mid-level (25%)
    - 27 initial (43%)

Full-time teachers fall into one of four ranks: professor (*jiao shou*), associate professor (*fu jiao shou*), lecturer (*jiang shi*), and assistant lecturer (*zhu jiao*).[29] Assistant lectures, the lowest rank in fixed staffing, were given such tasks as organizing lectures, discussion (*da yi*), job practice, laboratory work, correcting homework and managing teaching, research and ideological/political work. With the department head's approval, they could be made fully responsible for teaching courses. Under the guidance of senior teaching staff, they could advise seniors on their graduation theses. Teachers in arts were encouraged to spend one-fifth of their time in social investigation and those in science 20% of their time in laboratory, design or production work. Lecturers, the next rank up, were expected to fulfill all the duties of the assistant lecturers, to teach two or more courses per semester, and to be more involved in research. They were to contribute to an academic paper or participate in textbook development. The associate professors also taught at least two courses, one of which had to be a foundation course. They were to take responsibility over research projects and had to have at least one paper published in an academic journal at the provincial level or above. They should guide research on teaching reform and write about teaching. In addition, they were to guide seniors with their graduation theses and to teach graduate students. The full professor assumed the same responsibilities as the associate professor and was to be involved in more advanced academic work and serve as leaders in their academic fields. The distribution of staff by these categories for 1995 is presented in Tables 3.5 and 3.6.

Relative to other universities, SZU had a low-ranked staff. As indicated in Table 3.7, a statistic can be compiled to show how many lower ranked teachers a university has for each single professor employed. SZU was below average. From the beginning, few senior staff were hired, and entry into the highest rank was restricted by promotion procedures, which were twice suspended at the change-over between administrations (1990, 1993).

Employment contract system

The employment contract system, put into effect by the fall term 1986, was intended to break the "iron rice bowl" (dependence on the state) so "personnel could both come in and go out, cadres could be both promoted and demoted, and salaries could be both raised and lowered."[30] It fixed the number of staff positions for each department according to their work loads. The probation period for new personnel was set generally at six months, but new staff who were immediate graduates were put on probation for one year. After probation, newcomers needed to receive pre-position training and to take certain tests. Those who passed these tests could sign contracts with SZU. Contract terms generally lasted for two years. Those who failed the tests (which were left unspecified in documents) could extend their probation period for another three months. After that period, they would have to take another test, which if passed, allowed them to sign the contract. If they failed the test, they would have to find another employer. Those who held certain leadership positions before coming to SZU received a salary during the probation period equivalent to that of their previous job. After they were formally hired, an evaluation and qualification assessment would determine their future salary. During probation, there was "no possibility" that a spouse would be transferred and no housing was provided. Of course, no promotions could be given during the probation period. Those whose probationary periods expired before a formal contract was signed could receive an extension of probation, but the salary would be reduced by 5% starting with the seventh month. If the contract was not signed by October, salary would be reduced by 20%.

Table 3.7: Comparative statistic for teaching staff ranks among universities[31]

for each professor, number of…	associate profs. (1)	lecturers (2)	statistic (1) + (2)
East China U. of Science & Tech	.1	.3	.4
Dongbei U. of Finance & Econ.	1.9	2.0	3.9
Zhonghsan U.	1.8	2.1	3.9
Northeast Forestry U.	2.0	2.6	4.6
Qinghua U.	2.2	2.4	4.6
Jinan U.	2.4	2.3	4.7
Zhejiang U.	2.8	2.1	4.9
Huazhong Agricultural U.	2.6	3.7	6.3
Beijing Normal U.	2.9	3.8	6.7
Dalian Maritime U.	3.3	3.4	6.7
U. of Petroleum-East China	2.9	3.9	6.8
Chengdu Inst. of Technology	3.0	4.0	7.0
Dalian U. of Technology	3.0	4.7	7.7
Yantai U.	3.5	4.9	8.4
Guangdong Medical College	3.4	5.7	9.1
SZU	4.1	5.6	9.7
Xinjiang Agricultural U.	3.6	6.2	9.8
Wuyi U.	4.7	5.9	10.6
South China Agricultural U.	4.0	7.2	11.2
U. of Electronic Science & Tech	4.3	7.1	11.4
Nankai U.	4.0	7.5	11.5
Qinghai U.	4.4	9.0	13.4
Shantou U.	5.1	8.6	13.7
Guiyang College of Traditional Chinese Medicine	4.5	11.0	15.5

Some of these rather harsh provisions (no spouse, no housing) were moderated over time, as the university acquired better facilities to accommodate new employees. From early on, the university practiced what it called "systematic efficiency responsibility" (*xitong xiaoneng zeren zhi*) which delineated clear-cut responsibilities for each position, but permitted a certain degree of fungibility so that personnel could substitute for one another when someone was out of the office. This was intended to get rid of "passing the buck."[32] Each sub-work-unit was required to compile a list of specific positions, with duties clarified for each, and to submit this to the Personnel Office.[33]

Box 3.3: The eventual arrival of Teacher Lin

In September 1983, Teacher Lin read SZU's recruitment advertisement in Guangming Ribao, *China's newspaper for intellectuals. She immediately sent off a letter to the SZU recruitment team, enclosing two articles she had published in state and provincial level academic journals. Within a month the university sent her back a letter of acceptance and advised her to start the transfer process, the first step of which was to obtain the permission of her existing* danwei. *Lin put in a formal request to her department's Party secretary, who did not agree to the transfer. The request sat on his desk for six months until the department head personally intervened on Lin's behalf and persuaded the Party secretary to concur with the transfer. Lin, who had already resigned herself to the fact that she would not go to SZU, was elated that she now had the necessary chops from the university on her transfer request. She took the next step: sending the approved papers to the provincial Personnel Bureau. One month passed with no action. Two months…seven months. After Lin had lost all hope of ever transferring, she received provincial permission. At her own expense, she telegraphed SZU, which wrote her back within the month. The department which had agreed to hire her now had an acting head, a professor on loan from People's University, where he was department chair. The head wrote Lin that she would have to be interviewed and asked her to make arrangements to visit People's University where the deputy heads of his department would interview her. She obtained her university's permission to travel to Beijing and took a two-day train ride, hard seat, which she paid for herself. Her interview lasted 30 minutes during which the deputy heads discussed with her the contents of her two published articles as well as theoretical work in the field. At the end of the interview, Lin felt she had impressed the deputy heads with her knowledge and scholarship. They told her they would "put in the right word," an ambiguously encouraging response at best. She returned to her work-unit, and was assigned courses to teach for the next semester, fall 1985. But within two weeks, she received word from SZU that she was expected to arrive as soon as possible. She would begin teaching in September. Fearing the window of opportunity would never again open, she packed three suitcases and got on the next day's train.*

Disemployment

Once a contract was signed, staff who wanted to resign needed to give SZU three months' notice. Transfers within China are often time-consuming (e.g., see Box 3.3), and departing SZU staff were advised to "work on" transfer procedures within three months; otherwise, starting from the fourth month, salary would be reduced by 20%. According to the regulations, upon contract expiration, staff should report to the Personnel Office to receive the decision on whether their employment would continue. In the school's history, only a few full-time regular ("fixed") staff members saw their contracts not renewed.[34] In contrast, non-renewal of contracts of temporary, non-fixed staff, mostly teachers, was quite frequent (see Box 3.1). The matter was handled by the department heads; no oversight or formal grievance procedures existed in matters involving terminated irregular staff. Getting rid of fixed staff was an entirely different matter. If a sub-work-unit within SZU wanted to fire a fixed staff member, first a report had to be sent to the Personnel Office and approved by university leaders. Then, if the fired staff member thought that the firing was "irrational," a complaint could be filed with the "upper level"[35] or the SZU staff work union. SZU was obligated to continue for three months the salary of fixed staff whose contracts were not renewed. If the fired staff member was still looking for a new job after three months, the university could provide some temporary work and reduce the salary by 5%. If there was still no employment after six months, the staff person could continue with temporary tasks, but salary would be reduced by 20% from the seventh month.

Revisions in 1988 regulations provided unemployment insurance for unemployed SZU staff whose temporary salary had stopped and who had no other sources of income. Two SZU staff had to guarantee the situation of the unemployed staff person, who had to report to a university office every day. To obtain unemployment benefits, the staff had to submit a written application and complete an investigation form, which both the applicant and guarantors signed. This was then reviewed by the Finance Office and sent to the president for approval. With these conditions met, the unemployed staff received weekly payments and, to enable public scrutiny, his/her name was publicized in a list of recipients. Furthermore, the guarantors would be punished if there were violations.[36] The extent this system was used was unreported, but given possible humiliation that could arise from such public scrutiny, it is doubtful many unemployed staff took advantage of it. It may, in fact, have been a system that was built in such a way as to discourage anyone from using it.

From the founding of SZU, school authorities had the right on paper to fire employees who violated the law, as well as those who received low marks in their evaluations. This virtually never happened, but one reported incident provides insight into the process of dismissing employees.[37] On 28 March 1988 the *zhuanke* students of the Management Department in Adult Education wrote to SZU officials complaining about their College Chinese course. Upset that they had not learned anything, they wrote that the teacher's teaching level was low:

> XXX just reads from the book and the students do not know what is being taught. We suggest that the Teaching Reform Committee either send members to audit the course and to instruct the teacher, appoint experienced teachers of Chinese to help him prepare his teaching, or replace the teacher.

The university's response came in the form of a public notice that detailed the situation, but omited the actual name of the teacher. The Teaching Reform Committee appointed a three-person team, who audited the course on 4 April. They confirmed the teacher's reading only from the text and reported a poorly organized lesson, empty-worded teaching, unclear blackboard writing, and a generally incomprehensible classroom presentation. The following day the investigators recommended that the teacher's qualifications be revoked. They chided the *Zhuanke* College, the Chinese Department and the Management Department for their lenient evaluation methods. They wrote:

> Department heads should learn a lesson from this case: monitor teaching quality, especially of those who offer new courses, and of those whom students complain about. Heads should organize class auditing, and ask for students' opinions. If any problems are found, proper measures should be taken.

Most, if not all, dismissal of teachers resulted from follow-ups of student complaints. This was in line with President Luo's mandate that teachers listen to students. Almost all evaluation came in the form of an annual assessment during the ability-qualification review, discussed below. Until the mid-1990s no systematic soliciting of student's opinions was in place, and student review was handled only on an *ad hoc* basis, despite "public opinion" being one of three required methods of evaluation.[38]

1988 personnel policy revisions

The firing of the College Chinese teacher cited above was unusual and may well have been documented, and perhaps even initiated, in order to make a point to all teaching staff (*sha ji jing hou*, killing the chicken to scare the monkeys). In 1988, in the words of the head of the Personnel Office, SZU was "still confined by the old systems. Implementation of the employment system is difficult or becomes superficial."[39] He attributed this to a host of factors: the undeveloped Chinese labor market that restricted job mobility, the unavailability of unemployment insurance, the powerlessness of leaders to fire employees, and the all-out efforts by department heads to increase their staffs. Regulations in July 1992 presented detailed information on the firing of employees.[40] Possible conditions leading to termination included:

> Lack of obedience to the leadership, poor work which causes 'serious' damage to the state and to the interests of SZU; corruption or theft of state property; actions which cause bad influences among the masses; corruption, bad morals, spreading malicious rumors that negatively affect a work-unit, in which case the employee does not correct behavior after repeated warnings; violation of state laws, university regulations; if found unqualified [41] and refuses to take an alternative job. An employee cannot be fired because of serious illness, work injury, pregnancy permitted within family planning or during a vacation or academic leave.

One reported firing occurred in the spring 1995, in the run-up to the 1995 accreditation, when SZU dismissed one teacher for violating teaching discipline and reported this to the SEdC inspection group.[42] Elsewhere in its report, the university reported that 34 teachers since 1992 had been dis-employed (*jie ping*) "due to lack of devotion to teaching or serious violation of teaching discipline."[43] These included staff who did not have their contracts renewed, but the category was broad enough possibly to cover those who were formally terminated after they had resigned in order to study abroad or to work for private companies. The actual number of reported firings during SZU's history remains two: one in 1988, the other in 1995.

To improve efficiency while raising teaching quality, the Personnel Office in 1988 developed a policy that was intended to counter the existing situation where "most employees become permanent and the university loses the chance to get the best employees." The new policy aimed to create an atmosphere of fair competition and fabricated five categories of employees:[44]

1. fixed staff, the number of which is strictly controlled by Shenzhen municipality, on contract with the SZU president, Rank IV or above in ability qualification, salary and welfare provided by SZU;
2. staff whose salary and welfare are paid by a sub-work-unit, but housing provided by SZU. The number in each department is set by a formula which rewarded those sub-work-units which remitted more money to the university and, to a lesser extent, those whose rate of increase of remitted funds had increased over the past year;[45]
3. staff whose sub-work-units take care of salary and SZU only issues certificates;
4. temporary staff, job-practice staff, part-time teaching/research assistants and visiting scholars;
5. unemployed staff from category # 1 who still remain SZU staff.

Despite its mathematical complexity—several pages of formulae were provided in the regulations—the proposed staff categorization system stratified along simple lines—regular and irregular staff. Those in the former category would get housing and were the only ones who could become officially disemployed, in other words, downgraded from the #1 to the #5 category. Those thus affected faced several possibilities: they could leave SZU; they could become non-fixed staff in categories #2, #3, and #4; or they could transfer into SZU's labor service company, which would provide them with a temporary job and salary. The non-fixed staff, however, were not pleased with the stratification, and the categorization scheme was never implemented to any degree.

The 1988 policy revisions also included provisions on visiting scholars, teaching and research assistants, as well as on unemployment insurance, discussed above. The visiting scholar system was overseen by the Professors Committee, a presidential advisory group, with applications initiated by sub-work-units. The president gave final approval. Individual departments who refused to accept the visiting scholars they were assigned could lose some fixed staff. The visiting scholar's research was supposed to meet the department's needs, and the possibility existed that the visitor could be transferred to SZU on a permanent basis. As it turned out, academic departments had on average only about one visiting scholar every five years. Another proposal, the employment of teaching and research assistants (RA/TA), also attempted to increase teaching quality. Assistants could unburden fixed teaching staff from various chores (which the regulations did not specify) and increase their lecture hours, thereby augmenting teaching efficiency. The RA/TA system was seen as a step in line with the university's desired expansion of graduate intake and met the criticism that SZU relied too heavily on unqualified assistant lecturers. An article in the university's internal journal suggested eliminating assistant lecturers altogether and replacing them with graduate students who could be given a chance to do actual teaching.[46] Working with lecturers, the graduate students could even improve the lecturer's teaching, as the latter would be forced to do exemplary work. Although the 1988 regulations envisioned teachers of each course having a research or teaching assistant, the policy was never implemented because there were never more than a dozen or so graduate students at SZU at any time. Until after the 1995 accreditation, SZU never received SEdC approval to offer graduate degrees. Graduate students before that time could receive only certificates, not masters degrees.

Story 5: Teacher Han, returned overseas student

What separates me from most of my comrades is that I have earned a Ph.D. from abroad. Most overseas Chinese doctoral students never return to the Motherland. I didn't return for patriotic reasons. I just could not find a good job abroad, and I did not believe that I would have had a successful career in an English-speaking country. I write in English adequately and I can do research acceptable by Western standards. But I write in Chinese at the highest level, much superior to all but one or two of my colleagues at Shenda. I write quickly, in the Chinese way, not using references or footnotes. I published two books in my first years at SZU, and I author about two dozen published articles a year. I can be much more productive in China because language, more so than content, is important in essays. Thus, because of my high level of Chinese language skill, my academic future here is secured. Also, teaching in the West brought with it much too much risk. That is another reason I returned to China.

When I came back with my foreign Ph.D. I went to Shenda because, quite frankly, it paid better than inland institutions. Located next to Hong Kong, Shenda could offer me more doors and windows to the West. In fact, in the six years I have taught at Shenda, I have already taken a sabbatical to the UK. Returned students in China are treated relatively well. The Shenzhen government gives us an annual party; when we were hired, we were given promises about salary and housing (which eventually came true). I am often commanded to go to banquets for visiting dignitaries when the university wants to show off one of its returned scholars. I am always being praised.

At first, when I started teaching at Shenda in 1989 (I returned to China just after June Fourth), I realized that the university did not focus on education. Few teachers did scholarly research, and I could carry on intellectual conversations with only a few of them. This was good for me because it meant that there would be little competition. Promotion was secured. But, on the downside, it meant that teaching would be boring. Shenda does not have graduate students, and the undergraduates are not interested in studying. The undergraduates all disappoint me; I have never met even one at Shenda whose intellectual capability comes up to my standards. Nevertheless, I must teach. Fortunately, I have to teach only 12 hours—I never choose to teach extra hours. That means commuting to campus three morning a week. The rest of the week I spend at home on my *own scholarship. I never have to meet with students and I don't any longer participate in administration.*

For several years I was the deputy head of my department. The department was in a state of political crisis, and I was appointed by the president to try to make sure we still functioned despite the crisis. I did not get along with the other department heads, who were stealing money from the teachers. I was in charge of curriculum development and inherited a teaching plan that was modeled on a Western approach. I did not like it. It was too difficult to teach (it took at least an hour to prepare for each class), and it required us teachers to force students to carry on dialogues with us by using the Socratic method. This type of teaching is only useful for graduate students in China. The Shenda students were not capable of carrying on a high level of conversation with me, so the whole goal of the course was unobtainable. The course had been recommended by a foreign teacher who thought he knew how to teach. We only have foreign teachers at SZU because we want to show off how rich we are and that we are an open university and because the students demand them. Almost none of the foreigners are at the same intellectual level of Chinese teachers. If we had good foreign teachers—scholars from American universities instead of preachers, backpackers or high school teachers—they would embarrass us. We certainly don't want that to happen. The best foreign teacher is one who just shows her face in class and doesn't say anything to the students outside the classroom. I know foreigners who have been teaching ten years in China. They don't know the language or culture; and worst of all, they don't know the subjects they are teaching. One, who claims to have a Ph.D., pretended to teach psychology but did not even pronounce Carl Jung's name correctly. The students, who knew more about Jung than she did, laughed at her and considered her a "foreign fool."

Still, the students love their foreign teachers. In some cases, they literally become lovers; some students marry their teachers and emigrate. On the other hand, the students don't like me very much. They sit in my classes with blank expressions on their faces. They are from rich families in Shenzhen, and many of them live on allowances that are larger than my own salary. They cannot wait to finish their education so they can go out and make a lot of money, probably with their parents' help. When I was deputy department head, I was in charge of a requirement from above to have the students evaluate the teachers. Now, this really was a foolish idea: what do students know about teaching! I gave several classes the required form which they filled out anonymously. They gave me very low *scores, but they gave the foreign teacher high scores. This just shows how unreliable students are when it comes to evaluating teaching.*

When I first came to Shenda my salary was very low. I was living in an on-campus one room apartment built for unmarried teachers. But I had a wife and soon I had a daughter. We were given an adjacent room so we had two single rooms. At that time, we were offered the opportunity to buy a public housing flat. I had saved some money from my overseas study, but I still had to borrow money for the downpayment. At that time, Shenzhen treated us college teachers miserably. Some of the foreign teachers were making much more money, and they were given air conditioners, refrigerators and televisions. The students wanted to know why I did not prepare for class like the foreigners or spend extra time with the students. Simply, Shenzhen did not pay me enough. The city got only what it paid for.

I moved into a new flat in the teachers complex downtown before Spring Festival 1993. Since I have moved away from campus, I have been bothered much less by students and have been able to publish more. In 1995 I was chosen as a "backbone teacher," an honor which brings with it one trip abroad, the right to order books for the library, and a ¥10,000 per year payment as well as other subsidies. I am permitted to teach less and this allows me to publish more. It is about time China began to treat us intellectuals with decency.

Ability-qualification system

For the first several years of SZU's existence, the nationwide *zhi cheng* evaluation system for staff and teachers that assessed their qualification status was under state-level review; in fact, it ceased altogether for two years. SZU thus felt obliged to create its own ability qualification system which it called *nengli zige zhi*. When the *zhi cheng* evaluation was undertaken in Chinese tertiary institutions (*gao xiao)* in 1987, SZU did not have a corresponding method for evaluating teachers.[47] The system it had developed was characterized as "double track" with position qualification and teaching ability qualification. The former consisted of four position ranks: professor, associate professor, lecturer, assistant lecturer. These were beyond university control as the determinations were made by upper levels (on the university's recommendation, of course). The university could, however, decide the teaching ability ranks completely on its own. General criteria used for promotion, as set in 1985 regulations, were political performance, academic level, and work performance, with the evaluation "aiming to reflect teachers' contributions toward the Four Modernizations."[48] Other assessment criteria added later included foreign language ability, research accomplishments, teaching level, and computer knowledge. An evaluation included opinions of students and fellow teachers, who audited class sessions. Academic writings were to be evaluated by outside referees. All the evidence was considered by a commission, where majority vote ruled; its decision went to the president for his approval. Since this track was unique to SZU, the position or rank could not be transferred by staff members who changed jobs outside SZU.[49]

Workers at SZU were able to upgrade their qualifications also through a promotion evaluation.[50] Those wanting to be raised to Rank IV needed either a *zhuanke* certificate or equivalent knowledge. Those with such a certificate were tested on ability. Those without a certificate were given a make-up test in six subjects—Chinese, politics, and computer, and three subjects chosen according to the employee's major interest. Cadres holding rank IV also needed either to hold a *zhuanke* certificate or to pass the six tests.

Box 3.4: Teaching qualification point system (1987)

teaching:

- 10 points for smoothly finishing the year's work load
- 15 points each for new courses, two or more different courses, teaching in a foreign language (for non-foreign language teachers), teaching graduate courses, or for 'remarkable' achievements in teaching
- 20 points for winners of excellent teaching awards
- 5 points for teachers who do not finish their work load or are bad teachers

publishing:

- 10-20 points for publishing in state-level or foreign journals
- 5-10 points for articles in provincial level journals
- 3-5 points for articles below provincial level journals
- 3-5 points every 10,000 characters for state-level published books
- 5-7 points for provincial-level books
- 3-5 points for books below provincial-level

editing teaching materials:

- 6-10 points for state-level materials per 10,000 characters
- 4-6 points provincial level
- 2-4 points for school level

translation:

- 6-10 state level
- 4-6 provincial
- 2-4 under provincial level

patents:

- limited to 100 points.

research grants and awards received (prorated for group members):

- 60-100 for state level per item
- 0-60 for provincial level
- 20-30 under provincial level

Non-academic articles and essays:

- 8-15 state level each piece
- 4-8 provincial level
- 2-4 under provincial level

foreign language:

- 10 points for passing the foreign language test for promotion
- 15 points if test score is 85 or over

graduate tutoring:

- 5 points for one graduate student
- 8 for two graduate students
- 2 points for each additional graduate student over three

special awards:

- under 50 points

return from overseas training:

- 10 points

SZU developed a point system to determine teaching qualification. Each teacher completed forms which were submitted to an evaluation committee at the departmental level. The committee then assessed and matched these point scores against a five point ranking system (each with half ranks), which had corresponding salary levels. A minimum length of stay at each level was required before a teacher qualified for further promotion.[51] A score of 550 points placed a teacher in Rank I, 270 for Rank II, 75 for Rank III, 10 for Rank IV, and 0 for Rank V, according to the criteria in Box 3.4.

The qualification review process occurred annually, except for the period 1989-90 when, after the arrival of the post 4 June leaders, promotions were altogether suspended for one year. Provisional regulations were issued in June 1990 and revised several times in the ensuing six months. Qualification review was expanded to include categories in addition to teaching ability qualification, and ability qualifications were made available in academic research, engineering/technical, library, accounting, editorial, clinic, economic management, and translation. The five-rank system was retained: initial level as Rank IV and senior as Rank I. Each rank had requirements; the ranks are as follows, listed from the lowest to the highest:[52]

- Rank IV: *zhuanke* certificate, three years work experience after graduation, or one year's experience after graduate study or double degree.
- Rank III: four years work experience after obtaining Rank IV ability, with certificate of assistant lecturer training, or with proof of having grasped knowledge of masters courses, ability of major subject, or two years after having obtained Rank IV with masters degree, or Ph.D.
- Rank II: five years after obtaining Rank III, or two years after Rank III with Ph.D. Promotion to Ranks II and III requires foreign language test or translation publication of at least 30,000 characters. Those without *benke* cannot obtain Rank II.
- Rank I: Those with special contributions in academic research or teaching are not limited by these regulations.

Candidates for promotion to Ranks II, III and IV applied directly to the sub-work-unit leader. With the leader's approval, the candidate could obtain a qualification review application form, which was to be completed and sent to the review office. In addition, candidates for Rank II needed two references, one from outside SZU. Before 1989 the review committee's decision was forwarded to the president for approval. After 1990 a committee appointed by university leaders (usually one professor per department) judged departmental recommendations for promotion.

The review process covered much of a year and began in April with the study of documents. Before the end of June candidates were selected for the foreign language exam, articles submitted for expert examination, the evaluation group formed, and recommendations made before the end of June. Over the summer, non-teaching senior qualifications were reviewed; medium and initial qualifications were reviewed in the autumn and senior qualifications at the end of the year.[53] In 1991, 109 staff applied for senior level promotions, 70 (64%) of which were forwarded for upper provincial and municipal approval. In 1992, 79 applied, of which 61 (77%) were forwarded to the upper levels. The year 1993 saw 72 applications, of which 58 (80%) were forwarded. For the years 1994 and 1995, 66 and 65 staff applied for senior promotions. In 1991 the university recommended 60 and 64 promotions at mid- and initial-level ranks, respectively.

Even from these incomplete data, it is apparent that the review process was not *pro forma*. The university's internal review of departmental recommendations rejected anywhere from one-third to one-fifth of all applications for promotion. It is unknown to what extent Guangdong educational authorities rejected university-approved applications; some applications were delayed, but generally most got approved by the upper level. Both the review within SZU and at the provincial level involved committees, but in fact usually only one or two members of the committee read the writing samples submitted by the applicant for promotion. Often, promotions relied heavily on the judgment of a single individual, an expert in the same field or discipline as the applicant. Several informants reported to me on the seemingly arbitrary nature of decisions. But in discussing them, it became apparent that the decisions were not arbitrary at all. They were political. Decisions at the department level sometimes involved leaders acting against staff who they opposed in other matters, or just plain disliked. Despite the on surface fairness (and mathematical precision) of the promotion process, in an unknown number of cases it actually became a vehicle of campus politics.

1992 Staffing reform

What was billed as a major reform in SZU's staffing system appeared around the time of the change of administrations from Wei-Wu to Cai Delin, who formally assumed office on 1 November 1992. Two July 1992 documents proposing comprehensive reform articulated reform directions in personnel policy.[54] In order to perfect the employment system and create a better team structure, Three Fixed [things] were required. SZU needed fixed staffing, fixed positions for staff, and fixed responsibilities for staff. Staff were not to be assigned positions, but instead were to be hired on the basis of "two-way choice." Those with high qualifications received high salary; those with low qualifications received low salary. The diligent were to be rewarded, the slackers punished. Employees who made "serious" mistakes could be fired, and in general payment would be made according to labor.

An annual plan specified the amount of funds given each sub-work-unit for salary. This amount was fixed and did not vary according to the actual number of employees. The units could decide not to employ as many staff as called for in the plan and retain the unused salary, so long as the number not employed did not exceed 15% fewer than allowed. The early draft of the proposal included some sections omitted from Cai's subsequent presentations to staff meetings. One omission was the "full-load working principle" which stated that the work load of each person should be at least 80% of the average work load, a figure that could be lowered to 60% if the staff experienced health problems. Cai's proposals also replaced the term "position responsibility system" with "employment system."

Mobility

There was much mobility in the university's staff population. Teachers and staff changed offices within the university, some retired, and many left to work in companies in Shenzhen or to study abroad. Retirement did not become significant until the early 1990s. By 1994, eleven years after the school was founded, 107 staff had retired (and were still alive). Retirements reported for certain years included: 19 in 1993, 13 in 1993, 32 in 1994, 20 in 1995. Few staff stayed on after retirement (age 55 for women, 60 for men); most enjoyed their leisure days in university-provided housing, receiving a pension that included various subsidies and 50% of the salary assigned to their position. The year 1994 illustrates staff mobility. Excluding 32 staff who retired that year, 152 staff transferred, including 32 between departments and 21 transferring out. That year SZU hired 99 new personnel, which included 41 teachers and 13 researchers. Of the new hires, 25 came from Shenzhen, 44 from outside Shenzhen, and 30 were immediate graduates from domestic and foreign universities. The new researchers and teachers included 11 at senior rank, 30 at mid-level and 11 at initial qualification.

Table 3.8: Staff hiring[55]

1991	33
1992	99
1993	72
1994	99
1995	72
1997	79

Table 3.9: Status of teachers hired, 1983-1994[57]

status	number	percent
abroad	87	13.5
left SZU	97	15.1
retired	44	6.8
not in post	10	1.6
still teaching	405	63.0

As a new university, SZU saw large numbers of transfers during its foundation years. Transfers slowed dramatically in 1990, as the new administration undertook a university-wide rectification.[56] For that year only 33 staff were hired, while 29 left the university. The following year experienced a tripling of new staff, partly in response to the previous several years' sluggish hiring. The 99 new recruits included 39 teachers, 31 researchers and 29 non-teaching staff, most of whom were hired on political criteria, as the new Party secretary and president put their political stamp on SZU. Hiring for the early 1990s is reported in Table 3.8. Staff continued to leave SZU during those years. In 1992-93, more staff actually left SZU than were hired. The attrition rate (excluding retirees) lowered to around 1:5 for 1994-95.

Almost from its beginning, SZU lost teachers and other staff who went to work for companies in Shenzhen or went abroad to study. This group included 180 full-time teachers by 1995, a number that equaled almost one-third of all new teachers recruited by the university over the same period. Ninety-five percent of those who left were lecturers or assistant lecturers under age 40. Over half of them held graduate degrees.[58] As reported in Table 3.9, SZU hired 643 teachers from 1983-1994 (excluding those who in 1994 had moved into administration). Some of the teachers reported as leaving SZU may have subsequently emigrated abroad, so the causes of teacher departure appeared to be equally divided between study abroad and work in Shenzhen. Very few teachers who went abroad for course work ever returned to SZU. The *1986 Yearbook*, for example, lists the names of 25 teachers who went abroad that year. Only one of them was a SZU teacher in 1994, according to that year's annual. At any given time, about 8-10% of SZU staff had left their positions but were still formally employed by the university; they were put under the categories of *jie ping* or *ju ping*, literally "refused to be employed." In 1990 there were 26 teachers in that category, 14 in 1995.[59]

The teachers

Teachers represent slightly above 40% of SZU's total paid regular staff, a number that belies their real importance. Teaching at SZU was a one-way process that treated students as receptacles. The administration—president, Party secretary, and department heads—permitted teachers much autonomy, granting them the authority to tell students what to learn and how to learn it. The developing of teaching plans, setting of exams and constructing of pedagogy were largely left to individual teachers, with loose oversight provided by the department head. This aspect of academic freedom, which characterizes higher education elsewhere in the world, is due to the fact that almost all of the top administrators in universities (in China and elsewhere) were themselves at one time teachers; their personal experience helps them relate to the teaching staff. They deliver to their faculty the same independence they themselves relished as teachers. In terms of teaching, the contrasting sets of university leaders at SZU had one—perhaps only one—feature in common: they shared a hands-off approach vis-à-vis what occurred in the classroom. The hiring and management of faculty, however, differed considerably over the years.

Guangdong Province's request to the State Council for setting up SZU stated that the new school's "teacher's team should be built through a combination of employment and transfer, with stress on employment."[60] In choosing this path, policy-makers opted not to build a mini Beida (Beijing University) or mini Qinghua, with complete departments transferred in from China's prestigious institutions. The Xi'an Jiaotong model, in which the teaching staff of the new university in Xi'an almost entirely came from Shanghai Jiaotong University, was not followed. Rather, the designers of SZU intended to create a self-standing university with its own characteristics. It would have a unique teaching team, not a replica of any other university's faculty. Less than three months before the formal opening of SZU, an official from the Ministry of Education visited Shenzhen and reported on the university's preparation.[61] He, too, stressed that SZU should have its own teachers' team:

> Teachers mainly consider three factors when they come to a university: the future for their majors; the payment and living conditions; and whether the environment provides good schooling for their children. Beijing University used to have a branch in Changping County. But because the primary and middle schools were not as good as in Beijing, teachers wanted to return to Beijing town. Finally, the Changping campus was closed; over 100,000

Table 3.10: Teacher qualification ranking, 1987 and 1994[62]

qualification rank	1987 number	1987 %	1994 number	1994 %	% of teachers in post
#1—professor/senior engineer	25	4	42	12	7.7
#2—associate professor/engineer	147	25	121	35	29.9
#3—lecturer/associate engineer	315	53	24	47	50.1
#4—assistant	77	28	2	7	11.9
average (1=prof…4=assistant)	2.79		2.48		

> square meters of accommodation was deserted. Any university must consider these three aspects in order to attract advanced intellectuals. Hiring should consider the potential contributions of teachers toward the Special Zone's development; teachers should be concerned with more than just money. Chinese intellectuals are patriots and not attracted only by money. Money can only attract Rank III and Rank IV teachers.

In September 1983 when SZU opened its temporary site in downtown Shenzhen with 212 students, out of necessity its teachers were mostly borrowed from famous universities. Qinghua, People's University, Beida, Zhongshan, and Huanan Polytech each lent SZU teachers and cadres. Departments were set up under the leadership of famous scholars in their field on loan from their institutions.[63] The first teachers—those who arrived by late 1983—found the procedures for getting to SZU expeditious, so long as they had the approval of their current work-unit. Although paperwork prevented some teachers from arriving in the first batch, enough were in place so that the opening took place on schedule. During the following two years, faculty members were recruited to SZU through a more formal, nationwide application process which generated some 10,000 applicants for 200 places.[64] The intent was to put on permanent staff certain young teachers (under age 40) from the best universities in China. Some of these successful applicants arrived in 1984; others encountered delays and rocky roads (see Box 3.2).

When the university moved to its new campus in 1984, personnel included 250 fixed staff and another 40 listed as *jieping* (borrowed employee). Many of these staff came from China's prestigious universities: architects and engineers from Qinghua, the social scientists from Beida and People's University. By 1986, SZU had 615 fixed and 109 borrowed staff. Eighty-eight (14%) of the fixed staff held qualifications of Rank I (full professor and

Table 3.11: Teachers holding advanced degrees (percentage, selected years) [66].

	Ph.D.	masters
1987	3%	28%
1990	4	30
1994	9	37

senior engineer) or Rank II (associate professor, engineer or researcher). In 1986 the university had only eight full professors and 15 senior engineers, seven in Architecture alone (Luo Zhengqi, himself, was then only an associate professor). Only 10 of the staff holding senior qualifications were borrowed; the rest had transferred in as permanent staff. Even by 1987, the year in which the initial phase of staff hiring was completed, under 30% of the teachers held Rank I or II qualifications. As the school aged, this proportion rose to just under 40% (see Table 3.10). Over time, the percentage of teachers who had undergone advanced study also rose. For China as a whole, in 1991 only 12.7% of full-time teachers had Ph.Ds, masters or graduate study certification, while about half of SZU's teachers fit into that category. The biggest jump in advanced degrees occurred in the early 1990s (see Table 3.11). By 1992 SZU had defined targets for qualifications. Thirty-five percent of teachers with masters were to be in the senior qualification, 50% in the medium and 15% in initial.[65] In other words, SZU expected half of its masters to be associate professors, 70% of the remainder full professors, and the rest lecturers. A masters had become a requirement for all new teaching staff, except for political tutors, many of whom were recruited right out of college. Having a masters was neither necessary nor sufficient for promotion to full professor. The regulations specified that the senior/medium/initial qualification split for teachers with bachelors degrees should be 33:50:17, suggesting that with just an undergraduate degree, one could still become full professor. This grandfathered in those faculty hired at the beginning of SZU, before advanced degrees became a hiring requirement.

Teacher team construction

SZU always made an effort at recruiting teachers and staff with advanced degrees, but in its early years this was hampered by several factors. Graduate degrees were only awarded in China from the late 1970s. Moreover, many older teachers who had the interest and ability to pursue graduate education were prevented from further study during the Cultural Revolution. As a consequence, in the first years of the university, many arriving teachers who were in their ’30s or older had teaching experience and research accomplishments, but they did not have degrees. It was not surprising, therefore, that in 1987 only 3% and 28% of the teaching staff held Ph.Ds and masters, respectively. Non-teaching staff who worked in research units or teaching assisting units (such as the library, computer and audio/visual centers) even employed staff with advanced degrees (36%).[67] By 1994, SZU had been able to attract more teachers with higher degrees, largely from domestic universities. Based on the teachers’ listing in the *1994 Yearbook*, Ph.D. and masters holders represented 9% and 37% of the staff, respectively. This reflected rises over seven years of 300% for doctors and 32% for masters.

Teachers arriving at the new university in the early 1980s entered uncharted terrain. About the only thing everyone knew for certain was that it was uncharted. When hired, most early recruits were probably unaware of a suggestion by a visiting Ministry of Education official that teachers’ salaries should be sufficiently high to reflect qualifications and could be supplemented with border-region and other subsidies. His recommended levels of subsidy were: ¥200 monthly for professors, ¥150 for associate professors, and ¥100 for lecturers, which would have placed SZU’s salaries at the top of the scale in China.[68] He had also mentioned academic sabbaticals, the sending of teachers abroad for training, and teaching loads of two courses (6-8 hours per week) for associate professors and three courses (4-6 hours per week) for professors. At the same time the official said that he expected teachers who chose to be pioneers at SZU would make their decisions for various reasons; salary was a minor concern, if of any importance at all.

Once the school was established at its new campus, the faculty started to take firmer shape, with the president given the power to hire and reward teachers.[69] Year-long “academic vacations” with full pay would be earned after six years of service,[70] and teachers were encouraged to study abroad on a fee-paying basis. Professors and lecturers served as tutors to help students in study and with life’s problems. By 1988 there were 115 tutors for students, half of whom were Rank I and Rank II professors.[71] Entry level teachers (assistant lecturers) who arrived after 1984 would be given a maximum six years employment, after which they were to be reviewed according to the ability qualification system and either promoted to lecturers or dismissed. Lecturers hired from 1984 were also given six years within which to be promoted to associate professors.

Table 3.12: Teacher-student ratio[72]

	SZU	national average
1986	8.1	
1987	9.5	
1990	8.3	
1991		5.2
1992	9.5	5.6
1993	9.4	6.5
1994	8.2	
1995	7.7	
2000 (est)		7.0

Teacher-student ratio

The teacher-student ratio is one of the most widely used statistics in education. The difficulties in compiling such a figure are even more troublesome than the hurdles on the path to composing an accurate staff-student ratio, as noted earlier. Such problems also obfuscate developing a statistical indicator of teaching efficiency. While temporary professional non-teaching staff were rare at SZU—and the classification almost always led to permanent employment—the part-time teacher rubric often provided a terminal hiring status. Some teachers hired on a temporary basis taught at SZU for over five years. For statistical purposes, was this group included in the reported teacher-student ratios? Sometimes, yes. Sometimes, no. Indeed, there seem to be two quite different teacher-student ratios, depending on whether the swing group of temporary, full-time teachers was included. When it is included, the ratio is as low as 1:20.[73] Teacher-student ratios for full-time students and full-time teachers for the years with sufficient data are reported in Table 3.12, along with national averages.

These ratios are considerably lower, meaning less efficiency, than the comparable figures reported for institutions elsewhere in the world. In the U.S., for example, the ratio varies by type of college and university (i.e., research versus teaching, public versus private), but the ratio is usually about half the SZU figure (i.e., double the students per teacher). In its early reform proposals, SZU set a 1:7 target.[74] By 1992 this had been revised to 1:8.[75] The latter figure mirrors the recommended goal of the SEdC. Using FTE data, the teacher-student ratio at SZU for 1995 compared favorably with both those at other Chinese institutions (see Table 3.2) as well as the 1:7 predicted as the national average in the year 2000. SZU was still not close to the rather unrealistic goal of 1:12 set by educational economist Min Weifan for Chinese universities for the year 2000.[76]

Expectations for teachers

By 1986 a fairly clear picture of the first SZU administration's expectation of faculty was emerging. It emphasized teaching; within teaching, innovation was fundamental:[77]

> The department head is responsible for the general teaching plan, and teachers are responsible for course teaching plans. SZU should not require unified teaching materials for teachers who prepare a course together. Teachers are encouraged to compile their own teaching materials and to use original English versions of teaching materials…Teachers are encouraged to employ special teaching methods. If an experiment fails, teachers will not be held responsible. If it succeeds, they will be rewarded. We encourage new teachers to go to the platform [start teaching] as soon as possible. All teachers should offer new courses. Administrative cadres are encouraged to teach, and teachers are encouraged to participate in administration. Teachers with qualifications above lecturer will offer at least two courses. Professors and associate professors' major task is to teach. Department heads should take the lead in offering courses or their teaching-ability qualification will be canceled.

The new system combined teaching, research and ideological education. Integrating faculty members into aspects of the university that were prohibited to them in many Chinese universities (notably, serving as tutors in moral education, developing their own course materials, doing research independent of research institutes) was intended to create a basis for the faculty's running the academics of the university. The policy sought to avoid the shortcomings of dualism that existed elsewhere in Chinese higher education, "where teachers either focused solely on teaching and paid no attention to research, or vice-versa… either teachers paid no attention to students' ideological education or else they were in charge of ideological education and paid no attention to teaching." It attempted to avoid the phenomenon vividly described by the Chinese idiom: each person has his own trumpet, each trumpet sounds its own tune (*yi ren yi ba hao, ge chui ge de diao*).[78]

Such innovation demanded of a young and green staff required experienced leadership, and the university brought in noted scholars to set up most departments. Each of these department heads signed a personalized contract directly with the President Luo Zhengqi, as illustrated in Box 3.5.

Box 3.5: Employment certificate for Professor Luo Yunzhu[79]

Your term will be from March 1987 to September 1989. All professors must teach. No excuse exempts one from teaching two semesters in a row. Professors should prepare teaching materials and should ask students their opinions about teaching. Besides class teaching, professors should approach students. Professors should do research. As you become the department head of the Chemistry Department, education should focus on application and meet the three First Rates.[80] Develop a good teaching force. Chemistry will not recruit any teachers over 40, and all must be good in a foreign language. Employ the 3-in-1 system [teaching, research and production]. There should be one academic salon [seminar] every two weeks. Every two weeks you should meet with a teacher or graduates or visit a student's family. You should participate in student activities every two weeks. At the expiration of your contracted term, please recommend a successor. Simultaneously, you will be employed as a presidential assistant for the same term. In that job you will assist the president, raise opinions about reform, and provide consultation on science teaching and research. You are also to assist President Luo and Vice-president Ying with foreign affairs. You are free to criticize the president's work and point out his mistakes. 10 July 1987.

The university set up several vehicles to obtain input from teachers in the policy process. A Teaching Reform Committee, headed by President Luo, consisted of the vice-presidents and a few professors and associate professors. A Committee of Professors served as the "supreme academic organization of the university… in charge of all academic activities, serving as a consultant to the President."[81] As originally envisioned, its scope was comprehensive: it organized academic activities and provided a place for academic dialog among teachers; it evaluated SZU's academic achievements; it made recommendations to the upper level. It also set degree requirements and participated in the teachers qualification evaluation. The committee was supposed to guarantee proper directions in research and teaching and to stimulate faculty to improve teaching quality and research. It was designed to improve communication between departments, especially between the social sciences and the natural sciences. The 100 members on the committee included all full and associate professors and senior researchers. Its chair, who was nominated by the President and approved by the members, had to be under age 60.[82]

The Professors Committee was discarded by the Wei-Wu administration in favor of a Teachers and Staff Representatives Conference (*jiao dai hui*) consisting of departmental leaders and their selected ordinary staff.[83] Terms of office lasted two years and the Conference met annually over a several day period. Much of the work between the conference sessions was done by a work committee elected at the closing of the first session. The Representatives Conference was less a body elected by rank and file teachers and staff than an entity composed of administrators and their personal choices to represent teaching and non-teaching staff. Furthermore, the 21-person work committee elected by the 1994 conference consisted of no ordinary teachers or staff; everyone selected was deputy department head level or above.[84] Sometimes the representatives conference ran concurrently with the annual meeting of the Work Union, such as in December 1995 when the second session of the third teachers Representatives Conference met together with the second session of the fifth Work Union conference. The university leaders addressed the opening and closing meetings of the session and presented their work reports in speeches that usually each lasted over one hour. The meetings had a set agenda prepared by the administration. The program of the 22-23 December 1994 conference, attended by over 200 staff (171 of whom were voting representatives), included listening to the president's work report and approving the minutes of the previous meetings of the staff conference and work union. In addition, the representatives were scheduled to approve resolutions concerning democratic management, democratic monitoring, deepening reform and SZU's proposed work plan. They were also to select committee members and work union representatives.[85] Cai Delin described the representatives conference as the monitoring organization of the SZU administration. "Leaders and party cadres at all levels should hold a democratic meeting and carry out criticism and self-criticism according to requirements of 'preventing and correcting the unhealthy phenomenon of selecting and appointing cadres.'"[86]

From the beginning SZU relied on leaders and senior academics to guide the young staff. By the president's own admission in 1986, however, the school lacked a training system for new recruits and failed to help them get acquainted with school surroundings. "It was not a system for learning and improving." In addition, uneven work loads resulted in uneven distribution and unfair payment.[87] Certain innovations were tried. In summer 1985, for example, classes were arranged in one-hour periods, rather than for two hours, the traditional practice in China. This change was intended to allow teachers more flexibility in creating teaching plans. But according to the president, "many teachers were not able to adapt to the new system, and departments were allowed to decide their own arrangements. By the first term 1986 most departments had changed back to the old system."[88] President Luo was not alone in his concerns over the failing of innovations aimed at improving teaching quality. The Party vice-secretary also wrote that teacher quality was not adequate. As a new school SZU was not burdened by tradition, he pointed out, but the teaching method was still the same for every student. He spoke for the entire staff when he said that educational reforms required adjustment time and that "radical steps should not be taken too quickly."[89]

Teachers' work loads were stipulated in 1985 at 6-8 teaching hours per week.[90] Teachers of difficult courses were to get lightened loads; those with basic public courses such as Public English and physical education would be given 10-12 hours. Research should represent one-third of a teacher's work time. Teachers who were involved in administration or Party affairs could experience a 30-50% lighter load. In reality, teachers in almost every department were required to teach a minimum of 12 hours per week. The average for the late 1980s was more likely between 15 to 20 hours, with some lecturers teaching as many as 25 hours per week. Regulations in July 1992 implemented a system that weighed courses according to difficulty, using a system of coefficients, in order more fairly to treat teachers who taught burdensome courses.[91] The average course, defined as one without homework, received a coefficient of 1.0. More difficult courses included writing courses (1.4), lab and computer courses (1.35), and design or math courses (1.3). Courses with homework received the coefficient 1.2. Courses that were considered simple to teach received low coefficients: .9 for Public English, the required course for non-English majors, and .8 or .6 for courses that teachers repeated. In addition, large classes (above the standard of 40 students) received an added coefficient of .5 (per 40 extra students). Courses taught for the first time received a coefficient of 1.2. Credit was given for teachers' participation in students' social investigation and practice and thesis supervision. The department head and Party secretary could take a 60% less work load and the assistant head and secretary 40% less. A department's academic head or lab supervisor also got a 10% reduction.

Concerns over teaching

Improving teaching quality has been a major concern throughout SZU's history. In 1988 the Academic Affairs Office reported that a "minority of teachers were not well-prepared before class and that teaching discipline was not strict." It continued to call for teachers to use new methods and boldly carry out teaching reform, but no specific strategy was presented.[92] The major critique of teachers and teaching came as part of the 1990 rectification campaign with the aim to improve teaching atmosphere (*jiao feng*). About the time he completed his first year in office, Wu Zewei, the Party secretary, rebuked teachers in a long speech at a school-wide meeting.[93] After he praised a few dedicated teachers, including ironically Architecture professor Liang Hongwen, the wife of Wu's nemesis, disgraced President Luo, Wu launched into an attack. According to Wu, teaching "mistakes" included:

- the absence of a serious teaching attitude and the treating of their SZU jobs as part-time rather than full-time;
- unsystematic teaching content;
- teachers' being absent without proper reasons; some leaving without telling leaders, or asking others to take their places, or going out on business;
- teacher's refusal to follow the teaching discipline, with late arrivals or early departures having become more and more frequent;
- teachers' lack of dedication, with some always wanting to go abroad, to "be a monk for one day, ring the bell for one day" (*zuo yi tian he shang zhuang yi tian zhong*);
- teachers' neglect of students moral education, with some refusing to be political tutors, seemingly reluctant to even talk with students or answer their questions.

The Party secretary was particularly annoyed with the increasing importance placed on generating additional income through side teaching businesses (*chuang shou*). This was corrupting the relationship between the individual and the collective, according to Wu. He criticized teachers for being irresponsible, and gave generalized examples of teachers violating exam discipline, for example, giving the wrong exam papers to students and changing an exam after it had been distributed to students. He cited AAO statistics reporting 71 teacher absences without adequate excuses during the spring 1990 semester.[94] Teachers were damaging the school's reputation, he said, referring to a comment from an official from an unspecified company that a "certain SZU teacher" who took students on their social investigation more resembled a businessman than a university professor. "It is commonly known that many teachers are not well prepared for class, do not have a good teaching attitude in class, and design very simple test papers. A lot of students who have been working hard are dissatisfied with this situation." Wu castigated teachers for being unable to recognize and handle the relationship between freedom and discipline.

> Some teachers think that SZU is too strict with them. I think that for some teachers we are, in fact, too easy. Some do not follow the educational disci-

> pline or even the rules of the Party and school. Some teachers not only dismiss students early during the fourth period [right before lunch], but also the second period. In the past, early leaves did not exceed several minutes, but now it is common to have half an hour early leave. Some teachers leave the school and do not return, paying no attention to their teaching, and going out to do business. We have to seriously handle those who do this. If you don't want to be a teacher in this school, then you can leave SZU through proper procedures. 'Stepping on two boats' is very selfish. Some people who already have accommodation try to get an additional dorm room and rent it out. SZU forbids teaches from keeping dogs but some teachers keep them as pets and walk the dogs on campus in the evening. Teachers doing this imitate foreigners, showing their leisure and wealth. These teachers lose their dignity. Some might say: this is my freedom. But we are talking about the freedom of socialism, not that of individualism and not that of anarchy.

Wu's remarks certainly did not make friends among the teachers, nor was he able to influence staff to change their attitudes. Most teachers shrugged off his remarks, which were considered little more than a "peasant's harangue," in the words of one informant. Indeed, the delivery overshadowed and blotted out the content. Despite a flaw in basic logic—using a few carefully selected illustrations to represent the norm—the speech dealt with serious issues over which the Party secretary and many teachers as well were quite concerned. The school's response to these problems came in the form of a move to strengthen teachers' moral and political education that started shortly after the new administration took over. Leaders complained that teachers put insufficient emphasis on teaching and were themselves very undisciplined, even violating laws and regulations. Regulations attributed many teaching problems to loose moral and political education.[95]

Perhaps nowhere were these concerns better articulated than in a strongly worded article in October 1990 in the university's internal journal, written by its well-respected associate editor, Zhang Zhongchun.[96] According to the author, the most serious outside criticism of SZU was that its teaching and research atmospheres were "broken," that the university was not considered a serious place for study and research. His wide-ranging critique distributed responsibility among students, teachers and administration (implicitly at least), but its common theme was the lack of enforced regulations, specifically on student class attendance, monitoring of teaching and research and on distributing rewards and punishments rationally. The article reiterated many of the points made in Wu's speech, but on an intellectually higher, less abrasive, and more even-tempered plane. Zhang pointed out that the pressure from side-courses required young teachers just starting out to take work loads of over 20 classes per week. "How can good teaching quality possibly be achieved," he asked. He suggested the setting up of a publishing fund and allocating more of the university's resources to research.

The administration's censure of teachers continued in 1991. President Wei Youhai, in his annual work report, called for continued rectification of the teaching atmosphere.[97] He attributed lenient teaching directly to teacher's laziness— *jiao bu yan, shi zhi duo,* citing part of an idiom taken from the *Sanzijing*, the famous book of three-character sayings.[98] In his first year in office, Wei had not openly denounced teachers, a job which was assumed by the Party secretary. Many teachers then found Wei's changed attitude disappointing. Since his arrival at SZU, the president had been considered the "good cop" in contrast to Wu's "bad cop." By 1991, however, the duo was seen, in the words of one observer, as "devil cop, double devil cop." Wei reported on a weak teaching foundation and said that despite the teachers' high academic level, few were motivated to spend much of their energy on improving teaching quality. Still, Wei showed a deeper understanding than Wu of the teacher's situation. He admitted that staff and teachers "don't have much confidence in SZU's future and are skeptical about rectification."[99]

> Some comrades believe it is difficult to get out of the mysterious circle of *yi fang jiu luan, yi luan jiu tong, yi tong jiu si* (once let go, chaos; once chaos, rectification; once, rectification, rigidity.) Once rigidity, leniency returns, completing the mysterious circle. Other comrades think SZU's strong measures on side-courses and certificates are not reform but are backward steps. Still other comrades think that some old problems are too intricate and confusing, and defy solution. This shows that in the new year, we must change people's concepts by making positive accomplishments and improving work efficiency so that everyone regains confidence.

A year later, the school leaders reported that they had accomplished much towards improving teaching quality.[100] The first university-wide meeting on teaching had been held in March, attended by all teachers with qualifications of associate professor and above. Departmental teaching plans had been thoroughly revised, research organizations had been set up in "advanced" academic departments, textbooks and labs had improved. There was no explicit mention of classroom teaching quality improvement. At the end of the year, a provincial inspection group visited SZU to examine Party construction, a term that now encompassed all aspects of the university. In its report, the group commented that the relationship between teaching, research and side-businesses should be properly handled, but that the school should also try to reduce teachers' burdens. It also noted the existence of under-employment in SZU's research institutes, *ren fo yu shi* (people floating above things to be done).[101] By the end of 1991, there was a general call at SZU for emphasizing teaching work, something "which should be more central at SZU." The head of AAO wrote:[102]

> We should respect teachers, support their initiatives, encourage them to devote their major energy to teaching, and develop favorable policies, including those on transferring teachers, funding, professional qualification evaluation, and the distribution of side-income. We hope that students and teachers can work together to make teaching the center of the school's work. We must strengthen SZU's administration of teaching. School leaders should spend their main energy on teaching, since teaching is the main function of the school…Important teaching issues should be included in the agenda of the Party's main issues. School leaders should have teaching targets each year, and periodically should audit teaching. Over the past year, much has been achieved in rectification. However, some leaders do not have a strong concept of teaching and they often forget to address teaching as a result of their busy work. When they face many matters, teaching is pushed aside. In the professional evaluation qualification, the research essays have been unduly stressed, yet the importance of teaching gets ignored…Department heads spend too much energy on side-business income, rather than solving the existing problems in teaching. The teacher is the key to improving teaching quality. It is impossible to improve SZU's teaching without a fully devoted teachers' team.

Academic Affairs referred to the common notion that teachers were the engineers of human souls—*jiaoshi shi renlei linhun de gongchengshi*, the guardians of culture. But classroom teaching, of course, did not exist in isolation, and the teacher needed to be viewed in context. For AAO, this meant that the SZU leaders should enhance political and ideological education among the staff, encourage them to do a good job, take their problems seriously, care about their lives, and solve past problems so teachers need not worry about their reoccurrence, avoiding *hou gu zhi you* (look-back worries).[103]

The next SZU administration, headed by Cai Delin, adopted a conciliatory, sometimes deferential, attitude towards teachers. Cai gave staff a monthly ¥300 payment (later raised to ¥700) from the president's discretionary fund and also set up a teaching materials fund to encourage teachers to edit their own texts. In sharp contrast with Wei/Wu, Cai did not criticize teachers, although from time to time he criticized policies and situations that teachers were responsible for. His Ten Measures of Comprehensive Reform in 1992 mentioned teachers only once in passing. In calling for the enhancement of competition in teaching and study, he noted that optional courses with special economic zone characteristics were halted because teachers had not worked on them as hard as they should have.[104] Cai kept an even disposition when dealing with teachers. When necessary, the job of house critic was taken by Vice-president Zhang Bigong, appointed in 1994. In the preparation for the 1995 accreditation, Zhang worried aloud that SZU lagged behind China's prestigious universities in teaching atmosphere (*jiaofeng*).[105]

> In Beijing I visited big universities like Beida and Qinghua and was deeply impressed by the fact teachers there compete with one another in scholarship; students compete with one another in ambition. We visited some small schools, Jisou and Wuyi, and were impressed by the work ethic and responsibilities of staff and teachers. Compared with them, our life and payment are better here, but we lag behind them in *jiaofeng*. We have to admit this and be ashamed of this. Many of our teachers are irresponsible and privately ask others to conduct their classes, and in other practices they violate the teaching discipline. Some even cheat on exams.

The pending 1995 accreditation prompted school authorities to devote more attention to teachers and teaching reform, as illustrated in Party Vice-secretary Wang Songrong's Five Emphases.[106]

1. all the work of SZU should emphasize creating eligible socialist *rencai*;
2. all work must emphasize teaching;
3. course programs emphasize *benke*;
4. staff emphasize teachers;
5. review of school work should emphasize teaching quality.

By 1994 strengthening the teachers team had become the administration's mantra. Various aspects of academics became the targets of the 1994 work focus.[107] They included curriculum and textbook development, setting up a teacher monitoring office to work with the university's somewhat dormant Higher Education Research Institute, improving the credit system, developing key courses, improving teaching plans, and establishing a teaching work committee. The university also started in earnest to send academics and senior staff abroad for lecturing, research, training or on delegation travel. From 1991 to 1994, teachers made 400 such trips, starting with those who held the highest qualifications and who had the best relationships with the

Table 3.13: Teacher training fund (¥)[110]

1992	80,000
1993	80,000
1994	300,000
1995	650,000

president and vice-presidents. The regulations on attending international conferences required participating teachers to hold at least a masters degree or a mid-level professional qualification. SZU would pay for transportation and conference registration fees.[108] The foreign language level of the attendant had to have achieved the Four Abilities (reading, writing, listening, speaking), but this provision was usually not enforced. Other teachers were sent for further study in China, such as two from the Management Department who went to South Central Finance and Economics University (Zhongnan Caijing Daxue) as graduate students. In 1994 SZU paid ¥69,000 (US $8,000) in tuition alone for teachers' further training.[109] The entire teacher training fund had grown over the 1990s decade, especially in the two years prior to the accreditation (see Table 3.13). This fund was supposed to amount to 10% of SZU's discretionary fund disbursement. The money was earmarked for excellent teaching and research awards and would provide funds for publishing, book acquisition and academic activities.

This fund enabled 33 young teachers to undertake research, become visiting scholars, or to study abroad between 1992 and 1995. During the same period 96 young teachers went to inland universities to study for masters or Ph.Ds or in non-degree programs. By the beginning of the 1995 fall semester 20 young teachers had returned from abroad and 94 had come back from inland universities. The investment in textbook development had also paid off, at least in terms of quantity. SZU teachers had compiled 87 textbooks between 1992-1995, which amounts to slightly over 8% of all published course materials used.[111]

The SZU branch of the CCP considered academics as one of the areas where it, too, should be involved. New regulations placed teacher's team guidance under Party purview and required that it be subjected to collective discussion.[112] The Party's Propaganda Department decided to publicize teachers' accomplishments in the display windows outside of the administration building.[113] The university also promulgated regulations on teaching discipline, prohibiting teachers from carrying pagers into the classroom (no mention, however, of mobile phones) and restricting them from asking for leave for private business at the end of a semester.[114] Requests for leave under three days went to the department head; the Personnel Office handled requests involving 3-10 days; only the president could approve leave over 10 days. Cases in which students successfully persuaded teachers to raise exam scores were to result in the teacher's punishment, according to the seriousness of the case.[115]

Thus, by 1995 SZU had started to address the needs of ordinary teachers. It required training for its young teachers. Those who held only *benke* degrees were encouraged to get graduate training. The university said it would "try its best to provide conference funds for all teachers so long as the conference benefits teacher's academic level and reputation and would provide opportunities for teachers to go abroad for visits and training."[116]

Creating a teaching élite

An emphasis on the élite is a common thread that runs through all of Chinese education, but this theme was not enunciated so clearly at SZU until the recruiting of key scholars began in 1993. One of the major initiatives taken to improve the quality of the faculty involved the recruitment of nationally known scholars into the SZU community. A recruitment advertisement ran twice in the *Guangming Ribao,* China's newspaper for intellectuals.[117] The Personnel Office sent staff to Beijing during a snowstorm for permission to place the ads, which covered 10 majors, including International Trade and Finance, Food Chemistry, Hong Kong/Macau Economy, Real Estate Management, and Industrial Design. Applicants had to be under 50, with over ten years of teaching experience in higher education. The university received over 400 letters of interest. By the end of April, the Personnel Office had selected 69 professors and 91 associate professors as candidates, with 20 majors covered. A shortlist resulted in 26 names. After interviews, 15 were selected, some of whom did not meet the specifications in the *Guangming Ribao* ad. By the end of 1993, five professors, one senior engineer, and one associate professor had reported for work.[118] By 1995 12 in total had reported. Ensuring further training for key teachers was one of Cai Delin's Four Keys.[119] The recruiting of these so-called academic dragons received both national and local press attention. Reports in the Shenzhen newspapers commented that SZU had "lacked famous professional scholars, without whom its academic status cannot be improved"[120] and that "raising the reputation of the university requires a lot of famous academic leaders for building education theory…teachers are the main aspect of education."[121]

SZU employed a new class of teacher—leading teachers (*zhu jiang* or chief lecturers)—in its self-evaluation report to the 1995 SEdC accreditation team.[122] It defined 358 of its 462 full-time teachers as leading (77%), and 91% of the 188 teachers who held senior ranks as leading. Although it did not disclose the criteria used in creating this "leading" class, SZU gave itself the mark of A in this category on the SEdC self-evaluation.

Major initiatives in creating a teaching élite were part of SZU's responses to Guangdong's 1000-100-10 project, which was intended to name 1,000 backbone teachers, 100 provincial-level academic leaders and 10 state-level educational leaders from the province.[123] Thirty of these were to come from SZU. Conditions for becoming a backbone teacher included:

- If lecturer or above, age not over 35. If associate professor or above, not over 40. Healthy.
- With at least a masters (if graduated after 1990, must hold a Ph.D.).
- Foreign language and computers skills.
- Major lecturer of at least one course. Teaching quality evaluated as good, two years in a row.
- Must have a clear research direction.
- Must have achieved three of the following:
  a) book published since 1992 which, if in arts, has at least 80,000 characters;
  b) eight articles published in arts since 1992 or at least five in science;
  c) at least three arts or two science articles in famous journals;
  d) a completed research project at city level or above;
  e) at least one major academic achievement award at provincial or ministry level or at least third place award from the Guangdong Higher Education Bureau;
  f) Guangdong excellent teaching award;
  g) success application for provincial or ministry project of natural science or social science fund key project.

The successful applicant would be entitled to the "backbone" status for four years, subject to an annual review and a comprehensive evaluation every two years. Backbones in arts received ¥10,000 (US $1,200) per year, ¥15,000 (US $1,800) in science as well as a ¥100 (US $12) monthly subsidy which, if the mid-evaluation were passed, would be raised to ¥150. Opportunities would be given to take courses domestically and abroad in key research institutes and universities in order to acquire the most recent knowledge in their fields. Over the four years, backbones could take 2-3 tours out of SZU, including one abroad, but the accumulated academic visits should not exceed two years. Each backbone teacher could employ a tutor, someone qualified to supervise doctoral students and the tutor could receive a monthly tutoring fee of ¥100. Priority would be given for foreign language and computer training. Requirements for passing the biannual evaluation, in addition to finishing all SZU tasks and showing good teaching quality, included any two of the following five accomplishments:

- finish a Guangdong key research and pass its evaluation;
- publish one book plus one article;
- publish no fewer than three arts or two science articles in famous journals or six arts / four science articles in Chinese registered journals;
- at least one city level academic achievement award;
- provincial level excellent teaching award.

By the end of the four years, the backbone teacher should have accomplished three of the following items:

- one provincial key project;
- one solely obtained provincial or ministry project funded by natural science research funds, key project funds, or social science research fund, or if applied with others, the same type of project at state level;
- one academic research project awarded at provincial level or above;
- published books or university textbooks at provincial level;
- received Guangdong excellent teaching award;
- named as provincial-level expert with outstanding contributions.

Another program funded 100 “trans-century academic leaders.” The criteria here were stricter than those used for selecting backbones. Trans-century applicants had to hold senior professional qualifications. SZU was expected to support ten leaders, each of whom had to be under 50 if a professor, 45 if an associate professor. The compensation was ¥20,000 (US $2,400) a year for teachers of arts, ¥25,000 (US $3,000) in science.

Table 3.14: Salary (¥), associate professor, 1997

income	3,591
standard salary	365
flexible salary	156
special zone subsidy	1,305
price subsidy	195
housing subsidy	688
retained subsidy	467
air conditioning subsidy	400
book subsidy	15
deductions:	285.62
work union	1.82
conditional evaluation	37
medical coverage	44.92
pension	112.30
tax	89.58
president's discretionary fund subsidy	550
total monthly payment	3,855.38

Note: air conditioning subsidy paid for hot weather months (May-October) only.

Remuneration

Salary is not equivalent to total income. This holds true for the U.S. where income (as supposedly reported to the IRS) includes earnings from investments, savings and inheritance, as well as a paycheck. In China salary is only a small part of remuneration from an employer. Work-units give a number of subsidies and bonuses to employees, and together these amounts tend to dwarf actual salary.[124]

Staff salaries at SZU quadrupled over the school's first decade. From the mid- to late-1980s the average monthly base SZU salary was reported as ¥230, a figure that included state subsidy but excluded any on-campus subsidy.[125] The biggest changes occurred in the early 1990s. In 1992 the university upgraded each staff person one grade in salary. In 1993, a housing subsidy was added as well as temporary position and life subsidies. Teachers' income doubled from the beginning of 1992 to the end of 1993. In 1993 the Personnel Office reported to the author that the average staff monthly salary was ¥816.88 (US $140), a figure which included a ¥490 (US $85) living allowance, making the base salary about ¥330 (US $60).[126] The ¥816.88 figure excluded the numerous subsidies, allowances and non-salary income which amounted to ¥278.52 (US $48) per capita.[127] Thus, the average SZU wage in 1993 was about ¥1,100 (US $190), exclusive of bonuses and other payments issued from presidential discretionary funds.

In addition, departments and institutes also gave special payments (bonuses) to their staff, a practice eventually authorized by 1992 regulations.[128] These amounts varied by office according to the financial condition of each. Payments to employees were not to exceed ¥300 per month unless the unit remitted to the university an amount equal to half of the subsidy over the permitted level.

Table 3.15 represents the 1997 monthly salary (US $250) of an assistant lecturer, the entry level teaching qualification at SZU. Table 3.14 shows the pay slip for an associate professor for the same year (US $430). Neither of these amounts reflects payments to teachers from their individual academic departments, based on side-business income. In sum, they suggest that salaries at SZU probably doubled between 1993 and 1997.

Salaries, as illustrated by Tables 3.14 and 3.15, are very individualized, and it would be rare for two staff members who held identical positions, with similar lengths of service and educational qualifications, to receive the exact same pay. The 1992 regulations delineated three broad categories of subsidy: position, achievement and special.[129] The position subsidy was further classified according to eight ranks, the amounts based on the lowest rank (see Table 3.16). Thus, the president (the top rank) received three times the base salary of the lowest ranking clerk, in 1995 about ¥450 and ¥150, respectively.

The special zone subsidy reflected Shenzhen’s high cost of living, and the price subsidy related to inflation, based on something like a Consumer Price Index. In addition to these payments issued by the Finance Office, as authorized by the municipal government, departments provided their own subsidies/payments. These depended to a large extent on the financial well being of the sub-work-unit and the leader’s method of distribution. Thus a cash-flow rich department like Architecture might give a senior staff member ¥10,000 a month while income-poor departments like Physics and Math gave their staff almost nothing, except for the occasional bag of oranges or case of cooking oil.

Table 3.15: Salary (¥), assistant lecturer, 1997[130]

income	1,887
standard salary	179
flexible salary	77
SEZ subsidy	690
housing subsidy	363
retained subsidy	263
material subsidy	195
book and newspaper subsidy	15
annual bonus (prorated)	101
late marriage subsidy	4
deductions	
work union	.90
housing	58.24
conditional (10% salary withheld)	18.00
cleaning	.50
medical	23.64
pension	59.10
tax	49.76
total deductions	210.14
President’s fund subsidy	550
total monthly payment	2,226.86

Table 3.16: Position subsidy ranks, 1993[131]

rank	position	coefficient
1	president	3.0
2	vice-president, professor	2.5
3	associate professor, department/office head	2.25
4	vice department/office head	2.0
5	lecturer, sub-office head	1.75
6	associate sub-office head	1.5
7	office member, assistant lecturer	1.25
8	clerk	1.0

Awards and punishments

During the school year, SZU presented a number of monetary awards to staff, totaling ¥300,000, ¥376,800 and ¥801,000 (US $60,000-90,000) in the years 1990, 1991 and 1994, respectively.[132] Even more than other schools, SZU has attempted to use awards and punishments as the major way to improve teaching. From 1988 the university has retained 10% of teacher's individual salaries. This money went into the president's discretionary fund and was later returned to teachers in the form of staff awards.[133] This regulation, like others, offered a certain mathematical precision, something that attempted to correct for, but actually probably merely belied, the overall subjective nature of evaluations:[134]

> Each semester an evaluation will be based on performance. There is a basic award as well as 'heavy' awards for extra contributions in teaching and service. The basic award is the 10% reservation, unless the teacher is absent from classes, in which case 10% will be deducted from the 10% reservation for each class missed. If the teacher is absent from work for one day, 20% will be deducted. If the teacher violates exam discipline, 30% will be deducted. If the teacher speaks rudely, uses dirty language, or exhibits other improper behavior, 40% will be deducted. No reservation will be returned if the teacher disobeys the upper level, acts irresponsibility in the job, violates rules or ignores family planning guidelines. Teaching awards have five ranks, ¥500, 400, 300, 200, 100. A service award follows the same five groups, for those who provide service to staff or students. The department head does not participate in the 'heavy' awards.

Once or more each year, usually around Teachers Day in September, a meeting on teachers awards bestowed prizes upon outstanding teachers. The nature of these awards has changed over the years. In the 1980s they were based mainly on merit, according to the regulations above. By the early 1990s, however, they had deteriorated, as Editor Zhang pointed out:[135]

> Rational awards and punishment for different performances are needed. Many sub-work-units do not link evaluation to performances at all. Those who should be rewarded are not rewarded. Those who should be punished are not punished. In the campaigns that select excellent élite workers and the like, everyone knows that few are serious about this. Most such campaigns are done *ma ma hu hu*, (so-so, literally horse-horse-tiger-tiger), casually and do little good to improve the situation…The honor of excellence should be given to those with actual achievements and contributions.

The 1992 excellent teaching awards included three grades of prize (each which included a monetary award) for a total of 31 items, shared by 116 people: first prizes, 10 items, 36 teachers, ¥5,000 (US $900) each; 16 second prize items, 64 people, ¥2,500 (US $450); 5 items, 16 teachers for ¥500 (US $91) "encouragement award."[136] With few exceptions, the first prizes went to department leaders, many of whom were not personally involved in the projects or courses for which they received awards. The other prizes were shared by leaders, sub-leaders, and ordinary teachers. This type of distribution, which awarded those who supported the leadership, was based more on politics and position than individual contribution. It produced a general cynicism among ordinary teaching staff. One teachers' comment reflected outright bitterness: "The leaders wouldn't know good teaching if it bit them on their bottoms. But they well know when their bottoms are being kissed."

By 1995 the university had coined the term *jiang jiao jin* (award-teaching-money) which it modeled after the common expression used for scholarship, *jiang xue jin*, or award-studying-money. Whether money as an incentive can buy better teaching is, of course, suspect; but such a causal relationship was implicit in SZU policy. Several informants confirmed that they would "try harder" if there were the possibility of a monetary reward (e.g., see Story 5). Awards in 1995 came twice. Awards for advanced work-units and individuals, judged at the provincial, municipal and school levels, were given to over 250 individuals, including some leaders of particular work-units.[137] At the end of the year, awards under the title of "SZU's First Contribution Awards," were publicized in the university's magazine.[138] Those awards went to 126 teachers and staff (8 first prizes, 31 second prizes, 87 third prizes). At that time the awards had returned to a merit-basis, but in each case the three levels of prizes were generally stratified by rank and length of service, and not awarded purely on academic or service achievements. Ordinary teachers mostly received the third prize; the inclusion of recently hired teachers suggests criteria other than rank and seniority.

An evaluation procedure initiated at the end of 1995 maintained the existing review process but specified that the number of "excellent" teachers should not exceed 15% of teachers being evaluated in any single department.[139] Those who were judged as only "basically qualified" would receive a "yellow card" and be sent for three-months' training. Anyone who refused to receive training or failed the post-training evaluation would be fired. The basis for the year-end bonus was an extra month's salary. Those who passed the evaluation as qualified got the regular bonus. Those evaluated as excellent received an additional 30%. Those judged as only basically qualified or unqualified would receive no bonus at all.

In sum, the various efforts in the run-up to the 1995 accreditation paid off. In the university's view, they had accomplished their goal: to improve SZU's *jiao feng*, or teaching atmosphere. This is the picture SZU presented to the SEdC accreditation team:[140]

> As a neighbor of Hong Kong and Macau with their developed market economies and financial markets, the temptation of money worshipping is great. Once, this used to influence our study (*xue feng*) and teaching (*jiao feng*) atmospheres unfavorably. In recent years, by practicing the employment system, improving payments, adhering to stronger teaching discipline and carrying out ideological and political work, the *jiaofeng* has made progress. Random courses have stopped; the part-time businessmen phenomenon has decreased. Most teachers are devoted to teaching and cherish the good reputation of SZU. They care about school development, strictly follow teaching regulations and the teaching manual. Two teachers were awarded as national labor exemplary models and state level excellent teachers. Fifteen persons have been awarded as advanced teachers at the provincial level, 45 persons at the municipal level, and 731 at the university level. A minority of teachers have been punished for violating teaching disciplines.

Concluding thoughts

A Chinese idiom describes a person who, while holding a precious watermelon, eagerly stoops down to pick up a valueless sesame seed, losing the melon in the process (*jian le zhi ma, diu le xi gua*). This is what happened in teacher development at SZU.

The above quotation on *jiao feng* illustrates the university's approach to teachers, something characterized as teacher management rather than teacher development. The term in the west is faculty development, but as one of my colleagues pointed out to me, SZU really did not have a faculty. This colleague envisioned a faculty to be some sort of collegial body through which teachers controlled themselves and their teaching. This happened only during the Luo Zhengqi tenure. Even during Luo's time, SZU administrators were preoccupied with "teaching discipline" rather than teaching quality. Only when facing the SEdC accreditation did the university initiate procedures to train new teachers, something that was sorely absent during SZU's first decade. Over the years rules on teacher management were promulgated continually. The leaders worked on pruning the trees, not aware of what was happening in the forest (Chinese has the trees/forest idiom, also).

SZU's development of a young, inexperienced teaching staff, without adequate training or mentoring, resulted in poor classroom pedagogy, a subject discussed in Chapter Five. The university was so concerned with efficiency during the early years that the resultant shortage of teachers created insidious side-effects. Teachers were forced to teach as many as 20 hours a week. Their low salaries and pressing financial needs forced them to disengage from research, which will be discussed in Chapter Seven. At the end of the day, the university was left with a plethora of speeches, regulations and mathematical formulae on teacher management but not much to show for them. In other words, a lot of sesame seeds, but a spoiled watermelon.

---

1. Such staff are called *ting xin liu zhi* (stop salary, reserve position). The term of leave was supposed to be one year, but could be extended to a maximum of three. See "*Rencai* exchange development service center," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 350.
2. Data for the previous year, 1990, reported 280 temporary workers: 25 for landscaping, 22 for water/power, 23 for bus team, 26 for cleaning, 41 for security, and 143 in the canteen.
3. The figure was still probably around 10%. In 1994, for example, the Chinese Department reported 36 fixed teaching staff and four non-quota teachers, *1994 Yearbook*, p. 96.
4. Teacher Xing died in an automobile accident in March 1997.
5. "Key points for president running school," Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, p. 6.
6. "New proposals on SZU's reform and innovation, 25 September 1984," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 168.
7. This excludes adult education. Computation is based on *benke*/*zhuanke* enrollment from published sources and staff size data reported by SZU. Ratio for 1985 as reported by SZU is based on 628 staff, resulting in a student enrollment figure that exceeds reported enrollment by 11% (1,784 compared with 1,610).
8. Huang Weiping, "The spirit of the Thirteenth Party Congress," 1986.
9. Source: SZU yearbooks. Computed for regular staff and students.
10. Source for China-wide data: Department of Planning, SEdC, 1995, as cited in Min, "Major strategic issues for Chinese higher education," 1997, p. 4. Other sources: University websites, November 1997. SZU data from *1995 Yearbook*, p. 48, 51-2. Data are provided only for universities with websites that disaggregated their student populations into full-time and part-time students (three of whom equal one FTE). Data for agricultural institutions are from Kulander, "Agricultural universities," 1998, p. 180.
11. Data from *1995 Yearbook*, p. 48, 51-2. Student population based on actual

enrollment, not on figures prepared for the SEdC accreditation.

12. *China Education News,* 29 March 1995.
13. Source: "Report to Shenzhen municipality on SZU efficiency, 7 Oct. 1986," *1987 Yearbook,* p. 169. The corresponding figure for 1991 was 25.8%. See Su Nugeng, "Financial Department Report," *1991 Yearbook,* p. 156.
14. "Report to Shenzhen municipality on SZU efficiency, 7 Oct. 1986," *1987 Yearbook,* p. 169.
15. Wang Pingshan, Guangdong Lieutenant Governor, "Remarks at 1987 school year opening ceremony," *1987 Yearbook,* p. 9.
16. "Provisional regulations on personnel transfer, 18 May 1994," *1994 Yearbook,* p. 194.
17. The regulations call for new staff to be healthy and proper looking (*wuguan duanzheng*), meaning that the five parts of the face—mouth, nose, eyes, ears and eyebrows—should be well proportioned.
18. Source: SZU yearbooks.
19. Details on SZU's budgets and finances can be found in Agelasto, *University in Turmoil,* 1998, Chapter Five.
20. "Notice regarding position qualification subsidy for professional and technical staff, 18 May 1994," *1994 Yearbook,* p. 192. The policy was authorized in 1991 regulations, *1991 Yearbook,* pp. 223-6.
21. "Work plan for employing professional technicians, 21 June 1995," *1995 Yearbook,* p. 241. "Personnel Department report," *1995 Yearbook,* p. 205.
22. "Employment certificate for Liang Xueming," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path,* 1988, p. 78.
23. Feng Junying, "On training SZU teachers," *Shenda Tongxun,* no. 9 (1990), p. 32. That year the average age of a professor was 55, associate professor 49. The national averages were 59 and 53, respectively.
24. 0=illiterate; 1=primary; 2=junior middle; 3=senior middle; 4=university; 5=graduate study.
25. Nationally, the average teacher's age in 1983 was 42, lowering to 39 in 1992 (Cao Xiaonan, "Strategic role," 1998, Table 3.1, p. 38). Data for 1992-1993 put the age at 40.6 (computed from Min, "China," 1997, p. 51). The comparable figure for 1994 was 40.2 (computed from SEdC, *1995 Educational Statistics Yearbook,* 1995, pp. 28-9).
26. *1986 Yearbook,* p. 84.
27. Source: *1995 Yearbook,* p. 48.
28. *Ibid.*
29. "Teachers responsibilities and evaluation method, 26 February 1985," *1994 Teachers Handbook,* pp. 38-42.
30. "Regulations on implementing the employment contract system, 11 August 1986," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path,* 1988, p. 240.

31. Sources: university homepages, November 1997.
32. "Second proposals of SZU's reform and innovation, abstract, 10 July 1986," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 172.
33. "Systematic efficiency responsibility system, 24 February 1987," *1987 Yearbook*, p. 185.
34. The most notorious non-renewal involved President Luo Zhengqi, who was fired as president and dismissed altogether after the events of June 1989.
35. This vague language characterizes SZU regulations. Here, "upper level" could be interpreted as either university leaders (president or vice-president) or officials in the Shenzhen or provincial offices that oversaw SZU.
36. Wu Shulian, "Suggestions on the categorized staffing system," *1988 Yearbook*, p. 105.
37. "Notice on canceling XXX's teaching qualification, students' complaint letter 28 March 1988 and reply 5 April 1988," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, p. 145.
38. The other two were personnel review and department head's evaluation. See "Teachers responsibilities and evaluation method, 26 February 1985," *1994 Teachers Handbook*, pp. 38-42. Teacher evaluation is discussed more fully in Agelasto, *University in Turmoil*, Chapter Eight.
39. Wu Shulian, "Suggestions on the categorized staffing system," *1988 Yearbook*, p. 105.
40. "Provisional measures for employment of SZU staff, July 1992," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 337.
41. The term used is *bu cheng zhi* which means unqualified, but indicates the lack of capability of doing job well as opposed to being untrainable.
42. "SZU self-evaluation report, 12 October 1995," *1995 Yearbook,* p. 51.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
44. Wu Shulian, "Suggestions on the categorized staffing system," *1988 Yeabook*, p. 105.
45. The formula incorporates several pages of mathematical symbols, but boils down to: category #2 staffing = category #1 staffing x coefficient x (.7x + .3y), where: x is per capita amount the sub-work-unit remits to the presidential fund minus the average for all SZU departments divided by the SZU average; y is the annual increase rate paid to the presidential fund for the year minus the average for all SZU departments divided by the SZU average; the coefficient, constant for all departments, reflects SZU's ability to provide housing and varies by year. By this formula, the average department receives no category # 2 staff unless the rate of increase in presidential fund contributions is above average.
46. Wu Shulian & Wang Yiping, "On developing SZU's teaching team," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 6 (1988), p. 3.

47. Zhang Zhongchuan, "Contemplation of a SZU person," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path,* 1988, p. 366.
48. "Teachers responsibilities and evaluation method, 26 February 1985," *1994 Teachers Handbook,* pp. 38-42.
49. Li Yesheng, "Reforming the personnel system, Dec. 1986," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 136.
50. "Regulations on workers' participation in ability qualification promotion evaluation, 8 May 1986," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path,* 1988, p. 243.
51. "Teaching qualification point system, 18 June 1987," *1987 Yearbook*, p. 180.
52. "Notice on professional-technical qualification review, 24 January 1991," *1991 Yearbook*, pp. 223-6.
53. "1993 professional qualification promotion quota work plan, 23 April 1993," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 349.
54. "Ten measures to further deepen SZU reform," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 77; "General plan for SZU's comprehensive reform," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 66.
55. Source: SZU yearbooks.
56. These unit-wide political reappraisals occurred in 1985 and 1989-91 and are discussed in Agelasto, *University in Turmoil*, 1998, pp. 181-2, 197-8.
57. Source: SZU Personnel Department.
58. Tang Hong, "Suggestions for improving teachers team development," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 28 (1995), p. 30.
59. *Ibid*., p. 30; Feng Junying, "On training SZU teachers," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 9 (1990), p. 32.
60. "Shenzhen municipality request to Guangdong, 22 January 1983" and "Guangdong request to the State Council, 25 March 1983," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 153, 156.
61. Huang Xinbai, "Introduction to Shenzhen educational work [abstract, 5-8 July, 1983]," *1986 Yearbook,* p. 163.
62. *1987 Yearbook*, p. 75, *1994 Yearbook*, p. 277. 1987 data include all staff who have qualification ranking; 1994 data for teachers only. Right-most column is computed with the Personnel Office data that was used in Table 3.9. Proportionally, more higher ranked teachers are not actually teaching, compared with their lower ranked counterparts.
63. On 4 November 1984, a group of professors from Qinghua, Beida, People's University—Wang Tan, Tong Shibai, Tang Tongyi, Li Funing, Wang Chuanlun, Gao Minxuan, Wang Yang—visited SZU and were scheduled to become department and institute heads.
64. Cleverley, *Schooling of China*, *first ed*., 1985, p. 275.
65. "Regulations on fixed staffing, July 1992," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 342.
66. "Comprehensive Report to Shenzhen municipality, 5 May 1987," *1987 Yearbook*, p. 164; Feng Junying, "On training SZU teachers," *Shenda Tongxun*,

no. 9 (1990), p. 32; *1994 Yearbook*, p. 277 (based on teacher name list). Other figures for 1994 place 43% with masters and 13% with Ph.D. degrees: Cai Delin, "Speech at SZU second party conference, 19 October 1994," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 57. Ph.Ds in 1994 were reported as 10.4% in data included with those in Table 3.9. Information on the number of teachers in their teaching positions for 1994 that came from the Personnel Office (data that was used in Table 3.9) puts the 1994 figure at 53%. This suggests that the published figures carry "on the books" teachers who are studying abroad.

67. Including cadres and non-teaching professionals, but excluding workers, 56 of 157 professional staff (36%) held at least masters (two had Ph.D. degrees).
68. Huang Xinbai, "Introduction to Shenzhen educational work, abstract, 5-8 July 1983," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 163.
69. "New proposals on SZU's reform and innovation, 25 September 1984," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 168.
70. This was lowered to five years. See "Academic vacation regulations, 4 May 1995," *1995 Yearbook*, p. 239.
71. Chen Baohua, "Professors assist school administration," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, p. 137.
72. Computed enrollment (non-FTE) from previous chapter. Full-time teachers data: *1986 Yearbook*, p. 17; *1987 Yearbook*, p. 75; Feng Junying, "On training SZU teachers," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 9 (1990), p. 32; *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 52; *1994 Yearbook*, p. 57; *1995 Yearbook*, pp. 48-9. National averages taken from Zhang, "Establish a high-efficiency system of higher education investment," 1995, p. 35; and Liu Renjing, "College and university admissions," 1995, p. 8. The year 2000 estimate comes from Zhang Huaizhi, "Establish a high-efficiency system of higher education investment," 1995, p. 35
73. Wang Pingshan, "Remarks at 1987 school year opening ceremony," *1987 Yearbook*, p. 9. He reported a ratio of 1:16 for 1988, "Remarks to commemorate SZU's fifth anniversary," *1988 Yearbook*, p. 8. For 1987, the 1:14 ratio was reported in "Comprehensive report to Shenzhen Municipality, 5 May 1987," *1987 Yearbook*, p. 164.
74. "New proposals on SZU's reform and innovation, 25 September 1984," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 168.
75. "Regulations on fixed staffing, July 1992," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 342.
76. Zhang Huaizhi, "Establish a high-efficiency system of higher education investment," 1995, p. 35.
77. "Second proposals of SZU's reform and innovation, abstract, 10 July 1986," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 172.
78. Chen Baohua, "Professors assist school administration," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, p. 137.

79. “Employment certificate for Professor Luo Yunzhu, 10 July 1987,” in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University’s Reform Path*, 1988, p. 75.
80. Chen Xiaobo, “Create the three first rates,” in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University’s Reform Path*, 1988, p. 156.
81. Chen Baohua, “Professors assist school administration,” in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University’s Reform Path*, 1988, p. 137.
82. *1986 Yearbook*, p. 9.
83. Non-abbreviated term is *jiaoshi zhigong daibiao dahui*.
84. the list appeared in *Brief # 386* (26 December 1994).
85. Zheng Tianlun, “Speech at the opening of the third staff conference and the fifth work union conference, 22-23 December 1994,” *1994 Yearbook*, p. 33.
86. Cai Delin, “1995 work plan, 27 Februrary 1995,” *1995 Yearbook*, p. 11.
87. Luo Zhengqi, “First work report of first party committee of SZU, 5 April 1986,” *1986 Yearbook*, p. 176.
88. Luo Zhengqi, “Look at the reform from the point of view of SZU’s reform, 16 May 1986,” *1986 Yearbook*, p. 77.
89. Yu Zhongwen, “Educational reform is a complex, systematic project,” *1986 Yearbook*, p. 99.
90. “Teachers responsibilities and evaluation method, 26 February 1985,” *1994 Teachers Handbook*, pp. 38-42.
91. “Work load for teachers, July 1992,” *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 345.
92. Pan Yanming, “AAO report,” *1988 Yearbook*, p. 58.
93. Wu Zewei, “Strict requirements starting from every teacher himself; further correct teaching attitude, speech at teachers conference, 26 June 1990,” *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 39.
94. This amounts to about a 1½% teacher truancy rate, given 370 teachers, each teaching seven two-hour classes, for 18 weeks the semester.
95. “Opinions on strengthening moral/political education, 27 November 1989,” *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 225.
96. Zhang Zhongchun, “Focus on teaching, seek a good administration away from disorder,” *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 9 (1990), p. 9.
97. Wei Youhai, “President’s work report,” *1991 Yearbook*, p. 22.
98. The full idiom runs: The lack of instruction to a son is the father’s fault; teaching not strict, teacher lazy.
99. Wei Youhai, “President’s work report,” *1991 Yearbook*, p. 28.
100. “1991 work summary, 14 January 1992,” *1991 Yearbook*, p. 32.
101. Liu Xizhen, “Report of Guangdong university work union committee Party construction inspection group, 18 December 1991,” *1991 Yearbook*, p. 51.
102. Chen Guanguang, “AAO report,” *1991 Yearbook*, p. 137.
103. When moving forward, people are sometimes preoccupied with other concerns, called “look-back worries” in Chinese.
104. Cai Delin, “Report to staff conference,” *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 37.

105. Zhang Bigong, "Do a good job to receive accreditation, guarantee passing, and strive for good performance," *1995 Yearbook,* p. 22.
106. Wang Songrong, "Speech to mid-level cadres, September 1995," *1995 Yearbook,* p. 25.
107. "1994 work focus, 9 March 1994," *1994 Yearbook,* p. 9.
108. "Regulations providing funds for staff attending international academic conferences, 28 September 1994," *1994 Yearbook,* p. 191.
109. "Personnel Department report," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 172.
110. Source: "SZU self-evaluation report, 12 October 1995," *1995 Yearbook,* p. 52.
111. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
112. "SZU democratic centralism construction, 20 January 1994," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 81.
113. Wang Songrong, "Speech at propaganda work meeting," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 84.
114. Regulations on pagers and leave appear in *1994 Teachers Handbook*, pp. 47-9.
115. "Reaffirmation of teaching discipline, 20 April 1994," *1994 Yearbook,* p. 212.
116. "Decision on strengthening teachers' force construction, 18 May 1995," *1995 Yearbook,* p. 237.
117. *Guangming Ribao*, 22 and 24 February 1993.
118. *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 215.
119. The others are key subjects, key courses and key labs.
120. Qiu, "A time when dragons can swim in the big lake," *Shenzhen Tequ Bao,* 1994.
121. Xu, "Shenzhen University is trying to be a first class university," 1994, p. 5.
122. "SZU self-evaluation report, 12 October 1995," *1995 Yearbook,* p. 52.
123. "Implementation plan for selecting and training trans-century academic leaders, 1 June 1995," *1995 Yearbook,* p. 226; "Implementation plan for selecting and training trans-century backbone teachers, 1 June 1995," *1995 Yearbook,* p. 231.
124. For a discussion of the incentives and subsidies that are available in the Chinese workplace, see Bian, *Work and Inequality in Urban China,* 1994.
125. Su Nugen, "Financial department report, 20 December 1989," *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 99; "Report to Shenzhen government on SZU efficiency," 7 October 1986, *1987 Yearbook*, p. 171. The latter reports the average salary in a Guangdong university as ¥141 (¥107 basic salary and ¥34 subsidy).
126. Personal interview with staff member. Another figure, ¥1,764.76 is derived by dividing the total funds spend on salaries (¥19.97 million) by the number of fixed staff (943), both reported in the *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 220, 53. This

result excludes non-fixed staff who receive salaries from the Finance Office.

127. This figure is derived by dividing the reported non-salary income paid by SZU by the total number of fixed staff, *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 220, 53.
128. "Provisional regulations on the salary system and on-campus subsidy, July 1992," *1992-93 Yearbook*, pp. 352-3.
129. *Ibid*.
130. Notes: amounts in ¥ (*renminbi).* Late marriage is a ¥50 lump-sum annual subsidy for men and women unmarried by age 25 or 23, respectively. Material subsidy is for household goods and furniture. The annual bonus, paid in a single lump-sum, is based on SZU's evaluation and represents performance.
131. Source: "Provisional regulations on the salary system and on-campus subsidy, July 1992," *1992-93 Yearbook*, pp. 352-3. The cadre classifications for these ranks are: #1, *ting*; #2, vice-*ting*; #3 *chu*; #4 vice-*chu*; #5 *ke*; #6 vice-*ke*; #7 *ke yuan*.
132. *1991 Yearbook*, p. 24, 156; *1994 Yearbook*, p. 176.
133. The president's/school fund budget, however, does not include this 10% retained salary as an income line item, nor is the amount reflected as an expense.
134. "Awards and punishments for SZU staff, 15 January 1988," *1988 Yearbook*, p.186.
135. Zhang Zhongchun, "Focus on teaching, seek a good administration away from disorder," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 9 (1990), p. 9.
136. *Collection of Excellent Teaching Results Prizes* (SZU: August 1993), pp. 7-11. Different figures are presented in *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 46, 336-7; *Brief # 235* (5 November 1992) omits the names of award winners.
137. "1994-5 advanced work-units and individuals," *1995 Yearbook*, pp. 222-3.
138. "Name list of the first SZU contribution award winners," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 31 (1995), p. 11; *1995 Yearbook*, p. 85. Deeds of first prize winners in "first contribution awards," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 33 (1996), p. 7.
139. "Notice on 1995 staff evaluation, 12 December 1995," *1995 Yearbook*, p. 245.
140. "SZU self-evaluation report, 12 October 1995," *1995 Yearbook*, pp. 56-7.

Story 6: Xiao, retired teacher

My husband and I came to Shenda and worked here until we retired. Both of us had grown up and been educated in Shanghai. We met at university, and we expected to stay there throughout our careers, to teach and raise a family. In 1957, at the behest of Chairman Mao, we offered opinions on strengthening China. During the so-called anti-rightist movement that followed, we were severely criticized and were forced to leave Shanghai and teach in the remote Northwest. My wife had written on participation and democracy, ideas that are correct from the point of view of today. Back then, however, she was branded a rightist. We were separated for several years, and then I was allowed to join her. None of her colleagues would speak to her. During the Cultural Revolution we were again criticized and we spent eight years living in a remote village as farmers and laborers. In 1979 we were "rehabilitated" but could still find no way to return to Shanghai. When the ad for teachers for Shenzhen University appeared, we applied.

We were older than most of Shenda's teachers and held positions of leadership during our career here. We live a comfortable retirement, trying to make up for a life of hardship. One of our children lives abroad, and we have been able to visit. We like to visit, but we of course miss China. Foreign people ask us why, after all our suffering, we still prefer to live in China. Perhaps, one must be Chinese to understand. As intellectuals, we love its culture and tradition. We are not exceptional; generations have suffered before us, and we do not dwell on the past.

Neither of us misses teaching at the university. We are not visited by our former students or faculty colleagues, although we sometimes keep in contact with the students we had before we came to Shenzhen. Retirement is comfortable. We receive slightly under what we received in our last year teaching. The university gives us ¥500 each year toward travel, and there's an office we can go to if we have any special problems. We qualified for purchasing a flat; with our pensions we live quite modestly.

Looking back on the Shenda experience, we see a dream unfulfilled. The university went through a traumatic and difficult period, after which the quality of students, teachers and administrators fell. It may take decades for the status of the school to return to what it was in its early years, before the leadership changes, murders and corruption. It is quite sad to see what has happened. We no longer care to follow university politics; anyway, we had our fill of sadness.

4. Knowledge structure

As in universities elsewhere in the world, the teaching department in Chinese institutions is the basic operating unit. Academic departments, of course, are not equal. They vary in terms of wealth and prestige. Most important, they vary in terms of quality of students.

A university needs good students in order to establish and sustain both overall high quality and a good reputation. In China, universities are judged primarily by student quality. Freshmen scores on the college entrance exam for any year determine how an institution is categorized on the preference forms used by students the next year. These scores play a large role in the rankings of universities that appear in Chinese publications. It is possible for schools to move between categories, but continuous adjustment is unlikely because scores shift only by small increments and few schools are on the margins of the categories. SZU, for example, in 1989 came closest to becoming a *de facto* “key university” of Guangdong as determined by entrance scores; yet in that year more than 30% of the entering class scored *below* the key score line. That figure should be 0% for key universities.

Good students define good universities. Good teachers and researchers who are attracted to these schools command national and international respect and are able to tap research resources. Thus, quality teachers and superior facilities follow good students, not vice-versa. Hindsight suggests that any attempt by SZU to become a key university was probably doomed from the start by the approach it took: initially hiring good teachers and building state-of-the-art facilities, and *then* hoping to attract good students. In its rush for creation in 1983, the university enrolled its entering class of over 200 students in the few months prior to opening a temporary campus. Although data are not available, it is unlikely that many of this first class scored above the key-score line. In its first three years, many students were taken on the basis of recommendations rather than test scores. Decisions based primarily on exam scores did not occur until 1986. In the years that followed, the city government, in forcing SZU to give priority to lower-scoring local students over higher-scoring students from elsewhere in Guangdong Province, ensured that the university could never become “first rate” as defined by student input. The city also required SZU to emphasize *zhuanke* at the expense of *benke*. These shorter cycle students scored below regular *benke* undergraduates, demanded less of teachers, and were enrolled in majors that were somewhat vocational/technical in nature. Together these

Table 4.1: Arts entrance examination scores, ranked by major and year[1]

major (department)	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	average
International Finance (Int'l. Finance & Trade)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Accounting[a] (Economics)	3	3	2	3	2	2	3	2
International Trade (Int'l. Finance & Trade)	2	2	3	2	5	4	6	3
SEZ Accounting (Economics)			4					4
Public Administration (Public Administration)	4	4	8	9	4	6	2	5
International Economic Law[b] (Law)			9	4	7	12	4	6
Law[c] (Law)			6	5	9	8	11	7
Transportation (Economics)	5	7	10	7	6	3	9	8
Enterprise Management[d] (Management)				6	9	5	9	9
Real Estate Management (Management)	8	6	5	11	8	10	5	10
Chinese[e] (Chinese)	7	10	11	10	3	11	8	11
Advertising (Chinese)	6	5	12	8	12	7	13	12
English (Foreign Language)		9						13
Statistics (Economics)	9	8	6	12	11	9	7	13
Taxation (Economics)	10							15
Japanese (Foreign Language)					13		11	16

Notations [a] through [e] In Endnote 1.

factors negatively affected the academic prestige of the institution, making it less appealing to professors who might consider transferring in.

Just as universities differ in terms of prestige—an imprecise indicator that reflects the quality of students, teachers, and facilities—academic departments within an institution vary along the same variables. One of the few variables at the department level that can be accurately measured with available data is admissions scores. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present the entrance score data for the arts and sciences tracks for the years for which information is most complete. Using these data requires caution. Scores for the distinct sciences and arts tracks must not be compared because tests taken by sciences students historically are marked on a lower point basis than those taken by arts students. Comparing scores between years, even within a department, is also not appropriate because the scores are not standardized over time.

Table 4.2: Science entrance examination scores, ranked by major and year[2]

major (department)	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	average
Int'l Finance (Int'l. Finance & Trade)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Computer[a] (Electronic Engineering)	3	4	4	2	3	2	2	2
Int'l. Trade (Int'l. Finance & Trade)	2	2	3	3	2	3	11	3
Taxation (Economics)	4							4
Accounting[b] (Economics)	5	3	2	5	4	5	6	5
Int'l Eco. Law[c] (Law)					5	4	5	6
Radio Technology (Electronic Engineering)	6	5	6					7
Architecture (Architecture)	7	6	7	4	6	7	4	8
Labor Economics (Economics)		8						9
Optical Elec'l. Tech. (Physics)					9	13	3	10
Electrical Eng. (Electronic Engineering)	13			8	7	6	12	11
SEZ Accounting (Economics)			10					12
Transportation (Economics)				10	8	16	8	13
Enterprise Management[d] (Management)	8	7	9	14	12	17	8	14
Math[e] (Math)		9	17	6	11	10	13	15
Construction Man'g (Civil engineering)		11						15
Civil Eng.[f] (Civil Engineering)	12	13	7	7	10	9	20	17
Mechanical Eng.[g] (Mechanical Engineering)	13	9	13	15	14	13	10	18
Applied Physics (Physics)	11	12	15	9	14	21	7	19
Real Estate Dev.(Civil Engineering)			5	11	17	19		20
Real Estate Management (Management)			11	12	14	15	16	21
Automation[h] (Mechanical Engineering)	10	16	19	13	12	8	18	22
Industrial Design[i] (Architecture/Design)	15		13					23
Statistics (Economics)		14						23
Eng. Supervision[j] (Civil Engineering)			12	16	20	12	10	23
Advertising							14	23
Applied Chemistry (Chemistry)	12	17	16	16	16	18	15	27
Food Chemistry (Chemistry)	9	15	17		19	19	16	28
Public Admin. (Public Administration)				19	17	10	21	29
Compatriot Law[k] (Law)				18				30

Notations [a] through [k] In Endnote 2.

The U.S. Standard Achievement Tests (SAT or College Boards) taken by American high school juniors and seniors are, as their name implies, standardized so that a score of 552 in 1963 is equivalent to a 552 in 1991, for example. In contrast, the Chinese college entrance exam varies in difficulty from year to year and until recently has not drawn on a bank of test questions

Figure 4.1: Entrance exam comparisons, arts



Figure 4.2: Entrance exam comparisons, sciences



of approximately the same difficulty. Since 1988, test scores in Guangdong have been calibrated on a 900 point basis and by a ranking system so that the top test score (even if questions are missed) receives a 900. Students take several tests, each of which is scored on a 900 point basis.[3] The final score a student receives is the average of all the tests taken. Comparison within tracks permits for a ranking of departments for each year, as indicated in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.

Some of the data from Tables 4.1 and 4.2 are portrayed graphically in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. Although entrance scores at SZU relative to Guangdong key universities dropped over the period 1991-1995, the ranking of SZU departments remained relatively in place. Business majors continued to

Table 4.3: Department *benke* student population flows, 1988-1991[4]

department	1988			1989			1990			1991			total
	in	out	Δ	in	out	Δ	in	out	Δ	in	out	Δ	Δ
Electronics	99	94	-5	55	49	-6	65	56	-9	70	57	-13	-33
Architecture	29	29	0	72	58	-14	44	36	-8	25	22	-3	-25
Mechanical Engineering	39	33	-6	32	28	-4	30	26	-4	42	35	-7	-21
Chemistry	32	32	0	61	50	-11	47	46	-1	44	37	-7	-19
Law	26	17	-9	23	22	-1	21	19	-2	21	22	1	-11
Physics	23	23	0	23	20	-3	20	22	2	27	21	-6	-7
Civil Engineering	43	39	-4	27	28	1	30	26	-4	50	50	0	-7
Chinese	41	35	-6	34	31	-3	27	30	3	54	44	-10	-16
Math	30	24	-6	na	(17)[a]	na	20	22	2	25	24	-1	-5
Foreign Language	33	42	9	34	34	0	37	33	-4	35	35	0	5
Management	107	103	-4	35	37	2	32	36	4	40	40	0	2
Int'l. Finance & Trade	122	120	-2	64	79	15	67	69	2	70	72	2	17
Economics	83	93	10	74	110	36	96	94	-2	67	78	11	55
total	707	684	-23	534	546	12	536	515	-21	570	537	-33	-65

[a] To prevent distortion parenthesized data are not included in totals.

Figure 4.3: 1993 seniors' opinions of SZU education by department



be the most prestigious; traditional disciplines like language and natural science attracted lower scoring students. These students, of course, are by no means dull; they are still among the élite of China's secondary school graduates!

To their teachers low CEE scorers often appear just as intelligent as their high-scoring peers, and their relative low overall test scores may be attributed to their lower abilities at exam-taking or poor performance on any one of the six tests that make up the entrance examination score. A sciences track student's ability in English, for example, might decide whether he qualifies for a business major or must accept a place in the natural sciences. An arts track student's poor showing on the math component of the entrance exam may disqualify him/her from management studies, forcing the selection of advertising as a course of study. Differences in test scores may also reflect to a large degree secondary school students' diligence and drive. Nonetheless, the point spread between departments is taken by members of the campus community as a surrogate for student quality; it defines prestige among departments.

The prestige ranking of SZU majors by entrance exam score appears consistent with what is happening in other economically developing parts of China. Practical subjects that are training *rencai* for the market economy wax in popularity while traditional subjects in the curriculum wane. An empirical study of admissions scores at Nanjing University for 1992-1995, for example, showed that the majors of law, computers and international economics/trade rose in popularity while history and geography declined over the same period. In fact, the rate of decline has accelerated, indicated by the fact that the average admissions scores in history and geography have fallen further from the university average each year.[5] The same study found that admissions scores in popular majors at second level universities surpassed the scores of the less popular majors in first level (i.e., key) universities, leading to the conclusion that applicants pay more attention to majors than institutions.

Another way to compare departments is to examine students' satisfaction with the education they received. Students' academic experience is confined mostly to their major and courses taught by their department; thus, student satisfaction is an important indicator of a department's success, at least in the view of the students. Figure 4.3 presents the views of the 1989 students who graduated in 1993, as reported in a question on my 157-item survey.[6] In terms of college entrance scores, the year 1989 had the best scores of any class to enter SZU. On the whole, teachers with experience over many years at SZU confirm that the 1989 students were the highest quality students they taught. The data suggest that overall the 1989 students were quite disappointed with the education they received; the degree of disappointment varied by department.

An earlier chapter presented data that showed that more students graduated from SZU than had been formally enrolled as freshmen. These figures also varied between departments; in 1988-1991, for example, Economics and International Finance and Trade had large increases; Architecture and Electronic Engineering had big declines. Table 4.3, which indicates these changes, reflects various factors at play: out-of-plan enrollment, attrition due to poor performance or emigration for overseas study, as well as interdepartmental transfers. An understanding of these dynamics requires an examination of each department.

Tables on the following pages present descriptive data by department on various attributes of the departments: size (Table 4.5), professional rank of teaching staff (Table 4.8), gender (Table 4.4), age (Table 4.6), faculty per capita publications (Table 4.7), student fail rate (Table 4.10), and student gender (Table 4.9). These and other comparative data presented above will be analyzed more closely in the remainder of this chapter, which describes each of SZU's academic departments. Attitude data from the 1993 *benke* seniors (who entered SZU in 1989) will also be used.

Table 4.4: Department female teaching staff (percentage, 1994)[8]

Chemistry	42
Foreign Language	39
Math	38
Economics	37
Int'l. Finance & Trade	37
Architecture	30
for all departments	29
Social Science	27
Chinese	27
Physics	25
Management	24
Law	23
Mechanical Engineering	23
Public Administration	23
Electronics	22
Design	22
Physical Education	15
Civil Engineering	10

Table 4.5: Department fixed teaching staff size (1994)[7]

Design	10
Law	13
Public Administration	13
Physical Education	13
Social Science	15
Civil Engineering	15
Mechanical Engineering	16
Physics	20
for all departments	20.7
Int'l. Finance & Trade	21
Management	22
Architecture	23
Economics	23
Math	25
Chemistry	28
Chinese	31
Foreign Language	31
Electronics	33

Table 4.6: Age of departmental teaching staff, ranked by departments (1994)[9]

department	mean	std dev.
Law	46.2	10.8
Architecture	44.5	12.8
Chinese	43.0	10.5
Mechanical Engineering	42.6	10.4
Management	41.8	12.3
Physics	41.7	10.5
Social Science	41.7	9.4
Electronics	41.7	10.7
Math	40.8	11.6
for all departments	40.8	10.6
Civil Engineering	40.3	14.1
Economics	39.8	8.6
Public Administration	39.6	9.5
Foreign Language	39.3	9.7
Design	38.6	10.2
Chemistry	38.1	8.3
Int'l. Finance & Trade	37.8	10.3
Physical Education	33.5	7.8

Table 4.7: Per teacher research output, 1988-1992, ranked by department[10]

department	annualized per capita output	
	1988-1992 (rank)	1994 (rank)
Chinese	.78 (1)	.74 (3)
Physics	.72 (2)	.55 (8)
Int'l. Finance & Trade	.72 (2)	.62 (7)
Foreign Language	.62 (4)	.74 (3)
Law	.60 (5)	.77 (2)
Management	.60 (5)	.50 (9)
for all departments	.56	.52
Electronics	.56 (7)	.64 (6)
Economics	.56 (7)	.44 (10)
Chemistry	.52 (9)	.14 (13)
Architecture	.48 (10)	.70 (5)
Mechanical Eng.	.48 (10)	.31 (11)
Civil Engineering	.44 (12)	.07 (15)
Mathematics	.42 (13)	.24 (12)
Public Administration	.38 (14)	1.0 (1)
Design	-	.13 (14)

Table 4.8: Professional rank of departmental teaching staff (1994)[11]

	mean	std dev.
Architecture	1.7	1.0
Physics	2.3	.8
Mechanical Engineering	2.3	.7
Chinese	2.3	.8
Law	2.3	.9
Social Science	2.4	.7
for all departments	2.5	.8
Foreign Language	2.5	.6
Public Administration	2.5	.8
Economics	2.6	.5
Management	2.6	.7
Electronics	2.6	.8
Math	2.6	.8
Civil Engineering	2.7	1.0
Chemistry	2.7	.6
Design	2.7	1.1
Physical Education	2.7	.7
Int'l. Finance & Trade	2.9	.8

Table 4.9: Student gender by department (percent female, selected years)[12]

department	3-year average	1989	1992	1993
Foreign Language	75	70	73	81
Economics	58	55	55	62
Chinese	55	50	57	59
Public Administration	50	-	-	50
Int'l. Finance & Trade	41	38	37	46
Law	39	38	35	44
Architecture	36	33	40	35
for all departments	34	33	30	**40**
Chemistry	34	28	21	54
Math	26	25	24	28
Management	21	10	18	35
Electronics	16	16	15	16
Physics	13	9	21	14
Mechanical Eng.	12	13	7	15
Civil Engineering	10	7	14	7

Table 4.10: Student fail rates, 1988-1990 entering *benke* classes (percentage)[13]

department	6-year average	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Architecture	31	44	21	33	27	28	4
Mechanical Eng.	31	21	32	27	43	35	54
Electronic Engineering	30	32	22	32	33	33	33
Physics	22	30	25	9	24	14	21
Chemistry	21	13	26	22	24	42	17
Math	21	21	18	5	38	33	41
Management	20	19	41	0	20	26	20
Economics	20	20	17	16	28	16	18
for all departments	19	24	22	16	13	23	22
Civil Engineering	18	26	21	23	0	30	36
Int'l. Finance & Trade	17	21	29	12	6	6	15
Law	11	12	5	21	5	19	14
Chinese	10	14	16	0	10	18	17
Foreign Language	9	14	9	9	3	5	0

Architecture department

"Architecture is the best department in our university." This summary evaluation has become an accepted truth among faculty and staff at SZU. When SZU approached the 1995 SEdC accreditation, President Cai Delin instructed departmental leaders to "learn from Architecture." Heads of departments were advised to visit Architecture and use it as a model for reshaping their own departments. Why was Architecture viewed as a model?

First, it was the wealthiest academic department and its teachers were well off, relative to their colleagues in other departments. Although data on departmental remuneration are not available, the average income of teachers in this department was commonly believed to be the highest on campus. Teachers, as well as students, were involved in designing buildings in Shenzhen. The department's annual remittance to the presidential discretionary fund, through its affiliated Architectural Design Institute, dwarfed that of any other department. As the richest department, Architecture became a model for philanthropy. In 1994, it organized donations for Project Hope, a China-wide non-governmental program that provides financial aid to underprivileged school children. The department, itself, contributed ¥3,000 (US $430) that year. The department's high level of resources gave its leadership leverage in dealing with the university leaders, who allowed the department greater autonomy than given other departments. The importance of Architecture was clearly stated by SZU in the 1995 evaluation self-appraisal, in which the university proposed the creation of seven colleges (*xueyuan*) within five years. Architecture would have its own college, incorporating into it civil engineering and design.[14]

Second, the department was run by a domineering leadership in a relatively transparent manner. At least from 1991, very clear rules prohibiting teacher moonlighting were set. Staff, including non-teaching architects, were required to hold their positions on a full-time basis. No side-businesses were tolerated, and staff were not permitted to supplement their departmental income with private work. The problem of teachers' disengagement from academics that plagued other departments did not touch Architecture. Its management over the years has been relatively open, as evidenced by the fact Architecture published more statistics on its operation than any other academic department. Dissimilar to other SZU departments where teachers were often not consulted before the leaders assigned teaching loads, from 1994 Architecture teachers advised their leaders on what courses they felt best able to teach.

Third, the teaching and learning quality was considered the best at SZU. Although the students viewed their five-year education as a bit too practical, they were considerably less dissatisfied with their SZU experience than their peers in other disciplines.[15] Faculty were pleased with the students, most of whom worked diligently in the drafting labs, late into the evenings and on weekends. Students in other departments confirm that their peers in Architecture had more demanding and challenging courses. The student fail rate was the highest at SZU, fixed at a minimum of 10%. In 1989, for example, 20% of the students failed their graduation designs. These students were allowed to redo their projects, but in that year 10% of the graduates were still denied bachelors degrees. In 1991 the department proposed the "compulsory elimination teaching system," in which 20% of the students would be forced to discontinue their study after three years, at which time they would receive a *zhuanke* or Bachelors of Industry certificate. Those in this group who wished to pursue a Bachelors of Architecture would be required to work for two years and pass a re-admittance test. This plan was never implemented, having failed to receive approval from school leaders as well as municipal personnel and planning authorities. That the plan was proposed indicates Architecture's resourcefulness in coming up with ideas to improve student quality.

Perhaps because of their long hours together, Architecture students tended to be slightly more collective and less individualistic than their peers.[16] They were also slightly more material-minded than the average SZU student.[17] The students worked long hours—longer than their peers in other departments, and Architecture treated its students well. In 1995 it created a scholarship fund that sent the top three students in design to Hong Kong Polytechnic University for training.[18] Also in 1995, all juniors went on a field trip to Hong Kong, during which they visited university faculties of architecture as well as many of Hong Kong's famous buildings. Students who could not raise the ¥3,000 (US $360) required for the trip were lent funds by the department.

The students, in turn, enhanced the department's reputation. At the Fifth Conference on Modern Chinese Architectural Research in 1991, a jury of 14 renowned architects from China, Hong Kong, and Singapore unanimously gave first prize to a SZU student's work. Another student received seven votes for second place. A student admitted in 1989 designed a 32-floor, 30,000 square meter (m^2) hotel in 1993. A 1991 student won fourth prize in a national architectural sketching contest and won the Chinese Students Trans-century Development Prize, one of only 100 awarded in the nation. A 1993 student won second prize in a provincial contest of student extra-curricular inventions. In 1992 four students used their graduation design to earn the commission to design Shennan Gardens, a mixed-use structure about one kilometer from the university.[19] Its principal designer, Duan Jingyang, stayed on to work for the institute; as an award he was allowed to attend the Asian Architecture annual meeting in Pakistan, a few months after his graduation from SZU in 1992.[20] Another famous student architect was Zhu Xiaofeng who won the competition to design the logo of the IBM-funded International Software Development Company.[21] He also designed SZU's student affairs administration building which was built in 1996; he later went to Harvard to obtain a masters degree. As part of the 1995 accreditation effort, Architecture was the only department to present an impressive exhibit of students' work. Over the years awards and prizes bestowed on students from Architecture totaled more than all other departments combined.

Fourth, Architecture was well resourced and its facilities were well maintained. Located apart from other teaching departments, Architecture was situated on the sixth floor of the SZU library, a naturally lit area that allowed sufficient space for student drafting (The department also occupied the fifth floor of the library until that space was returned to library in 1991).

Much of the income generated by its design projects was plowed back into the department. In the late ’80s the department started a computer-aided design (CAD) center that by 1988 was the most advanced center of its kind in China. The center, the software and hardware specifications for which were based on recommendations of an American academic who served as visiting professor, cost about US $250,000. Over the years technology was constantly updated (it had 40 CAD micro-computers in 1995) so it remained state-of-the-art; it did not suffer the technology time-lag that characterized the Computer Center, Library and Audio/visual Center. Architecture was often praised for its exemplary use of multi-media in teaching.

Fifth, Architecture made the most of foreign resources. In 1995 the departmental library subscribed to over 90 original foreign periodicals (the largest of any architecture school in China) and kept a large bank of slides and photographs of non-Chinese architecture, as part of its collection of 21,000 books (up from a reported 13,000 in 1991) and 20,000 slides (1991).[22] It employed overseas teachers who were architects and planners. They taught courses that were a fundamental part of the curriculum; they were not hired merely to teach non-demanding oral English courses, considered by many SZU students as just “recreational.”

Sixth, politics did not interfere with departmental management. The two-track system (Party and administration) ran smoothly, much as it does in many state-run companies. The Party did not involve itself in either architectural teaching or design work. In 1989, after Party branches were set up in teaching units throughout the university, the new Architecture Department head, Xu Anzhi, concurrently held the position of Party vice-secretary of the department. He was also appointed head of the Design Institute. The Architecture Party secretary held the post of deputy head of the institute. This intermingling, which allowed leaders to experience mutual benefits, did much to alleviate conflict between the units, and it permitted them to act in a single direction. In such a way, Architecture avoided the factionalism that plagued several other teaching units. By 1992, a reshuffle resulted in a new departmental Party secretary and vice-secretary. The former Party secretary became deputy department head for 1993 and was replaced the following year by a Party cadre, not an architect. Other reshuffles in 1994 and 1995 changed the sub-leaders of the Design Institute; throughout the changes Xu Anzhi continued his concurrent position as institute leader. The department’s official publications highlighted the importance of Professor Xu’s leadership:[23]

> Professor Xu has a profound understanding of the theories of modern architecture, especially in design of highrises and superhighrises. His publications of architectural articles and essays are on the lists of international conferences and enjoy a good reputation. Under his leadership and coordination of staff and faculty, much progress has been made in teaching and design.

Architecture was among only three of SZU's teaching units which received both "advanced Party organization" and "advanced work-unit" classifications in 1995.[24]

Finally, the Architecture Department had a unified sense of direction, driven by market demands. Its sense of purpose was not interrupted by leadership changes—it had three heads of department before 1989. In the words of one faculty member: "We know what we are about." Clearly, the department focused on meeting the architectural and human resource needs of the SEZ. Courses emphasized highrise design, something that was the locus of much new commercial and residential development in Shenzhen. As local demands increased for interior and industrial design in the early 1990s, however, these new areas received more attention in the class plan. One path that was pursued from the department's founding was directed to obtaining SEdC approval to offer masters and Ph.D. degrees in architecture. New universities in China must wait for five years before they can apply for permission to award higher degrees. Luo Zhengqi had been told informally in early 1989 that SZU could apply; his post-Tiananmen departure prevented an application at that time. The department had wanted to apply in 1992; it actually applied in 1996, after a year's worth of effort had gone into improving facilities. Architecture received permission to enroll upper degree students beginning in 1997.

From its inception, the department faculty members, spurred on by President Luo, himself a trained architect, wanted to establish Architecture's reputation as one of the best design schools in China. In August 1990 and again the following year, it passed provincial evaluations; from then it set its sights on state-level approval. In November 1991, the four best Chinese architecture schools (Qinghua, Southeastern, Tongji and Tianjin) passed a state-level evaluation by a team that included overseas judges. At that time, the department had hoped to pass the second-round evaluation, scheduled for 1993, but this was not to happen. The department submitted its self-evaluation to the provincial higher education authorities and learned that it lacked sufficient academic achievements. As a consequence more emphasis was put on research; output increased, and the department advanced five places in research output rankings (see Table 4.7). The department compiled and published a book on highrise design in 1995, and other research projects were undertaken. In 1995 architecture theory/design engineering was included among SZU's five strategic keys for science and technology development.[25] Research was directed to focus on seven areas: broad and flat beams regulations, highrise design theory, design theory about buildings near water, planning of mid- and small- size cities/towns, design theory of civil architecture, architectural and environmental protection, and land use planning. Province-level research grants were obtained for highrise design (¥160,000 [US $19,200]), hospital architecture (¥60,000 [US $7,200]), big-scale building complexes (¥90,000 [US $11,000]), and waterside sub-tropical construction (¥80,000 [US $9,600]), making the department/institute one of SZU's top grantees. Its research received various municipal and provincial awards.[26]

Architecture also maneuvered in China's academic politics to push its case for getting the right to grant higher degrees. In 1994, the Guangdong higher education authorities granted SZU the right to train ten masters students in joint programs with other provincial universities. Architecture received one of the students from South China Polytech. As part of a public relations offensive, the department head escorted President Cai to visit universities in Hong Kong and then to Beijing, where they made the necessary rounds in influential educational circles. Architecture successfully bid for the right to host, jointly with Huanan Polytech, the 1995 meeting of Chinese architectural faculties, which would offer "a good opportunity to publicize the department."[27] In 1994 it set accreditation as its goal for 1996, earmarking ¥2 million (US $230,000) of its own funds to build a physics laboratory and upgrade its other facilities. It formally applied in July 1995 to the State Council's Degree Committee for the right to teach masters students, filing its self-evaluation report in October 1995. It was included in the third round of architecture schools for the 1996 accreditation. Accreditation, good for four years, was granted in the summer 1996. SZU's was one of 14 Chinese architecture departments which passed the 1996 accreditation round; altogether there are 61 architecture schools in China.[28]

History

A department of architecture was not in the original plans for creating SZU. Guangdong's response to the city's idea of creating a Shenzhen economics college called instead for founding a comprehensive university. The provincial report mentioned architecture as a major from which *rencai* were needed for the SEZ, and the municipality's report back to the province obediently listed Architectural Materials Engineering as one of 16 majors. In May 1983 the Founding Committee listed architecture among six majors, but this arrangement was not firmly in place by July when Huang Xinbai, the deputy minister of education, visited Shenzhen. Huang had said: "Whether or not SZU should have an architecture major needs further study by experts. This issue should not be determined by individual leaders."[29] The issue had apparently been settled by September; Architecture was among the university's five departments (along with Foreign Language, Law, Commercial Economic Management and Electronic Engineering). By 1986 Architecture had 21 teaching staff, 13 of whom held first or second level qualifications (one professor, five associate professors and seven senior engineers), the most of any teaching department. In that year architecture was considered a "hot major," which had more qualified applicants than places, a distinction it shared with only International Finance, Management, and Electronics. Adult education established an architecture major in 1984, but there is no record of any student having gone through the program via the part-time *zhuanke* night school.

About a half dozen architecture professors from five of China's famous schools of architecture were initially involved in setting up the department. The department then hired teachers from China's leading universities, and it had considerably more senior ranked teachers than other SZU teaching units (see Table 4.11). About 40% were from Qinghua; 37% of the faculty have returned from overseas study. The department developed through several stages, the first of which emphasized architectural engineering and technology. Then, from 1989 the focus and scope of the department expanded to include interior design, environmental design and computer application. In 1994 architects and designers numbered 120, including 34 professors, associate professors and senior engineers. That same year there were 20 lecturers and engineers, 18 post-doctorates and masters, eight visiting scholars returning from abroad and two foreign teachers. By 1996 all faculty had been to Hong Kong or Macau more than once, and 80% of the teaching staff had traveled abroad.

Table 4.11: Teacher senior ranking (percentage)[30]

	SZU average	Architecture
1986	13	62
1987	29	55
1988	na	38
1990	34	na
1991-2	24	na
1993	36	na
1994	47	70
1995	41	na
1996	na	87

Given the nature of its work, the Architecture Department has been highly visible. Several of its teachers from Qinghua had worked on the overall campus design at the behest of Luo Zhengqi. By 1986 Architecture had designed various buildings on campus, including the Yue Hai Men Hotel, Block E lecture building, the bus depot, the Yunge faculty dorm, and the Ziwei women's dorm, which won a municipal design prize. Affiliated with the department was the Architectural Design Institute which, through its buildings in Shenzhen, gave additional visibility to the department. Backbone teachers in the department were encouraged to work at the institute in order to improve teaching quality and ensure richness in teaching. The architectural work of the institute was also supposed to contribute to teaching.[31] The institute, which was founded two years after the department, provided a part-time work place for students in the second or later year of their study. Seniors could place their senior design project there. Students in 1987 produced designs for Huang Bei Ling, a Shenzhen residential area in the Luo Hu district, which is notorious for housing the mistresses of Hong Kong lorry drivers. In that same year four student projects were selected as excellent designs at the provincial level and two at the national level.

The department's visibility was local, nationwide and global. Young architects and designers were constantly winning awards, prizes and competitions, including the commission to design the new headquarters of *Shenzhen Tequ Bao* in 1995.[32] Teachers frequently went abroad for conferences.[33] Exhibits of the department's works were also recurrent. From 1987-1992 designers won four state/ministry-level awards, 13 at the provincial level, and 19 at the city level.[34] Two professors helped China secure the hosting of the 1999 World Architecture Conference by designing the logo and brochure.[35] By 1993 SZU architects and designers had received 43 prizes for designs, including 5 national and 13 provincial awards.

The Architecture Department's integration into the community fit right into Luo Zhengqi's philosophy of making education practical and relevant. This pragmatism was a key feature noticed by visitors, including a Montclair State professor of earth and environmental studies, who reflected on the WWW:[36]

> The [SZU] Institute of Architectural Design, where I was a guest professor, includes faculty from urban planning and architecture who contract with private developers to build and design many of the subdivisions and commercial areas of this rapidly expanding city. It is among the most financially secure areas of the university because it generates its own revenues from its contracting opportunities. These revenues, in turn, are distributed to the individ-

> ual faculty participants in the form of annual bonuses that often double their salaries. In this manner, the university is as entrepreneurial in its relationship with its faculty as the city is to the rest of China.

The Design Institute's profit was ¥8 (US $2.2) million by 1988. With fixed assets of over ¥3 million (US $810,000), it had designed over 200,000 m^2 at SZU as well as over one million m^2 in Shenzhen. Its projects included the Shekou Union Hospital, Guangdong Development Bank Building, Zhong Yuan Oil Field Exhibition Center, Da Xing Commercial Building (the institute's first 100 meter high structure), and Wen Jing Mansions, which is a Lego-type construction located on the edge of Shenzhen's Ya Yuan triple-decker freeway interchange. Many of its projects received awards, including the SZU Administration Building and the Dongjiang Reservoir Office Building, which won second and third provincial prizes, respectively. The most famous of the institute's designs was for the 88-story Shenzhen International Economic Trade Center, which the institute submitted in partnership with Skidmore, Owens and Merril. The bid was won in 1993, but by 1998 the project had not yet begun, as the Chinese partner was embroiled in negotiations with Li Ka-Shing, the Hong Kong investor. Having gained a reputation for skyscrapers, the institute in 1993 was studying the feasibility of three projects each involving over 100 stories. In 1995 Shenzhen municipality ranked the institute as third among the architectural firms of Shenzhen, second among the zone's 37 design institutes, and first in number of awards received and micro-computer application.[37]

Much of the profit from the institute's commissions was retained by the department for materials and equipment purchase. In 1987, for example, the institute provided ¥40,000 (US $11,000) for the purchase of books from overseas and ¥100,000 (US $27,000) for CAD. In 1991, it used ¥90,000 (US $17,000) of its income to purchase televisions, slide projectors and air conditioning. In its first four years, Architecture had invested ¥2 million (US $540,000) of its own income for departmental construction, a fact that led President Luo to note that some academic departments would inevitably "get rich first," drawing on a concept that Deng Xiaoping had applied to the nation.[38] The division between the department and the institute never forced the units to become mutually exclusive entities. It took several years for teaching and design work to mesh; by 1988 "the contradiction between the two was in the process of being resolved."[39] Further rectification occurred in 1989 after President Luo was fired. At that time, the institute stressed ideological education; some staff "who have harmed socialist public ownership" were punished; and the practice of "people using the institute's name to earn personal money" was eliminated.[40] After the political storm dissipated, the department and institute became mutually dependent. Departmental teachers worked at the institute, while about one quarter of the institute's professional staff taught. By 1996 the department employed 13 teachers and a total staff of 16. The institute, in contrast, employed 94 staff, of whom 18 worked in administration. The remaining 76 held academic qualifications, the equivalent of 38 professors, 6 associate professors and 32 lecturers.

The Design Institute had two branches, on Hainan Island and in Shanghai. The latter, set up in autumn 1985, employed over 30 technicians from SZU, including 14 senior engineers and over 10 *zhuanke* architectural students. In its first three years, it brought in fees of ¥4.4 (US $1.2) million and designed 33 highrise buildings over 18 floors. It designed the Zhejiang PLA Veterans Hospital free-of-charge.

By 1996, the department had graduated eight classes totaling 276 students. Before 1986 10% of the students were enrolled from Beijing, Shanghai or Hong Kong/Macau, the latter colonies accounting for 13 graduates. After 1986 municipal policy required that all students come from Guangdong. Students have received 23 awards in professional competitions. More than 20 graduates pursued overseas studies in North America, Japan, Australia and Sweden. From 1989 entering freshmen were required to take an art test; colorblind or "color-weak" students were not permitted entry.

Curriculum

The curriculum at Architecture, which generally followed the course arrangements of domestic and international universities, included:[41]

> fundamentals of construction, construction blueprints, aesthetics in construction, model making, structure of construction, construction equipment, construction physics, structural design, construction structure and models selection, Chinese and overseas architectural history, computer aided architectural design, theories of construction design, principles of urban planning and design, interior design, architectural economics and regulations, landscape architecture, famous architects and their works, specialized engineering.

In 1988 new courses were added on architectural financial management, architectural criticism and SEZ architecture. The structure for majors has changed over the department's history. In 1986 two types of courses were offered: architectural engineering (four years) and architectural design (five years). The former took students who did not make the cut for the final year.

For several years the department offered an industrial product design major, but this was scrapped when SZU set up an independent Design Department in 1994. SZU's Ten-year Development Plan formulated in the early 1990s suggested a new major of architectural management engineering, but this was to be under the auspices of Civil Engineering. The same plan listed architecture as one of six majors SZU would stress.[42] The department in 1991 adopted the Qinghua model in which foundation courses occupy a student's first three years, followed by one-half year of work (in SZU's case at the Design Institute), with a final year and a half of course work.

As in all departments, Architecture offered a school-level key course, but the department's course, entitled architecture theory and design, was by 1992 one of only three SZU courses that had also received provincial approval (and ¥200,000 [US $36,000] in funding) as key courses. The course focused on highrise construction. Architecture was also the only department to receive two funded SZU research awards: one to a professor for combining teaching, research and production; the other for teaching reform in a structures course.

The formal architecture curriculum was supplemented by expatriate teachers and guest lectures from overseas. In the mid-1980s interior design was taught by a professor from Purdue University and architectural design by a registered engineer from the U.S. Both were ethnic Chinese. Architecture held as many as ten lectures by invited outsiders each year, far surpassing other departments. Guest speakers were sought, through personal contacts that had been developed at international conferences or by staff participation in international architectural organizations. Requests to lecture also came from "walk-on's"—overseas architects who visited SZU on their own, to look over the campus design, which had won international recognition as well as first place in a competition in China among 230 campus designs. To further its position in the Chinese architectural community, Architecture hosted the fifth annual conference on Modern Chinese Architectural Research in 1991.

Architecture was also the first (and until the mid-1990s only) SZU department to publish an international journal: *World Architectural Review*, first issued in June 1985, before even the university's academic journal was founded. *World Architectural Review* was not without controversy, contention that resulted not so much from its contents, but due to circumstances surrounding its leaders. One of China's notorious criminals of the 1980s, Hu Xiaoyang, possessed a temporary journalist workcard for the *Review* when he was arrested. Hu, the son of a Shanghai cadre, was executed for allegedly committing over fifty rapes and seducements. His description in

China's media as a "SZU person," according to Luo Zhengqi, damaged SZU's reputation and was the result of the work-unit's loose control over its workcards.[43] Controversy ensued when the post 4 June administration investigated the journal's leader for corruption. The new leadership accused the editor, Zhang Lianjun, of using fake chops and signatures and fabricating a resolution of the journal's board of directors. Zhang was alleged to have incurred a debt of over ¥160,000 (US $34,000), money that was subsequently returned to SZU. The university confiscated the fixed assets of the journal, including a flat in downtown Shenzhen, two photo-copiers, six air conditioners, an amplifier, and an old BMW owned by Zhang for three years.[44] The matter, which was reported to Public Security, was considered by many in the SZU community to be politically inspired—a way for the new leadership to attack Luo Zhengqi, who had appointed Zhang to his position. Indeed, SEdC official He Dongchang's speech at SZU in 1991 censuring Luo included a critique of the *Review* for being "not academic enough but rather more advertisement-oriented." The *Review* was involved in a dispute in the early 1990s with New Century Company and Southern Advertisement Company. This was settled and the journal resumed publication in December 1991.[45] Its tenth anniversary celebration was attended by dignitaries including the Shenzhen mayor and the minister and deputy minister of the Ministry of Construction.[46] From 1994, the Architecture Department head also served as president of the *Review's* publishing house.

By its very nature, architecture is a practical subject, and its students spent much of their time in labs. The department's computer facilities permitted students sufficient time to develop expertise in computer-aided design. Some faculty have complained that students' drawing and drafting abilities were adversely affected by their over reliance on computers. Students who might otherwise develop superior skills in perspective and aesthetics realize that they can hop over some laborious training and jump right onto the computer. This concerns many of the architectural teaching staff who themselves had become qualified architects before computers were personalized. Drawing classes are still taught at SZU, of course, but faculty worry that the students are not doing sufficient apprentice work to develop their skills. "This is Shenzhen," one admits. "Everything must be done yesterday. The individual is still the basis for design. The computer cannot design; it can only follow instructions. We want to develop students who can create, not just students who can program computers."

Chemistry Department

In many regards Chemistry lies at the opposite end of the spectrum from Architecture. The exam scores for entering students in Applied Chemistry were the lowest among sciences track majors in 1991-1995, averaging 36 points below those in Architecture and 104 points under International Finance. Whereas Architecture students were the most satisfied with their education, their peers in Chemistry were the least pleased (see Endnote 6). Some students showed their displeasure by quitting the major, with the department losing students each year from 1989-1991 as some transferred to different majors and others went abroad for study. Students were not the only ones leaving Chemistry. Several faculty members hired in SZU's early years left for other SZU work-units, but many new teachers were hired. In the late 1980s the department doubled its student enrollment to accommodate a second *benke* major (Food Chemistry) and a *zhuanke* major. By 1994 Chemistry was the fourth largest academic department in staff number, but near the lowest in terms of average academic rank. Its young teachers averaged about 38 years old. Research output among faculty declined. For the years 1988-1992 Chemistry was slightly below the SZU departmental average in terms of publications and patents, but by 1994 it had dropped to third from the bottom.

Over 63% of the students who arrived at SZU in 1989 to study chemistry had not obtained their first choice of college and major. It is not surprising, therefore, that these students, who entered college disappointed, carried that disappointment with them through their four years at SZU. Some of these students had wanted to go to medical school, others to different sciences track majors such as business or engineering. Chemistry was a fallback position. In North America, Chemistry departments are often gathering areas for pre-meds, but in China there is no pre-med undergraduate major because medical schools recruit directly from secondary schools.

When they graduated in 1993, the Chemistry majors reported the lowest use of their field of study in their jobs. (Architecture was at the opposite end of the scale).[47] Just as they had entered with disappointment, they left with frustration. In contrast, the Chemistry graduates ranked second only to Architecture in stating that they used their general skills and talents in their jobs.[48] Taken together, these two statements suggest that Chemistry students greatly questioned the value of their tertiary education. As a group, the students in Chemistry were the most cohesive group among all the disciplines. Sixty-five percent (compared with a 54% average) reported that they preferred to be with their classmates than to be with their other friends at SZU.

Perhaps a possible explanation is found in the idiom: misery likes company. Chemistry students felt their studies should be practical, and like their peers around the campus, they felt students should be active in class, but this did not concern them as much as it concerned students in other departments. In fact, they generally believed the teacher (rather than the student) should be the center of the class. Chemistry students were the second most materialistic students (behind Management). In summary, the results of my 1993 survey suggest that Chemistry students accepted and were not greatly bothered by SZU's pedagogy or educational methods. They were just in the wrong field of study…not the field they wanted at the time they enrolled and not the field they would use in their jobs.

The Chemistry Department was established along with Mathematics and Physics in November 1985 when SZU was just over two years old. The department has offered two *benke* majors: Applied Chemistry (sometimes called Material Chemistry) and Food Chemistry, as well as various *zhuanke* programs. Student intake began in fall 1986. About half of the *benke* students admitted in 1987 were *daipei* under contract to the state oil company. Start-up was a year earlier than originally scheduled in a plan that had called for creating Petroleum Chemistry and Food Chemistry majors in 1987. In late 1986 the department wanted to add three major directions: petroleum refining engineering, chemical engineering and precise chemical engineering. The term "major direction" (*zhuanye fangxiang*) is not exactly the same as "major" (*zhuanye*), in that the latter must be approved by the upper levels. Major direction is a way to skirt regulations; the term does not have SEdC authority behind it. Discussions by Chemistry in the university's yearbooks were often confusing because major directions are sometimes referred to as majors, including petroleum chemistry, precise industrial chemistry, and precision polymer chemistry. In late 1986 the department projected an enrollment by 1990 of 400 students. This optimistic prediction was never realized as only about 250 students were enrolled in 1990. The Ocean Petroleum Company stopped sending SZU *daipei* students in the late 1980s, and the *zhuanke* program was suspended for a period after 4 June. Initially, however, the *zhuanke* program outpaced the department's predictions. Instead of the anticipated 40 students in two *zhuanke* majors in fall 1987—a prediction made the previous December—the department enrolled 60 students in a single major. The *zhuanke* programs changed over time. In 1991 it was called chemical analysis; in 1995 three majors were offered: analysis and testing, commodity inspection and applied life science (or bio-engineering). The next year, only applied life science was being offered. The Ten-Year SZU Development Plan in 1991 suggested creating a major in chemical engineering, but this did not materialize. Department reports for various years are peppered with proposals that never saw realization. The department's mission, as outlined in 1988, was seemingly all-inclusive: to provide three types of training for students—academic research, industrial development, and technology and trading.[49] This lack of precise mission, as well as the shifts in recruitment and false starts, made for an unsteady path. Such confusion did not escape the antennae of high school guidance counselors, who did not recommend SZU Chemistry as a choice for their best students. That the department lacked a clear vision or sense of direction—factors *inter alia* that set it apart from Architecture—negatively affected student intake, creating a vicious cycle that delimited prestige for Chemistry.

In 1996, the department offered these courses taught by 37 instructors (of whom 28 were fixed staff):

> *Applied Chemistry (Material Chemistry):* general physics, inorganic chemistry, analysis chemistry, organic chemistry, physics/chemistry, fundamentals of computer application, equipment analysis, principles of chemical industry, picture making in the chemical industry, high molecular chemistry, high molecular physics, precision chemistry, introduction to material science.
>
> *Applied Chemistry (Food Chemistry):* art of food, food chemistry and nutrition, food analysis, principles of food projects, food project and mechanics, fermentation, micro-organisms and organic matter, management of chemistry enterprise, economic analysis of chemistry technology.
>
> *Applied Biological Engineering (zhuanke):* animals, plants, plant psychology, micro-biology, cells, genetics, biological chemistry, biological chemistry technology, gene projects, cell projects, fermentation projects, moisture equipment analysis.

In contrast to the reporting style of the Architecture Department, reports from Chemistry tend to be short on empirical data and are repeatedly inconsistent with one another.[50] It is unclear from published reports, for example, exactly how many students studied in or how many teachers taught in the department. The Chemistry Department started hiring just at a time when personnel quotas from the municipal government were becoming difficult to secure. During the first years, irregular faculty made up a large portion of the teaching force. In 1986 four out of 12 teachers were described as "part-time," suggesting they did not have official standing. The following year, the number rose to 7 out of 15. Reports for 1988 put the number of teachers at 17 or 20, which included three teachers who went abroad for doctoral studies (which most departments would not list on the active teaching rolls). The inaugural department head, a renowned chemist, managed her faculty of young scholars (13 of 15 teachers were under 40 in 1987) in an open manner, a style that characterized many academic departments in SZU's first years. Appointments of laboratory heads and teaching assignments, for example, were publicly bid, in what the department leadership called "administrative democracy."[51] In 1986 the department had what it billed as a speech contest in which teaching staff spoke on the topic: if I were department head. In 1989 the head allowed students to formally evaluate their teachers, a practice that was not instituted university-wide until 1994.

Marketization and research

The constant change in majors and major directions illustrated Chemistry's constant battle with marketization. Inconsistency became the department's way of responding to the needs of the Shenzhen labor market. For example, one year the leadership perceived Shenzhen to need *rencai* in petroleum processing, and focused teaching in that direction; another year it felt that the zone needed workers equipped to perform chemical analysis for companies. Ironically, the department's diligent attempt to improve "job match"—student's using what they learned at university directly in the workplace—met with, as Chemistry students themselves reported, the poorest job match of all SZU graduates in 1993. Nonetheless, the department's efforts showed its concern for being a part of the larger Shenzhen economy. This concern was also illustrated by the department's research.

The SZU community considered Chemistry a success in one regard: the practical nature and marketability of its research. Even in 1986, the second year of the department and its first with students, Chemistry described itself as an "important consultant service work-unit."[52] That year it undertook a peanut oil production techniques project, investigated Shenzhen industrial pollution (for which it later received two municipal awards), and took on joint research and exchange projects with universities outside China. In 1984, even before the department was founded, SZU had established the Bio-Chemistry Institute with the express purpose of "developing tonics and other products that strengthen health and postpone aging."[53] Most of its research focused on food additives and electron cleaning agents; it created the Bibaoling natural honey soda drink and a mineral water containing bee pollen, neither of which apparently became commercial successes. SZU's Oil Technology Center, set up in 1986, evaluated the physical properties of oil products. Its research also focused on ways to combat the corrosion of oil field equipment; it looked at failure analysis and safety assessment of pipelines, storage tanks and petrochemical equipment, and energy conservation technology. Funded in large part by the China National Oil and Gas Company and petrochemical companies, the center enjoyed a close relationship with Beijng's Petroleum University. It served as one of that company's *de facto* research and development units, and few of its six staff were taken from SZU's fixed staffing quota.

By 1987 the department had received one state-level funded research project, and two each from the province, municipality and university itself. In addition, four contracted projects that same year brought in ¥160,000 (US $43,000), or ¥12,000 (US $3,200) for each of its researchers.[54] SZU's research development strategy for the turn of the century proposed further advancements in SZU's chemical technology, especially in leather processing, aluminum processing lubricants, and edible fungi. Areas for further development in bio-chemistry included electric chemical materials, textile dyes, water treatment, health and medical products, rot-proof technology, new coatings for architectural materials, and high magnetized mechanical equipment.[55] Over its history, no other teaching department accomplished so much research or consulting, save for Architecture. To propagate its successes, the department hosted the second international conference on Chinese chemistry (in other words, chemistry done by ethnic Chinese, including those living outside the PRC).[56]

In 1988, Chemistry's research funds exceeded ¥300,000 (US $81,000). It had developed a technique for keeping Shenzhen leechee fresh, enabling the export of 1,000 kilograms of fresh fruit to Japan the following year. It developed random testing programs for government agencies, including the Commodity Inspection, Customs and Railway bureaux. Other research involved the process of recycling the silver discharge of photo processing, the Dayang brand liquid paper correction fluid, long-lasting non-fading ink, a leather polisher, waterless hand-washing lotions, cleansers, toilet deodorizers, a water free cleaner for oil stains, and dust-free chalk. The silver recycling process was bought by a Shenzhen company, which agreed to share its profits with SZU.

Chemistry worked closely with its research institutes. The Shenzhen Personnel Bureau had approved few fixed staff for SZU research units, and Chemistry's teachers spent much of their time developing commercial products for the institutes. In turn, institute staff sometimes offered courses in Chemistry. Though SZU's Bio-Chemistry and Life Sciences research institutes, the department developed several products to meet the changing needs of the 1990s. Life Sciences undertook five research projects in 1989, including a state-level 7-5 project.[57] The institute collected sea specimens as part of an investigation of the South China Sea living environment. It developed a tonic designed to kill the hepatitis A and B viruses, as well as liver tonics, vegetable cleansers and insecticides. One of its four anti-virus liquids was the *Aile ye* (literally, love pleasure liquid), intended to combat the spread of sexually transmitted diseases (STD). Citing an endorsement from China's National AIDS Research Institute, its inventors claimed that the liquid at 2% density could kill the AIDS virus within one minute and render harmless other STD as well.[58] The *binjiangui* (literally, guest returns healthy) liquid was also developed for combating STD.

The development of institutes relating to chemistry was not effected according to the original plan. To supplement Bio-Chemistry (established 1984), the department in 1986 had set forth a time schedule for developing several more institutes: applied chemistry (1989), food chemistry (1989), bio-chemical engineering (1990) and precise chemistry (1990).[59] By 1991, however, only three institutes relating to chemistry existed: petroleum, bio-chemistry and life sciences. The latter had been categorized as a SZU "backbone" research institute in 1989, which entitled it to funding priority. The division between the Chemistry Department and its related institutes remained blurred over the years. The institutes' coordination with Chemistry was on an *ad hoc* basis; general communication between the entities was nearly nonexistent except when economic links were present. Each institute was managed by a single individual, initially those for whom the institute had been created. The reputation of an institute rose and fell with the accomplishments or tribulations of its leader. The department of Chemistry exercised little power over them.

Figure 4.4: Chemistry Department research output[62]



In 1988, when officials at SZU were concerned over the university's idleness in research, Chemistry was praised for successfully securing 12 research projects. The SZU Research Office at that time admonished other academic departments and research units that "research should not just pass inspections but that it should be turned into commodities. These commodities should circulate in the market; researchers themselves should pay attention to social and economic efficiency."[60] These latter terms refer to products' improving society as well as producing a profit for their developer. Not all research ran smoothly, however. A 1990 contract signed between the chemistry departments of SZU and Beijing University called for cooperation on shrimp food processing and the establishment of a SZU bio-chemical factory. According to the SZU partner, "the contract was signed but cooperation between the parties has not been smooth and nothing has been done."[61] While most research out of Chemistry was practical and applied, the faculty also published in academic journals. The department's academic output followed the general SZU trend in volume. Publications/patents peaked in 1989, dipped in the early 1990s, and rose again in time for the 1995 accreditation (see Figure 4.4).

Outside linkages

As part of its research efforts, Chemistry developed overseas academic links, in addition to its governmental ties inside China (with 30 bureaux by 1990). Early on, relationships were developed with the Chemistry Department of Manchester University as well as with an Austrian institution. The Manchester exchange involved joint research and in 1986 there were plans the next year to jointly recruit graduate students (this never materialized). In 1987 the head of SZU Chemistry, who had been recruited by Luo Zhengqi earlier that year, visited Manchester; a reciprocal visit by a Manchester professor followed. In 1988 the British Council funded the Manchester scholar's two-week lecture visit at SZU. In September 1990, the Chemistry head revisited Manchester for a longer stay, and through her efforts the following year, the British Council donated chemistry books worth œ2,500 to the SZU library.

Chemistry also obtained SZU's first sizable private donation. Shao Yifu (Run Run Shaw), a Hong Kong film entrepreneur, gave the university HK $2 million (US $260,000) for setting up a 17,000 m^2 equipment testing center. The Shaw name appears on the buildings of many tertiary campuses in Hong Kong; this overseas Chinese is also widely recognized in China as his name appears on numerous *kung fu* Cantonese-language films.[63]

Teaching quality

Concerns over teaching quality in Chemistry surfaced in the early 1990s. In general, the post 4 June administration criticized SZU teachers for spending too much time on non-teaching work, and this admonition certainly applied to Chemistry, where teaching had never been the chief task of the department. The major tasks there had been applied research and laboratory development. Until 1990 none of the annual reports by the department's leaders even mentioned curriculum development or teaching reform. The new leaders in 1990 replaced the department head, whom Luo Zhengqi had hired as both department head and presidential assistant. At various times, the new SZU administration had mentioned that young teachers needed guidance from their more experienced peers. This advice applied to Chemistry, which had one of the youngest staffs (the first department head had been told explicitly not to hire anyone over 40).[64] In the SZU 1991 work report, priority in allocating teaching funds was to be given to several departments, included Chemistry, an indication that its young teachers were being warned to improve. Chemistry was also one of the disciplines for which the university nationally advertised to recruit renowned professors. In 1995 the SZU leadership suggested that four departments, including Chemistry, send their leaders and cadres to the student dormitories to ensure they complied with dorm discipline.[65] Teaching issues continued to trouble Chemistry. In late 1996 the department head summoned all class leaders and study representatives (*xue xi wei yuan*) to report on their teachers' teaching.[66] In contrast with problems in the department's administration, the Party structure was considered exemplary, and in 1995 Chemistry was awarded as an advanced grassroots Party organization. That same year, the department was one of five academic SZU units that held Party Constitution study groups, resulting in further praise by the university leadership.

In sum, Chemistry's *benke* students did not especially want to be there; their teachers were more interested in applied research than teaching. From the start, the department had wanted to recruit graduate students. The Chemistry Department, in fact, wanted to be a research institute dressed in teaching clothes. In 1986, it reported a desire to recruit Ph.D. candidates by 1990.[67] Graduate teaching in China is permitted in two sorts of units: those with very strong undergraduate programs or non-teaching professional institutes. The Chemistry Department at SZU fit neither bill. To further complicate matters, the department's teaching energy was split between the regular *benke* and *zhuanke* students and the older students who took courses in the night school.

In December 1994, the department was evaluated for three days by an expert group from the SEdC. This department-level evaluation was a precursor to the SEdC's planned 1995 overall accreditation of the university.

The selection of Chemistry for a demonstration had little to do with Chemistry itself; some department had to be selected, and Chemistry was chosen by the university leaders, perhaps because it was considered a problematic department. One purpose of this mini-evaluation was to inform and educate the campus leaders about the accreditation process. None of the points raised in my preceding analysis of the Chemistry Department, however, was mentioned in the SEdC review, which praised the department for having a young teaching team, good teaching conditions and a teaching plan that conformed with the SEdC model. The inspection team also complimented the department on its use of computers, English and audio/visual equipment and commented positively on periodic checking of students' work and quality examinations. Short-comings noted included dated laboratory equipment and an absence of quality in graduation theses.[68] Chemistry benefited from being a guinea pig in one major way: the university allocated special funds to upgrade its lab equipment.

The SEdC mini-evaluation belied the department's true situation—one that was addressed by university leaders through several administrative reshuffles, with new department heads appointed in 1991, 1994 and 1995. Publicly, however, Chemistry was reviewed as a successful department. In the preparation for the 1995 accreditation, for example, President Cai Delin described Chemistry as having "a small but able team." The department, he noted, did not have full-time laboratory staff. Instead, Ph.Ds in Chemistry conducted their own lab sessions. For that, according to Cai, the SEdC had deducted a point in 1994 because this contradicted national lab standards. The president suggested that the earlier evaluation had missed a major point: that SZU's departments could have their own characteristics that fell outside of SEdC guidelines.[69] Certainly, Chemistry illustrated such individualism.

Chinese

From a shaky foundation, SZU's Chinese Department has been redefining and rediscovering itself throughout most of its existence. Many SZU teachers consider it one of SZU's most innovative departments, being the first in China to offer certain majors: Public Relations in 1986 and Tourist Culture in 1991 (both *zhuanke*).

The preparatory document from the provincial authorities that conceptualized SZU did not include Chinese as a field of study among the half dozen it listed. The municipal government's response to the document enumerated

16 majors, of which Fine Arts was the only one which covered any of the areas traditionally thought of as encompassed by Chinese departments. Neither document mentioned language, literature or culture. Consequently, when the university opened in September 1983, Chinese was not included among SZU's first five departments. Chinese was formally established on the university's first anniversary, along with Electronics, Mechanical Engineering and Civil Engineering, as authorized by the municipal government in late 1983.

In contrast to Architecture, which was created through a collaborative effort, Chinese (like Chemistry and most other departments) was largely the product of one individual, in this case Professor Yue Daiyun, an internationally renowned comparative literature scholar from Beijing University. Yue set three major directions for her department.[70] The literature focus would include both Chinese and western works. The linguistics focus would be on Chinese character information processing, such as creating multi-functional computer index systems. A third focus—journalism/secretarial work-skills—would emphasize applied computer, Chinese and English typing, interpretation, short-hand, driving a vehicle and other practical skills used by Chinese executive secretaries (positions of some importance in the work place as their holders often served as gate-keepers for powerful leaders).

The choice of a comparative literature specialist to set up the Chinese Department of a new university was problematic because the field of comparative literature in China is itself a subject without a departmental base. Large universities in the U.S., which can tap on vast resources and hire staff interdepartmentally, sometimes have units offering comparative literature. It is more common in China, however, to include a specialty of world literature as one of 10 or so foci within a Chinese Language and Literature Department.[71] Comparative literature academics in China are often looked down upon by scholars who read texts in their original language and who are usually situated in language departments. Professors in Chinese Departments are not generally interested in literary comparisons of works not originally written in Chinese. Consequently, the best work in comparative literature in China comes out of foreign language departments. In any case, SZU set up a mixed department. The inevitable conflicts between linguists, literature scholars, culturalists and comparativists required a most skilled politician who understood the dynamics of how these specialties played off one another. Yue accomplished her given task—establishing the heterogeneous Chinese Department—and then returned to Beijing in 1987. What she left behind was a collection of six inter-related (or unrelated, from another point of view) entities:

- The Department of Chinese Language and Literature, with 25 teachers by 1986, offered several majors to *benke* and *zhuanke* students. It was also responsible for the full-year course (College Chinese) required of all entering year students.

- The Public Media Training Department, set up in 1985, did not have upper level approval as an academic unit, but it nonetheless offered certificates for three majors: public relations, television arts and television advertising.
- The Institute of Chineseness, founded in 1984, was operated by eight researchers from the Chinese Department. This institute was established to examine the cultural history of China's thoughts, to prepare comparative studies of oriental and western culture, to review Chinese studies made by foreigners, and to computerize Chinese classics. By the early 1990s the Institute of Chineseness had evolved into the Foundation for the Compilation of Chinese Classics, which was integrating five ancient, big dictionaries to build the 'Grand Book of China,' which would include on laser disk the entire aggregation of Chinese characters.[72]
- The Comparative Literature and Aesthetics Institute, founded in 1986, allowed six scholars to further the study of comparative poetry, Chinese/Hong Kong/Taiwan aesthetics and art aesthetics. With Yue Daiyun's support, SZU hosted the first meeting of the newly formed Chinese Comparative Literature Association, attended by 150 guests, including the province's lieutenant governor.
- An Institute of Hong Kong-Taiwan Literature in 1986 worked with Jinan University to host the third Taiwan-Hong Kong-Overseas Literature Conference.
- The Chinese Language Center worked on promoting *putonghua*. As in the case of the other institutes and the Public Media Training Department, its staff were fixed staff of other units, borrowed mainly from the Chinese Department in this case.

The Chinese Department's affiliated units, like those linked to Chemistry, were non-teaching; they undertook special projects which were often interdepartmental in nature. Such units often ran semi-independently, obtaining their own grants and marketing their products. Of the two institutes affiliated with the Chinese Department, only one fit this description (and then only the first part). The Chinese Language Center hooked up Chinese literature scholars with computer technicians to computerize and index several classical Chinese works. By the early 1990s some of these software had been marketed and exported; but given the world's inclination toward CD-rom based information retrieval, the technology that went into these products quickly became outdated. The products themselves retained little commercial value over time.

After Yue Daiyun departed, management of the department was turned over to Professor Hu Jingzhi, Yue's former colleague from Beijing University. Hu was an advocate of cultural interchange and received media recognition for his efforts to build scholarly ties between Mainland universities and their counterparts in Hong Kong.[73] A master of public relations, Hu received much respect in China (even if he received little from his colleagues at SZU). In 1993 he became the first SZU fixed staff empowered by the SEdC to tutor Ph.D. students.[74] A scholar in aesthetics, Hu oversaw the 1988 merger of Chinese Language and Literature with the Public Media Training Center into the renamed Department of International Culture and Media. More than the department's name changed. In an effort to train more versatile students, the department began to offer courses in photography, drivers' education, and English typing.

In 1987 the first *zhuanke* major was offered. It was entitled Chinese Secretary and was intended to "train ordinary secretaries with satisfactory knowledge in theories and culture, who possess solid skills in secretaryship, know office automation such as computers, strong public relations skills, and satisfactory foreign language level."[75] The courses taught in this two-year major started to resemble the first two years' curriculum of the *benke* major, which was still titled Chinese Language and Literature. Language and literature classes began to be replaced with more practical courses involving advertising, public relations and the like. In 1989 and 1990, a second *benke* major, Enterprise Culture, was added. This major intended "to instruct students how to deal with business administration (so-called internal relations) and public relations (external relations)."[76] Also in 1989, a *zhuanke* major exclusively for fee-paying students was planned. Entitled Chinese Character Information Processing, this major involved desk-top publishing. By the decade's end, the department had also enrolled over 30 graduate students from city bureaux to study SEZ culture, although no SZU unit was empowered at that time to bestow masters degrees. Then, in 1991, the name of the *benke* Chinese Language and Literature major was changed to Chinese Secretary, and the Enterprise Culture major was renamed Advertising, a subject taught in the former Public Media Training Department. The students had persuaded the department that these name changes would enhance their job prospects. For the years 1988, 1989, and 1990 SZU was probably the only comprehensive university in China not to have a department with the word *Chinese* in its title; in 1991, 1992 and 1993 SZU was probably unique for not offering a major titled Chinese Language and Literature. In 1994, however, the Chinese Secretary *benke* major reverted in name to Chinese Language and Literature, in part because its former title had never been approved by the SEdC. It had nonetheless operated under the unapproved title for three successive years.

Behind the constant renaming was the desire to attract better students and retain the students it admitted, in other words discourage them from leaving the department, something that had been a problem from 1988-1991 (see Table 4.3). Along with Foreign Language, the Chinese Department took high school graduates from only the arts track. Even the departments of Law and Public Administration had permission by the mid-1990s to take in some sciences track students. The rest of the departments enrolled science students, a group which accounts for about two-thirds of all university students in China. Departments which taught economics and business took in the highest scoring arts track students, and Chinese realized by the late 1980s that it needed better students. As indicated in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1, Chinese has run neck-in-neck with Foreign Language and appears to have surpassed it by 1997 in terms of acquiring higher scoring students.

Course offerings in the department greatly expanded over the first decade of its history. The number of teaching staff tripled in the first four years (from 10 to 30), and 90 different courses were offered over this period; in 1989-90, 30 new courses were planned. Courses in the department were set for particular groups of students (majors in advertising, public relations, etc.) and students generally did not take courses outside their specialty. Nonetheless, students in Chinese felt less hemmed in than their peers in other departments, where curriculum more-or-less followed the Soviet system's rigidity wherein all students in a major took the same courses.

One of the Chinese Department's major tasks was to teach the College Chinese course for SZU freshmen. A service department like Foreign Language, Mathematics and Physics, it assumed this role dutifully, but teachers forever complained about students' deteriorating writing standards. The grumblings became public in 1993 when the department reported on the results of the annual writing contest which involved 119 authors from all teaching departments:[77]

> This contest showed many problems, including students' poor grammar foundation. A lot of sentences read incorrectly. Many students lack the ability to organize their thoughts. Some articles are disorganized and say little. Stu-

> dents do not have broad knowledge or vision. Most articles lack new ideas. However, about half of the pieces say something and are well organized with acceptable penmanship.

Academic vibrancy

By all accounts Chinese has been a vibrant department, with many sub-fields represented so that the exchange of ideas was the most kaleidoscopic at the university. Much of the department's reputation was based on the scholarship of its four leading professors, who formed their own committee to "promote the work of the department."[78] One served as an associate editor of the College Chinese textbook used throughout Guangdong Province.[79] The department also had an array of personalities, including artists, film directors, poets, pedantic texualists, and literary critics. Many of these scholars were innovators; for example, the Public Relations major at SZU was the first in China, called a "solitary blooming flower" (*yi hua du fan*).[80]

This environment of diverse opinion in part accounted for why the Chinese Department's students were considered by both themselves and their teachers as among the most critical and creative thinkers on campus. This sheds light on a finding from the 1993 graduates survey which suggested that the department's students were the second most dissatisfied at SZU (see Figure 4.3). Another explanation of the survey findings, suggested by a Chinese Department faculty member, was that it indicated that the students were just doing what they did best: think critically. The same survey revealed that more Chinese Department students had selected SZU as their first choice (85%) than any other *benke* freshmen entering in 1989. It is possible, of course, that they were among the most disappointed students, but this contradicts a large body of anecdotal evidence. Chinese Department classes were among the most popular on campus; many Chinese teachers permitted students from other departments to take their classes as electives, and some of these visiting students reported that Chinese lectures put their own department's teachers to shame. Chinese Department faculty rarely read from texts (as in International Finance and Trade), did not "beat the text to death" (as in Foreign Language), and had a sense of humor, a trait students found lacking among teachers almost everywhere else on campus. Xiong Yuanwei, a prize-winning playwright, gave especially entertaining lectures.[81] Several of the Chinese teachers developed reputations for giving high grades as well as for delivering entertaining, well prepared lectures. One teacher in particular had developed a reputation for telling the same jokes—actually good jokes—

year after year. Another professor gave lectures on television, as part of Shenzhen's television university. Truant students could follow the lectures on television, although with a several week delay. The interpretation of the survey results that suggests that Chinese Department students were critical rather than dissatisfied is also supported by other data collected in the same survey. On most questions, Chinese Department students' opinions reflected the norm, and there is no other indication of an especially high level of dissatisfaction.

The constant name changes in the Chinese Department belie the fact that the content of the principle *benke* major has remained virtually unchanged over a ten year period. Almost from the beginning, courses stressed "application":

> 1986 *Chinese Language and Literature*: writing, foreign language, modern Chinese language, ancient Chinese language, calligraphy, Chinese and English typing, cultural exchange, current events, secretary, public relations, Chinese literature, foreign literature, ordinary linguistics, HK/Taiwan and overseas literature, comparative literature, aesthetics of art, western literature criticism, Chinese literature criticism, literature, computer operation, data base management, Chinese word processing and various courses on different academic subjects.[82]

> *1996 Chinese Language (Chinese and English secretary):* modern Chinese, ancient Chinese, contemporary Chinese literature, ancient Chinese literature, general introduction to literature, western literature, art and aesthetics, basic writing, documentary writing, secretaryship, applied knowledge of computers.[83]

In 1986 the major stressed language in its first two years, then secretaryship, comparative literature and applied language. By 1996, the courses remained the same but the major itself had been redefined "to train high class secretaries with solidly based theoretical knowledge on literature, secretaryship and culture, with proficiency in Chinese and western language, good writing skills, familiarity with office automation and expertise at public relations."

> *1996 Advertising (Public Relations):* principles of public relations, management, principles of communication, study of body language, advertising planning and creativity, practices in public relations, enterprise culture, marketing, office automation, methods of social survey.[84]

A second major, first called Enterprise Culture and later Advertising, was added in 1989 to attract students less interested in the traditional curriculum. Its goal was "to train high class public relations specialists with basic theoretical knowledge in public relations, communications and management, who can conduct and perform public relations activities, who can make use of various communication media to undertake public relations, and who possess strong social skills and have mastered one foreign language."

Ironically, students in this new major scored higher than those in the traditional listing in only one of the five years for which data were reported. Thus, one of the intended side-effects of opening the new major—to draw higher scoring students away from SZU's business offerings—did not apparently occur.

> *Chinese Secretary (zhuanke)*: basic applied computers, basic writing, documentary writing, introduction to Chinese culture, introduction to Western culture, office automation, secretaryship, contemporary Chinese literature, ancient Chinese literature.
>
> *Tourist Culture (zhuanke*): art of being a tour guide, writing travelogues, management of a tourist agency, management of tourist hotels, marketing of tourist hotels, development of tourist resources, western tourism, tourist English.

Two two-year *zhuanke* programs admitted lower scoring students. One of these, Tourist Culture, intended to "train specialists in tourism who possess professional and theoretical knowledge in tourism with a strong work ability, high cultural skills, knowledge of office automation, and a good foreign language level."

The merging of teaching units and the constant discussions on curriculum development resulted in a faction-ridden department. By 1992 Hu Jingzhi had been replaced as department head by Zhang Bigong, a classical scholar, who was being groomed by the post 4 June leadership for Party chores. Zhang, a superior administrator, ridded the department of its factionalism by building and mending fences and wisely distributing patronage. One of the major hurdles to departmental unity, in addition to the existence of so many sub-fields, was its sheer variety of programs, the teachers of which each had particular vested interests. In the department's first five years, the number of students enrolled as *benke* majors totaled around 200. But by the department's own admission, in 1988, the department had taught over 1,000 different students. In addition to the *benke* and *zhuanke* programs, there were part-time students in night school and graduate classes; other offerings were found in the department's numerous nooks and crannies. It ran a nationwide correspondence course, which gave students little value for their tuition. One departmental staff member was assigned to open mail sent to the correspondence course office, extract postal money orders, record the data, and discard any essays submitted as part of the course requirement. No essays were ever assessed, and a transcript indicating passing grades was sent to anyone who paid fees. Fortunately for undergraduates, this cavalier attitude did not extend to the department's *benke* courses.

An active department

Throughout its existence, the Chinese Department has been keenly aware of the importance of marketing and public relations, two subjects the department itself taught. It hosted campus-wide gatherings, one of which was attended by 400 students of the department, foreign students studying Chinese and students enrolled in various joint-degree programs that the department ran with domestic and overseas institutions.[85] It organized outings for its own students and teachers, such as a 10-day visit to a Project Hope site in Guizhou Province for 51 1993 students and their teachers during a summer holiday.[86] Chinese was the leader among departments for meeting with students' parents, having held six meetings by 1997.[87] It held one such meeting at the end of the 1992-1993 school term to allay parents' concerns over an on-campus murder that had occurred in May 1993.[88] It also held routine student conferences in which short introductions were given for teachers and their research interests highlighted.[89] More than other academic units, Chinese strove to maximize student activities. Consequently, its students picked up more than their share of awards and prizes at campus cultural and sports events.[90] Through the Chinese Association, the department sponsored more academic lectures than other units.[91] Its Party branch was also active, largely influenced by Zhang Bigong, who in his capacities of department head and later vice-president advocated a leading role for the CCP, for which he received praise by university leaders.[92] It was not unusual for general Party meetings to include 70 members or probates.[93] The department attempted to make political activities as interesting as possible. In 1992, for example, 33 students from the 1989 entering class took their week-long social investigation field trip to Henggan Township in Baoan County, a thriving factory town employing tens of thousands of immigrant workers. This town was at the time listed among China's 100 "star" townships, so named for being one of China's top money generators among towns and villages (The town's 1991 income exceeded ¥223 [US $41] million.)[94]

In 1985 the department recruited as a student Shi Guangzhu, a blind veteran of China's brief war with Vietnam a few years previously. A nationally recognized battle hero, Shi was featured in several newspaper articles and by

1990 had been honored as one of China's "Excellent Youth of the 1980s."[95] He published four collections of poetry and received the 1991 Guangdong Lu Xun literature award as well as the 1994 state-level literary progress award. Shi returned to SZU several times to have his picture taken with school leaders.[96] Another famous student in the department was Yu Xiu, the daughter of Yu Longyu, the Chinese Department's own resident scholar on Indian literature and culture. An overseas student in the Chinese Department's twinning program with Edmonds (discussed in Chapter Six), the younger Yu, while still in secondary school, had written and later published a very popular novel, *Flower Season, Rainy Season,* about the life and times of high school students.[97] In 1998, the novel was released as a motion picture. Another famous graduate of the department was represented by Luo Zhengqi as the embodiment of the part-time *zhuanke* program for SZU staff. Fang Xibo, 43, a chef who managed a campus canteen, was in 1987 the oldest night school graduate. With an overall average of 81.7, Chef Fang ranked fifth academically in his department, and while working at SZU, he had been promoted from grade #3 chef to grade #1 chef. He caught Luo's attention because he had turned down offers from two Hong Kong-funded hotels who wanted to hire him away from SZU with a salary of HK $8,000 (US $1,000) a month. He remained at SZU for ¥200 (US $54) per month.[98]

Civil Engineering

There was a joke on the SZU campus (and perhaps in academic corridors around the world) that civil engineers were architects' poor cousins. According to one civil engineer:

> When you look at a building and it is beautiful, you praise the architect. But if something goes wrong, the civil engineer is the one to blame. The architect never gets blamed; the engineer, never praised.

Civil engineers earn neither as much money nor glory for designing bridges and roads instead of the shiny skyscrapers that bring architects fame and fortune. Indeed, Civil Engineering is one of SZU's invisible departments, attracting little attention from those outside or even inside its own field. A small department—a 15-person teaching staff made it only half the size of the largest departments—it was not very demonstrative in academic circles, neither hosting conferences nor publishing research. In fact, its research output was the lowest of any SZU academic department, with the average teacher publishing an article only once every two or three years.

In the 1990s the department made several attempts to become more active. It undertook a land use survey and appraisal for the Shenzhen government which won provincial and ministry-level recognition as an advanced achievement.[99] In 1991 it began cooperating with the Structural and Engineering College of Shanghai's Tongji University and the Nanjing Chemistry Industry College on joint research. Other co-operative agreements involved the civil engineering departments of Victoria University of Technology, Melbourne, and Qinghua, the latter for training its graduate students in construction economics. In 1994 the department trained five groups of supervising engineers for the Ministry of Construction. The next year it cooperated with Dalian Polytech University in a research project that won an award given by the China branch of the United Nations technical information service. In July 1995 the department founded SZU's Construction Supervision Institute with the purpose of serving as a job practice base for students. An earlier institute, the Structural Engineering Institute founded in 1984 to develop CAD applications in construction, had never received fixed staff and had virtually ceased to exist.

The students of Civil Engineering obtained average or below average scores on their college entrance exams, relative to SZU's other sciences track freshmen. Civil Engineering, the traditional major, placed in the middle of the scores, below business subjects but above Enterprise Management (Economics), Physics, Mechanical Engineering and Chemistry. Scores for entering students in other majors offered by the department fared poorer, in part because these majors were new. High school seniors generally steer away from new subjects that do not have proven track records. Influenced by their guidance counselors, they fear that if their year's intake were unique—in other words, afraid that the major would be discontinued after they arrived on campus—they would be left floundering. In fact, that is exactly what happened to the students in the Construction Management major of 1993. The major was not offered in subsequent years and was replaced by the Real Estate Development and Engineering Supervision majors. Consequently, the 1993 students were forced to take classes that had been designed for other majors; their teachers were unwilling to put much effort in developing courses just for them that were to be only one-shot affairs.

Although Civil Engineering students scored consistently lower than their peers in Architecture, there is no evidence to suggest that these students had really wanted to be architects in the first place—that, having failed to score sufficiently high for admittance to Architecture, they had settled for Civil Engineering. Actually the 1993 Civil Engineering graduates overwhelmingly reported (81.5%) that SZU had been their first choice, a percentage second only to Chinese Department students in this regard. Part of the explanation is that students who chose Civil Engineering did indeed want to be engineers not architects; they fully understood the differences between the disciplines. This was different from Chemistry, where students who did not really want to be chemists felt trapped in their department although it had offered them a university "safety net." In general, the surveyed 1993 students, who entered SZU in 1989, might have chosen SZU in part because it was located in a special zone perceived of as being safe from 4 June repercussions. The students who entered Civil Engineering, therefore, may have applied to the top engineering programs in Guangzhou, Shanghai or Beijing had it not been for political events. For recruitment purposes SZU Civil Engineering was a third category institution and as such accepted students with lower scores than those who entered, for example, Qinghua and Tongji (first rank) or Zhongshan (second rank). Some of the civil engineering students who came to SZU in 1989 qualified for admission to first or second rank institutions. They might have gone to them if they had listed these "superior" institutions as their top choices. This contrasts with the situation in 1987, when applicants were scarce. That year about one-third of its students were *daipei* (contracted to future employers) suggesting the difficulty the department initially faced in recruiting regular students.

The 1993 survey showed Civil Engineering students to be a bit cliquish, preferring to stay with their classmates rather than with students they did not know. They reported a below average use of their study field in their jobs, and they were near the bottom end in expressing satisfaction with their education. Many of their teachers were young and inexperienced. Enrolled in this small department, the students had many of these teachers for more than one class, something that inevitably caused boredom despite the fact the teacher was teaching different subjects. Since the students of a major took their classes together, the dynamics between teacher and student, once set, remained unchanged, despite different subject matter. Still, more strongly than any other major, Civil Engineering students agreed with both statements: that the teacher should be the center of class and that the students should be active. These results are not surprising. Civil Engineering is a practical subject that requires much laboratory practice, in which both students and teachers participate. Of all students, Civil Engineering majors reported they were least concerned with money as an important factor in job choice. Taken together with the other survey findings, this suggests that Civil Engineers very much wanted to practice their profession; they had chosen SZU as the place to learn to become engineers and acquire skills for the workplace. That they did not find jobs that used their skills was a phenomenon not unique to their major; for SZU graduates job mismatch was as much the rule as the exception.

The Civil Engineering Department's history fits into two phases, separated by 1989. Founded in 1984, the department took in its first students in 1985. It offered a single *benke* major to 30-40 students each year. Civil engineering departments in China usually have the characters *tu mu*, literally soil wood, at the start of their name (Traditional construction involved soil and rock for walls and wood for roofing). This is the case in Qinghua and Tongji, the most renowned civil engineering schools in the nation. When the SZU department was founded, however, the name omitted *tu mu* because the SZU leaders felt that since the new department was to offer only one major—civil and structural engineering—the department's scope was too narrow to be worthy of the standard nomenclature. The new department followed the traditional curriculum of civil engineering. After interviewing Shenzhen work-units involved in civil engineering to find out what type of graduates they wanted, the department revised its teaching plans and training targets in 1986 in order to better serve the needs of the SEZ.

In the early years, most teachers were assigned to the department on a temporary basis. By 1988, with several years of experience, the department had a full-time staff in place and launched an innovation that was picked up a few years later by Architecture. A new teaching plan called for 2½ years of course work, followed by a half year in off-campus, full-time employment with a work-unit specializing in design, construction management or academic research. After that, students would return to SZU for an additional year of study that offered specialized training. It is unclear to what extent this pattern was fully followed, but at least some students were allowed to work off-campus, and all were in fact required to complete their graduation designs in work-units; evaluation by the work-unit accounted for 60% of the design's grade.[100] The department structured the curriculum around seven packages of courses: structural engineering, civil engineering, architecture, construction management, computer-aided design, equipment, and real estate. In addition, students were recommended to take a minor in a related field such as architecture, design, electronics, computers, enterprise management, or mechanical engineering.

These plans were short-lived, for the department head under Luo Zhengqi was replaced by Yu Pingjing, a teacher selected by the post-Tiananmen administration.[101] Yu took control to establish, in her own words, a "sounder and more upright system."[102] Her annual reports, as reprinted in the SZU *Yearbooks*, are a mirror of policy handed down by upper-level leaders. Yu was an exemplar of political correctness: she served as both department head and Party branch secretary—the only academic department head to hold the positions concurrently from 1993-1995.[103] In 1990 she wrote about establishing a five-person anti-corruption task-force to ensure financial probity. She discussed the development of a teachers team, and the review and revision of the teaching plan to ensure flexibility of course setting so that new courses could be added depending on the needs of the SEZ. Short on details, her 1990 report repeated the rhetoric handed down to her by the leadership. The following year, she personalized the account:[104]

> As the people's teacher, a scientist, and a CCP member, my ideal is communism, which has been deeply rooted in my mind. Since childhood, I have believed that only socialism can save China. I firmly believe in the leadership of the collective. We must care for the students. I often talk to them about revolutionary ideals and the purpose of study, especially with the women. We must teach students to love the Party, to love socialism, and to have confidence to change China's underdevelopment. We must especially be against adoring foreign things…

She ends the 1991 account again on a personal note, with a self-criticism:

> My shortcomings are that I seldom go to the students' dorms, and I don't care enough for the students, which is different from two years ago when I was deputy head. I did not respond in time to the problem of insufficient number of teachers. I have not visited students and teachers often enough.

By 1991 the department's curriculum had three major directions: the traditional approach that dealt with the structural aspects of construction; an emphasis on infrastructure, which included water supply, drainage, air conditioning and power supply; and thirdly a focus on construction project management, which also included construction supervision and real estate development analysis. The situation in Shenzhen was believed to require graduates to have a broader knowledge than what most civil engineers in China possessed. SEZ civil engineers were not to be restricted to engineering and structure knowledge.[105] The SEdC curriculum was adhered to the first two years, after which students would take courses in their specialties, such as management, budgeting or appraisal. Students were encouraged to take more than one major direction, and in this way they could become generalists by acquiring more specialties. In 1992 the department's name was changed to include the characters for *tu mu*.

The department generally took its directions from above. In her 1991 report, Yu discussed at length the need to improve financial management of side-businesses, a particular worry of SZU's post-Tiananmen administration. She discussed the revision of the teaching plan, another recommendation from above. Yu reported modifying the teaching plan to comply with those used by Qinghua and Tongji University. She listed the department's four teaching directions: industrial and civil construction, infrastructure, construction monitoring and real estate development and the need to develop a complete teachers team within three years. She discussed the new Construction Management Engineering major which the department was pursuing as a major direction while it awaited formal approval by the SEdC. That approval, in fact, never came, and the major was abandoned after one year.

As much as any other department, Civil Engineering was greatly concerned that its graduates met the *rencai* needs of the SEZ. Professor Yu further developed a policy of "cooperative education" that had existed since 1989, which she also called "inviting in and going out."[106] Practitioners from the outside were invited to the department to lecture and instruct students. Students were encouraged to take part-time jobs in engineering firms and design institutes, where they would complete their graduation design. These designs were to serve as the students' best letters of introduction when they looked for jobs. Forty-one students from the 1988 entering class, for example, were sent to 12 firms for ten weeks. Graduation designs were defended before a panel that came from a pool of 19 professionals, including teachers and engineers and designers from ten local firms.

Professor Yu's report in the *1992-3 Yearbook* was one of eight departmental reports that year to follow a similar format: leading off with the need to improve moral education, followed by discussions of improvements in teaching, teacher team construction, adjustment of majors, and concluding with academic research.[107] Her reports in other years were much the same: citing instances of implementing upper level policy, such as building Cai Delin's Four Keys, and developing activities to learn from Shenzhen citizen Chen Guanyu, a grandmother in the selfless mold of Lei Feng, China's model volunteer.

By 1994, the department had restructured itself into three groups of teacher teams for civil engineering, construction management, and real estate development, and it established teaching-research offices in each area. Teachers were appointed directors for each major, coordinated by a teaching secretary who held a masters. In the same year, the teaching plans underwent a "thorough revision" so that they complied with SEdC national criteria. The department continued to address the side-income issue, asking teachers' opinions on how department-generated income could best be used. All these policy initiatives reflected the interests of President Cai Delin.

In 1995 the department again revised its teaching plans, in what by then had become an annual occurrence, and focused on laboratory improvement. In preparation for the 1995 accreditation, it used some of its own income as well as ¥1 million (US $120,000) allocated by the university to rebuild its labs. Although the labs had passed a tough provincial evaluation in 1992 (one-third of labs in Shenzhen failed), they were further improved.[108] By then the department had developed Five Emphases (which were not enumerated in the annual report).[109] This appears to be the extreme case where the department head confirms adherence to policy (in this case that departments should have emphases) without mentioning the substance of that policy (e.g., what the five were, why they were chosen, how they related to one another, how they reflected what was done in other institutions, etc.).

In any case, by 1996 the department offered three majors.[110] Construction Projects Supervision had the goal of "training high class project technicians with basic engineering training who can perform structural designing of architectural projects, building techniques and management duties." This major attracted the interests of an eight-person delegation of Hong Kong engineers who visited the department in 1992.[111] Real Estate Administration and Management was intended to "train high class specialists with economic theories of real estate market, familiar with professional techniques of real estate, and familiar with construction project knowledge who can perform real estate price evaluation, development and administration." Project Management related to the supervision of construction projects, "training high class specialists who can perform social supervision or governmental supervision duties with a knowledge of construction projects, building design, economics, law and management."[112]

The department's curriculum for these three *benke* majors offered in 1996 was as follows:

> *Construction Projects Supervision*: four courses with physics, structural course, steel structures, study of building houses, construction process, construction economics and management, earthquake resistant structures, structure of tall buildings, road and bridge projects.
>
> *Real Estate Administration and Management*: structural physics, structure of construction, residential construction, construction process, construction project, economics and management, general introduction to real estate markets,

price evaluation of real estate, economics of real estate, marketing of real estate, network planning techniques, management of land, urban planning.

Project Management: physics, construction structure, construction building, construction project economics and management, general introduction to the supervision of construction projects, network planning techniques, quality control of construction projects, investment control of construction projects, contract management, bidding and tenders.

Although it seems unfair to describe Civil Engineering at SZU as Architecture's poor cousin, it appears appropriate to comment that the department was "searching for its own identity," in the words of one former student. It certainly lacked consistency in curriculum. Majors and class plans were forever changing. As a substantial number of older teachers began retiring in the early 1990s and were replaced with recent graduates with little teaching experience, the department lost the sense of direction it had had early on. Its curriculum, listening to many voices, drifted towards the type of over-specialization in China that characterized the setting of majors during the Soviet-influenced era. This path was taken in order for the department to better address the Special Zone's needs, a fulfillment of rhetoric that filtered down from above. Ironically, students who graduated in 1993 felt that they did not much use their field of study in the workplace. This finding alone questions the wisdom of the department's direction—a matter never raised in its public reports, which appear to be written for the sake of political correctness and to please their intended audience: leaders at the upper levels.

Story 7: Li Laoshi, visiting after 10 years

Amazing. Extraordinary. Incredible. Inconceivable. Even these vocabulary fail to do justice to the senses I felt as I returned to Shenzhen and to Shenda after a ten-year absence. When I taught at Shenda in the mid-1980s, it was uncertain how much support the Special Economic Zone would continue to receive from the central government. Deng Xiaoping was getting old. If he died suddenly on a Monday, perhaps the zone would start to wither on Tuesday. As it turned out, Deng lived for another ten years; the zone prospered.

I had returned to China several times in the years between 1987-1997. On my visits, I had witnessed great changes occurring in Beijing and Shanghai—improvements in urban infrastructure as well as improvements in people's lives. Citizens no longer dressed in drab blues and grays. Shenzhen had always been richer; few people had ever dressed like their northern cousins. Arriving in 1997, however, I saw a great modern city, many of whose inhabitants carried pagers or mobile phones. Shenzhen's smartly dressed businessmen and women would not seem out-of-place on the streets of Hong Kong. The streets were packed with privately-owned vehicles.

When I taught at Shenda, we preferred to go to Guangzhou for entertainment. There was nothing in Shenzhen except a lot of dirt, whirled up by the around-the-clock construction of buildings. It was not a pleasant downtown to visit. Guangzhou, despite its crowds, was a culturally rich and energetic, lived-in city which offered something for everyone; Shenzhen offered little to anyone. By the time it was a fledgling child of five, China's premier new town had become an architectural nightmare. Some of its buildings had been built to human scale (seven floors maximum) while random skyscrapers appeared occasionally along Shen-Nan road [connecting Shenzhen-Nantou]. *Returning in 1997, I saw the results of ten-years of non-stop construction. I realized that Shenzhen was no longer a cultural wasteland. I visited what is probably one of the largest and best-stocked bookstores in China; I saw billboards advertising various cultural events. In the decade I had been away, the commercial sections of downtown had been taken over by skyscrapers; only a few of the three- or four-story structures from the previous years had survived. The impressive Shen-Nan road was now flanked by glistening skyscrapers of various tints, mostly bank-owned buildings. (Whether Shenzhen replaces Shanghai as*

China's banking center remains to be seen, but the SEZ is clearly the nation's center of banking buildings). One of the few vestiges of the past, the Dongmen [east gate] *old section of town, in summer 1997 was being raised as part of an urban renewal project. About the only low-rise building in that section which was not under the threat of the wrecking ball was Shenzhen's (and China's) first MacDonald's. Perhaps this house of the Big Mac should be preserved as one of Shenzhen's historic and cultural structures! I did not even recognize Nantou. Where dusty roads used to be were now paved streets, and the highrise district administrative building (I was later told) looked like some corporate headquarters found in downtown Chicago or Boston.*

I took an air-conditioned no. 113 daba [big bus] *west from downtown Shenzhen to Shenda. Air conditioned city busses had not existed the previous decade. This particular bus was run by a private company. When I was a teacher, we had often traveled by minibus, which displayed signs for their terminus but had no route numbers. Back then, mini-busses selected their routes largely upon the request of the riders. I remember once having to get off a bus because a crowd of new passengers had persuaded the driver to change directions; the bus made a U-turn, and I was given back my money and told to find another bus. Now, the mini-busses all displayed route numbers and stuck to their pre-assigned routes, a clear indication that China was adopting the rule of law on some basic levels.*

The bus to Shenda took Shen-Nan Road, which was now a six-lane limited access highway with elevated pedestrian/bicycle viaducts. I recognized some familiar sites along this major east-west corridor, including Honey Lake amusement park and the Shenzhen Golf Club. The latter was the first set of links in Shenzhen. Back when it was built, we wondered if it could ever get enough members to pay for fairway and greens upkeep, much less make a profit. It must be succeeding; another golf course was built just down the highway. We passed by three tourists spots that were built after I left. I had read about miniature Splendid China, Minority Cultural Villages and Window to the World, but I had no idea where they had been built. In fact, they are adjacent to one another. They were located around the Shenzhen Bay Hotel, which when it was constructed in the mid-1980s, had been surrounded by vegetable fields, rice paddies and fish farms.

The bus dropped us off at the east gate of campus. When I left Shenda, it was an open university—literally. There was no wall or gate. Now, we walked through the gate, past the guard who did not look up from the newspaper he was reading. Despite its wall, Shenda still seemed very much an open campus.

The startling difference (one that I had not prepared myself for) was the fact the campus looked so mature. The trees were full-grown, not the saplings of a decade earlier. The campus was darker; there was a lot of shade where before one could hardly find retreat from the blazing sun. When I had left, the science building and the amphitheater were still under construction. Since then a sports center and student management center were completed, along with two sets of faculty residences, housing hundreds of staff. The campus now had some decent restaurants (for a good meal we used to have to go to the Xinan [Southwest] *Restaurant in Shekou), and the lake had been redesigned for human use. There was little feeling of newness. Whether the school was still innovative could not be discerned by physical appearance.*

One of the reasons I came back was to see what Shenda had become, but I also had two specific tasks: to reclaim the things I had left behind in 1986 (mostly books) and to return the ¥3,700 [US $1,000] *I had borrowed from the university for my trip to the U.S. I went to the* caiwuke [accounting division] *to return the money and it took them a while to find the IOU. I saw some two dozen IOUs, some of which went as far back as mine. I recognized one of the people in the office and she said she also recognized me. Then I went to look for the* fangchanke [property division]. *On the way I stopped by my old apartment (510 Yunpeng Lou). I knocked on the door but nobody answered. I stopped by a grocery shop (new) and had a cold drink. Saw a lot of new apartment buildings and the muddy beach seemed to have disappeared. At the* fangchanke *the guy in charge said he had no idea where my luggage might be since it had been 11 years. I pleaded with him to let me have a look at their warehouse, saying that I had come all the way from Sichuan to collect my books (I had several hundred). He finally agreed to let me wait for the guy with the keys. Then we walked to a student dorm and looked at several storage rooms but didn't see any of my things. I thanked the guy and went to lunch at a nearby student canteen where I used to eat. I had fish and some vegetables which were certainly no better than the food there back in '86. I recognized the guy selling pop, and he said he also remembered me.*

Then I stopped by a (new) bookstore near the canteen and bought a copy of Yu Dafu's autobiography. The stock was not particularly scholarly. I went to my former department and saw Teacher Lin, the secretary. We chatted for about 20 minutes and she told me that some 50 people had come to and left the department. Some had retired. Now there was hardly anybody there I knew. She told me about one old colleague who was now *in the U.S. and another who was in Germany. A bit tired, I lay on the ground in the open space beneath the teaching building. A security guard came by and asked where I had come from and told me not to lie there as it was inappropriate for the area. Then I went to the library, which was still under construction when I left. It was very spacious and well lit, less crowded and closed-in than one in a U.S. university. I browsed the areas in my field. The Chinese collections seemed fine but the foreign section was thin. I had a better collection of philosophy books in my office back in the U.S. (But then Shenzhen is not a place for philosophy).*

In returning to Shenda, I wanted to contact some of my former colleagues. Several had left to set up businesses in Shenzhen. I was especially sad when told that another had died of illness. From colleagues I visited, I learned of the school's ups and downs—five administrations in 14 years. The university had suffered a great loss of prestige; corruption had been rampant. Political leaders had procured fortunes for themselves, making decisions based on self-interest. When I was at Shenda, the prevailing attitude among Party members was "What can I do for the Party and what can the Party do for China." That attitude had been subverted into: "What can the Party and China do for me." All this saddened, but did not surprise, me; it is what I feared, having received hints of the school's demise from personal correspondence and published reports. Under these conditions, there is no incentive for people like myself ever to return to Shenda, except for brief visits. Will Shenda ever return to its golden years of the latter 1980s? Only time will tell.

Design

The Department of Design, along with the Department of Bio-chemistry, was founded on 4 January 1994, about a half year before it would start recruiting students. It developed three *benke* majors: Industrial Design, Fashion Design, and Environmental Design.[113]

This was not the first time design had been taught at SZU. Mechanical Engineering offered some courses in industrial fine arts (packaging design) as early as 1986, but most design was taught in Architecture. Thirty Fine Arts students in an Architecture night school *zhuanke* program were admitted in 1984 and were graduated in 1988. In winter 1987 these students worked for the Honey Lake Entertainment Park in Shenzhen making 300 ghost statues for a haunted city. About ten teachers and students took on the job and finished the work within 20 days, a time considered too limited by professionals who had refused to bid on the project. Earlier the same year the Fine Arts majors had successfully bid on a decoration project worth several hundred thousand yuan; they also designed Ming Dynasty furniture for a local furniture factory and produced many of the miniature figures for the Splendid China theme park.[114] The Architecture Department, of course, also taught other types of design: urban design and building placement, interior design, and landscape design. Its students and teachers had occasionally won awards for creating logos and package designs. In 1988 Architecture started offering an Industrial Product Design major, which that year took in 20 students and had four full-time teachers. This major focused on product and packaging design, but it was scrapped several years later. The planned intake had been around 20 students each year, but fewer were admitted than the plan had called for. In 1993, for example, nine students entered at the time of formal enrollment although the plan had projected 16. Students were all taken from the sciences track; their exam scores were in the bottom third, slightly above Physics.

The creation of an Industrial Product Design major under Architecture in 1988 was part of an on-going expansion in majors. Design was one of four new majors that were created that year. In 1992, the Academic Affairs Office, following the interests of the municipal government, raised the idea of creating new majors in apparel design, interior design and urban design, along with several others. Architecture was unwilling to take on this job; it was reluctant to teach areas unrelated to its main focus and felt itself unqualified to undertake such a diversification. The municipal government, however, was enthusiastic about the subject, so a new department had to be created. Thus, in 1994 SZU set up an independent Design Department, at the city's insistence.

In its first recruitment, the Design Department reviewed applications from 478 students, of whom 34 were given places. It set up laboratories for apparel and packaging design, in part funded by a municipal Planning Bureau ¥1 million (US $120,000) grant. It redecorated corridors in the teaching building and set up a gallery to display students' work. The task of setting up the Design Department incurred cost overruns which were largely responsible for an unbudgeted outlay that exceeded ¥1 million, according to the General Affairs Office.[115]

Curiously, the data presented by the Academic Affairs Office in 1994-6 on entering students' exam scores exclude the majors of Industrial Design and Fashion Design. These students came from neither arts nor sciences, but from fine arts, a track that existed in the SEZ's technical/vocational secondary schools. Their scores were much lower than those in the other tracks as these types of schools did not in general prepare students for tertiary education. Indeed, when the scores were finally published, for 1997 admissions, the fine arts track scores were 150 points below those of arts students.[116] The poor foundation of these students led to the realization that students in the design majors would be unable to keep up with their university peers in SZU's public courses such as College Chinese, Public English and politics. The issue came to a head within months after the students began classes. In a November 1994 meeting, students told the department head and the head of AAO that they hoped the university would understand that, while they were good at subjects within Design, they were admittedly weak in other courses, especially language study.[117]

This situation was not unexpected as Design students had been admitted by a different standard from that used for other *benke* majors at SZU. They were more at the academic level of students who entered Shenzhen Polytech, the zone's higher vocational/technical college, which commenced operation in 1994 and offered 19 majors by 1996.[118] It is unclear why design studies were not placed under Shenzhen Polytech, which was established the same year SZU created the Design Department. One possible explanation was that SZU had recruited a design professor as part of its nationwide 1993 recruitment of academic "dragons." Without the Design Department, the professor had no home-base, as Architecture did not want him (He was not a dragon by Architecture's standards). Having just recruited him amidst national and local media hype, the university could not force his transfer to

Shenzhen Polytech, an institution below the academic level of SZU. Consequently, a SZU department was created for him.

These problems notwithstanding, the department proceeded. Twelve teachers were hired in 1994; the total reached 24 in 1995. Students' work was exhibited at local and national competitions; various students won prizes. The department experienced financial irregularities. SZU's Audit Office reported in 1995 that Design, along with Foreign Language, violated various university financial regulations, but specific details were not released (as they were in the case of Foreign Language).

> *Environmental Art Design*: pen and ink drawing, colors, picture composition, design fundamentals, design presentation, live drawing, material selection and usage, architectural design fundamentals, interior design fundamentals, project evaluation, CAD, garden design, environmental art design, environmental lighting, urban tree planting, residential design, furniture design.
>
> *Clothes Design:* pen and ink drawing, colors, colors of clothes, clothes picture drawing, study of clothes materials, aesthetics, history of clothes in China and abroad, techniques of clothes, drawing, designing of clothes accessories, designing of clothes structure, clothes manufacturing, clothes design, knitted clothes design.
>
> *Industrial Design*: pen and ink drawing, colors, history of Chinese aesthetics, design techniques, three factors of development, design sketching, history of industrial design, techniques of design presentation, material selection and usage, marketing, CAD, brand name designing with computer imaging, aesthetics in designing, management, product packaging, product advertisement, product design.

A complete four-year curriculum was developed for each of the three majors, although in 1995 Design was still one of three SZU departments that lacked all SEdC recommended courses for its majors. The Environmental Art Design major had as its stated purpose to "train high class specialists who can perform environmental and architectural designs and planning, indoor or outdoor designs, and garden designs, and who can teach and do research in enterprises, specialized design departments, schools, and research units."[119] Its landscape architecture courses duplicated the offerings of the Architecture Department. The major in Clothes Design intended to train "design specialists familiar with the history of clothes in China and abroad, familiar with specialties of different clothes, familiar with trends in the clothes markets in China and abroad, clothes design techniques, and the functions of clothing materials." Graduates from the Industrial Design major were expected to have the "ability of comprehensive analysis and adjustable technical skills, who have mastered fundamental theories, specialized knowledge and techniques of industrial design and who can perform industrial products design, teaching and research."

All in all, SZU teachers considered the inclusion of the Design Department as downgrading the academic quality of the university. Around campus it was believed that such vocational/technical training better belonged in a lesser grade institution, such as Shenzhen Polytech, not in a comprehensive university.

Economics

The Economics Department at SZU has been one of three departments that teach business courses. Although its courses are more theoretical in nature than those taught in either Management or International Finance and Trade, its approach is very much one of applied economics. From the start, its prestigious major was Accounting, always attracting among the highest scoring SZU entrants, vying with the Finance and Computer majors for this honor. The department's majors were constantly in flux as the leadership attempted to meet the perceived (and forever changing) personnel demands of the SEZ. As indicated in Table 4.12, several majors have been offered sporadically. Some new offerings were unable to attract top-scoring students, which may have been a factor leading to their abandonment (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2).

In 1983 the Economic Management Department was one of SZU's six inaugural academic units. In April 1985 that department was closed and in its place the Economics Department and the Management Department were founded. At that time, Economics offered two majors, International Finance and Financial Accounting, to some 500 students, making it one of the university's largest departments. Classes were large; the teacher-student ratio for Economics was 1:25.[120] Then, two years later in November 1987 the International Finance and Trade Department was created, thereby removing from the Economics Department all the teachers in the specialties of trade and finance.

In part, these administrative adjustments had to do with personality conflicts, especially the inability of junior and middle rank staff to work with the senior professor who was in charge. The structural modifications were necessitated by the unwillingness of teaching staff to build a cohesive depart-

Table 4.12: Economics Department specializations[121]

year	’85	’86	’87	’88	’89	’90	’91	’92	’93	’94-’97
finance	x	x								
trade	x	x								
accounting	x	x*	x*	x*	x*	x*	x*	x*	x*	x*
taxation						x	x			
SEZ accounting									x	
transportation										x
statistics		*	*	*	x	x		x*		
labor economics						x		x		

x= *benke* major; * = *zhuanke* program offered.

ment in a discipline that held various theories that conflicted with one another. In other words, the Marxist-educated economists, self-taught free-market economists and those who took a business administration approach were unable to resolve their theoretical differences to a degree that allowed them to share the same departmental roof. These conflicts were not unique to SZU, nor indeed to Economics. They have existed for decades in many disciplines throughout the world’s universities. Conflicts are rarely resolved to everyone’s satisfaction; resolutions require compromises and tolerance on the behalf of teachers, scholars and researchers. Still, most universities have only one department of Economics, which is composed of various factions and whose academics tolerate and are civil to one another. SZU, in contrast, took a more expedient and less bumpy road. Rather than force the academics to confront the fractious nature of the discipline in order to work out their own problems through compromise, the SZU leadership permitted fragmentation. The result was three departments of economics under three different names. Issues basic to the debate over knowledge structure no longer needed to be confronted.

One might argue that SZU, in splitting the department, took the easy way out. Yet, one might also argue that SZU found a practical solution for an age-old problem. The solution had no public opponents, and probably few in the campus community opposed it. Placing courses relating to international finance and international trade into a separate department, of course, meant specialization. The supposedly abandoned Soviet system of specialization, continually and frequently criticized by the nation’s educationalists, was in fact very much alive at SZU. The establishment of three separate economics departments supported the widely held view that economics should be the major focus of SZU and, accordingly, require more than one department. Recall that the city leaders, in setting up the university, had originally wanted only an economics college. Dissuaded from this by provincial authorities, they went about creating a comprehensive university that very much had the feel of an economics college. The first detailed plan, issued in January 1983, called for an initial five majors, three of which were economic in nature (industrial economic management, commercial economic management, finance).

Creating new departments involves academic expansion (what is sometimes pejoratively called fief-building), providing a way to reward and promote some staff while isolating others. In SZU's early years, no teaching department was as factional as Economics. Almost all of China's economists at that time had been educated under Marxist doctrine. Some were better able than others to apply economic theory to Deng Xiaoping's modernization drive. Others had to fall back on their Marxist training to produce convoluted rationale for a "socialist market economy." The teachers in the Economics Department divided along the lines of adaptability to market theory. It was widely perceived that the senior professor/department head was unable to do more than repeat official rhetoric; he made no significant contributions to the body of emerging knowledge, and he was being outshown by others. One luminary was SZU's initial vice-president, Fang Shen, a renowned market economist. Fang was not actually placed inside the Department of Economics although he was put in charge of the Institute for the Study of SEZ economics. While at SZU, Fang undertook research that would later make him one of the nation's leading market theorists. When Fang returned to People's University in March 1986, Luo replaced him with Vice-president Zheng Tianlun, an economics professor. By 1987 Zheng had successfully lobbied for subdividing the Economics Department, and Luo appointed Zheng the first head of International Finance and Trade, a position he held concurrently with the vice-presidency. By 1991 the conflicts in Economics had become a subject of open discussion as the inaugural head was in the process of being replaced. The deputy department head and Party branch secretary, in the department's 1991 annual report, referred implicitly to the earlier conflict, when stating:[122]

> In terms of political ideology, we have implemented upper level policies and maintained a stable situation, coordinating leaders so that those with different opinions work together, regardless of personal conflicts and hatreds.

In a thinly veiled reference to previous autocratic management, the report continues:

> I am willing to assume responsibilities and settle problems fairly. I have never attributed all good to myself and faults to others [*lan gong tui guo*, pull in goods, push away faults]. I myself never participated in out-of-plan side-courses and have never done anything that harms the public in order to benefit individuals. My shortcomings: my work has not covered everything. Although I know about the side-course problem, I have not taken effective measures against it. Sometimes, I am bad tempered, not patient enough.

President Cai appointed a new department head in 1992. He chose Li Mengmei, a labor economist, who had served Cai as the deputy head of Academic Affairs. Thus, the department continued to be headed by an individual whose scholarly endeavors were heavily influenced by Marxist economics and who had not herself been greatly exposed to non-Marxist economic theory. With Li in charge, Economics took the lead among academic units in political activities. The *News in Brief* is replete with Economic's emulation of Lei Feng and with award meetings for students' social investigations.[123] Under Li's guidance the department continued to emphasize short-cycle accounting programs, including joint programs with Edmonds Community College, Seattle, and Victoria University of Technology, Melbourne. The department also convinced the Tax and Management Association of Australia to award the best accounting graduate. The off-campus Peixin Accounting Consulting Office, set up by the department in 1995, earned money for teachers and served as a job practice base for 10 students.[124] To boost its prestige, Economics hired as an honorary professor Yu Guangyuan, a member of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, who had visited SZU in September 1983 and December 1987.[125] It also placed importance on political work, resulting in its CCP branch being awarded as a SZU advanced Party organization. By 1996 a new dean took control of the department. Younger than his predecessors, he had published widely on China's market economy.

After trade and finance courses had been removed from the department, the Economics curriculum was left with a sizable void. Finance, followed by Trade, had been the most popular major in 1986. After the split, Economics offered only accounting at the *benke* level; it had no economics major, per se. No major adopted a curriculum that began with a macro-micro sequence as taught in economics departments outside China. Both the Management Department and International Finance and Trade offered more solid foundation courses, with the latter department even offering Western Economics as its key departmental course. The Accounting major in Economics trained "accountants who could use Chinese, English and computers and who were familiar with economic theories, management theories, intensive accounting, foundation for accounting, various practices in accounting, bookkeeping, and auditing."[126] The department experimented with various other majors—Statistics, Labor Economics, Transportation Economics and Taxation—but none of these was long-lived or considered indispensable to the knowledge structure. For example, in the mid-1990s, at the insistence of the municipal government, Economics offered a major in transportation economics, designed to "train management specialists in the economics of transportation who possess a solid economics foundation, extensive theories in transportation economics, master accounting, finance and trade, and who were familiar with transportation activities in ports, railways, highways and air transport."[127] In conformance with the Soviet notion of specialization, city authorities felt that the SEZ needed more and better qualified personnel in this field, especially with the construction of Shenzhen's Yan Tian port. After the specialization was set up, the teachers reviewed enough transportation economics to be able to teach their students. One teacher remarked that the new major had a very simple history: a city official who had been caught in a traffic jam on the way to SZU had complained to the university leadership that they should be working harder to solve the zone's transportation problems. Although such an analysis borders on the whimsical, it makes two apparently valid points. First, decisions on major structure generally came from upper levels. Second, majors at SZU were not carefully thought out in terms of knowledge structure. The curriculum for the *benke* majors follows:

> *Accounting (International Accounting):* fundamentals of accounting, financial accounting, cost accounting, management accounting, auditing, financial management of companies, accounting info. systems, international accounting, financial accounting (in English) and financial analysis auditing (in English).
>
> *Transportation Economics:* principles of transportation economics, shipping and transportation, enterprise management, transportation and shipping, international shipping and port economies, containers and international multi-mode transportation, transportation transactions and agencies.

As a business program, Economics took secondary school seniors from both the sciences and arts tracks. Two-thirds of Economics *benke* students had put down this major as their first choice. The 1993 survey revealed that the graduating seniors were relatively satisfied with their education, much more so than their peers in International Finance and Trade. The department gained students (see Table 4.3), but this appears to be due to an entire extra class being added after formal admission had ended. Other data extracted from the 1993 questionnaire reveal average scores on most indicators. The graduates reported a low use of skills on the job (fourth from the bottom) but a high use of their field of study on the job. This suggests that their jobs were located in economics-related enterprises and bureaux but that the specific skills they had acquired, such as accounting or statistics, were not being used. This finding argues for more general and less specialized education; it further suggests that students would have been more pleased with a general economics education like those available in North American bachelors programs. The students in the Economics Department were fairly active on campus. They formed two associations: the Readers Club and the SZU Students' Finance and Economics Association, the latter which published a periodical.

The department offered a *zhuanke* program in accounting for SEZ secondary school graduates whose exam scores fell below the cut-off for *benke* majors. The curriculum for this two-year program was a streamlined version of the four-year course-work. Many of the same courses were offered in condensed versions, for example half-year rather than full-year. In 1986 (after the split with Management but before International Finance and Trade's departure), more students were enrolled in the *zhuanke* program (470) than in the *benke* majors (410). In that year some students were admitted into *zhuanke* based on their exam scores, but many students were part of cadre training programs, first set up in July 1985, that did not require students to take the uniform entrance exam. By 1987 there were 1,075 students and 38 teachers in the department; its sheer size required a more streamlined and effective management; downsizing was accomplished by the jettisoning of Trade and Finance. The following year, after the separation, Economics focused even more on *zhuanke* programs. The 20-person fixed staff taught about 1,000 students in various enrollment categories. Large classes allowed for teachers to enjoy a relative low average weekly work load of 9.3 hours.[128] This expansion incurred a cost. Many students in the *zhuanke* programs were undisciplined, especially *daipei* students who had a guaranteed job upon graduation.[129] By 1993 the situation had exacerbated. Most of the students involved in a May 1993 campus murder were from the business departments, with one of the ringleaders being a second-year self-financed *zhuanke* Economics major. After that point, the department started to emphasize moral education and de-emphasize night school courses; enrollment dropped to 548 regular students in 1995, of whom 330 were *benke*.

Economics never found a unique niche in the university, except perhaps in its accounting program. Economics theory and applications were taught in no fewer than five SZU departments. International Finance and Trade and Management each offered Bachelors of Economics degrees. Law offered a major in International Economic Law; political economics, a required public course, was taught by the Public Administration Department which was also responsible for required and elective foundation courses such as national economic management, world political economics, and the SEZ economy. The Math Department taught econometrics, math statistics and economic forecasting courses and offered a major, Management of Economic Information. One Economics course received special attention. Special Economic Zone Economics was selected in 1993 by the university to be a key university-level course. In 1994 it became one of SZU's three key provincial-level courses, for which the department received ¥100,000 (US $12,000) in research funds. The course was expected to serve as a model for other universities which wanted to teach a similar course. Accounting, however, remained the department's nucleus. Shenzhen city earmarked ¥1 million (US $120,000) for setting up a computer accounting lab in 1994.

By the late 1980s, while it still attracted high-scoring *benke* students and a few graduate students in non-degree programs, Economics had become a rather undistinguished department in terms of research quality. Plum state-funded research grants—such as two "7-5" projects in 1986—related to the study of trade and finance and no longer came to the Economics Department. In 1988 teachers worked on input-output models of the Shenzhen economy and economic and population forecasting for the year 2000, which in hindsight have proved disinformative. They also undertook a survey of visitors to Sha Tou Jiao (then called China-U.K. street town), a border village whose main street separated the Mainland from British-controlled Hong Kong. For the most part, the department's teachers were not on the frontiers of research, although Economics was affiliated with the university's SEZ Institute, which had been established shortly after SZU's founding. The institute had received provincial level approval as a research organization in 1986.[130] Fang Shen, as institute head, organized a one-month research project that involved 34 economists, many from key universities, who investigated the special zones and published a book. Soon afterwards, however, Fang Shen returned to Beijing and the institute lost its leading theorist. Thereafter, the institute's research mostly featured compilations; few new data were gathered, and sophisticated analytical techniques were not employed. China's key center of research on the special economic zones was located at Jinan University, Guangzhou; the SZU institute made few research contributions. As a permanent fixture of the university, however, the SEZ Institute was not subject to merit-based evaluations, and it was held in low regard by members of the university community. The university's own Research Office complained in 1988 that SZU had "few research achievements in areas that are badly needed in the SEZ—agriculture, economics and industry."[131] That is not to say the institute was idle. In 1991 it took on six research projects and hosted an international conference on stocks and securities. A paucity of published research continued until, in advance of the 1995 accreditation, Cai Delin beefed up the institute and gave it a publishing mandate. From 1986-1992 the institute's output had averaged about 2.5 publications per year; under the new directive, it published 28 articles in 1994 alone, with 18 more in 1995. In 1994 the institute was bestowed the university's highest accolade: advanced work-unit. One expert in the field, however, considered the institute's recent output to be of "exceptionally low quality," relative to other SEZ research in China. Other research institutes in China, including the Jinan center and the Development Institute of Fudan University, continued to provide more insightful studies on economic issues in the special zones. Teachers in Economics, however, received occasional recognition, such as the three faculty members in 1992 who received an award for their work on stock market reform. By the mid-1990s there were signs that the Economics Department was strengthening itself academically. Teachers edited a book called Appreciation Accounting which represented the only provincial level book-funding SZU received in 1995. Economics was designated an advanced work-unit at the university level in 1995.

One former teacher characterized Economics as a department with squandered potential. Situated in the only comprehensive university in China's premier special economic zone, the department by its very location could attract visiting scholars and lecturers, as did Architecture. SZU had hosted an economics conference as early as December 1984, but most of its later activities were of an entrepreneurial rather than scholarly nature. Some were joint endeavors like the April 1985 course on foreign-related economy, trade and foreign investment that was undertaken with the Beijing Foreign Trade University, the Chinese Economics Association and the International Economics Research Association. The university's Economic Management Cadre Training Center offered a training course for factory heads and senior managers in conjunction with a Hong Kong personnel bureau. These types of projects became less common as the university aged. Still, many delegations of economists traveled to Shenzhen and stopped by SZU for a visit. Japanese groups investigating China's economy were frequent visitors. A

Bulgarian team visited in December 1985 and sent a second delegation in October 1989, a time when China was receiving few foreign visitors. These visits could have provided opportunities for lectures and seminars; few generated long-term cooperation. Language proved a hurdle, but the largest barrier was Economics' unwillingness to pursue serious scholarly endeavors, a similar road taken by Chemistry and other departments. Ironically, SZU offered good research facilities for scholars in economics. In 1994 the university library created a data base for economic periodicals that contained over 8,000 entries. At the same time a special database for articles relating to the SEZ economy was being compiled, with information on 850 articles posted by 1995. The *World Economics Digest* was also being put into a database. The extent to which these materials were used by scholars is unknown.

Electronic Engineering

The Department of Electronic Engineering (EE) has been among the most prestigious teaching departments at SZU. Applied Computers has been its primary *benke* major, also offered on a smaller scale at the *zhuanke* level. Electrical Engineering at the *benke* level has been offered sporadically (1986, 1988, 1991, 1994-95), as has Radio Engineering (later known as Communications Technology) in 1986, 1987, 1990, and 1991-97. With around 35 teachers, the department oversaw SZU's largest teaching staff and taught 98 courses in 1991 alone. It managed 16 laboratories, merged into six big labs in 1995 (circuits, electronic systems, computer-aided software, applied electronics, signal processing, electronic data analysis). Some teachers were assigned as instructors in the public courses in computer—the fundamentals course required of all non-computer majors and a course in either data-base, cobol, or fortran that each university student took. The department was also responsible for teaching eight courses for other departments and for supervising the unified provincial computer exam that non-computer majors took each spring from 1994 (SZU students scored the best among Guangdong universities). Each year, the graduate designs of over 130 EE seniors were supervised, and job practice arrangements were made for 350 students in lower grades. The EE teachers were lower in rank than in the average department and slightly older. This indicates the relative difficulty for teachers to be promoted, due to increased competition. Computer skills were in high demand in the SEZ, and over the years many EE teachers have left SZU to work in the private sector or for state-run companies. Others have emigrated abroad for study, including four in the department's first four years.

According to the 1993 graduates survey, students in EE were fairly satisfied with their education despite the department's having one of the highest fail rates at SZU. Students entering the Applied Computer major obtained the second highest exam scores among sciences track students, after International Finance. The Radio major enrolled students with above average entrance scores, and the Electrical Engineering major took students who scored in the middle of sciences track exam-takers. About half the students who entered the department in 1989 chose it as their first choice. Many of the others would have preferred to have gone to institutions like Qinghua University, but this was precluded because they failed to make the cut-off for top category universities. Still others would have preferred to select SZU's trade and finance majors but also failed to make the grade. The surveyed students in EE reported that they preferred to work alone, a quality expected of computer aficionados. They also preferred their classmates to others, which suggested a high degree of clannishness among the majors. Relative to their peers in other academic departments, EE students did not consider themselves to be intellectuals. This suggests that they saw themselves more as technicians than as intellectuals who undertook more scholarly subjects. The graduates from this department used their field of study in their jobs. In this regard, they ranked behind only Architecture. EE students generally experienced the least difficulty finding jobs in Shenzhen since a sizable portion of the zone's industrial production was in electronics.

Much of the computer teaching at SZU has been done by the staff of the Computer Center. The center is separate from EE, but the two units have worked together teaching non-computer majors. Over the years, much of the public teaching burden has fallen on EE teachers, because the Computer Center staff has been short-handed. In the late 1980s, students in public classes were unable to find fully operating computers, and classes overflowed into the areas of the computer center reserved for free (non-class) use. As the center's computers aged and SZU's departments became richer, individual academic units began to set up their own computer rooms. By the mid-1990s, the Computer Center was networked, most computers were operating to standard, and classes did not impinge on non-class operation.

The cooperation between the Computer Center and EE was promoted by several factors. The first head of the computer center, Ying Qirui, was also a teacher in Electronics Engineering. When he moved into the vice-presidency, he fostered continued cooperation between units. For several years in the early 1990s, Vice-president Ying also served as head of EE. The department and the Computer Center were mutually dependent in terms of working on revenue-generating projects. For example, EE could not offer side-courses without using the Computer Center's facilities. The two units shared staff on contractual work with outside units.

The EE Department was founded in May 1983 and recruited students for classes that began in September of the next year on the new campus. By 1986 the department had become SZU's largest, with 30 teachers, 300 *benke* and 250 *zhuanke* night school students. In that same year it bought equipment for frequency, network and logic analysis using loans from the World Bank. Also in 1986 the Shenzhen Electrical Group Corp. (SEGC) initiated a scholarship which provided certain selected students with ¥70 (US $19) per month.

By its very nature, EE offered what one observer called "rising sun" rather than "setting sun" majors.[132] In 1987 the department taught 424 *benke*, 49 *zhuanke*, and 400 night school students. Its majors were in constant flux: in 1986 it had offered Applied Computer, Radio Technology, Electrical Engineering, and Automation. Electrical Engineering was dropped in 1987 and a *zhuanke* major in Household Electrical Appliances was added. The following year, a single *benke* major in Electrical Engineering was offered, along with *zhuanke* Household Appliances. In 1990 as the 1986 Radio students were graduating, freshmen were enrolled in Radio and Applied Computer, as well as Applied Computer and *zhuanke* Household Appliances. Both *benke* majors continued to be offered in 1991, but Electrical Engineering was dropped in 1992-1993 and Radio was dropped from 1994. A *zhuanke* major in Computer Information Processing appeared in 1996, and the Automation major offered in 1986-1986 eventually wound up in the Mechanical Engineering Department. The Household Appliances *zhuanke* program ran into some student unrest in the early 1990s. Students of the major objected when some of their teachers were changed and they threatened a boycott. This was solved by the political tutors who undertook a rectification campaign to correct the students' *xue feng* (This major was abandoned altogether a few years later.). The constant change in EE's majors had nothing to do with the personnel needs of the SEZ. Rather, the rationale behind the changes reflected the department's desire to keep its teachers teaching. The instructors in radio technology, especially, would be underemployed if there were no radio major. Thus, the EE major offerings, and indeed the department's curriculum rationale, was based on teachers' needs, not primarily on the needs of either students or their future employers.

Departmental management

The teachers themselves disagreed over the role of theory versus application in electronics education. Wu Zukun, the acting head in 1986, wanted to "stress students' ability to do actual work. In the past, there were many cases in which a Radio major graduate could not fix a radio receiver."[133] Wu, supported by some of his colleagues, advocated a practical curriculum, but found that some staff members' attitudes proved an obstacle.[134]

> Our teachers are used to participating in high-tech projects with funds allocated directly from the state level. They regard household appliances and personal computers as low-level industries or mediocre technologies. This concept has to be changed; otherwise, it is empty talk to say 'to serve the SEZ.' There is a lot of work in the household appliances or personal computer fields that looks simple but is actually quite complicated.

Wu was critical of the way Chinese academics in general handled electronics education:[135]

> In the teaching of electronics in China more emphasis is put on memorizing book knowledge rather than giving enlightenment to students. In terms of research, more emphasis is put on playing around with mathematical games than on invention and creation. In terms of production, more emphasis is put on calculation in designs rather than on the manufacturing process and quality assurance. In product research and development, more emphasis is put on building whole units rather than developing components and materials.

Given so few students in certain majors in certain years, an excess of teachers prompted the department to establish the Shenzhen Pu Ming Industrial Company, Ltd. for high-tech development and production. The company served as a site for student job practice, where 40 *benke* and 40 *zhuanke* students worked between 1988-1991. Hiring students at relatively low pay helped ensure the economic viability of this departmental enterprise, which built radios and transformers. Most of the department's teachers were engaged in outside consulting of one form or another. Some of the staff undertook research, with much of the outside funding going to one professor, Yang Shuwen, who had received three state-level projects totaling ¥260,000 (US $70,000) by 1988.

Professor Yang enjoyed a national reputation, was well-connected in China's science circle, and was well versed at the art of public relations.[136] She was specifically hired by Luo Zhengqi to head the department for two years from November 1987 and was told to recruit no teachers over age 45. At the same time, she was employed to head the Communications Technology Institute, which had been founded in 1986 to combine communications and computers. The institute's goal was to adapt technologies developed in western countries to Shenzhen products designed for export.[137] The SZU administration believed that EE would benefit from Yang's prestige if she headed both the department and institute, despite her lack of enthusiasm for administration. Her contract specifically stated:

> The president can appoint full-time teachers to be part-time department heads; full-time teachers have an obligation to accept. Teacher who refuse to be thus employed must state their reasons.

Yang's service as head aggregated the unresolved theory-versus-practice debate and resulted in departmental chaos; and by 1990, pervasive factional politics had developed in the department. In the words of Bao Youli, a former deputy head who was appointed to succeed Yang,[138]

> Teaching order, lab management, and the financial situation were all abnormal because of conflict among teachers. A few staff could not properly handle the relationship between personal interests and professional interests, and staff were not forgiving of one another, or could not understand one another.

Yang (and her funding) left the department (and the Communications Technology Institute as well). She was relocated to the New Technology Research Center, a unit which was created especially for her. Although SZU had created the institute in 1988, it was not formally approved by the Shenzhen government until February 1990, a delay caused by the post 4 June decision-making lacuna. For almost a year Yang had served ineffectively as the lame duck EE head, and the department's management further suffered. When Yang relocated, vice-president Ying took over leadership of the department to reestablish departmental order. While Ying left the day-to-day running of the department to deputy head Bao, he kibitzed the unit's operations.

Bao confronted departmental chaos head-on. The crisis in EE was of the same magnitude as those that at various times had affected Chinese, Economics and Foreign Language, but in EE's case the issues were publicly discussed. Much of Bao's four-page 1991 report focused on leadership, offering his personal perspective:[139]

> The work style of leaders is the key to improving the teaching and study atmosphere. I joined SZU in April 1984; I had worked for many years in grassroots units including a secondary school, wireless equipment factory, and im-

> port/export company. For many years at SZU, I was just an ordinary teacher. I have a good understanding of what an ordinary worker or teacher expects of a leader. Each person hopes that the leader will be fair and can work together with ordinary members, rather than sit on high and deliver commands and empty words. In terms of personal interests, leaders should first be strict with themselves. If leaders observe the above, work-units are easily run. This is easier said than done. This reminds me of the situation when I was nominated to be vice-head of department in October 1988 and again in 1990 when I assumed the current position. Twice when it was discussed, teachers complained a lot about my nomination as vice-head. The teaching order was a mess. Laboratory management was in total chaos. Since I believe I am at least a fair and hard-working person, I believed I could get most teachers' support, but I never fantasized that I would get everyone's support. I believe I can put the Electronics Department on the right track.

Bao, with Ying's background support, strove to put the department in order. A new teaching plan covering 186 courses was adopted after 25 meetings. From 1990 a financial management system was installed that required each staff to pay income tax. Side-business courses were closely regulated, and requests to offer some side-courses and cooperative arrangements that would have "smeared the face of SZU" were rejected. Bonuses were distributed according to work load.

Bao, however, had no intention of remaining in the department's leadership. He said he took on the job as part of his duty to the department; by his own admission he had never requested or received extra compensation for being deputy head or payment for the extra work the position demanded. "Because department work took so much time, I hardly fulfilled my job as a husband and father. In the future I hope to work as only an ordinary teacher," he wrote in 1991. Several years later, Bao retired and was replaced by Yong Zhengzheng, a teacher who had been sent in 1986 by the department for study in Canada. Yong was the only SZU teacher among those who had gone abroad for training in 1986 (25 faculty members, six from EE alone) to ever return to SZU's teaching staff.[140] Under Yong's direction, the department continued to develop a relationship with the University of Central Lancashire, U.K. For several years, departmental personnel exchanges had occurred. In the early 1990s, a joint twinning program was initiated that allowed SZU students to study in Britain and receive a B.S. from each school.[141] By 1994 the department's management had improved to such an extent that it was awarded as an advanced educational work-unit by the city government. In the same year, it received several large financial contributions. The Shenzhen Science and Technology Bureau gave EE ¥1 million (US $120,000) for building a data analysis research lab, and IBM donated US $570,000 for a CASE (Computer Aided Software Engineering) lab.[142] It also received ¥200,000 (US $23,000) in provincial funding for Signal and Information Processing, which had been designated as a key Guangdong course.

Curriculum

The department's curriculum was aimed at training *rencai* for the SEZ. The Electrical Engineering/Communications major focused on information processing, transmission and electronic system communications. The Applied Computer major was designed to create engineers "who have mastered relevant computer system theories, who can develop and maintain systems and application software, who have been exposed to new theories and technologies in specialized technology and computer science, and who can design and execute research, development and applications in computer software and hardware."[143] The *zhuanke* major in information processing aimed to train technicians, knowledgeable in both software and hardware, and who had proficient programming abilities and skills in office automation maintenance and application. Another *zhuanke* program in Applied Electronic Technology trained "practical persons in communication technology, household appliances, computer application and general electronic technology." The *benke* curriculum (except where noted for *zhuanke*) follows:

> *Electronic Engineering (Communications)* (1996): fundamental theories of circuits, signals and system, circuit simulation, digital circuits, feedback and control theory, electro-magnetic theory, microwave technology and antennae, principles of communication, digital system processing, digital communication, microwave circuits and components, communication networks, digital distance-control exchange, digital picture processing, gigantic integrated circuits, CAD and C-language programming.
>
> *Applied Computers* (1996): digital logic and electric circuits, dispersal mathematics, programming, structure of data, principles of programming and translating, construction principles of computers, structure of computer systems, control systems, computer networking, junction and communication, design fundamentals of specialized chips, software engineering, principles of data base system.
>
> *Computer Information Processing* (three-year *zhuanke*, 1996): information processing in Chinese, office automation, computer network, introduction to data base system, structure of data, principles of microcomputers, C-language

> programming, combined programming, PASCAL programming, control systems, software development technology.
>
> *Applied Electronic Technology* (three-year *zhuanke*, 1996): fundamentals of communications technology, digital system processing, television receiving technology, fundamentals of microcomputer application, principles of single chip machines, high frequency electronic circuits, mobile communication, video and audio taping techniques, D-base software.
>
> *Communication Technology* (1986): antenna, microwave technology, circuits, digital circuits, high frequency circuits, signal and linear systems, information transmission, signal processing, theory of information and communication, theory of color television, electrical magnetic theory.
>
> *Household Appliances* (*zhuanke*, 1987): advanced math, physics, circuits, engineering, electrical circuit board, high frequency circuits, transmission line and radio transmission, color television theory, stereo broadcasting, electronic acoustics, micro-computers.
>
> *Automation* (1986, 1987): automation control theory, digital control technology, automation control system, information theory, meters, system imitation, system engineering.

In the early 1990s, research output in EE declined as the department teachers shifted from being academics to becoming entrepreneurs. Many worked as computer consultants. Another cause of the decline was that most research by department staff was in the area of optical and electronics technology, the focus of the New Technology Research Center, which got credit for the research. The center operated six state-level funded projects in 1991. By then it had finished 20 projects (17 hardware, 3 software), six of which included items put into production. It had obtained ¥1.03 million (US $190,000) from SZU and had raised ¥339,000 (US $40,000) for research. Its output included five Chinese patents, and it provided technology to 10 enterprises. The institute, along with

Figure 4.5: Electronics Department research output[145]



the Architectural Design Institute, was the university's most respected and publicized research unit.[144] To correct its own research shortfall, the EE Department in 1990 started to require all teachers to publish at least one book or paper every two years; in the next few years, the quantity of research improved, including 12 textbooks by 1991 (see Figure 4.5). Department faculty members were responsible for producing national course materials, including textbooks on Pascal programming and high frequency electrical circuits. The department's Pascal course was one of three SZU courses approved as a provincial level key-course in 1994. Its use of audio/visual technology became a model for other departments.

Foreign Language

Located adjacent to Hong Kong, Shenzhen has stressed English teaching in the period of post-Mao economic reforms. In 1984 primary schools in the Special Zone started to offer English, two years ahead of the deadline given by the provincial authorities. From the third grade, children have taken three hours of English weekly plus another three hours of reading English aloud outside class. The average time students devote to English constitutes about 18% of their total weekly curriculum. Also, a specialized foreign language secondary school opened in Shenzhen in 1990 in which 27% of the total teaching load was devoted to either English or Japanese language teaching. By 1993 the total number of English teachers in the SEZ exceeded 1,300—100 in tertiary institutions, 600 in middle schools and 600 in primary schools.[146] This effort at teaching English, working in tandem with the zone's English language exposure through Hong Kong media, has meant that SZU enrolls students with a high level of English language ability, relative to most other universities in China.

When SZU was founded there were discussions about each department's adopting a five-year curriculum in which the first year would be dedicated to English-language teaching.[147] This idea was never implemented for several reasons. Although the 1983 entering class were admitted with the understanding that their education would last five years, college education in China is usually four years, and the initial intake of students objected to a fifth year that would put them behind their contemporaries in the work force. As a compromise, they graduated in 4½ years. Second, the new university lacked a sufficient number of English teachers to handle more than a regular load of 4-6 hours of weekly English instruction to non-English majors.

Third, the university community realized that the SEZ provided an exceptionally good environment for learning English and that the new university's modern language laboratories could speed up the teaching process. Finally, the initial teaching staff of the Foreign Language Department (FLD) preferred teaching English majors; they regarded the Public English courses with little enthusiasm.

From the start, the plans to create SZU called for foreign language teaching; English was in the first listing of 16 proposed majors and was indeed one of the four departments established in 1983. The initial documents concerning the university's founding, however, do not repeat the mantra that existed a few years later: that SZU students should be well versed in English and computers. But by SZU's first anniversary, the general description of the university read:[148]

> The following types of *rencai* are to be trained: those who have a solid foundation and broad knowledge scale, *who know one foreign language*, show strong adaptability, who comprehend both socialism and capitalism, and know about inland experiences as well as the laws of SEZ .

The university's 1986 reform proposals and regulations went further, stating:[149]

> Teachers are encouraged to compile their own teaching materials and to use original English versions of teaching materials. From 1987, for all grades above the second year, at least one course will be taught in English. Each semester at least one course will use original version English materials or reference books.

Only a few departments, including Law and Economics both of which employed foreign scholars, attempted to comply with this. The problem, of course, was that for the most part the teaching staff outside of the FLD were ill-equipped to teach in English. More university faculty members had themselves actually studied Russian than English. Although attempts were made to improve teachers' English through training classes, it became apparent that the language problem was one that could be addressed only with the hiring of new staff, and second language proficiency became a *de facto* hiring requirement by the early 1990s.

By the late 1980s, the English/computer focus, a major emphasis of Luo Zhengqi,[150] became a recognized SZU characteristic. This point was made in many articles about SZU, including the cover story on the university that appeared in the official magazine of the SEdC at the time of SZU's tenth anniversary.[151] From 1986-1990 exam-exempt students were brought to SZU several months early before the rest of the entering class; English was one of the major courses the exam-exemptees took during their stay. Luo also wanted students who worked in offices as part of work-study to improve their English. He asked a student in 1987 to prepare a collection of commonly used office phrases and then two months later required student office workers to be tested on them. Students who failed the test were to be fired from their office positions.[152]

To address the fact that SZU staff as well as Economic Zone cadres in general lacked English ability, the university created the SZU English Training Center in September 1985. Its general purpose was to train cadres and staff from municipal bureaux. Within a year the center had 900 students, and its teachers—some of whom moonlighted from the FLD—taught 90 hours worth of classes. It also ran off-campus training courses for 300 students and enrolled 2,000 students in correspondence courses. The center was administered by Zhang Daozhen, a consultant to President Luo. Zhang, who was not affiliated with the FLD, was famous for editing a set of English teaching materials widely used in China. The center took a "quick and dirty" approach to teaching English. It taught vocabulary above all else. The center edited a book entitled *100 Easy Sentences in Communicative English,* which sold 15,000 copies. Its other titles included: *300 Sentences in Foreign Trade Negotiation*, *300 Sentences of Practical English*, and the more advanced version, *500 Sentences of Practical English*. By 1986 the center had printed over 20,000 copies of teaching materials and had duplicated over 10,000 cassettes. SZU cadres under age 35 were required to learn the 500 English sentences; those who failed to learn them and did not progress in language study were to be denied promotion.[153]

The need to see immediate results in language proficiency, something that characterized Zhang Daozhen's English Training Center, was an anathema to the FLD which took a more traditional approach to language teaching. The curriculum was set up by the first department head, Li Funing, a professor on leave from Beijing University's English Language and Literature Department. Initially, Beijing University's curriculum was for the most part transplanted to SZU. It was directed at teaching the Five Skills: reading, writing, speaking, listening, and translation. Many of the teachers hired for the university's first year, however, did not remain when SZU moved to its new campus. Some were considered unqualified; others could not manage to have their work-unit status transferred. Within the next few years, Li put in place a staff of graduates from China's key universities, including his former student, Lei Conglei, who became department head.

A variety of efforts at SZU brought FLD students into practical work. The 1983 students served as translators at an all-Asia ping-pong tournament. The 1984 class interpreted at an international economics and technology trade fair. FLD students also wrote articles for the daily broadside, *Shenda Tattler* (1986-1987), which brought campus news to students and staff, in a bi-lingual edition. One of the largest SZU student organizations, the English Club, provided English-language extra-curricular activities for students, although most of its over 200 members were not English majors. The English Club, which in later years became an avenue for religious proselytizing, was initially set up to provide short-courses in conversation offered by Zhang Daozhen, to select students to be tutors for Hotel Management majors and to hold lectures on manners and western values and customs. It presented songfests, poetry readings, film showings, "free talks" (meaning informal group conversations), and English speaking and writing contests from which English majors (who were assumed to have an unfair advantage) were excluded from participating.

Setting the curriculum

As the FLD matured, its curriculum for English majors began to deviate from that of Beijing University. Fewer hours were devoted to grammar, linguistics, and literature and more to practical courses. From 1986 translation/interpretation was deemed the focus of the department. Writing was taught only in the students' last two years, until the policy was changed in the late 1980s. Courses like business correspondence, business documents, and foreign trade English began to appear in the curriculum to replace the foundation courses that were still being taught in other universities and language institutes. This movement towards practicality was the result of an ongoing debate among FLD teachers over what language students should learn. It was described in 1987 by then department head Lei Conglei:[154]

> Students have had difficulty getting job practice in work-units, which did not want them because they did not think they fit into any specific field. Problems concern how to teach and the teaching direction. There are different opinions. Some suggest SZU should follow inland schools; others suggest there should be only practical courses, that we should cancel literature and linguistics, or learn only phrases in business and tourism English; still others say that students should stay in the FLD two years and then transfer to other departments. Students fear they cannot get jobs after graduation, and they think about transferring to other departments. Even teachers are frustrated and

> want to find other jobs. It seems like the end of the world: where should FLD go? We investigated, organized seminars with students and teachers, and referred to curricula including those in Hong Kong. We agree that students need a solid foundation in language. There is no quick way to learn language. But traditional teaching does not fit our current situation. We accept the middle solution: continue to enhance foreign language study, and senior students are encouraged to take a second major. To arrange the schedule, we must provide optional courses for students, and inform students about the labor market; and they must use their vacations to find jobs. We need better contact with alumni so we can figure out how to help students get jobs.

Even ten years later the debate ensured. Teachers advocating traditional approaches that emphasized strong foundations continued to argue their case.[155] Their voices were drowned out by their colleagues' silence. Over half the department's staff taught the Public English foundation courses outside the department. In many cases, the English abilities of these teachers were not at a high enough level to teach majors. They had few academic achievements and undertook little scholarship in language study. In fact, the language level of English majors by their second year was recognized by students and teachers alike as superior to many of the teachers of Public English courses. These teachers taught the same basic courses year after year, often sitting in language laboratories monitoring students' repetitive exercises.[156] They rarely used English outside their teaching; they opposed any innovations in teaching that would affect their own teaching styles; innovation in the foreign language curriculum or pedagogy for majors was feared because of any spill-over effects it might have on Public English teaching. One innovation was attempted in the curriculum for majors, however. It involved employing the communicative approach as developed by the Guangzhou Institute of Foreign Languages. The approach was abandoned after four years for reasons discussed in the following chapter.

The curriculum for both *benke* and *zhuanke* English majors has emphasized the practical. The formal listing of courses below belies the fact that only 5% of course time was devoted to courses on literature, grammar or linguistics. Furthermore, the curriculum rarely included these topics within the standard core courses, and teachers rarely deviated from the assigned texts. English majors education, as indicated by the course timetable, fell prey to what one teacher has called "instant-success tendencies."[157] This trend was not unique to SZU. It exists in foreign language departments around China, including those in the nation's foremost institutions. The *benke* program at SZU aimed to train "multi-functional English specialists who are familiar with English literature and British and American cultural backgrounds, who also master a second foreign language (Japanese) and have a solid foundation of Chinese. They should be familiar with modern office techniques, e.g., using computers to perform medium to high level interpretation, translation, secretarial, business and trade and other duties involving foreign affairs." The two-year *zhuanke* was a pint-sized version of *benke*, training English specialists who were familiar with the English language, familiar with modern office techniques and who can perform duties involving foreign affairs." The curriculum follows:[158]

> *English Literature, Culture and Business*: intensive reading, extensive reading, listening, oral English, grammar, pronunciation, British and American literature, selected reading of American and British newspapers and magazines, selected reading of contemporary English, interpretation, translation, business writing, international trade.
>
> *English Literature and Business* (*zhuanke*): intensive reading, pronunciation, extensive reading, listening, conversation, practical writing, interpretation, translation, writing, common usage, tourist English, foreign trade writing, foreign trade practices, practices of international finance, conversation in business English, reading of business English.

English tests

A major concern of the FLD, and the SZU administration as well, has involved the test scores of non-English majors on China's unified College English Test # 4 (CET-4), commonly known as Band 4. This test, given to college juniors and other students, offered an easy way to gauge a university's success in teaching Public English. The test, which was scored on a 100% basis, examined student's reading, grammar, listening (and to a small degree writing) abilities. A university's "pass-rate" could be compared with averages for key universities and other institutions in the province and nation as a whole.

In its 1987 work report, SZU took pride in the *zhuanke* students' second place on the year's Band 2 test and the *benke* students' fourth place on Band 4.[159] Starting with the entering class of 1987, students were required to pass Band 4. Those who failed were to be denied a bachelors degree.[160] There were also eventual plans to include the passing of Band 6, a more rigorous exam, as a graduation requirement.[161] The university developed special classes designed to improve scores on foreign language tests and set up English writing and speech contests to generate students' enthusiasm. Regulations also exempted high-scoring students from taking the Public English courses.[162] Taking Band 4 in 1990, the 1988 class scored sixth in Guangdong. To improve upon this, FLD received permission to transfer into the department all Public English teachers who were employed by other departments. This transfer met with such fierce opposition from teachers in International Finance and Trade, whose students scored higher than those in other departments, that the following year these teachers were allowed to return to their departments of origin. In SZU's Ten-year Development Plan issued in October 1991 the leadership predicted that the Band 4 scores would by 1995 rank in the top three among Guangdong universities.[163] That result was achieved immediately: the 1989 class who took the test in 1991 ranked second of 45 Guangdong institutions, behind the Military Medical University. The SZU average score was 66.8, compared with only 59.5 at Zhongshan University, southern China's most prestigious university.[164] That year SZU achieved the province's third highest passing rate, behind Military Medical University and Zhongshan University.[165] The disparity between second-place passing rate and third-place average suggests that high scores brought up the SZU average. SZU authorities preferred to use the pass-rate statistic, perhaps because numerically it has always exceeded the average. Although the more informative statistic would be the average, this statistic was rarely presented.

Table 4.13: Band 4 passing rate for non-English majors [166]

entering class year	passing rate	excellent rate
1985	34.5	.2
1986	48.9	2.4
1987	59.2	2.6
1988	73.0	5.0
1989	87.5	8.3
1990	91.9	15.6
1991	89.5	17.9
1992	90.6	13.9
1993	88.7	5.8

By 1993, Band scores also played a role in the annual comprehensive evaluation of students. An early pass of Band 4 (meaning before junior year) earned a student three points and an early pass of Band 6 garnered six points.[167] Regulations on degree requirements issued in April 1992 stipulated that from 1991 entering students who failed Band 4 would be denied a bachelors degree.[168] A similar regulation that had been enacted four years

Table 4.14: Band 6 passing rate for non-English majors[169]

entering class year	passing rate	excellent rate
1985	.5	na
1986	3.9	na
1987	9.6	na
1988	20.0	.3
1989	35.9	3.3
1990	29.1	3.7
1991	36.8	2.1
1992	39.7	1.5
1993	40.7	1.6

before had only selectively been enforced. Failing Band 4 most likely contributed to the overall rate of students not being awarded degrees (see Table 4.10). About 12.5% of the 1989 class had not passed Band 4 by graduation; the fail rate for graduates that year was 22%. The overall fail rate for the 1990 class was 16%; their fail rate on Band 4 was just over 8%. The following year's class—the first covered by the reiterated regulations—had a Band 4 pass-rate of 92%; their overall graduation rate was 87%. By the mid-1990s, even the weakest departments had improved their passing rates. Chemistry's passing rate, for example, rose from 70% (1992) to 89.1% (1993) to 93.3% (1994). Data on overall Band 4 results at SZU appear in Table 4.13, previous page.

Data for the English band tests, unfortunately, were not available to the author in raw form. They were not widely circulated for comparative purposes and were not presented in a unified fashion over the years until an article appeared in SZU's internal journal in 1998.[170] The little comparative information that is available suggests that SZU compares favorably with other universities. The test given in 1994 produced an average SZU score of 68.6, compared with 67.6 for key universities and 62.6 for the nation as a whole. That year SZU's 75% passing rate was above that of other universities (59.5 average) and also that of key universities (73.8). Comparative data must be viewed with caution, however. The tests have varied in difficulty over time, as different institutions have been given responsibility in different years for test design. From the mid-1990s an attempt has been made to build a "bank" of test questions so that scores can be compared over time, as is possible with the U.S. college boards (SATs).

Other unified tests were also administered each year. Band 2 was given to *zhuanke* students in their second and final year. Data for this test are presented in Table 4.15. In 1993, both the passing rate (59.6%) and average score (61.7) for SZU were above those in other Guangdong universities, which were 36.8% and 54.6, respectively.

From 1994 majors in Economics, Electronics and International Finance and Trade—the students who always had the highest Band 4 scores—were required to take the more difficult Band 6. Passing Band 6, however, was not a degree requirement. Data for this test are presented in Table 4.14. In 1991, both SZU's passing rate (36.8%) and average score (53.9) were above those in other Guangdong universities, which were 20.8 and 50.9, respectively.[172] National passing rate was 22.8%, and average score was 50.8.

All in all, SZU's scores on Band 4 were considered above average in China, a point that was highlighted in the 1995 report by the SEdC's accreditation expert group. By implication, SZU's Public English teaching was viewed as more effective than elsewhere in China. It is important to note, however, that these tests measure several different things. First, scores are very much dependent on the language ability of *entering* students. Students who enter with better foundations are likely to score better on standardized exams, despite whatever teaching they are exposed to at university. Regardless of curriculum and pedagogy, entry level test scores would be expected to correlate highly with band test scores of graduating students. Unfortunately, data are not available to test this hypothesis. Second, to some extent the scores measured the success or failure of the curriculum and pedagogy used. Some books and teaching methods would be expected to be more effective in helping students acquire the knowledge they needed to score well on the banded tests. Third, test results measured the individual teacher's effectiveness. This is likely to be true only if the first two factors are controlled for. In other words, the results of the students of different teachers should be compared *only* if their students had similar entry scores on the English exam and they all used the same textbooks. The latter condition held true at SZU since Public English teachers were assigned identical texts, but the former condition did not hold even for teachers who instructed the same major. Students were assigned to English classes by major, not by English test score. For example, a class could be all first-year Chinese majors or second-

Table 4.15: Band 2 test scores for *zhuanke* students[171]

Entering class	pass-rate	average score
1986	81.9	64.2
1991	80.0	66.2
1992	75.0	65.9
1993	59.6	61.7

year math majors. Even within a major, scores varied because the entrance exam was the average of six tests, only one of which was English. In general, the English scores of International Finance and Trade students were higher than those for Chemistry major students, because the overall scores of the former were higher and the individual scores of most of the components were higher, too. Specifically, however, at the start of the semester, one class of a major could be noticeably better in English ability than another class of the same major. Thus, assessing teachers according to their test scores is a risky endeavor. Nevertheless, such assessment occurred at SZU. FLD teachers whose students did well on the exam were praised and given monetary awards; those whose students did poorly were told to improve their teaching. By the late 1990s, new management had stopped this practice.

Assessing a university's entire Public English program by the results of student Band scores is also problematic. The average test score has sometimes varied wildly from year to year. Thus, the pass-rate was seen as a more dependable statistic than the average score. Yet the pass-rate was also affected by the difficulty of the test, which varied year to year. The pass-rate for Guangdong in 1990, when the 1988 class took Band 4, was 44.7%, compared with 31.9% the following year, an implausible 29% decline.[173] Furthermore, when statistics were presented in SZU documents, it was often unclear whether the figures referred to all students taking a test at the same time (e.g., all students who took Band 4 in spring 1993), or for students of particular years (e.g., the 1990 class who were juniors in 1993). This issue was extremely relevant because students may take the test several times until they scored above 60, the passing mark. Data on Band 4 pass-rates for the 1990 class in different yearbooks gave different figures: 85.9% and 90.9% pass-rates, in the 1992-3 and 1995 yearbooks, respectively. This suggests that some students—5% of the 1993 class—who had failed the test in 1993 passed it by the time they graduated the following year. When data were given, it was often unclear whether they represented final figures or intermediate calculations. The data made available in 1998, presented in Table 4.13, finally appear to solve this problem, as they represent final scores, in other words, those of classes at the time of graduation.

Even if the data were presented accurately, a serious error still resulted from equating effective teaching with test scores. These tests did not measure communicative skills and did not to a large extent assess writing ability. Students who scored high on the Band tests may not in fact have been able to effectively communicate, relative to students who scored lower on the tests. A fixation over test scores also denied attention to the issue of potential.

Test scores may be viewed as good whereas they could actually have been greatly improved if textbooks or pedagogy had been changed. “Goodness” cannot be accurately assessed without an examination of different curricula and the use of a control group.

The caveats expressed above did not appear in discussions where Band scores were flaunted in narratives in the SZU yearbooks. The scores were used to make certain points that pertained to specific arguments. Data were not presented for interpretation; rather than were submitted more as evidence. All these warnings having been issued, the data are nevertheless presented above.

Students

Shenzhen secondary students who chose to major in foreign language at university were forced to make that decision before they actually took the college entrance exam. Thus, there were really three divisions at the secondary level: sciences, arts and foreign language (fine arts was added in the 1990s). Students in arts and sciences were precluded from majoring in foreign languages at university. For the purposes of this book, however, foreign language has been included in the arts track because both groups of students take the same set of entrance tests; their exam scores are thus comparable while they are not analogous to sciences track scores. The early tracking of foreign language has little parallel in Chinese secondary education. Specialized sports secondary schools exist, but there are no pre-med or pre-engineering tracks: only sciences and arts. The SEdC in the 1980s created the foreign language division as a way of promoting foreign language study and ensuring that foreign language departments and institutes would have sufficient enrollment. While this meant that foreign language students had fewer choices than their peers, it also meant that they were more certain about their future: either they would major in foreign language in college or they would not attend. During their secondary education, however, foreign language track students were exposed to only slightly more English in their preparation. They may be given an extra conversation course, but in other regards their curriculum was identical with that of arts students.

About two-thirds of the students who entered FLD in 1989 had selected SZU English as their first choice. This means that one-third of the class had wanted to go to other universities or language institutes. The graduate survey shows that the students tended to be cliquish, in this regard placing third, after Chemistry and Civil Engineering. In terms of individualism, FLD students scored fairly high. They also felt strongly that students should be active in class (only Civil Engineering students felt stronger on this issue), and they ranked first in disagreement with the statement: "The teacher should be the center of class." Only one-quarter of the students endorsed the notion that education should be practical; one-third said their education was too practical. This suggests a moderate amount of disagreement among these students in terms of what they should be taught—a disagreement that was shared by faculty members. In fact, while some students were dissatisfied that they were not reading much literature, others were disappointed they were not getting more courses in business English. In terms of overall satisfaction with their college education, FLD students were average—which means they were satisfied relative to other majors, but not very satisfied in absolute terms. Still, FLD attracted transfers. Ten students from other departments transferred in from those who entered SZU in 1988. From 1988-1991, FLD saw a net increase of five transfers.

Ironically, in the 1993 graduates survey FLD students ranked low among majors in terms of use of English at work, but high in term of skills and talent use. This is borne out by six year's of conversations which indicated that one-third of the FLD graduates rarely used English at work, about one-third used some English, and one-fifth served as interpreters and translators. The remainder occasionally used English intensively, such as in the import/export business or in contract negotiations that occurred infrequently. For the most part, therefore, the English level of FLD graduates was higher than what was required in their workplaces. This concurs with a finding in a report issued by a Beijing University research group that found that Shenzhen employers demanded an English level associated with *zhuanke*, rather than *benke* students.[174]

FLD *benke* students, beginning in 1993, took nationwide tests given to all English language majors. Two different tests were given for second- and third-year students, for the 1991 and 1990 entering classes, respectively. The second-year students ranked 2.4% below the average for students in China's comprehensive universities. The third-year students scored above the national average. Their listening was 4.1% better, but they tested below average on reading (-8.5%) and writing (-6.7%).

Zhuanke students

The FLD recruited the best *zhuanke* students at SZU, according to test score. During the recruitment period, when department leaders examined students' exam scores, a certain type of student was selected for FLD *zhuanke*. This student had scored high on the English component of the exam with an overall score that was above the cutoff assigned the department. These students would have been admitted to the *benke* program had their overall exam scores been slightly higher. Usually, a low exam score reflected a poor score on just one or two exam components. A z*huanke* student, for example, might have scored low in politics or math, but otherwise would have qualified to be admitted into the four-year program. FLD's z*huanke* students in 1993 scored the highest among two-year arts freshmen entering that year. At the time of recruitment, their average score, 630, was only 21 points (out of a possible 900) below the average score for SZU *benke* students.[175] This point spread between *benke* and *zhuanke* programs was smaller for FLD than any other academic department in either arts or sciences in 1993. The FLD *zhuanke* average was 15 points away from the 645 cut-off for admittance by state plan to *benke* foreign language programs for universities like SZU. Below this mark students could be admitted but only as fee-paying. In 1993 the lowest scoring FLD *benke* freshmen had a mark of 590, 61 points below the average *benke* student for the FLD and 40 points below the department's average *zhuanke* score. This suggests a wide range of ability in the *benke* program. The *zhuanke* students were more tightly clustered. The *benke* students covered a wide range; students at the top were somewhat bored with the curriculum, while students at the bottom had difficulty keeping up with the rest of the class. For this reason, many teachers preferred to teach *zhuanke* FLD students, a group where there were "fewer shining stars but also fewer dead stars" in the words of one teacher.

Second foreign language

The FLD started to require students to take a second foreign language in 1987. German and Japanese were offered, with the latter taking about two-thirds of the students. There were several Japanese teachers but only one German teacher; in 1988 the German teacher, whose father was German and mother Chinese, decided to become the full-time driver for the university president, a job which paid better and offered more financial opportunities than language teaching. Japanese thereafter became the only second language available for FLD students, although French was occasionally taught on campus. A teacher in International Finance and Trade taught several terms of French, and a French native who was a foreign student studying Chinese at SZU taught an informal course to about two dozen students and faculty several nights per week in 1989. The FLD in its officially published 1994 brochure purported to let students choose French or Japanese as a second language. In fact, the FLD had repeated refused to offer French, despite student requests and the availability of native French speakers who had offered their services.

The Japanese sequence was disliked by most FLD students. They were aware that their two year exposure to Japanese would fail to provide sufficient language knowledge that could be used in the workplace. Few FLD graduates used any Japanese in their jobs. Even those who worked for Japanese-run firms and banks used English with Japanese personnel. Knowing that the Japanese courses had little relevance to their future relieved most students of any enthusiasm they had for studying the language. Like the political and moral education courses, it was studied only so it could be passed and so students could graduate.

As early as 1986 the department planned to set up a Japanese-English bilingual major. But it was not until the 1991 Ten-year Development Plan that SZU formalized the suggestion of offering a Japanese major. Second to English, Japanese was considered the business language of Asia. But language was not the major consideration for deciding to create a Japanese major. The new major, which had its first in-take in 1995, was a way of expressing SZU's opinion that Japan was important. The decision gave face to Japan. Since its first years, SZU had received donations from Japanese companies. SZU's most famous "foreign friend" was former Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki. Japan was a popular destination for delegation travel. SZU received more visitors from Japan than any other country. Its exchanges with Japanese universities were considered exemplary. Several delegations of students from Japanese universities visited for short-courses; Japanese constituted the largest block of foreign students studying Chinese at SZU.

Against what might be considered a political rather than an academic decision, the Japanese major was created. Students would be enrolled every other year, as there were not enough Japanese teachers to teach classes enrolled every year. The first class of 15 students had the lowest exam scores of any major (apart from Design whose scores were too low to be reported). Few of the students had put SZU Japanese as their first choice; they had wanted to study English at SZU or Japanese at another university. None of these students had taken Japanese in secondary school; their ability at second language learning was considered weaker than most SZU students.

Management

Departmental management has been FLD's most problematic feature. Operating in cliques, the teachers as a whole have never really been able to get along together. For example, in June 1988 the department set up a translation company to capture some of Hong Kong's lucrative trade. Despite a potential market for translation that could have earned the teachers additional income, the company broke apart within a year due to friction between teachers. Faculty members turned to out-of-plan teaching to supplement their wages. The high demand for English in Adult Education gave the leadership headaches because it meant that almost all FLD teachers were required to teach evening courses. The students at night school were generally dissatisfied with their English teaching, viewing the teachers as an undedicated lot who taught only for money.[176] Night teaching stressed out the teaching staff and precluded most of them from undertaking research. Indeed, research output dropped in 1990 to a low of nine publications, down from 22 the previous year.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, staff friction characterized the FLD. The minority of dedicated teachers became increasingly critical of their less-than-serious colleagues. One exemplary teacher, who refused to stop teaching despite her being diagnosed with cancer, was singled out in speeches by Wu Zewei and Cai Delin. Zhu Huixin had fainted in class and was helped back on her feet, but she refused to leave the class until it was finished. Wu praised her for returning to work soon after a cancer operation. According to Cai, she was angry about her colleague's "easy attitude about teaching."[177] Teacher Zhu's attitude was shared by some of her associates: the dedicated minority were for the most part disgusted with the indolent majority.

From the beginning, as indicated in the above excerpt from Lei Congli, the department was split into two camps: those advocating the practical and those advocating foundation/theory. Lei's compromise resolved the dispute only on the surface. The minority who stressed strong foundations, which included literature teaching, kept stating and restating their positions,[178] but this had little discernible effect on policy. Lei's replacement, Tan Zaixi, a graduate of Hunan Teachers University with a masters from Exeter University (U.K.) placed much greater emphasis on the practical:[179]

> SZU graduates are part of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone and have strong opportunities to use English in economic activities, like commerce, tourism and foreign trade negotiation. Therefore, the curriculum setting should include these points for consideration, and it should not follow the old mode of some foreign language departments which stress linguistics and lit-

> erature and train research fellows in foreign language teaching. We cannot, of course, cancel literature and linguistics altogether and only focus on commerce, tourism and foreign trade. If we do that, we will become a vocational institute in foreign language teaching. We need to work out rational distribution of basic and applied courses; we should have both.

As the FLD (and indeed SZU itself) grew in size, the department became divided in several other ways. In the mid-1980s two specialized teaching groups had begun to form, those for English majors and non-English majors. In fact, in 1997 the Public English teachers were assigned their own department, separate from Foreign Language, both located in the newly created College of the Arts. The most serious division, however, came in the area of academic politics and centered around the management that was appointed when Lei retired in late 1989. Immediately upon Lei's retirement, Shenzhen authorities criticized the FLD for financial irregularity. The accounts of the department had mysteriously gone missing the split second between Lei's retirement and Tan's taking office. This event served as a precursor to more serious matters that were to occur during the next five years. Teachers in FLD were spending many hours teaching side-business courses, but they observed that their colleagues in other departments were earning more money. At the same time, they saw the department's management display personal wealth. An investigation into corruption was launched by a faculty *ad hoc* committee. In the end, the management team led by Tan and his associate Gao Litian was publicly chided for corrupt practices by the SZU's Party Disciplinary Inspection Committee.[180] Both leaders were removed from their positions, but the battles between staff factions that had lasted for three years, had inflicted permanent scars. The war had not been a simple case of one side (Tan-Gao's support network) against the other (Tan-Gao's opponents). Ongoing conflicts on knowledge definition (practical versus applied) and scheduling (English major versus non-English major teaching) caused ever-changing relationships among staff. FLD staff members often wavered and shifted support, changing allegiances on an *ad hoc* basis. This required the leaders to build a relational network and to dispense patronage in order to maintain it. Spouses of several teachers were given jobs for which they held few qualifications. In basing decisions (including those involving promotion) on relationships rather than merit, the leadership developed a poor reputation, according to observers both inside and outside the FLD.

By 1994 there was an end to any collegiality that might have existed prior to the corruption investigation. President Cai Delin, Tan and Gao's patron who had strongly supported them against the CCP's charges of corruption, appointed a new department head, He Daokuan, a man with good CCP attestation who had been on the SZU faculty less than six months. Despite only limited credentials as a scholar, He Daokuan had been personally picked by Cai as one of SZU's so-called dragon professors. Lacking administrative experience in his prior job which had been as an ordinary teacher in a Sichuan language institute, He Daokuan was a compromise candidate for department head. In fact, aware of his lack of administrative expertise, he did not want to be department head and had publicly stated for two months prior to his appointment that he had no qualifications in administration. In any case, he accepted the appointment, but from the start, his competency was questioned. Although He had a window of opportunity in which to make reforms, he said his job was not to make changes but just to restore order to the department. For a brief period He relegated authority over academic matters to the deputy head, whom he had inherited. The two leaders were always at odds, for the holdover leader was an outspoken advocate of traditional teaching methods (lecture and memorization) and a curriculum that emphasized linguistics and especially literature, his own field. In terms of knowledge structure, He Daokuan set forth two directions for the *benke* major: economics/trade English and culture. Graduates should be "cultured businessmen," he said, referring to the Confucian concept of *ru shan*. This approach was merely cosmetic as the curriculum was not even slightly changed. In reality, He Daokuan, who had just completed writing a textbook on tourism, advocated the practical approach. He replaced the literary deputy dean, his rival, with a recent hire who, having just received a Ph.D. from Zhongshan University, had neither much teaching nor administrative experience. This man was put in charge of the English major curriculum, a subject with which he had little familiarity. The FLD management team commanded little respect from either teachers or students. In fact, the *benke* students were aware of the department's corruption controversy; they for the most part disliked their teachers, many of whom they considered arrogant, boring and humorless. The foreign teachers, assigned two courses for each year's grade, were generally considered incompetent. In time, word drifted back to Shenzhen secondary schools about the conflicts in the FLD; this, coupled with the student's dissatisfaction with the department, influenced many secondary school counselors not to recommend that their students study English at SZU. By 1995, FLD had lost so much prestige that the exam scores of entering students for the first time fell below those of the Chinese department. As the quality of an English major became devalued, teachers became even more depressed. Experienced teachers continued to leave the department, which since its inception had lost about one-third of its teaching staff due to departures for emigration or private sector employment (excluding retirement).

Thus, by the mid-1990s FLD enjoyed the least prestige of any academic unit—in either arts or sciences—at SZU. Questions were raised about whether it should even offer a *benke* major, as the department had few teachers competent enough to teach English major students. Many FLD teachers hired since 1989 had secured their jobs through relationships with department leaders; the quality of teachers was widely perceived to have plummeted. The department's main purpose was to function as a service department to ensure that non-English majors performed well on the Band 4 test. English major teaching was a side-line that could be dispensed with, according to some. Employers who needed graduates with high foreign language skills could recruit them from key universities. With the expansion of the Shenzhen Teachers College and its inclusion into the SZU family, the Teachers College English department was considered the more proper unit for training language teachers, the *rencai* needed by the SEZ in the area of English skills. In terms of language skills, English majors of the FLD were overqualified for their jobs; non-English majors who passed Band 4 had more than sufficient skills for most jobs in the SEZ that required some use of English. In fact, the university in 1997 decided to curtail class hours for Public English from 6 to 4 per week, an implicit acknowledgment that, given their high Band 4 pass rates, the students were being over-taught.[181]

Academic politics, however, will most likely prevent the elimination of the *benke* English major. The students will probably continue to be taught by teachers who themselves had specialized in literature, linguistics, or translation. By 1995 not a single FLD teacher was educated in teaching English as a second language (ESL), the major task of the department. Of the seven new teachers hired that year, all held masters in linguistics or literature. Like most of their colleagues, none had any ESL training nor had any ever done research in that subject. The FLD, which had survived a decade of chaos, would continue teaching in ways that satisfied neither student nor teacher.

In 1997 FLD merged with the Chinese Department to form the College of the Arts. At the same time Public English teachers were culled off into the newly created Public English Teaching Department. The FLD leaders were removed and placed in political positions in the College administration. The new head of FLD was a well-liked Japanese teacher. Despite the fact he spoke no English, he headed a department in which the work load was over 90% English teaching. The fact that English teaching would be under the administration of someone who did not speak English did not greatly surprise members of the SZU community, who were no longer amazed by strange occurrences in the FLD.

International Finance & Trade

Even before International Finance and Trade (IFT) split from the Economics Department, the international trade and international finance majors were the two most prestigious subjects at the university. Taking their students from both the arts and sciences tracks in secondary school, IFT majors scored usually in the top three in terms of freshmen admissions exam scores. International finance, along with Accounting, were the first two majors offered by Economics. Foreign trade was offered almost as an afterthought, after the Economics Department realized that finance students, in the absence of job allocation, would experience difficulty in finding jobs in the SEZ's infant banking sector.[182] That situation, of course, changed as the zone expanded, and by the 1990s many finance and trade graduates worked in banks.

The first classes IFT recruited as an independent department in 1988 attracted the highest scoring students.[183] Being able to command the highest scores, the department rapidly grew into becoming one of the big three in size (with Economics and Electronics). Each year it admitted around 150 full-time *benke* and *zhuanke* students, twice the intake of the average department and five times that of the smallest departments. Since the department had only an average sized teaching staff, classes tended to be large. All classes were lecture; no seminars existed, and the average class size exceeded 75. When students complained in 1990, most classes were split into two sections. The department had a young staff (average age 38 in 1994) and consequently the lowest professional ranking of any academic department. Many were inexperienced teachers.

About one-third of the students who entered IFT had wanted to go somewhere else, usually to a key university in Guangzhou or northern China. The other newcomers had achieved their first choice. The one-third of the entering class who were to some extent disappointed upon entering SZU pales in comparison with disappointment as expressed in the attitudes of graduating seniors. According to the 1993 survey, over 70% of that year's graduates felt that their education was not as good as they had expected. Being the brightest and hardest working secondary school students (as measured by exam scores), they had experienced four years of non-demanding instruction while at SZU. More than in any other department, IFT students were "under-employed" as students. They did not need to study very much;

a few weeks of cramming before the final exams were sufficient. Virtually no classes required term papers or any kind of homework that inspired critical or creative thinking. The upper level courses taught by expatriates were only "conversational" and did not seriously explore economic issues.

Language skills

English was emphasized in IFT more so than in any other department, except FLD, with 48% of the department's total teaching hours devoted to second language teaching. Instead of six hours of English for the first two years and four hours for the next two—the arrangement in most departments—IFT gave its students 12 and 10 hours a week, respectively. This paid off. In 1994, all students in the 1990 *benke* class passed Band 4; 93% passed Band 6. Most IFT students passed Band 4 their first year; students were required to take Band 6, but the awarding of bachelors degrees did not hinge on a passing mark on this test. Students had, in fact, entered IFT with higher scores on the English component of their entrance exam than students in the Foreign Language Department.[184] TOEFL simulations for 1987 students prior to graduation resulted in scores over 500 for 65% of Foreign Trade and 40% of Finance students.[185] Of these, 15% scored above 600, an achievement that FLD English majors could not have matched. IFT students realized that their level of English proficiency was way superior to what would be required in their work places.

Student disappointment

Why were SZU's brightest students, in its most prestigious majors, so disappointed? And what did the department do about it? The latter question is the easier to answer: the department did little or nothing to address the student's concerns. The titular head of IFT was Vice-president Zheng Tianlun, who also served as chairperson of the teachers' union, overseer of the SZU-run enterprises, library head, publications head, and overseer of the arts departments. Zheng, who met and banqueted a weekly average of two dozen visitors as individuals or in delegations and spent two months a year traveling abroad, was way too busy to spend much time or effort on IFT. In reality, the department basically ran itself. Day-to-day management of the department was delegated to a deputy head. IFT ran smoothly without the conflicts that had characterized Economics, FLD and Chinese. The department leaders, as well as the teachers, realized that IFT ranked at the top, as measured by entering students' test scores. In the views of many staff, the department needed to achieve nothing more. Maintaining the *status quo* was sufficient; student disappointment went either unrecognized or ignored. True, the students rarely expressed themselves in clear and loud voices, but there is much anecdotal evidence from students to suggest that their disappointment was in fact recognized by teachers, who simply chose to ignore it. Students' opinions, as long as they did not get out of hand and manifest themselves in extreme measures like demonstrations or riots, were of little importance to departmental leaders. The students who were the most disappointed with their studies tended to be high achievers; but these were the very same students who won scholarships and prizes and who were appointed to serve as student cadres and class monitors. This group, according to one member, felt it inappropriate to complain, having been themselves "bought off." These students had the most to lose if they antagonized the department heads; they did not want to rock a moored ship.

The reason IFT students were disappointed is much more complex than in other departments like Chemistry, for example, where most students did not want to be there in the first place. Part of the explanation applies to every SZU teaching unit: an old styled and unchallenging pedagogy that put students in class to sleep, often literally. Attending class was repetitious; the teachers for the most part explained the text, instruction which most students did not require (see Story 3). But stodgy and out-dated teaching existed in most every SZU unit (except for Architecture, Electronics and Chinese), so this does not explain why IFT students were more disappointed than their peers. An explanation more unique to IFT is that these students entered with the highest expectations. Their hopes and aspirations went further astray from reality than other students' expectations. Through years of diligent study in primary and secondary school, they had earned a university place in a prestigious major. They had expected challenges, as well as opportunities. What they found, however, was something much less interesting than secondary school. In the words of one IFT graduate,

> I expected more when I entered university. At least in middle school, teachers cared about us. Here, we are treated like a floor—something needed to walk on. If I had to do it over again, I would choose another department or another university.

The sheer size of IFT made it impersonal. Unlike the students in Electronics, another big unit, teachers did not work closely with students. "I went through four years without more than one or two teachers ever learning my name," according to another graduate. The Electronics students had com-

Table 4.16: IFT student opinion on practical education (percentage)[186]

Response to the statement: I believe education should be practical

	false	mostly false	sometimes true, sometimes false	mostly true	true
IFT	32	16	16	15	21
for all majors	29	22	23	12	14

puters and software to challenge them; IFT students had only their own minds.

The situation described above was permitted to exist because no one felt strongly about changing it. Students did not protest loudly. Administrators and teachers maintained the *status quo*. Most believed the system did not need changing. One teacher, in rejecting the above analysis, suggested that market mechanisms would correct any deficiencies. Word would drift back to secondary schools, via IFT graduates, that the department was not what it was cracked up to be. Students' disappointment would be reflected in dropping admissions scores for future classes. Theoretically, this scenario is valid, given free flow of information and rational decision-making. Neither factor, however, existed. Even by the mid-1990s, most secondary seniors who applied to IFT probably did not realize what type of education they would be getting. They knew only that they had been admitted to the most prestigious department at SZU. Even if they had realized that their education would not be challenging or interesting, would they have made the rational decision to go for a better program? Probably not. SZU was the only institution in Shenzhen that offered a *de facto benke* business degree. Other choices would require students to leave the SEZ, an avenue down which only a few high school seniors wished to venture.

The high degree of student disappointment may also be related to an issue involving knowledge structure. International trade and international finance are specializations. They are not disciplines, per se, for they lack the body of well-developed theory that characterizes disciplines such as sociology, psychology, anthropology, etc. Finance and trade are courses of study within the discipline of economics.[187] Disciplines have withstood the test of time because they have offered sufficient theory to challenge students, who at the highest level (Ph.D.) themselves add to existing theory. Even at the undergraduate level, disciplines provide challenging theory as well as a structure for building a curriculum. None of this existed in IFT. There was no knowledge structure with a theoretical basis. Courses seemed unrelated except that they dealt with trade or finance; there were no sequences in which advanced courses followed prerequisites, although IFT courses adhered to a strict ordering set down in the class plan. All this was by design. In its first annual report, the department noted that "the SEZ did not need *rencai* who were well versed in Keynesian economic theory, but it needs people for actual operation, so we offer courses in transportation, insurance, investment project evaluation and foreign trade case studies."[188] The Economics Department, in contrast, provided a more theoretically-based and more intellectually satisfying curriculum; perhaps partly for this reason its students were more satisfied than those in IFT.

This discussion of the absence of a theoretical framework takes on a degree of irony given the department's sometimes stated desire to teach theory. International Finance majors, for example, were to be trained so they could "perform international financial transactions independently and undertake administrative/ management work and theoretical research. They should possess basic theories in international finance and basic transactional skills, be familiar with international financial practices, and the relevant laws of China, and be proficient in English and office automation equipment, including computers."[189] Required courses for the major were:

> *International Finance*: Marxist economics, western economics, accounting, statistics, taxation and expenditure, international trade, money and banking, international finance, study of economic development, administration and management of banking, stock market, practices and settlement of international trade, accounting in banking, international borrowing, financial law, financial English.
>
> *International Finance (zhuanke):* Marxist economics, western economics, accounting, statistics, money and banking, international finance, stock markets, finance law, administration and management in banking.
>
> *International Trade:* international trade, marketing, survey on Chinese foreign trade theories and policies, international trade practices and settlement, business correspondence, foreign trade firms management, foreign trade accounting, business laws, futures market, foreign taxation, international trade geography, commodities.

The two-year finance program was designed “to train practical specialists who understand basic finance theory and the stock markets and who have basic transactional skills, are familiar with relevant financial laws, regulations and policies of China, and can perform job duties in banking and security trading as well as financial activities involving foreign affairs.”

Of all the 1993 graduates surveyed, those in IFT (35%) more strongly believed that their education should be practical in nature. Just short of a majority of students disagreed that practicality should be the first consideration in education. Compared with other majors, students in IFT most rejected theory, but the survey results suggested that even many of them generally deplored an overemphasis on practicality (see Table 4.16). Practical education was virtually all they were given; hence their dissatisfaction. About 26% agreed with the statement “My education was too practical,” an average response at SZU.

Experimental foreign trade company

As in other departments, teachers in IFT were preoccupied with off-campus activities; they evidenced a lack of enthusiasm in their teaching but were eager to serve as consultants to local business ventures. The department itself established a SZU-run enterprise, the Experimental Foreign Trade Company, which received a city license in spring 1987. Similar to other school enterprises, the Company remitted a portion of its profit to the university. Located downtown, the enterprise was basically run like any import-export company. It dealt in the trade of various commodities, including textiles, medicine, chemicals and building materials. Turnover in 1992 was ¥14 (US $2.5) million, and the company received an AA bank credit rating. Shenzhen University did not appear in its name, and most people doing business with the company would not have recognized its links with SZU. From 1988 IFT required its teachers who taught foreign trade to have actual experience in foreign trade.[190] This policy was made easier to effect once the foreign trade company had been set up. The Company was the sole investor in three high-technology enterprises and ran a joint-venture garment factory. The Company has also ventured into real estate development and construction. It built the *Gao ke li* (literally high-tech profit, transliterated to sound like “Gold Quality”) Gardens, a 33-floor commercial twin towers located at the edge of the Shenda Village staff residence in the Futian District. Office rents from these buildings were expected to contribute greatly to staff welfare in future years.

Rectification

By 1991 absentee management, student apathy and teacher disengagement had resulted in serious student discipline problems. Zheng Tianlun remained (until 1994) titular department head, but other leaders changed. Zhang Xinying, a teacher appointed as departmental Party secretary in 1989, wrote in 1991:

> We have rectified department atmosphere and study atmosphere. In the past for many reasons, students were not willing to study. They played mahjongg, did business, had love affairs, and drank. Before 1989 the management of this department was chaotic. After the new leader group assumed positions at the end of 1989, rectification was accomplished under the leadership of the new Party Committee of SZU. We studied the relevant documents from the central and provincial governments. We practice stricter discipline for the teachers. We seriously handle some teachers' mistakes regarding absences, tardiness, early leaves, etc. We require teachers to be strict in class and set up a tutors' work system.

The new leadership installed a new teaching plan, which included 14 courses recommended by the World Bank and the SEdC. The plan, according to the leaders, was praised by experts from People's Bank, Shanghai Financial *Zhuanke* College, Nankai University, People's University, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). In 1991 IFT opened up a *zhuanke* major in Securities to supplement the one in Foreign Trade that had operated for several years. This new major was "welcomed by the Shenzhen financial circles, and it aroused the interest of sister institutions." In 1993 *zhuanke* Securities enrolled 75 students although the plan had provided only 37 places. Another aspect of rectification involved establishing a consultant committee consisting of ten Shenzhen-based company directors and general managers. The committee helped the department refocus its task on training *rencai* needed by the SEZ. A further change "rectified the chaos in the department's financial management by regulating that the accountant and cashier should monitor one another." A host of regulations concerning teachers and students were implemented.

IFT took a stab at improving teaching, requiring teachers to monitor each other. Teachers were required to attend at least five classes of their colleagues. Before 1992 teachers were paid ¥10 (US $1.80) per visit, but few visits had occurred. Then, the department changed tactics and adopted the stick rather than the carrot, or in Chinese vernacular, the hard rather than the soft approach (*ruan ying jian shi*). Teachers who did not visit colleagues' classes would be severely fined.[191] These visits, according to informants, had little effect in improving teaching methods.

IFT took advantage of its size and organized students into numerous extra-curricular activities. Through the student's Finance and Economics Association, lecturers were invited to speak on campus and students were organized to take jobs as caddies at a local golf club; the association offered free newspapers to students.[192] It encouraged students to publish, and it provided monetary awards for student research.[193] For several years students took recreational outings to the Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant, for example. Party activities were important. In December 1994 and again in May 1995 student CCP members and probates went to Humen (Tiger Gate) in Dongguan, Guangdong, the spot where Lin Zexu's burning of opium precipitated the Opium War.[194] In 1991 the department won first place in SZU's sixth track and field meet. It won big in other years, also.[195] Sports was not the only recreational activity for students. Despite rectification of *xue feng*, many students remained bored with their studies. Several IFT students were involved in the infamous 4 May 1993 murder, including the victim, Li Haidong, a 1987 *daipei* student who had been expelled by the department. Even their students' involvement in the 1993 murder did not damage the department's reputation. By then it had become SZU's Teflon department.

Law

In contrast with IFT, Law was a small, personalized department. It employed the smallest teaching force, who were fairly senior in rank and were the most senior in terms of age. Law took in fewer *benke* majors than any other department except for Mathematics, and it offered no daytime *zhuanke* program. It did, however, run a large night school program.

After the business majors (which took from both sciences and arts tracks), Law was the most prestigious arts department. It also ranked high among sciences students when, in 1995, it enrolled sciences students in the International Economic Law major. The *benke* graduates of 1993 expressed a high approval (or rather a low disapproval) of their education, second only to their peers in Architecture. This result takes on added significance given the fact that only 57% of all Law majors had selected SZU Law as their first choice when applying to college. Student's satisfaction can be attributed to small classes and close relationships with teachers, but also to the fact that the curriculum was generally appreciated by students. Respondents to the 1993 graduates survey did not believe their education had been too practical. They gave the weakest response among majors to the statement that “education should be practical.” Taken together, these opinions suggest that they agreed with the thrust of their courses in terms of the theoretical/practical divide. Their curriculum, in other words, had achieved a balance that most other subjects at SZU had failed to attain. Law students, in general, respected their department’s leaders, who made efforts to find graduates good positions in the legal community. Representatives from legal bureaux and offices visited the department almost annually to talk with students.[196] The public’s perception that Law was a more defined subject area than Foreign Language or Chinese meant that its students had less difficulty in finding employment.

In 1996 the department offered two *benke* majors. One focused on Hong Kong Law to train specialists for legal research in governmental and public security departments, bureaux of legal inspection, courts, lawyers offices, and other institutions involving foreign affairs. The International Economic Law major had a slightly different focus, producing *rencai* who could undertake legal work for government and financial institutions, or work in legal offices involving foreign affairs, administration, economics, or trade.

> *Hong Kong Law:* legal theory, the constitution, criminal law, civil law, criminal procedure, civil procedure, administrative law, administrative procedure, economic law, foreign economic law, international economic law, international court law, international private law, the legal system of Hong Kong, the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Hong Kong business law, Hong Kong monetary law, Hong Kong company law, and introduction to U.K. and U.S. law.
>
> *International Economic Law:* legal principles, the constitution, criminal law, criminal procedure, civil law, civil procedure, administrative law, international private law, international investment law, international monetary law, international technology transfer law, customs law, maritime law.

The Law Department’s success in juxtaposing theory with practice had much to do with the nature of its program. The SZU Law faculty was on the leading edge of legal theory in China; the subject was new and exciting; the intellectual excitement that teachers experienced created an environment that the students themselves appreciated. In China, as in Europe, law is studied immediately after secondary school, unlike in North America, where it follows undergraduate study. Given China's undeveloped legal system, law and the role of lawyers is not yet well defined. The law is subject to the Communist Party of China, and the "rule of law" as understood in many countries has yet to be established. The legal mechanisms that characterize English common law, as well as international law, are just now appearing in China. Civil actions and advocacy are still rare in the world's most populous country.

Law study at SZU does not resemble a law school education in the U.S. It is more closely akin to what an American pre-law major might entail, general in nature rather than a methodical study of case law. Most law graduates from SZU do not practice law after graduation and never acquire the necessary credentials to litigate or represent clients. Entering the bar in China requires passing a national exam that is offered annually around National Day, October 1. Only a minority of those who take the bar exam pass; preparation entails understanding and virtually memorizing about a dozen books. Law school education at SZU is not geared to passing this exam. The curriculum is not constructed for graduates to work as lawyers in litigation or client representation. Instead, they work for government bureaux, legal offices or enterprises, often reviewing contracts and interpreting laws and regulations passed by the various levels of government. The type of work they do is also done by non-law graduates. Much legal work in China involves the CCP; it is not surprising, therefore, that those with legal interests tend to be involved in politics; law students have a high rate of joining the CCP. In 1987, before it became fashionable at SZU to join the CCP, 26 Law students joined the Party and 30 served as probates. (Presumably, many Party members and hopefuls were night school students with full-time day jobs). The 1993 survey revealed that Law graduates saw themselves as the least cliquish, not a surprising finding given the small number of students in the major. Doing legal work involves interpersonal communications and relationships; one's work is facilitated by a large *guanxi* network. SZU law students had to go outside their circle of classmates to build their *guanxi* networks. On the 1993 survey, law students indicated they were individuals, and as a group they appeared in the upper cluster of departments in terms of individualism (along with the rest of the arts departments and Electronics). The students appeared to be idealistic; money was relatively less important to them than to their peers. They also belonged to the major where students least considered their classmates to be intellectuals. This finding is subject to various and conflicting interpretations, but one that seems valid is that law students viewed themselves as technicians. Like those who work with machinery or computers, law students operated inside the legal system, and their jobs were very much technical (hence, non-intellectual) in nature. Other interpretations of the data require the belief that law students were a cynical lot, but this was not validated by my interviews with about a half-dozen graduates of the department.

What separates the Law Department from many other academic units at SZU is that it maintained a steady course of development. Shenzhen government's first report on establishing SZU listed Law as the only major expected to take *benke* students its first year. This, of course, was changed as each of the first four departments, including Law, enrolled *benke* students in fall 1983. In April-May 1985 Law, with financial support from the Ministry of Law, set up a foreign-related economic law class and a Hong Kong law study course. The latter enrolled 50 students and was jointly offered with a Hong Kong organization. The department also offered courses in Hong Kong, which by 1988 had awarded 40 certificates in a course on Chinese foreign trade law. In 1987 the department was teaching over 700 students (275 *benke*, 572 part-time *zhuanke* night school students) and it offered two training courses for enterprise management cadres. The idea for expanding law beyond traditional *benke* programs was inspired, if not mandated, by the province's report to the State Council on SZU's establishment. This 1983 report, the endorsement of which created SZU, read in part:[197]

> Since the establishment of the SEZ, we have suffered some losses due to the lack of understanding of the international market, Hong Kong economy and world economy, capitalist management, and *economic law*, so we badly need specialized personnel who are not easily produced by inland universities.

Some of Law's full-time *benke* students were part of Adult Education, and the night school/part-time students were highly regarded. Eight of nine students from the 1986 Law class who took the national bar exam passed it within six months of graduation. Two graduates from night school *zhuanke* successfully defended the PRC customs office at the Hong Kong-Shenzhen border against a suit brought by foreign investors.[198] The head and deputy head of Shenzhen's Industrial and Commercial Management Bureau used the knowledge they had acquired in their night courses to collect ¥10 (US $2.7) million in bad debts. The department also participated with Fudan University in an economic law correspondence course for 2,800 students.

Law promoted students' involvement in the real world. From its early years, the basic philosophy of the department held that [199]

> students as legal personnel should be trained to protect the interests of the state and people, to handle cases fairly and just, be eloquent, be skillful in handling interpersonal relations, act on the basis of facts, solve problems, and offer volunteer legal advice. Students should organize these activities by themselves, which is good experience for students.

Law was the first department to espouse Lei Feng-type volunteer activities (although at that time the model soldier's name was not specifically mentioned). On Sundays and holidays, students and teachers dispensed free curbside legal advice to passers-by from booths set up on downtown Shenzhen sidewalks. Law was also instrumental in setting up the Students Self-disciplinary Committee, which included a Student Court, run mostly by law students. The court served to mediate student disputes and punish those who committed rules infractions. Two teachers—one from Law and the other from the SZU CCP's Disciplinary Inspection Commission served as consultants to the court. A Law student was elected chair of the second Student Union in 1985. Law students' heavy participation in campus activities, however, was short-lived. Students from Management and other departments which had expanded their *benke* programs took over the organizations by 1987. In any case, student self-government was suspended in 1989; the form in which it later returned reflected tight control by the university administration.

Like most other departments, Law was the creation of a single individual, Professor Li Zepei. Li was influential on campus and served as vice-director of the School Affairs Committee, which Luo Zhengqi headed. Li strongly advocated expanding legal education, using channels other than the traditional *benke* approach. He also wanted to see a six-year undergraduate major, something that never materialized.[200] Law departments in China stress particular subjects, and Li chose foreign economic law to be his department's focus. Half of Law's main courses in 1987 concerned foreign-related legal affairs.[201] By 1986 the department removed traditional courses like forensics and reduced the hours devoted to Chinese legal history and legal developments in foreign countries. New courses were offered in frontier fields:[202]

> international law, lawyer and notary system, SEZ law, Hong Kong law, contract law, banking law, incorporation, intellectual property law, international investment law, international technology transfer law, international finance law, international business arbitration law, customs law, bills and documents law, foreign legal suits, computers, foreign language.

In addition, attempts were made to alter the traditional teaching methods away from the duck-filling type which was defined by "taking notes in class, checking notes after class, regurgitating notes before exam." Activities that resembled moot courts in U.S. law schools were encouraged. Teachers were required to audit one another, making Law the first department that put such a policy on record.[203] Teachers were also instructed to provide reading lists, give homework, and to lecture no more than one-third of class time. Teachers were to talk only about the key points, to organize discussions and discuss actual cases. Li was especially concerned that law teachers should have real world experience in handling actual cases. "A teacher who is unable to draft an economic contract cannot teach a course on contract law. How can those who do not know how to handle a civil case do a good job conducting that course?" Consequently, many teachers worked part-time for law offices, as legal advisors to enterprises, or on arbitration committees. The department itself managed two law offices. Despite heavy teaching loads (10 hour average in 1988 with some teachers putting in 16-18 hours), teachers were involved in research. The department's major endeavor focused on the compilation of Hong Kong laws into an 18 volume series. Individual teachers took different topics and wrote books (six published in 1989 alone).[204] For its achievements, Law was selected by Shenzhen as an advanced work-unit in 1987, the first SZU academic department to receive such a designation from the municipality.

The Law Department created a niche for itself and did not apparently feel threatened by the fact that law was taught in other departments. From 1987 Economics offered a course on International Commercial Law, and Management taught contract law; in 1988 IFT added International Business Law, and Management added Economic Law. Perhaps because other majors began adding law courses, Law lost its uniqueness. Its student population fell: 77 *benke* students graduated in 1988 from the 1984 class; only 39 students were admitted as law majors in 1993. The department also downsized its night school *zhuanke* program from the high of 150 students, who graduated in 1988.

In 1989 the new administration appointed another teacher, Li Zhongwu, to take over Law's helm, and Li Zepei spent most of his time with the Hong Kong Law Institute where he continued work on the 2.5-million character, 18-volume series on Hong Kong law. For the next several years, the department towed a politically correct line. Focusing on the "Party's role as political core," Li Zhongwu's annual reports did not emphasize the study of law; his first report failed even to mention curriculum, pedagogy, or any aspects of legal study.[205] His second report drew attention to his own personal qualifications:[206]

> I always follow the state's law, am honest and against corruption, lead a simple life, never take advantage of position for personal gains, and I am humble and open-minded, ready to accept different opinions. I always instruct students to become 'red and expert,' personally leading students to factories and rural areas for social investigation…In teaching attitude, I am always serious and prudent and am well prepared before class.

In 1991 three teachers retired from Law, and the department was downsized to a staff size half of what it had been in previous years. In the politically charged environment of the early 1990s, foreign-related law, even if focused on economics, became a sensitive topic. Legal education for students took on another meaning. Students were to be instructed to follow the law, and each freshman was given a copy of *Introduction to Law*, as required by the central government. As part of compulsory moral education, the Law Department offered a one-credit Legal Education course to all freshmen in their first year. This course was basically self-study, with several lectures given by political tutors; it was graded on a pass/fail basis and students needed a pass on the first attempt in order to graduate.[207]

In 1992 with the departure of the Wei-Wu administration, Law resumed its former direction. Li Zhongwu was removed as department head and reassigned to the Hong Kong Law Institute. The course on foreign-related law became in vogue again. In fact, in 1993 the course won the second prize for excellence in teaching at the national level; the university had funded it as a key university course. The province awarded Law first prize for its reforming legal education and training *rencai* about Hong Kong and Macau law. Six new teachers were hired, and student recruitment doubled from 20 to 40. The department cooperated with Shenzhen's Legal Bureau and Bureau of Commerce and Industry to train over 2,000 enterprise cadres. Thus, the department had recovered from the post-Tiananmen trauma. One of the outcomes of academic politicization in Law was the establishment of a strong student Party branch, which was one of only three student branches the university leaders awarded in 1994 among nine advanced Party organizations. The department itself was named an advanced work-unit by the university.

Politicization had taken its toll, however. In 1994 the Law department faced a severe shortage of teachers, caused by three retirements, four teachers' leaving for overseas study, and two teachers placing themselves on sick leave. Nevertheless, in the same year SZU officials were listing Foreign-related Law as one of the subject areas (along with Architecture, SEZ Economics and Electronic Communications) in which it wished to grant masters degrees. Also, the university in December submitted the course, along with SEZ Economics and PASCAL Programming, for provincial consideration as a Guangdong key course, but only SEZ Economics was selected that year. International Law was not selected the following year either, although the Architecture and Electronics courses were both approved. Law was finally named a provincial key subject—the fourth for SZU—in 1997. As a key subject, International Private Law earned the department ¥100,000 (US $12,000) in research funds. Professors in the department also received provincial “8-5” [Eighth Five-year Plan] funding to compare inland PRC and Hong Kong laws and municipal funding to compare Shenzhen and Hong Kong laws. The department’s research output was the second highest among academic units, up from fifth place for the years 1988-1992.

In sum, just as law in China has been closely linked to the CCP, so has been the fate of SZU’s Law Department. Trauma caused by post-Tiananmen readjustments, however, did not have a lasting effect, as legal study at SZU by 1989 had become a dynamic subject which was not deterred for long by politics.

Story 8: Recruited Teacher Zhang Xiaoli

I have often thought that I was just the wrong person in the wrong place at the wrong time. I arrived at Shenda on 22 July 1989 to take up my teaching post. One of the first things I did when I arrived on campus was to go to President Luo to tell him I was on board. Luo had come by the Personnel Office at the time I was being interviewed for the job in the spring; his interest in my coming to Shenda was one of the main reasons I decided to move south from what would have certainly been a comfortable, predictable career. At that time Luo had told me: don't come if you can't take the risk. That fateful Saturday Luo and his wife welcomed me to their apartment. While we were having tea, he received the phone call that informed him of his fate. He learned he had been fired. I quickly excused myself, selfishly worrying that my own job was precarious. As if he were reading my mind, Luo told me to call the head of my new department and immediately sign a contract. Your job will be secure, he said.

I had earned bachelors and doctors degree in engineering from one of China's renowned technical universities, where I continued to teach from 1985-1989. I alone was selected among all the year's graduates to teach in our department. It was expected I would remain there until I retired in 30 years. I enjoyed teaching, although I was impoverished at least by the standards of urban workers. If I had stayed, I would have become a lecturer that year [1989], perhaps an associate professor in 1995 and a full professor by the turn of the century. My salary was about ¥200 a month; I was able to supplement this by teaching an extra course and by publishing in journals. I received about ¥100 for every scholarly article I published; the fear of worse poverty was precisely what made me become so well-published.

I took Luo's advice and secured my contract. That was a wise move; I met teachers who had not signed contracts, and they were never permanently hired because the new leaders refused to honor commitments (even some signed contracts) made under the Luo administration. Anyway, I was at Shenda and there was no turning back, yi wu fan gu.

You asked me to say a few words about Luo Zhengqi. In China we have a short-hand way of describing a person's worth or character. A long *(dragon) is someone who is strong, possessing high quality and integrity and essentially a good person, not like the European dragon that is often depicted as evil. The opposite term is* chong *(worm). The character* *rhymes with long, so if someone is referred to as a* long, *calling him a* chong *usually brings out a chuckle. Luo Zhengqi was a* long. *You can judge for yourself what his successors were* [chuckle].

My introduction to Shenda did not come through classroom teaching. The first month of my new job was devoted to full-time, organized political study. During both morning and afternoon sessions, I along with all staff was required to attend re-education meetings, led by fellow faculty members. It was a time for day-dreaming of a brighter future than China's academics could obviously offer me. It was during these hours that I contemplated giving up on China altogether and trying to emigrate. I was not sure whether I could get authorization or obtain scholarships, but I was determined not to let my mind rot with the infusion of tired political ideas about pollution from the West and the great potential of socialism. If socialism is so great, how come it has been a mess for the last four decades! Political study ended as suddenly as it had begun, and I quickly forgot what I was supposed to have learned.

My own political credentials were impeccable, but the new leadership insisted on trying to intimidate me. Party officials at Shenda examined me on five occasions, trying to ascertain if I was a Luo spy and counter-revolutionary. Fortunately, I had a good family background, something that had protected me during the Cultural Revolution. My grandfather had been on the Long March with the first generation leaders. I had joined the Party as an undergraduate and during the disturbances of Spring 1989, as a young faculty member I had worked with students to ensure they did not break any laws or get into trouble with authorities. Our city did not suffer the tragedy of Beijing, and Shenda's new political cadres could not bring a case against me. I offered to resign if that was what they desired, but my resignation was not apparently what they were after. They just wanted to intimidate me so I was made aware of who had power (them, not me). I am not out-spoken politically; I think I know the difference between right and wrong, and I respect the CCP for its good works. I am not ashamed of being a Party member, even after June Fourth. I was willing to serve in the CCP in order to change and make China a better country. It seems that my CCP resembled the CCP of Luo Zhengqi. And since that fateful Saturday Luo's CCP was now dead.

I was torn between emigration and accepting sycophantic submission to political authority, and this conflict continued to haunt me for several years. I figured I would delay going abroad and would become an obedient cadre. I still thought about this issue a lot, in all the senseless political *meetings that I was required to attend as a Party member and "next generation leader." I had at least three or four meetings each week; I was able to do no research; I was hardly able to keep up with my teaching. My department had assigned me twenty hours of teaching, including lab supervision. This was double what I had had in the North. As the most recently hired member of the faculty, I had no choice but to accept the assignments. But I found I had free time. Shenda students almost never asked me for help outside the class. Few would ever visit me, so time outside classes became my own. Previously, I probably spent 10 hours a week working with students. In contrast, Shenda students were too busy. They had part-time jobs and extra-curricular activities. Teachers were busy, too. Instead of research, many of my colleagues were working for enterprises, engineering products for the market. I could have done this, also, but I preferred theoretical research rather than trying to make, for example, a better engineered and more marketable widget. But all these became academic concerns, displaced by the university's decision to send young cadres like myself to do grassroots investigation. In 1991, I was suspended from teaching for an entire semester and sent to a rural town in the economic zone, where I was told to observe "socialism with Chinese characteristics." Unlike most of my colleagues, I was able to turn what could have been a total bore into productive academic research. During my time in the field that was not taken up with seemingly endless meetings, I launched a little community-based engineering project that earned me four published articles. Social investigation, for me at least, was not as bad as it was for others.*

Personal finance remained a problem. I had to make a decision immediately. Was I to go abroad, where I could pursue scholarly studies and live a more comfortable life, or was I to remain at Shenda, where I could only be a poor scholar? I looked around me. My colleagues were not poor; they were all moonlighting. I started to do the same. Little by little, I began to take on outside work. In a day working on a project for an enterprise I could earn the equivalent of what I was paid an entire month at Shenda. I stopped writing academic articles, for I realized that promotion was given through different channels. I had come to one of those turning points in life: yi wu fan gu, *meaning once a righteous decision is made, there is no turning back.*

Then, I was brushed by a stroke of luck. A campus-run enterprise needed a senior engineer—one who, like myself, spoke English and German, and could deal with foreign clients. This enterprise had a certain *fixed-staff quota, which meant that if I transferred to the enterprise I would retain all the welfare benefits that I currently enjoyed. When the time came, I would be able to buy a flat that was greatly subsidized by the government. Thus, I abandoned an academic career. In 1991 I had been promoted to an associate professor and I could carry that title with me to my new job. Since I took up the new post, I have met many intellectuals in China who are no longer scholars and teachers. China is a big country; it can survive.*

Last year I visited my former department up north. My Ph.D. tutor, one of the world's eminent scholars in her field, remarked that she had not recently seen my name in publications. She thought I must be working on a book. I told her what had happened to me over the past six years. I knew she was disappointed; she said: "You could have been a long.*" Pretending to misunderstand her, I chuckled: "Yes, a* chong.*"*

Management

When Management and Economics divorced in April 1985 to form two separate departments, there was no consensus on what direction Management should take. In contrast, Economics merely continued its traditional courses like statistics, accounting and finance, traveling down a path that did not require curriculum revisions. The study of management in China at that time, however, was not as well established as economics. Rather than adopt western curriculum models, such as those in undergraduate business schools, Management continued to offer the two *benke* programs that had been part of the former Economic Management Department—Industrial Enterprise Management and Commercial Enterprise Management—and it added a *zhuanke* program in Hotel Management. The division according to type of enterprise managed was a simple solution, the one used in inland universities at the time, and was basically consistent with Soviet-inspired specialization. Such a set-up did not necessitate a conceptual investigation into the nature of the management field, a diverse subject that includes areas such as personnel management (psychology), financial management (economics and accounting), and product management, the latter involving marketing and product development (statistics, survey research, sociology, etc.). Not addressing issues concerning the knowledge structure led to a uniformity in the curriculum. The courses for those who studied how to manage industrial firms were basically the same classes taken by those who studied how to manage commercial firms. The curriculum of each major was a hodgepodge of courses that were structured into three groupings: public courses that both majors took, major courses that were particular to each major, and optional courses that either major could choose. The curriculum for 1987 follows:[208]

> *public courses*: theory of economics, management theory, management math theory, markets, computer, management information systems, foreign related enterprise management, personnel management.
>
> *major courses*: industrial enterprise management, commercial enterprise management, scientific technology management, financial management, management engineering, international enterprise management, market prediction and decision-making, accounting, statistics.
>
> *optional courses*: foreign trade, management psychology, trans-national companies, international settlement, long-term investment decision-making, public relations, commercial psychology, trade negotiation, contract law, investing, insurance, tourist economy.

The courses in 1987 were structured so that they aligned into the SZU credit system, discussed in Chapter Six, that permitted optional courses within a major. There was no apparent attempt, as judged by the result, to arrange courses so they were part of a rational knowledge system, however. Management students were extremely dissatisfied with this orchestration. The very first students, those admitted in 1983, complained about the seemingly arbitrary distinction between commercial management and industrial management. They also felt that the teaching content was too general, like an "all-purpose tonic," and that this deficiency would hamper their finding jobs.[209] When new department leaders took office in November 1987, the system was changed. Beginning in 1988, Management offered only one *benke* major called Enterprise Management, as well as a *zhuanke* in Industrial/Commercial Management. At the same time, the new leaders established eight major directions: production; commerce and trade; investment risk; real estate; enterprise finances; hotel and tourism; marketing; and foreign-related enterprises. Two years later, the department dropped Industrial/Commercial Management altogether, continuing to offer Enterprise Management and adding Public Relations Management and Tourism Management (*zhuanke*) for 1990 only. Tourism was not in the official state plan, and it was abandoned the following year. From 1993 Real Estate Management was offered, along with Enterprise Management.

Public opinion—complaints by *benke* students as well as the opinions of secondary school seniors who "voted" by their choice of majors—greatly influenced the department. In 1986 the recruiters faced difficulty in finding qualified students who wanted to study Industrial Management, whereas Commercial Management was over-subscribed. The state plan that year had called for 40 students in each major, but Industrial Management attracted only 26 regular *benke* students who scored above the threshold on the entrance exam. Thirty students were enrolled in the *zhuanke* program (with its lower entrance requirements), but these were all *daipei* and were beholden to their employers which had sent them to study at SZU. For each year from 1983-1987 Management students found commerce more appealing than industry, and the former major consequently enrolled 20-30% more students than the latter. The *zhuanke* Industrial Management major did not have the same problem. In 1987 it was over-subscribed and had as many students as the *benke* Commercial Management major. By 1988 the pattern suggested that students who could make choices (as opposed to their *daipei* peers) wanted to be the future leaders of business, not factory managers. Commerce was perceived as more desirable than industry.

Table 4.17: Enrollment in the Management Department, 1988[210]

percent	type of course (ban)	duration (years)	notes
15.4	*benke*	4	B.Econ. degree track
3.9	full-time *zhuanke*	2	certificate only
7.5	Hong Kong class	2	
32.3	*suidu dazhuan*	2	"accompanying study"
14.5	*kaifang dazhuan*		"open," 5 types
3.3	hotel management *zhuanke*	2	
6.0	*ganbu zhuanke*	2	"cadres"
13.5	*yieda zhuanke*	3	"night school"
1.2	*dazhuan qidian benke*		1 *benke* class with *zhuanke* foundation[211]
2.1	graduate students		including 5 masters

Multiple delivery channels

More than any other department, Management experimented with different channels for offering instruction. The late 1980s saw a proliferation of management courses and programs. By opening up different subjects and course types, the department attempted to blaze its own trail, uncertain "whether the future be bright or dark, whether the road be straight or curved."[212] In 1988 the department offered 124 in-plan (*benke*, *zhuanke*) courses with an average teacher work load of 15.3 hours weekly. The majority of the department's over 2,900 students were not in-plan, the first two categories in Table 4.17. Management accounted for more graduates in 1987 than any other department. That year, it graduated 90 students in its full-time *zhuanke* program (tied with Chinese for first in size) and 63 graduates from night school *zhuanke*, second to Law in size.

The class of Hong Kong students was the first part-time study of its type offered to Hong Kong residents by a PRC university. Students traveled to SZU for weekend classes. The first enrollment, in October 1987, involved 120 students, many of whom were management staff in Hong Kong enterprises. The course was intended to teach Hong Kong managers about the Mainland's economic, legal and management systems, as well as the operations of PRC work-units. Only 60% of applicants passed the admissions test in 1987 (this figure lowered to 25% in 1995). The second recruitment took place in July/August 1988. The Hong Kong class was suspended from 1989 "due to certain reasons," in the words of a Shenzhen newspaper.[213] This is journalistic code for post-Tiananmen political rectification of education. In 1993 the program was resurrected and lengthened. In November 1994, 30 students received a certificate after four years of study at a ceremony attended by 200 guests.[214] After almost a decade, the course had become a university fixture, and in October 1995 another 65 new students were enrolled. By that time, the 1987-1989 classes had completed their study. Of the 600 students who had enrolled, 144 had graduated. Despite an attrition rate of over 75%, the program was praised in the local Party paper in 1995.[215] This program had endured despite what the paper called “insulting articles against SZU by a certain magazine,” presumably referring to the exposé on corruption at SZU that appeared in *China Spring*, a Chinese-language magazine published in the U.S.[216] There was no new intake in fall 1996; it was unclear at that time whether the program would be revived at some future date.

The success of the Hong Kong program (as measured by enrollment rather than completion or degree conferment rates) was due in part to an effective recruitment, resulting from advertising. The Hong Kong partner was the Hong Kong Management Association (HKMA), a public service company with considerable experience in external degree programs. HKMA had helped to design the program so it appealed to a Hong Kong audience. Completion of the program earned the student a Bachelor of Economics (Business Administration). The course was one of many offered by HKMA and the role of SZU was downplayed (“in association with Shenzhen University, China”).[217] Entrance requirements were flexible and below those demanded of students in some Hong Kong tertiary institutions.

The hotel management degree, listed in Table 4.17, was practice-oriented. The department operated a hotel under contract, which provided management positions for five teachers and over 20 students. It undertook management studies for medium-sized hotels (those with 113 and 130 rooms) and a feasibility study for a 320-room, five-star hotel.

The cadre graduate class targeted senior management personnel from Shenzhen companies. The SZU Management Department itself lacked a sufficient number of qualified teachers to run the course, so it employed visiting professors from the Beijing Economic Management College, Zhejiang University, and South China Polytechnic. Given the department’s own admission that it had a “limited quality in teachers,” employing outsiders allowed Management “to improve teaching level by standing on other’s shoulders.”[218] In 1988 Management had reached agreements with overseas institutions to offer joint courses that would result in degrees conferred by both institutions.

The first batch of in-coming students for these programs was scheduled for the second half of 1989. This program was canceled in the wake of Tiananmen.

Departmental management

Management was subject to the same political influences that manifested themselves in the post-Tiananmen removal of several Luo Zhengqi tainted appointments. The department head, Feng Shicong, was replaced with Yu Zhongwen, the man who had been the SZU Party Committee vice-chair under Luo as well as one of Luo's presidential assistants. Although Yu had publicly supported Luo's reforms, he had always hedged his bets and was never the staunch advocate of campus political reform that Luo had been.[219] After Luo's removal, Yu achieved political correctness through self-criticism and by condemning the very reforms he had a few months previous supported. Yu's about-face ingratiated him with the new leadership, who had commanded little respect upon their arrival at SZU, and Yu was allowed to retain his position as CCP vice-secretary, until Cai Delin arrived to assume it. Yu headed Management for more than a year, during which time he closed most of the department's side-courses. His annual report for 1990 is a testament to political correctness:[220]

> We focus on learning from Lei Feng and doing good deeds...The 1989 students cleaned up during holidays and Sundays...The Youth League organized students to clean up the kindergarten...In entertainment, we raised ¥5,000 [US $1,600] for student activities, won the singing contest, opera contest, and swimming competition...Many student applied to join the Party, and 15 were selected as Three Good students and good cadres...

Yu's report failed to mention any substantive developments in curriculum and course offerings; his writing was characterized by a conservatism often adopted by academics who fear that their words might be used to harm them in future political movements.

By the time Yu was removed (he later was transferred to become president of Shenzhen Polytech), the department was in disarray. Chen Guoquan, the deputy head, was elevated to top post, and he vowed to establish stability. Chen, a graduate of Xi'an Jiaotong University, had conducted research in both Japan and the U.S. and had been a masters tutor at one of the nation's leading institutions, the Science and Technology University of China (Beijing). He faced a difficult task. Recruitment had so dropped that the teaching plan had been revised seven times after 1990. Arguing that the best could often be an enemy of the good, Chen "dared not say that a good and complete teaching plan has been worked out. If we find something unsatisfactory, we will not revise further until we try for one semester."[221] Chen exercised a managerial style that included his listening to the opinions of others, a feature that in the early 1990s did not characterize most leaders of SZU's teaching units. Teachers in Management were asked what they wanted to teach, rather than being given compulsory assignments without notice.

Chen's criticism of his immediate predecessor falls between the lines of his 1991 report:[222]

> Unification is important among intellectuals. Inevitably conflicts exist in a work-unit. The key is how to handle conflict. We are doing all we can to achieve unification of the work-unit. A survey reported that no one really wants to leave our department, but many staff expect the school to give them freedom as opposed to their just hoping that they can get something from their work-unit. The affairs of the *danwei* are not the issues they are concerned about. As long as they can finish their given jobs, get along with their colleagues, receive basic payment adequate to cover a low level of expenditure, and take advantage of the department's conditions to do their own thing, they are satisfied. Therefore, we are far from achieving unification in the real meaning. Some staff regard themselves as having no career; they experience set-backs and do not know where to spend their energy. In these cases, the teachers themselves are partly responsible. But we leaders are also responsible for their not doing a good job…We should not give orders in the morning, just to rescind them in the evening.

Chen faced the same dilemma confronting other department heads: how to increase teachers' payments without polluting scholarship and academics by offering an excessive number of side-courses. Management had experienced greater teacher disengagement from research than any other academic department. Publications had declined dramatically (see Figure 4.6). Teachers of *benke* and *zhuanke* in-plan courses were paid lower than those who taught training classes. In what would become a model for other departments to follow, Chen proposed redistributing some of the income from side-courses into the bonuses of teachers who taught the in-plan courses. In some respects, Management was an average department—slightly larger in size, with slightly lower ranked and slightly older teachers than the norm—and a redistribution scheme might face better odds in this department than in those with skewed distributions of age or rank. In any case, Management was a relative

Figure 4.6: Management Department research output[223]



well-off department, given income generated from all its side-courses. In 1993 each teacher was given a personal 386 computer. Over three years, the Management library, which covered 82 m^2, spent ¥25,000 (US $4,400) to buy publications. Its collection included 12,000 Chinese books, 8,000 foreign-language books (compared with 1,500 in the FLD) and 135 periodicals.

Chen encouraged side-businesses, especially through the various teaching channels, because "without side-business then the department has no income and even normal teaching cannot be done...we encourage practices by market mechanisms. We must raise course fees to discourage teachers from outside work. If students cannot afford raised fees, then we cancel the course."[224] Teachers who did not have their hearts in their teaching saw their income drop dramatically.[225] Management also attempted in vain to set up a consulting firm, but according to Chen, this endeavor failed because faculty members did not see its value. In the department's firm, teachers worked in return "for a dinner and some thanks," and Chen suggested that salaries were required to establish its worth. Individual teachers offered consultancy, but as with FLD, they were not able to work together.

Despite these problems, Management was a department that was itself often well-managed and run in a highly transparent fashion. It was the only SZU teaching unit that produced a brochure for SZU's 1993 tenth anniversary. An 83-page booklet described the department, its teachers and their research. Detailed descriptions for each course covered 52 pages.[226]

In May 1994 Feng Shicong, who had been ousted when Luo Zhengqi fell from power, returned to head the department. Chen went back to being deputy head, making Management the only department in which such a return to power had taken place. It was also one of the few departments which witnessed a cordial administrative shift in which the former leader retained a high position. Feng was a respected academic who had written an international trade text book that was used in IFT, a rival department. He publicly embraced “fairness and transparency,” and as department head vowed to practice democratic centralism.[227] Side-businesses were further expanded, although care was taken so that they did not hinder *benke* programs.[228] A *zhuanke* Industrial/Commercial Enterprise major was offered at the new branch of SZU Adult Education located in Longgan District and an administrative management program in Cuitong, Baoan District. From 1995 the department cooperated with the Management College of the Electronics, Science and Technology University of China to offer courses to 50 graduate students.[229]

During all the political and administrative commotion within the department, Management students nevertheless received an education that was the most practical of the business majors. The Enterprise Management major intended to “train practical managers with a solid theoretical foundation and foreign language level, familiar with modern management skills, computer technology, and enterprises procedures, with the ability to discover and solve actual problems.”[230] The Real Estate major was designed to produce specialists to work in real estate development, administration, investment, evaluation and transactions. The *zhuanke* Tourism graduates were expected to work in hotels and various tourist enterprises and hotels.

> *Enterprise Management (Industrial and Commercial Enterprises Management):* Marxist economics, western economics, principles of management, competitive forces in enterprises, marketing, management of industrial enterprises, industrial and commercial accounting, practices of international trade, study of commodities, management of commercial enterprises, management of enterprises’ finances, organization and behavior, management information systems, management of multi-national companies.
>
> *Real Estate Administration and Management:* administration and management of real estate, real estate economics, investment analysis of real estate, price and evaluation of real estate, real estate laws, real estate management, management of ownership, financial management of real estate, construction drafting, housing construction, real estate marketing, real estate finance.
>
> *Tourism Management (zhuanke):* introduction to tourism, tourist culture, introduction of hotel management, management of hotel halls and rooms, hotel food, hotel marketing, hotel accounting, specialized English, nutrition and sanitation of food, tourist psychology.

Students

Over 79% of the freshmen who entered SZU Management in 1989 had selected it as their first choice. Secondary graduates who came to Management had lower scores than those in the other two business majors. By the time they graduated, as indicated in the 1993 survey, they were fairly dissatisfied with the education they had received (fifth from the bottom in terms of overall student satisfaction). Over time Management's placement among majors, as judged by exam scores for both arts and sciences, dropped perceptibly, if only slightly (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2). In arts, entrance scores for Management majors remained above those of Chinese and FLD, but below Law. In sciences, they were above Mechanical Engineering and Chemistry but below other subjects that took in sciences track students. The students in this department ranked the highest in terms of viewing money as important in the job. Party work was undertaken in earnest by the students, who received SZU's acknowledgment in 1994 for running an advanced Party organization. Field trips taught them "vivid socialist education lessons."[231] By 1995 7.5% of Management Department students were CCP members. The Youth League branch was also active, organizing academic field trips.[232] The 1991 *benke* class of Enterprise Management was awarded advanced class status by the province. Students also ran the Management Association, which invited guest speakers, including senior management personnel from the local McDonald's Restaurant franchise.[233] The student association's ties with McDonald's enabled its members to obtain training at one of the franchise outlets, and in 1992 the fast-food giant gave four scholarships totaling ¥5,000 (US $910) to outstanding SZU students in management.[234]

According to the 1993 survey, students in Management were more satisfied (actually less dissatisfied) with their SZU education than were other business majors. In fact, these very graduates helped set up a Management alumni association a few months after they left SZU.[235] Students in interviews suggested that Management classes were more interesting than their counterparts in Economics or IFT. All Management faculty members who held senior qualifications taught, earning the department an "A" rating for this item on the 1995 accreditation index. Nearly 86% of all teachers held graduate degrees in 1995, earning the department another "A." Teaching performance was also rated high. All in all, Management came out near the top in the 1995 accreditation report: 10 items won "A," 10 "B," and one "C."[236] Management was one of five SZU teaching departments that was designated an advanced work-unit. Students in Management tended to be more actively involved in organized extra-curricular activities than students in smaller departments. They were also given a larger say in student affairs than in other departments. The department hired six student CCP members to serve as tutors to freshmen, “breaking the convention that only teachers can be tutors.”[237]

Mathematics

The Mathematics Department was set up in November 1985 along with Chemistry and Physics. It was founded by Professor Shao Mingfeng, who had been recruited from Qinghua University by President Zhang Wei. The department began with 17 teachers and one part-time statistics professor. It was set up quickly, and many of its first teachers were hired without interviews, with their first six months of work during the probationary period substituting for an interview. The initial leaders admitted that Math had an unclear direction. Inland and famous departments of math stressed high technology in applied math, and their graduates worked on state-level and national defense projects. “Shenzhen does not need students like this,” the department’s first report said bluntly.[238] Right from the beginning, SZU students who enrolled in Math feared difficulty in finding jobs, and they wanted to transfer to other departments. The department quickly adjusted its teaching plan to emphasize the use of computers in modern management. Mathematics offered courses designed to give students both theoretical and practical training in modern applied mathematics:

> math analysis, analytic geometry, linear math, probability and statistics, optimization, systems engineering, computer language and programming, economic prediction and decision-making, economic quantitative analysis, mathematical economics.

In a subsequent revision of the plan a few theoretical courses were abandoned. Some teachers felt that statistics as taught was too theoretical. Generally in China, statistics belongs with either math or economics, depending on the policy of the individual university. In 1988 the statistics courses went over to Economics to compensate for the latter’s losing its trade and finance curricula to the new IFT Department. The determination to move statistics to Economics was facilitated by Zheng Tianlun, the vice-president originally from Economics. Math, at the start, was not allowed to teach computer subjects, an area restricted to Electronics or the Computer Center. This restriction was overseen by the other vice-president, Ying Qirui, who at various times headed Electronics and the Computer Center. With no one at the highest levels of the SZU administration to fight for the Math Department's interests, statistics was simply taken away from the department.

Never during SZU's history has the department been called simply Mathematics. It was established as Applied Mathematics. Then in 1988 it changed its name to Soft Science, which was "not only a change in name, but a change in direction, training method, job direction for graduates, and research."[239] The name change was intended to imply that the department incorporated both the natural and social sciences and used mathematical theory/methods and computers. The teaching staff were especially eager to get involved in areas that might in the U.S. fall under the management rubric, such as business forecasting, optimization, decision-making and organization theory, employing techniques such as statistical analysis, econometrics, and modeling that were not represented in SZU's largely non-quantitative business departments. Several professors specialized in "economic management engineering" and computer applications. These grand aspirations, however, were dampened by several factors. Math had a small student population, something which limited the diversification of courses it could offer. Equally important, its instructors were busy teaching non-majors. Mathematics was needed as a service department to teach the required math courses for the engineering, science and business departments. Although Math had doubled its staff by 1988, SZU's enrollment had also expanded and math teachers were in great demand all over campus. Adult Education, which did not offer a math major per se, also required math teachers. Individual math teachers were not assigned exclusively to teach only majors or non-majors, as was the case with English teachers in Foreign Language. Some of SZU's best math students have been in departments other than math, and teaching non-majors required just as qualified teachers as did teaching majors.

In 1989 Math changed the name of the *benke* major from Applied Mathematics to Economic Information Management, a move supported by its teachers at staff meetings. Math, computers and economic management each accounted for one-third of the teaching hours of courses in the new major (excluding public courses such as College Chinese, Public English, and physical and moral education). This new major obviously overlapped the emphases of the departments of Economics, Management and Electronics. In justifying its change of direction, Math presented its case in the university's internal journal, *Shenda Tongxun*. In an unsigned article, the department argued that the major was set according to social demands; in other words, it was what the public wanted.[240] Overlaps between disciplines were natural and should not be considered a problem, in the department's view. Examples from famous Chinese universities were presented to booster the argument: the Department of Economic Information of People's University had been founded by a group who had studied math and programming; many of the teachers in Fudan's Management College came from mathematics; the Economic Information Department of Liaoning Finance and Economics University was founded by mathematicians, and so on. Management science departments do not conflict with economic management departments in the same university, the article argued, because the latter takes from the arts majors (which actually was not the case at SZU because Management took students from both tracks). In any case, the major was set up. *Benke* majors in Economic Information Management were "trained in software development, in management information systems, in decision support systems and in analysis systems and were trained to perform other management duties in various enterprises and economic management departments."[241] Graduates from the three-year *zhuanke* program, set up in the early 1990s, were trained to become "general data processing specialists who master basic computer software technology, are familiar with modern economic management theories and who can proficiently use computers to perform general data processing."

> *Economic Information Management*: C-language programming, data base structure, micro-computer theory and combined programming, control system, data base and application, information system analysis and design, planning, economic statistics, decision methods and applications, methods of computation.
>
> *Economic Information Management (zhuanke):* micro-economics, international finance and trade, linear planning and networking, principles of accounting, fundamentals of computer application, C-language and data base structure, DOS and analysis, connection data base, Foxbase software, introduction to MIS, economic forecasting technology.

The new math major seemed to be what the public (or at least some secondary school graduates) wanted. After the change in major, Math enrolled students with good exam scores which, although below the threshold for Architecture and most SZU business majors, were above the scores of Enterprise Management, Physics, Chemistry and Mechanical Engineering. Still, the department experienced an outflow of five students between 1988 and 1991, but this was an improvement over the mid-1980s when almost every student wanted to leave the department. In 1985, for example, only one secondary school student had chosen SZU Math as a choice of major. Only 48% of the 1989 entering class had selected SZU Math as their first choice. By 1991, when 20 students were recruited, four-fifths had selected Math for one of their selections (10 as first choice, 6 as second).[242] Students found the curriculum somewhat demanding and interesting. Satisfaction for 1993 Math graduates ranked fourth from the top, despite the department's higher than average fail rate. Forty percent of these students, more than in any other department, felt that their education was too practical, a fact that was especially ironic given the department's strong conviction towards practice and away from theory.

Given the responsibility of teaching all math courses at SZU, Math remained largely a teaching department, and annually it placed near the bottom in research output. This accounted for Math's slower promotion rates; in 1994 the teaching staff were of average age but their average rank was below the norm for SZU. The opportunities to do research were swamped by continuous teaching demands. Math teachers taught all science department students, who were required to take six hours weekly of Advanced Math during their freshmen year. Students in Economics, Management and Architecture were required to take a slightly different course for four hours weekly. In addition, in 1991 Math offered several side-courses, including one in cooperation with the Nanyou Training Center, located just off-campus, which were designed to help students pass the national adult education entrance exam (over 50% of the students in this course passed the exam, the highest such passing rate reported at SZU). In the mid-1990s Math offered various classes, including English language training. It opened up a *zhuanke* major in the early 1990s.

Despite heavy teaching loads, Math continued to be the poorest teaching department in terms of income. The teaching force was not stable, with about one-third of its teaching staff leaving for overseas study and others changing departments within the university. Regulations on work load favored math teachers, who were paid 130% more than those teaching regular courses without homework, but this additional income paled in comparison to what other teachers earned through side-businesses. Math's computer lab was inadequate (Its 20 AT-286s, one AT-386, and 10 PCs became out-dated soon after their purchase in 1991). Math's teachers received the lowest department dividends of any teaching unit. In the mid-1990s, side-businesses took on added importance; concerns over financial irregularity resulted in the removal of one teacher responsible for handling side-courses. To earn income the department joined up with a local communications company to develop software for managing phone calls. Other applied research included developing a management information system for a private company, a Chinese Internet platform, and an e-mail system for Shenzhen city. The SZU administration put in funds to upgrade laboratory equipment. The department's teaching lab by 1995 had 30 486-type computers, three 586s and a local area network. The research lab housed three 486s and four 386s.

Long teaching hours and teachers' general dissatisfaction with their low income negatively impacted the quality of teaching and learning. The SZU administration recognized the problem by 1992 when it reported the "shocking" fact that on a unified advanced math test for Guangdong, SZU had scored at the very bottom.[243] In March the following year, a teacher from Academic Affairs, along with a reporter from the university's radio station, examined math teaching in science and engineering departments. They reported that 60% of the students felt that math teachers failed to adequately correct homework, which they also believed was insufficient in quantity. Students complained about a lack of reference materials and teachers' lack of preparation. A summary of the report was circulated around campus via *SZU News in Brief*, with a promise by the Math Department's leaders to improve the situation.[244] Math, whose teachers had been auditing one another for two years, got the message and initiated additional reforms.[245] Results on unified tests improved over the following years, but even by 1996 performance was still considered poor.[246]

Math's role as a service department took on added importance as SZU prepared for the 1995 accreditation. From the early 1990s, SZU leaders had required the department to organize an annual school-wide advanced math tournament, one of about 30 academic contests that took place at SZU during every school year.[247] Teachers had also compiled a textbook of exam questions in advanced math. The year 1994 marked the start of a university-wide advanced math exam, in which students could participate in groups or as individuals.[248] That same year the university required that sciences track students, in order to graduate, pass a unified advanced math exam. By the fall of 1995, Math was in an excellent position to assist in the November accreditation by preparing students for possible testing by the accreditation review committee. Several groups of students were expected to receive tests, but it was not known who would be tested on what subjects. It was fairly certain, however, that math would be one of the subjects tested. The Math

Department was instructed by the university leadership to prepare all students for the possibility of being examined in advanced math. For their part, the entire math teaching staff started to prep science students several months in advance of the accreditation. The previous year's material was reviewed in three to four sessions per week, lasting 2½ hours each. Training classes were set up in the afternoons and evenings, during which sample questions and solutions were offered. Ten days before the scheduled accreditation review, SZU leaders were "informally" told which specific groups of students were to be tested. The school-wide math classes immediately stopped, and all focus was put on the second-year students in Applied Physics, the class that had been selected by the SEdC to take the advanced math exam. These students stopped all their other study and devoted full-time to preparing for the Advanced Math tests. Whether the intense preparation paid off is unknown; in any case, these students obtained an average score of 73.4 and a passing rate of 88.23%. For their part in the performance, Math teachers received bonuses for the students' good showing. And, of course, SZU passed the accreditation.

Mechanical Engineering

Mechanical Engineering (translated literally as Precision Machinery and Instrumentation) was part of the second group of academic departments, formed at SZU's first anniversary. Its first head, Zhao Yijun, had been recruited personally by his former teacher, Zhang Wei. Zhao also served as deputy head of the School Affairs Committee, representing science departments.

The department first recruited night school students in 1984 and offered a *benke* major, Precise Electronic Mechanics, the following year. By 1986 it had 180 students and was in the process of building four laboratories in the Science Building, which was completed in 1988. These labs covered a floor area of 1,029 m^2. The department was one of the first in China to offer a Computer Aided Design (CAD) course. It saw its larger role as serving SEZ industry both by training *rencai* and working directly with enterprises. In 1987 it set up training courses for a laser company and helped with installing and maintaining production systems in various companies. In cooperation with the Shenzhen Municipal Mechanics Co, it helped set up and jointly run the Precise Mechanical Manufacturing Co. In March 1986 this company together with Weili Welding Equipment Co., Ltd (Hong Kong) sponsored the Shenzhen International Welding Technology and Equipment Fair at SZU, with 100 participants from 20 provinces. The department encouraged its teachers to “convert research into teaching” and to allow seniors to participate in at least one research project. Teachers were permitted to retain some of the profit when their designs went into production. One type of research was preferred over others: small items that could bring quick “economic efficiency,” such as bicycle air valves and tennis racket stringing equipment.[249] Several SZU-run enterprises—the Shenying Mechanical Factory, Mechanical Mode and Materials Factory, Tianhong Machinery Factory and Reflective Materials Factory—related to the work of the department, but no formal ties existed between department and the enterprises.

SZU Mechanical Engineering purposely took an approach that defined the subject broadly, a path not followed at other Chinese universities. At a 1985 national teaching conference on mechanical engineering held at SZU, Professor Zhao was called upon to defend the direction his department took. Conference attendants joked that in calling its major precise electronic mechanics, SZU was misrepresenting itself—“selling dog’s meat while hanging out a goat’s head.” Zhao responded that SZU was not only selling dog’s meat but any meat the market demanded.[250] That conference attendees tried in vain to reach agreement on a precise definition of precise mechanical engineering, after which Zhao was more convinced than ever that his department had chosen the correct path. SZU was not training specialized *rencai* for the whole country as did inland universities; its target was Shenzhen employers. Over half of the mechanical engineering firms in Shenzhen had fewer than 100 employees, and they needed graduates with various skills. If SZU adopted the inland model of specialization, dire consequences would follow. Shenzhen employers would not accept its graduates, Zhao predicted. Students would flock from the department, teachers would quit, and the department’s foundation would collapse.

The department’s early curriculum looked as follows: Freshmen took foundation courses. From the second year, students followed one of two directions—mechanics or mechanical electronics. In students’ final year, courses were even more related to jobs, in areas like industrial robotics, modular design, optical equipment and manufacturing automation. Optional offerings included enterprise management and industrial fine arts for packaging design. Required courses were of three types, reflecting the three emphases of the department: production, design and testing.

- precise mechanics production, precise special manufacturing and automation theory;
- precise mechanical design, including spare parts optimal design, CAD, reliable technique foundation, molding, industrial robots; and
- testing meters design, micro-computer theory and application, geometric measuring, physical measuring, testing meters, signal handling, optical theory and application.

In 1988 the department, still worried that its graduates were not what the SEZ needed, started to stress application even more strongly. It suggested offering majors such as auto repair and foreign trade of electrical appliances and machines. With Professor Zhao's retirement in 1989, the department's deputy head was elevated as first leader. In the politically charged climate of the early 1990s, Mechanical Engineering devoted time to moral education. Students were sent on Lei Feng-inspired volunteer missions to serve the public, for example to fix bicycles or cut hair. The department established ties with the China Petro-chemical Corporation to research metal welding and jewelry processing. The department, however, did not have a close relationship with SZU's New Energy Research Institute, the university's first institute that received municipal approval (in 1984). This institute employed its own mechanical engineers. In 1992 SZU's Experimental General Factory, the administrative unit that oversaw the running of SZU-run enterprises, sought Hong Kong investment to build the Precision Mechanical Research Institute, with ¥2 million (US $360,000) of registered capital. This plan was never effected.

In 1991 the name of the *benke* major was changed from Precise Electronic Mechanics to Mechanical Electrical Engineering to more accurately reflect the nature of the subject. Precise equipment majors exist in some of China's leading engineering schools, but their curriculum was much different from that at SZU. Although the department opened another *benke* major, Production Process Automation, and began offering a *zhuanke* in Measurement and Control Technology, it faced a 45% short-fall of teachers. Only 10 of the 18 fixed staff in 1991 were working teachers. Some had gone abroad; others were on long-term sick leave, maternity leave, or sabbatical. Perhaps for this reason, Mechanical Engineering limited itself to teaching regular students in *benke*, *zhuanke* or Adult Education programs. It offered no non-certificate programs (in sharp contrast with Management and Foreign Language, for example). Research funding helped to keep the department afloat financially, including ¥400,000 (US $75,000) in funds for projects with

China's Ministry of Petro-chemistry and various companies. It applied to SZU leaders to set up an academic research institute, a request that was apparently not favorably acted upon.[251] The university, however, provided considerable funding to upgrade the department's labs. The department's leaders changed again in 1991. The new team faced a problem common to most SZU academic units: teachers' lack of motivation for academic research. Teaching did not generate much side-income and the university was niggardly in terms of providing equipment and investment funds. The department itself was able to bring in ten outside research projects, such as one to develop computer control software for a Hong Kong company. This somewhat ameliorated the financial crisis. The department continued to emphasize politics, in fact choosing certain freshmen "to groom for Party membership."[252]

Another leadership change occurred in 1994 with the appointment of Zhu Qing, a Qinghua graduate and returned overseas student who had received a Ph.D. from the University of Colorado. Zhu, a so-called second generation SZU scholar, had published several articles in refereed academic journals in the West. Equally important, he was the personification of political correctness, having patriotically returned to China at the time of Tiananmen. His academic and political credentials caught the eye of SZU leaders and he was catapulted onto the fast track for advancement. He was rewarded in 1993 by being named branch Party secretary and deputy department head, and then elevated the next year so he held both key leadership positions. In 1994 on SZU's recommendation, Shenzhen named him as an excellent Party member at the city level. The same year his department was cited as an advanced work-unit at the school level.

Under Zhu's leadership, the department changed its name from Precision Machinery and Instrumentation to Control and Mechanical Engineering, much for the same reason that the major's name had been changed several years earlier. A *zhuanke* major in Automobile Testing and Repair was set up. According to the 1995 evaluation, the Mechanical Engineering curriculum failed to offer all the courses listed in the SEdC catalog for majors, lacking several from the list. Nevertheless, majors in Mechanical and Electronics Engineering were trained as "technical engineers with fundamental theories, basic knowledge and basic skills of mechanical engineering and electronic engineering, who can combine electronics with mechanics and can design, manufacture, control, test, and research products and systems that combine mechanics and electronics."[253] The Industrial Automation major gave students knowledge in "electricity, electronics, automatic control, information processing, and automatic testing, to train them to make use of modern control theories, information processing technology, and computer control technology for industrial design and installation, and enable them to manage and undertake research in automated production systems." The three-year *zhuanke* program in Automobile Testing and Maintenance trained "specialists to perform auto testing analysis, maintenance and management." The curricula for majors follows:

> *Mechanical and Electronic Engineering:* project design, physics of strength and power, mechanical design, circuit and electronic technology, principles of automatic control, principles and application of macro-computers, condenser, condenser and automatic testing technology, digitally controlled mechanical workshop, optimally designed automation, mechanical and electronic conveyance and control, CAE/CAM, robot technology.
>
> *Industrial Automation*: theories of circuits, electronic technology, modern control theories, principles and application of micro-computers, fundamentals of software engineering, condenser and automatic testing technology, optic and electric testing technology, computer control technology, signals and systems, conveyance and control.
>
> *Automobile Testing and Maintenance* (*zhuanke*): project design, physics of strength and power, electrical and electronic technology, fundamentals of mechanical manufacturing, fundamentals of mechanical designing, liquid pressure and air-movement technology, structure of automobiles, theories of automobiles, principles of generators, auto appliances, functional studies of automobiles, functional testing of automobiles, diagnosis of auto breakdown, automobile maintenance project.

Relatively low in research output among academic departments, the faculty members of Mechanical Engineering started to take on more international travel and publishing in the 1990s. The university listed mechanical/electrical engineering as one of its components in a 1995 strategy to develop science and technology. The department was to be part of a team that worked on artificial nerve networks, super-precise measurement, programmed control devices, intelligent meters, automobile testing and control, comprehensive medical equipment and new mechanical lubricants. With a ¥900,000 (US $110,000) grant from Shenzhen, the department built a control engineering lab, and its other labs passed provincial certification. Zhu advocated the type of A/V technology he had experienced in the U.S.; the department's Electrical Electronics course was deemed a school-level A/V course in 1994. The department also hoped to use students as research assistants. The second-year Mechanical and Electronic Engineering majors were examined in physics as part of the 1995 accreditation. Overall, the class passed and one student was singled out for excellence.

Much of Mechanical Engineering's focus has been on contract work with state and private enterprises. Although students were not altogether neglected, they were not the focus of the department either. This inattention probably did not disappoint students, who in the 1993 survey ranked high in individualism. Students in the department were not generally satisfied, ranking fourth from the bottom in the graduates survey. They placed second lowest in terms of their use of skills and talents on the job and slightly below average in terms of use of field of study. Not a single graduate in 1993 used English on the job, despite the department's focus on second-language study. In 1987 it had proposed increasing English study for non-majors from two to three years, and in the same year it had been entrusted by the Mechanical Engineers Association to give English training for those involved in trading mechanical equipment.

The department experienced a net outflow of 21 students in the *benke* major from 1988-1991. It tied with Architecture as having the highest student fail rate (31%). All in all, it was neither an easy nor prestigious major. Every year from 1991-1995, it placed second or third from the bottom among sciences track *benke* majors, below Physics but above Chemistry. Only 34% of the 1989 freshmen had selected SZU Mechanical Engineering as their first choice. Female students, who represented about one-third of SZU undergraduates, were rare in Mechanical Engineering. In 1993, they accounted for only 5% of the enrollees in the *zhuanke* program, and 19% and 9% among *benke* entrants that year in the Automation and Electronic Precision Machinery majors, respectively. In contrast, 31% of the faculty were women. Overall, the teachers were fewer in number than in the average teaching department and were higher in age and professional rank (in the latter the department ranked second highest in 1994).

Physical Education

All levels of schooling in China attempt to mold Three Good students—those who excel in the intellectual, moral, and physical aspects of education. At SZU physical education started at the earliest levels. SZU's kindergarten, which schooled the toddlers and pre-school children of university staff, held annual “tiny” (*xiao xiao*) sports meets, which were attended by school leaders.[254]

In some ways, however, Physical Education (PE) did not resemble the other academic departments at SZU. PE staff placed less emphasis on research and scholarship, factors that were given more weight in academic units at promotion time. PE did not offer a major; it was entirely a service unit, like the Computer Center, which taught students from other departments. Yet, unlike support units such as the Library and Audio/Visual Center, PE was listed in SZU publications not as a service unit, but as a teaching department, although always placed at the end of each list.[255] In the *1994 Yearbook,* for example, wallet-sized ID photographs (against the traditional red backdrop) of all teaching staff were placed in the usual order by department, arts followed by sciences, with PE at the end.[256] Photos of teachers from PE were included, although staff of the Computer Center, A/V and Library were not. As a support unit, PE was responsible for teaching all students their required physical education classes, for organizing sports contests and maintaining sports facilities, a task undertaken jointly with the General Affairs Office.

The PE Department itself was not formally established until December 1985 when SZU was already two years old. The delay is attributable to the fact that the university lacked sports facilities in its early years. PE classes were held even at the temporary downtown campus, which offered little more than the equivalent of a primary school play-yard. At that time most sports and physical conditioning occurred outside an organized framework. The new campus by 1987 provided almost 15,000 m^2 in sports fields as well as a 25-meter swimming pool. A 30,000 m^2 outdoor sports stadium was finished in 1991, and the ¥13 (US $1.5) million indoor Yuanping Sports Center was completed by 1994. The latter, measuring 7,900 m^2, was assisted by a HK $10 (US $1.2) million donation from Hong Kong entrepreneur Yu Yuanping. Initial plans had called for a modest ¥3-million structure of only 4,000 m^2, but Yu’s donation made a larger facility possible.

In 1986 about 200 students belonged to the Recreation and Sports Association, which organized team competitions. The university volleyball team won second place in a city tournament. Altogether, about 40 athletic teams and 12 sports clubs in 1987 were involved in activities that included traditional sports as well as body-building and winter swimming. Whereas in SZU’s early years students took responsibility for their own physical education, in later years university authorities organized students. Sports events within the campus and competitions with teams from outside SZU were placed under the auspices of PE, not student organizations. From 1990, students who wanted to organize their own sporting events needed various approvals, including one from the Propaganda Office of the SZU Party Committee, whose permission was needed for the posting of notices. Student events were almost always placed under the jurisdiction of departmental Party branches and Youth League branches, who could process the necessary paperwork with relative ease. Sports and extra-curricular activities were recommended by the post-Tiananmen administration as a major way for political tutors to manage students.[257] Indeed, for 1991 sports appeared under the rubric of "ideological education" in the SZU CCP Work-plan. From 19 April 1991 students were required to perform early morning calisthenics three times a week at 7:15 a.m. in groups divided by major, class and year. The rules propagated the Three Fixed Aspects of exercises: at a fixed time, at a fixed location, and each student in a fixed place in line, so he or she could be accounted for. The policy had been mandated by SZU leaders with little student input; the responsibility for implementation had fallen upon PE as the academic unit most responsible for student physical exercise.[258] Every work-unit was instructed to give full publicity to the regulation and make it known to all.[259] Lights-out was set at 11 p.m., and the wake-up calls over the public address system commenced at 7 a.m. To give PE some enforcement power, the department was allowed to factor student's morning exercise performances into their grades. A failure in a PE course meant no bachelors degree.

Faculty sporting events in the 1990s continued to be sponsored by SZU's official Work Union, which was run by a committee of teachers representing departments but was under the formal control of the university (one of Vice-president Zheng's many responsibilities). Such an event was a multi-day affair, involving in 1991, for example, 38 events, 25 sub work-units, and over 360 participants.

PE Reform

SZU's system of teaching PE never conformed with that used in the mainstream of Chinese higher education. In 1979 the Ministry of Education issued a teaching plan for all universities to follow. It was very complex and included 18 items which were basically a repetition of secondary school PE classes. All the items had to be finished within two years, the equivalent of 140 hours of instruction. From the start SZU leaders did not think this system would be suitable for the new experimental university.[260] Instead, the four PE teachers who taught in 1983 set up four courses, according to student interests and teachers' strengths: football (soccer), badminton, ping-pong, and martial arts. Each of these sports, along with roller-skating, had an associated sports club. When SZU moved to the new campus, four additional courses were opened: basketball, volleyball, body-building, and gymnastics. In all the classes students were required to acquire the Four Abilities: able to play, able to understand the game, able to referee, and able to organize games.

The traditional PE teaching plan for most Chinese universities offered PE only in a student's first two years. As the 1983 freshmen entered their junior year in 1985, SZU set up a four-year curriculum that fit into SZU's academic structure. The PE courses were assigned credits and considered restricted-optional in nature. Passing them was a requirement for scholarships and graduation. By 1986 the first-year course was entitled Physical Education Foundation and sought to evaluate students comprehensively, rather than just on the basis of test scores (e.g., number of chin-ups, speed of running 100 meters, etc.). Students in their second and third years could choose courses in nine sports: basketball, volleyball, baseball, football, swimming, gymnastics, martial arts, body-building, and ping-pong. The way of testing students in these courses was changed in 1987 from pure skill tests to exams that were more comprehensive, assessing theoretical knowledge (20%), skills (40%), physical condition (30%) and every-day sports participation (10%). These classes usually involved scrimmages or organized competitions. Elimination tournaments took place at the end of the term. Students generally appreciated competitive team sports as a substitute for drills, practice and lectures. One teacher in 1994 surveyed his football students on ways to improve the course. Such an endeavor to get student feedback was rare at SZU; the results were presented in a two-page article in the university's internal journal.[261]

The fourth year offered general sports, during which time students' physical abilities and conditions were assessed in a so-called "target" test, which included five items: 1000 meter run (800 for women), standing jump, chin up/sit-ups (men/women), 50 meter run, and a medicine ball toss. Students had taken a similar test their first year (passing rate for freshmen and seniors in 1989 was 89%).[262] Seniors did not have to attend PE classes, but they had to meet the "targets," which in one year included swimming a pool length, in order to graduate. This rule was often ignored by relenting PE teachers; consequently, SZU's senior PE pass-rate was above 99% for the classes that graduated 1989-1991. Regulations precluded any student, even those who competed for school teams, from being exempt from PE courses (although teachers tended to be lenient towards star athletes in this regard). Because of their tight schedules, students were restricted to taking PE at times that did not conflict with their required courses. This meant that they almost always took PE classes with their academic classmates. Classes were divided by sex; because gender was skewed by major, some majors had to be combined, and inevitably clusters of students developed. (Chinese and FLD males made up a single class; females from several engineering departments were consolidated). Still, PE offered one of the few opportunities for students to meet their peers from outside their major.

The entire PE system was overhauled from the early 1990s as PE took on a more organized and serious air. Reform was encouraged by a key SEdC 1992 document on physical education. This document, with policies that were more flexible but just as demanding as its 1979 predecessor, encouraged students to develop sports hobbies in their own time. In response, regulations promulgated by SZU in 1993 for the purpose of improving PE teaching defined a dozen responsibilities for PE teachers. Department staffing was to be based on overall student population; the teacher-student ratio for PE was set at 1:150. All the department's teachers were required to submit teaching plans, a procedure followed for several years in other academic departments. PE, like other academic units, was permitted to choose a course for SZU key designation. Thus, tennis appears in the list along side SEZ Economics, Pascal Programming and others as a university key course, presumably having passed the same criteria for selection that the other designated courses had faced. In terms of side-businesses, PE for accounting purposes was cast in the service-provider group that included the Library, Computer Center and A/V center. As such it was permitted to retain 70% of all income earned by side-businesses (e.g., swimming pool and sports center entrance fees and equipment rental) with the remainder remitted to the university.

An inspection tour by provincial authorities in 1991 generated praise for the department. Students who had taken the unified provincial test on basic physical education knowledge had achieved an average score of 75.9.[263] Several teachers, however, were criticized for not devoting most of their energy to teaching.[264] Academic research became a priority; staff presented 11 papers at a 1991 PE conference for universities located in eastern Guangdong, and in the same year, the department was listed as an experimental unit for physical education. In 1994 the leader who had overseen PE since its inception was transferred to run the Personnel Office, and PE's new leadership gave the department an even more academic air. Audio/visual teaching was encouraged. Questions from 52 test papers for 13 PE courses were input into the computer. Awards were given for outstanding teachers.

Guangdong authorities were pleased with SZU's reforms in PE, and in the summer 1993 two leaders from the PE unit of the SEdC visited campus. They agreed that SZU could undertake a PE experiment to organize the PE curriculum around specific sports and initiate what was to be called the "sports club" system. Experiments and trials are a common practice in Chinese educational reform. In areas such as job allocation, tuition, and curriculum reform, the SEdC has commissioned specific institutions to try out new strategies. If these experiments are deemed successful, they are turned into state policy and are implemented nationwide. This marked the first time in SZU's history that any of the university's many reforms had been officially endorsed as a state-level experiment. In response, the university issued detailed regulations in May 1994. The experimental club system worked like this: juniors and seniors would no longer take classes. Instead they would receive PE credits for participating in sports activities organized by sanctioned campus sporting clubs, one hour per week for one credit. These activities were not restricted to class times and could occur on the weekends or evenings. Teams were encouraged to compete at the city, college or provincial level. These clubs were to be organized by students, and each was assigned a tutor from among the PE staff. These tutors were given all-inclusive (*baogan*) responsibilities for planning the club, drafting its constitution, making progress reports, administering technical tests and giving members the "target" tests needed for graduation. Students took out club memberships and had to pay membership dues. Students were to receive academic credits only if they participated up to a certain standard. Also starting in 1994, freshmen no longer took the basic PE foundation course. Rather, they along with second-year students would take a specific sports class (e.g., tennis) for two-hours/credits a week. These reforms were intended to take advantage of students' enthusiasm for competition, address the limits of class teaching, and develop students' interest in sports—an interest they could carry with them after graduation.[265] In reality, only a few junior or senior students participated in the club system; most upperclassmen/women opted out of sports altogether, but ensured that all the necessary forms were properly completed and chopped so that they could receive PE credit.

Extracurricular sports at SZU involved a series of annual competitions, such as track and field meets (usually in November during the dry system) and swimming races (in June). Not surprisingly, the largest departments, IFT, Economics, Management, and Electronics and Civil Engineering, in that order, took the most medals. There was no handicapping that might have leveled out the advantages of size that favored the large departments. In contrast, a handicapping of sorts existed in staff events. From 1992 administrative offices, enterprises and the GAO sub-units were combined to make three single teams. They competed against the academic departments. Competitions were usually won by the GAO team (which included the buildings and grounds crew), followed by the Administrative team and Architecture. These annual events saw 600 entrants from staff and 700 from students.[266]

A few students and teachers also participated in national, provincial or city level sports events. Students who won at the municipal level or above in 1987 earned ¥300 (US $81) for first prize, ¥100 for second and ¥80 for third.[267] Breaking a record at the city level earned the athlete an additional ¥250. Awards for placing first, second or third in such a contest were modified in 1988 so that winners earned ¥200, ¥150, and ¥100.[268] Bigger awards went to winners at provincial level contests: ¥300- ¥80 for first-sixth place winners. By the early 1990s, as SZU had expanded, members of the campus community began to produce a better showing in city events. In the third Shenzhen all-city sports meet (1990), SZU athletes won nine gold, 15 silver and 20 bronze metals. They placed first in track and field, second in tennis and third in swimming; altogether they broke nine city records. Students in 1990 who were champions in school sports meets or placed in the top three in city competitions automatically obtained a "single item scholarship," part of a class of awards that were limited to being won by no more than 5% of the student population.[269] The SZU soccer team participated annually in the Governor's Cup, which was initiated in 1988, placing as high as third in both 1991 and 1992. In 1992, SZU hosted a provincial-level university sports meet, with 70 participants. Over 1,300 students and teachers participated in the tenth annual track and field meet in 1995, in which 15 school records were broken.

To get students in shape for the November 1995 accreditation, PE eliminated entrance fees to all sports facilities. Until then, student fees for the sports center and swimming pool were about ¥.50 (US 6›) per entrance; tennis courts rented for ¥10 (US $1.20) per hour. In the months prior to the accreditation, students were encouraged to rise early and take exercise. In its self-evaluation, PE noticed that it lacked documents required by the SEdC; it immediately compiled the documents. Teachers continued to publish, including three textbooks and seven articles in 1995. SZU won the bid to host the 1999 Guangdong universities sports meet, and for all its efforts that year, PE CCP branch was designated an advanced Party organization.

Physics

When it began, Physics resembled a teaching unit much less than other departments. It enrolled fewer *benke* students (only about 25 per year), and its teachers engaged in relatively more research than their colleagues in other disciplines. The department did not face a public demand for side-courses, as was the case with the business departments and Foreign Language. Although College Physics was offered in Architecture and the Engineering departments, Physics was not overwhelmed with the task of being a service department (like FLD, Chinese or Math). Nor did the department choose to find a niche in adult higher education, as did Chinese, Chemistry and Law. It first offered an adult education certificate course in Electronic Metering Technology in 1987 and enrolled its first full-time *zhuanke* students in Measuring and Control in 1991. From 1985-88 the teachers of the department were content with doing research and working in the affiliated units, notably the United Research Institute of Applied Nuclear Technology and the Communications Technology Research Institute, two of the nine research institutes with fixed staff in 1991.[270]

The department had originally developed a five-year curriculum, but this was adjusted to four years as part of a university-wide reform. Physics varied the foci of majors between optical fiber communications and applied nuclear technology with the latter being canceled in the 1990s. By 1996 its *benke* major in Optical Electronic Technology was designed to produce "high caliber technical engineers who can master basic theories and technologies in optics and electronics with solid foundations in math, physics, computers and foreign language and who can undertake research, manufacturing and testing of optics, optic electronic components and software."[271] The *zhuanke* program in Computer Testing and Quality Control was intended to "train high quality practical persons with solid, practical basic knowledge, proficient lab skills, modern testing skills of industrial products and who have mastered quality management and quality control methods of modern international enterprises."

> *Optical Electronic Technology*: principles of lasers, laser components and technology, optical electronics display technology, optical conveyance technology, optical information processing and storage technology, optical picturing, optical electronic transistor components, optical fibre communication systems, optical electronic testing and signal processing.
>
> *Computer Testing and Quality Control (zhuanke):* fundamentals of applied physics, digital circuits, simulated circuits, micro-computer systems and applications, principles of micro-computer, application of single chip machines, optical technologies, condenser technologies, electronic measuring, testing technologies for industrial and agricultural products, sample testing and analysis, quality control projects, introduction to ISO-9000, standardization of industrial products, enterprise automation and management systems, marketing.

In 1988 the department changed its name from Applied Physics to Optical and Electronic Technology Engineering. According to Deng Feifan, the chair professor of Physics, who also served as chair of the Committee of Professors:[272]

> Generally, applied physics is not a bad name. It covers all sorts of things, including optical and electrical technology. But the traditional opinion of society is that physics grads are not suitable for work in production and technology. Thus, very few students choose to enter the Physics Department. Many enrolled students ask for transfer. Most students and teachers approved of the name change; a minority disapproved. Some senior students even asked to graduate with 'applied physics' on their degree.

In fact, only 44% of the *benke* students who entered Physics in 1989 had selected the department as their first choice. For this statistic, Physics was at the bottom of all SZU departments. Physics also lost students to other departments and through emigration: a net outflow of seven students from 1988-1991. Professor Deng's analysis notwithstanding, Physics from 1991-1995 attracted higher scoring students than either Mechanical Engineering or Chemistry. It is not surprising that these students—more than half of whom had not wanted to study Physics in the first place—did not find jobs that related to their field of study. Physics graduates of 1993 reported that they seldom used in the work place what they had learned in their discipline; in this regard they ranked slightly above only Chemistry. They also reported the lowest on-the-job use of their skills and talents of any department's students. One Physics student interviewed in 1994 took a fatalistic view:

> Sure, we won't use physics in our jobs. But studying physics is a good intellectual experience. We enjoy lab work.

Whether this student was actually speaking for his classmates is unknown, but 60% of the Physics graduating seniors on the 1993 survey considered their classmates "intellectuals," second highest to Civil Engineering. Student physicists also shared with their civil engineer peers less an infatuation with materialism than did other students, as measured by the importance attributed to money as an aspect of employment. The survey results suggested that Physics and Civil Engineering students were a breed apart from their classmates, especially those in business majors.

It is impossible to assess whether Physics students were more intellectually curious than their university mates, but the department placed much emphasis on creativity. Physics was the only academic department to use the term "creativity" in its description on departments' 1996 homepages, defining its *raison d'être* to be "to train high class persons with physics thinking and creativity to face high technology."[273] Because Physics was a relatively small and personal department, students and teachers in its first years were closely bound; they shared a mutual respect and were not as alienated from one another as students in the massive and impersonal departments. In this regard, Professor Deng's report edifies. In the *1988 Yearbook*, it stood out alone as the departmental report that stated a concern for students. Few departments in reports for that year referred to students at all; those that did mention students referred to them as mere teaching objects or as potential human resources who can contribute to the zone's economy. But Physics students even influenced the curriculum. At the students' request, according to Deng, Physics offered in 1988 a night course on Statistical Physics. Deng peppered his narrative with *xue sheng* (students). In discussing study atmosphere, he wrote:

> Seniors say: 'We are graduating. However, our stomachs [minds] are empty, with no knowledge. How can we work in the future.' So seniors cherish their last year.

Departmental management changed in 1989 with the appointment of Wang Jiansheng as head. The new leader continued the departmental tradition of placing emphasis on students, although Wang's 1990 report differed from his predecessor's in terms of emphasizing political concerns. Rectification resulted in increased class attendance. Wang wrote:

> Students even raised questions in class and finished homework on time. In the evenings they go to library earlier to reserve seats. Unlike in the past, students without being told, redo the experiments if needed. Some do experiments two or three times and suggest how to improve their work. Student cadres dare to take the lead and organize collective activities, sports meets, arts festival, and dorm cleaning. The Party branch organized Party study group, half of whom participated. Many apply to join the Party and actively took part in Saturday compulsory labor.

The department's emphasis on English has been continual. Science and technology English was offered so students could translate and write in English. Teachers were encouraged to write chapter headings on the blackboard in English and to pronounce special terms in English. From the early 1990s the university began to emphasize the overall importance of College Physics, one of several key courses highlighted in the 1991-1992 work-plan and selected to receive special funding.[274]

The department's name reverted back to Applied Physics in September 1991. During the rectification period, bickering and in-fighting—or in Wang's words *feng feng yu yu* (strong winds and heavy rains)—characterized Physics (as it did in many other departments).[275] But, unlike in the other units that were rife with political intrigues, Physics was distinguished by a higher level of civility and fewer personality clashes. While describing the times as "not peaceful, bitter-happy," Wang in his 1992 report noted that "achievements cannot be separated from what was done by the former head." This praising of a former leader was singular in SZU's history; nowhere else in any yearbook had such a positive assessment been offered of a predecessor. Most comments in yearbooks about former leaders served to cast blame or to try to explain the sorry state of affairs that the new leaders had themselves inherited. The debates in Physics, unlike those in other units, were academic in nature. Discussions might at times be heated but they were not *ad hominem* as they were elsewhere. Rumor generation and behind-the-back slander were rare in this single department. In his 1991 report Wang summarized the debate in physics:[276]

> The key concern in curriculum setting is whether we should continue to offer the traditional mechanical courses or change them to theoretical physics. Should we have clear-cut or vague major directions; should courses cover a broader spectrum of knowledge? Compared with inland universities, Hong Kong University and Chinese University of Hong Kong, lab class hours at SZU are limited. Those schools are much more advanced than SZU in

> graduation thesis topics. How do we improve, given SZU's current conditions?

Teachers and staff in Physics had numerous discussions over the teaching plan. Problems with students and teachers emerged:

> SZU's physics students have had a low attendance rate and experienced a poor study atmosphere. The Physics Party branch has corrected this by having tutors patiently talk with students. Teachers keep attendance records, and we stop the basic scholarship for students who are too often absent. The situation has improved. Students now ask for leave when sick. A few teachers are sometimes late for class or leave early. There are very few teaching accidents like willful canceling or changing of classes.

Post-Tiananmen student anomie did not escape Physics. The students referred to in the above passage included those who graduated in 1993, the subjects of my survey. These Physics seniors reported their dissatisfaction with their education, slightly below average for departments. It is doubtful, however, that rectification and a renewed interest in student discipline affected student attitudes. The Physics Department had always been strict with students. In 1987, for example, three students with poor performances were persuaded to transfer to other departments and another was put on academic probation.

Physics was a small department, with only one-eighth as many teachers as departments in inland universities, even smaller than the staff size of a physics teaching-research office in those institutions. Its 16 teachers in 1991 handled over 30 in-plan courses. As a result, teachers were so busy teaching their own courses that there was little dialog between teachers, according to Wang. Until 1992 SZU Physics did not even have a teaching-research office to undertake research on teaching. As the department expanded and the demand in other departments for College Physics increased, Physics teachers started to experience the high work loads that their colleagues in other disciplines had faced for several years. These problems were present in almost all SZU departments, but Physics (perhaps because it had been relatively isolated and was a late-comer to the situation) alone discussed them so forthrightly in official reports. Discussions, however, did not lead to solutions. Wang had identified the problems, but he could not come up with answers. "We are waiting for the next group of leaders to solve the problems," he wrote. Wang's wish to leave administration and return to teaching was not granted by the Wei-Wu team, which had also appointed Wang to head the

Nuclear Institute. Wang remained in his positions until 1994, at which time Cai Delin appointed a new department head as well as a new director of the Nuclear Institute.

In terms of management, Physics was unique. In 1994-95 30% of the teachers (6 of 20) were or had been departmental administrators, either then or in previous years. Also, unlike in many departments, the Party secretary was a member of the teaching staff. Since 1989 the pattern of leadership at SZU usually separated Party and administration, thus creating the dual-track within a department. From 1993 most Party secretaries in departments were full-time positions. But, in Physics, from 1992-95 there was no full-time Party secretary. Instead, a departmental teacher served as CCP secretary, while also holding one of the posts of deputy department head. The single-track worked in Physics; the department was one of the seven academic units named advanced Party organizations in 1995.

The overall leadership pattern at SZU almost always involved the total removal of former leaders from their work-units, either through voluntary or forced retirement or forced transfer. In Physics' case, however, the former head and deputy head in 1994 stayed with the department, thereby providing a degree of continuity. Their continuing presence also forced a level of transparency upon the new leaders. Their proximity served as a disincentive which kept the new leaders from issuing the usual explanation for departmental problems: "it's the fault of the former leaders." (New leadership was less inclined to blame their predecessors when the latter are within hearing range!) Instead of venting excuses and recriminations, the new leadership of Physics focused on the future. It set the goal of obtaining the right to offer

Table 4.18: Test results, 1995 SEdC accreditation tests results[277]

test	class tested	average score	% passing rate	number of students scoring over 85
advanced math	1994 Physics	73.4	88.2	6
college physics	1993 Mechanical Engineering	-	-	1
college physics	1994 Electronics (radio technology)	-	90.6	9
college physics	both classes together	69.4	79.1	10
accounting	1993 Int'l. Finance	61.7	68.2	1

masters degrees in optical science. In 1994 the department undertook this objective jointly with the A/V research institute, the Reflective Materials Institute and the newly established Optical Engineering Research Institute.[278]

Physics management, along with SZU leaders, was concerned about the SEdC accreditation in 1995. The university gave the department ¥1.2 million (US $144,000) for improving its laboratory equipment, and the college physics lab passed a provincial evaluation. The labs were a source of departmental pride, prompting the head to boast that a SZU lab could conduct 26 experiments simultaneously, while a comparable lab at Qinghua University was limited to 16.[279] Physics lacked some of the courses listed in the SEdC majors catalog, but their major worry involved the testing of students. All SZU students who studied physics were prepped and primed for possible exams, and indeed physics was the major area that was tested. The 1994 Applied Physics majors were tested on advanced math; the 1994 Electronics majors and 1993 Mechanical Engineering majors were tested on college physics. Physics experiments of 1994 Physics majors were also examined. The test results appear in Table 4.18, previous page.

Research

In general, most research funds to Chinese universities involve the sciences, not the arts. Science departments received all of SZU’s state-level grants, most provincial and over half of city-funded projects (SZU-funded research tended to go for arts). Given teaching requirements that were less excessive than in other departments, Physics teachers were able to stress research. By the end of 1988 the department operated five laboratories with equipment worth ¥998,000 (US $270,000). Nine research projects undertaken in 1995 brought in ¥250,000 (US $30,000) worth of grants. Funding arrived from various sources, including loans and state-level grants, as well as funds from state-run companies and municipal bureaux. Teachers worked with various campus work-units, including the Joint Institute of Applied Nuclear Technology and the Reflective Materials Institute. No field that was the exclusive domain of physics, however, was included among the research fields that SZU would stress in future years.

Reflective Materials Institute

Founded in 1986, this institute served as the research and development arm of the SZU-run enterprise, the Reflective Materials Factory. It employed five full-time and seven part-time researchers. Closely associated with both the Physics faculty and the factory, the institute was in a good position to combine teaching, research and production. The factory, which had what amounted to a full-page advertisement in the *1986 Yearbook*, developed its own products and produced reflective signs for China's first super-highway, Hu Jia expressway. Its 1988 output was valued at ¥2.5 (US $680,000) million, with a gross profit of ¥750,000 (US $200,000). In 1988 it formed joint ventures with several Hong Kong companies which invested in equipment. Of the 81 factory personnel, only 10% were part of SZU's fixed staff quota. Unable to provide benefits equivalent to those given SZU fixed staff, the factory raised worker salaries by 20% in 1988 and built a 2,000 m^2 staff dormitory. Eager to enter the export business, the factory obtained several Chinese patents and passed state-level evaluations designed to ensure compliance with international standards.

As an endeavor that had been set up under Luo Zhengqi, Reflective Materials received little enthusiasm from the post-Tiananmen administration. In 1991, the Reflective Materials Institute was not included on the list of five backbone research units. The Reflective Materials Factory was mentioned in the *1991 Yearbook* in several items, about its passing several unspecified evaluations, the catching of a man who stole ¥170,000 (US $31,000) from its accounts, SZU's determination to measure its fixed assets, and with regards to its difficulty in replaying loans. For that year, in a bit of historical revisionism, SZU's Academic Research Office did not list Reflective Materials as one of SZU's original institutes.[280] The Enterprise Management Office, in its 1991 report, stated that that the factory had been losing money since its establishment. In 1993, however, under guidance from the Enterprise Management Office, the factory turned itself around. Production was valued at ¥30 (US $5.2) million, and the factory was able to remit funds to SZU. With Cai Delin's appointment as president, criticism of the factory stopped as suddenly as it had begun, and it was again praised as a high-tech campus enterprise. The municipal government in 1994 endowed the factory with the "new and high tech enterprise" label, one of three campus units to receive the honor.[281] The factory's products received numerous awards and state-level grants. It began to specialize in anti-counterfeit labels that used hologram technology. In 1994 the university came to the factory's defense when it received much negative publicity after it had been caught producing counterfeit Microsoft trademark holograms.[282] This did not deter business; the notoriety may have in fact helped increase sales. In 1994 it won the bid to manufacture 10 million industrial and commercial labels for China's Industrial/commercial Administration Bureau.

Joint Institute of Applied Nuclear Technology

Founded by the Shenzhen municipal government, this institute was engaged in the research and development of new applied nuclear technology in providing technical services, consultation and training courses. Its 800 m^2 of labs were managed under international guidelines: ISO/IEC 25 (it failed to gain ISO-9000 certification in 1993). The Chinese Commodity Inspection Bureau certified the institute as a quality inspection station for exports and imports, and the municipal government designated the unit in 1994 as one of Shenzhen's excellent teaching units. Staff from the institute also qualified to serve as expert witnesses in arbitration cases involving commodity quality. Its inspection methods and test techniques covered human body tissues, foodstuffs, geological samples, metals, water, petroleum, pharmaceuticals, chemical products, and building materials.

The 11-person institute operated its own mini nuclear reactor, which five certified operators were allowed to run in 1993 (up from two the previous year). The reactor was described as follows on the institute's homepage:[283]

> It is a very small reactor, emits very little radiation and could not have a nuclear accident like a nuclear power station. If run properly, it can operate safely for more than 30 years. The reactor can provide high sensitivity testing of neutrons and detect 72 elements of the periodic table. The reactor can make more than 40 man-made elements, that are used in medicine, industry and agriculture. As a teaching tool, the reactor can be widely used in physics, environmental topics, earth, life sciences topics, archaeology, core science, industrial application topics, commodity inspection and quality inspection.

After visits by a nine-person delegation from the Nuclear Industry Ministry in April 1986 and by a contingent from the Chinese National Atomic Energy Research Institute and the Nuclear Reactor Institute in October, permission was given for SZU to construct what was then described as the only commercial mini nuclear reactor in Southeast Asia. Equipment was acquired by the end of 1988, and the reactor was on-line by the end of 1989. Security, erosion, short-circuiting, and the prevention of untreated waste water disposal and radiation leaks have all been issues with which reactor staff have dealt.

To distinguish the institute from similar entities such as the Beijing Science Institute (which the SZU institute head once derided as an "ivory tower"),[284] the SZU institute included "applied" in its name and referred to itself as a service-provider. Because society's needs were constantly changing, the institute recognized that its staff needed a broad range of knowledge and could not just focus on a single subject. According to the institute head,

> Social demands require that we cannot do closed-door research. Instead, we need to link high-technology with households in society, a process we call building bridges. The reason many scientists fail to promote high-technology is that they do not emphasize building this bridge. Comprehensive applicable technology means that technologies from different natural science subjects actually connect to one another.

This interdisciplinary approach meant that the institute's research related to sound, light, electricity, heat and even bio-chemistry; it was not just limited to the nuclear field. One of its major contracts involved producing multi-functional radiation alarms in 1993. In 1994 it reached an agreement with the Physics Department of Hong Kong University to allow the latter's physics majors to use the SZU facility for their graduation theses.

The Physics Department maintained close ties with the institute, to the point of sharing staff. In 1988 eight of 29 physicists and assistants in the department were assigned to the nuclear reactor. The reactor, in a sense, put the Physics Department on the academic map; it received a thousand visitors in its first year of operation. Even before it went officially on-line, the reactor had become a prominent attraction during SZU's first major open house, which commemorated the university's fifth anniversary.[285] In 1995 the institute, which had been self-funding, received a fixed staff quota of ten personnel.

Public Administration

Public administration is a relatively recent field of study in China. It involves employing theories used in business management to public sector work-units such as governmental offices and bureaux. The SEdC in the mid-1980s encouraged all universities to offer Public Administration majors or at least courses in the field. Public Administration at SZU was founded in June 1986, the first free-standing academic department of its kind in any Chinese University.[286] From that time until 1993, the department assumed the duties (but not the name) of the former Social Science Foundation Department, the university's ideology teaching unit (The name of the latter had itself been revised in 1985 from the traditional title, Marxism-Leninism Theory Research Office). At creation the department's *raison d'être* was to help implement the civil service reform adopted by the Thirteenth CCP Congress.

In 1986 Public Administration offered a two-year nationwide correspondence course (that had reached 10,000 students by 1993) and enrolled its first class of adult night school students in a three-year certificate Administrative Management program, offered through SZU's Adult Education College. Its curriculum:

> *Administrative Management (zhuanke):* management math, computer applications, English, administrative procedure, secretaryship, national economic management, SEZ economy, management philosophy, management psychology, administrative management, enterprise administrative management, science of leadership, behavioral science, and evaluation of western administrative systems.

This program was designed for students who had passed the national unified adult education entrance exam. At the time there was no *benke* or full-time *zhuanke* major, but teachers in the department taught regular students in their role as service provider of all required ideological courses. The *zhuanke* program in Public Administration major resembled a less rigorous version of the Management major. During this time teachers in the department compiled the first textbook series in administrative management in China, published by the Yunnan Educational Press. As the department became more firmly established, per capita research output soared from last place (1988-1991) to first place (1994) among SZU teaching departments.

After six years in office, the departmental head asked not to be reappointed to the position so he could focus his latter years on teaching and research.[287] His request was granted, and a new leader was appointed at the beginning of 1992. At the same time, the functions of the department were split, and a new Department of Social Science was set up to take care of ideological education. Teachers went to whichever department they were better suited, and this resulted in a shortfall in Public Administration, which had to hire five new faculty members in 1994-95. The department ran smoothly, and its students were politically involved, with over 70% of them attending Party Construction Study in 1995. Perhaps for this reason Public Administration was awarded as an advanced work-unit by SZU leaders in 1995.

In 1993 Public Administration enrolled full-time *benke* and *zhuanke* students for the first time. The Public Administration *benke* major took in 24 students, four more than called for in the plan, two of whom were admitted after formal recruitment was completed. In terms of entrance scores, the first class ranked behind International Economic Law and the business majors but ahead of all the other arts majors. A *zhuanke* program in Office Automation enrolled 44 students, 20 more than the plan permitted, ten of whom came through irregular channels after formal procedures in Guangzhou had finished. Their exam scores were the second lowest in *zhuanke* programs, just ahead of Hotel Management. In the initial year students came only from arts, but by 1996 students came from both the arts and sciences tracks. The *benke* major, completion of which earned a Bachelors of Law, intended to "train specialists who can analyze actual problems in administration and management with basic principles of Marxism, who are familiar with basic policies and regulations of China, basic theory and knowledge in administration and management and have extensive knowledge, social abilities, actual working ability, and communication skills."[288] The *zhuanke* program was aimed at training "specialists with good cultural skills, strong abilities in organization and coordination, good language and expression, basic theoretical knowledge in administration and management, management skills and techniques of modern office automation, and who can handle daily office administrative work."

> *Administration and Management:* principles of politics, introduction to public administration, organization and behavior, administrative law, introduction to the civil service system, documentary writing in administration, leadership, secretaryship, principles and methods of social investigation, case studies in administration, forecasting, decision and math methods; public economics, municipal administration and management, public income and expenditure.
>
> *Administration, Management, and Office Automation (Zhuanke):* fundamental application of computers, word processing and common software usage, fundamentals of computer networking, data base management and usage, office automation management systems, C-language, introduction to administration, documentary writing, introduction to office management, public relations, organization and behavior, administration law, principles and methods of social investigation, modern management.

Ideological education

During the Luo Zhengqi years, the Public Administration Department was characterized as having "two nameplates but one group of people."[289] Its dual purpose included two somewhat unrelated directions: offering the certificate program in management while also teaching the state-required Marxism-Leninism theory courses. Since it did not offer a *benke* major, however, Public Administration dwelled on the periphery of SZU academic units. The *Yearbooks* for 1987 and 1988 failed to mention the department altogether, as either an academic or service department. The leaders who replaced Luo, however, located Public Administration firmly among the arts academic units (not like PE which was relegated to the end of the list). Rather than having its own departmental Party branch, however, Public Administration was included in the university's #1 Party branch, along with the offices of the SZU Party Committee and the Publications Center. The deputy department head served as vice-secretary of #1 branch.

When it began in 1985 to teach political theory courses, Public Administration teachers rebelled against what they considered old and out-dated teaching content of traditional political theory courses that had been deeply affected by ultra-left ideology.[290] They no longer wanted to teach students by making them recite Marxism theory and repeat the content of secondary school courses; the department's stated purpose was "to break old stereotypes of political theory education developed over many years and to offer more interesting courses to students."[291] They continued to offer the traditional courses in Marxism, Political Economy and Chinese Revolutionary History, but they added new courses: Modern Western Philosophy, Scientific Methodology, SEZ Economy, Chinese Democratic Parties (*Tongyi Zhanxiang*), Contemporary World Politics/International Relations, Logic, Party Construction, Administrative Management Science, Social Psychology, and Behavioral Sciences. Students had to select one of these courses each semester; three were offered per term in rotation. Instead of being restricted to theory, these courses looked at actual problems in modernization and SEZ construction. "This makes the political economy courses more interesting and productive for students. Many students develop their own points of view from the courses."[292] The department also offered optional courses in Calligraphy, Music and Personal Development.

As part of the rectification undertaken by Luo's successors, the Marxist and Leninism Research on Teaching office was reestablished. In 1989-1991 members of the campus community were subjected to special classes in ideological education. The new unit, which called on teachers from Public Administration, helped to initiate and arrange weekly political study sessions for both teachers and students. In addition, a Moral Education Office was set up. In 1994 the three teaching-research offices—Philosophical Social Science Research Institute, Marxism/Leninism Research Institute, and Moral Education Research Office—were amalgamated into the Social Science Department.

Ideological education at SZU was revised as part of the post-Tiananmen rectification. Four compulsory courses had to be taken during the students' first four semesters. The formerly optional course on Theories of Marx and Lenin returned to being compulsory, along with Political Economics, Chinese Socialist Construction, and Chinese Revolutionary History. The latter course was basically the same as students had taken during junior secondary school. This subject had not been taught in senior secondary school, but students who wished to go to college had to study the subject themselves because the area was included in the politics component of the unified college entrance exam. Both Political Economics and Marxism to some extent duplicated what had been taught in secondary school. In their junior year, SZU students could choose from among the same optional courses that had been offered in the past. Overall, students tolerated these courses and studied the necessary material in order to pass the exam at end of term (under 3% of the students failed these courses).

Concluding thoughts

This chapter's discussion of SZU's heterogeneous assortment of academic units is this volume's longest, most detailed and data-based portion. The entire chapter could have been presented in a much more generalized way, referring to specific departments only when needed to make points or to provide illustrations. This would not have done justice to the individual units, nor would it have drawn a picture so that the reader can see just how differently operating units within the same university function. Just as Chinese universities are themselves a diverse lot, so are academic departments within an institution. Unfortunately, there is little published material with which to compare the above analysis. Universities the world over have developed an immunity against scholarly self-examination. Academics themselves are reluctant to study universities in systematic fashion. Transparency is dangerous; it opens up areas—university politics, importance of relationships, the power of authority over hapless subordinates—that many in the academy would like to keep secret. This chapter tries to pry open some of these secrets.

One of the chapter's insights involves the importance of individual agency and leadership in a tertiary institution. SZU is not unique in this regard. Maria Jaschok, an anthropologist, notes the importance of the individual in her ethnographic case study of "Zhengzhou International Women's Institute."[293] Professors at SZU, especially in the early years when each department had only one person at the full professor rank, could exercise virtually total authority over their departments. They alone had final approval over decisions on hiring, curriculum setting, and student management. Some leaders ran their units as the potentate of an independent kingdom, while others instituted procedures and informal processes that maximized input from teachers and even students. The form of governance related to the individual leader's personality more than any other factor, such as age, sex, experience, or relationships with upper level leaders.

Another insight relates to the role of the Communist Party, something which differed from department to department. In some departments, the administrative and political tracks were merged into one if the department head concurrently held the position of branch Party secretary. In others, the dual-track system promoted factionalism. In still others, the two tracks had their separate functions and they ran smoothly in parallel. Again, SZU is not unique in experiencing problems regarding how the Party and administration relate to each other. Bob Adamson, for example, refers to Party interference in academic matters in his case study of English language teaching at Taiyuan Teachers College.[294]

Social relationships—*guanxi*—between the department head and the upper-level (president and Party secretary) figured prominently in the between-the-lines histories of SZU academic departments. Some department leaders survived a change in upper level leaders, but in most cases new administrations installed new leaders. Department heads could be removed only by the upper-level. In such a way, department leaders felt more beholden to the upper-level than to the faculty members in their own department. Constant leadership changes played havoc in some departments, just as upper-level changes (six presidents and four Party secretaries in 13 years) has hindered SZU reform.

To a great extent both the members of the campus community and the general public measured the reputation/status of a department by a single factor—the entry level CEE score of its entering *benke* students. High reputation and status do not automatically equate to quality of teaching, student satisfaction, or research output. Some of SZU high status departments scored poorly in these regards. None of these other elements, however, seemed as important as the exam scores of entering students. In the vast majority of departments, however, *benke* students accounted for less than half of the students enrolled (Most students were night school adults, excluding correspondence students). After 1989 test scores for SZU's *benke* students fell, as more high test-scoring pupils from the zone's key secondary schools went to Guangzhou or elsewhere in China. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the mid-1990s some of SZU's prestige departments sent teachers to Shenzhen's key high schools to talk with prospective students.

One lesson from the review of SZU's departments is that big is not necessarily better. Various costs are associated with expansion. Overworked teachers put aside research; classes became larger; students received less individual attention, and in turn they disengaged from study. Departmental reports are replete with statements critical of students' study attitudes and behavior. None of these complaints, however, linked expansion, teacher disengagement and student problems. These were treated as non-related phenomena, perhaps because separate units in the university bureaucracy were covering each area. Student affairs were handled by the Student Affairs Office as well as various Party and Youth League units. The Academic Affairs Office, Personnel Office and University Research Office each had its own turf. It was left to the upper-levels of university management to discern the linkages. They failed to do so. SZU leaders never apparently realized that student apathy, teacher disengagement, the constant changing of department heads, and inconsistent policies based on political considerations were somehow tied together.

Research

Teaching units are the most important cells of any institution whose primary purpose is teaching. Even research universities, where arguably research's importance can detract from teaching, form important partnerships between teaching and research. These links at SZU can be seen in the relationships between teaching departments and their informally affiliated, semi-autonomous research centers and institutes. During the period of this study SZU had, on average, 15 academic teaching departments and about a dozen listed research units, only a handful of which were self-supporting entities with permanent staff. Many of the institutes were paper institutes—set up

Figure 4.7: SZU research output[296]



for specific individuals, with few fixed staff or little funding. Examples included the following institutes: Population, Higher Education Research, SEZ Culture, Soft Science, Hong Kong Law, Reflective Materials, Philosophy/social science/culture, Tourist Science, Media, Industrial/commercial Enterprise Development, Foreign Language and Culture Translation, and International Economy. As the university aged, the number of listed institutes expanded: from 10 in 1986 to 18 in 1994.

The increase in number of research institutes—or indeed the enlargement of SZU professional staff—had no discernible effect on research output, which in aggregate peaked in 1989 and then slumped for several years until about 1994 (see Figure 4.7).[295] The drop in total research in 1990 reflected the reality that financial demands forced teachers to increase their incomes through extra teaching or side-businesses. Research was put aside. Double digit inflation in Shenzhen in the late 1980s added to the pressure, but the single most important demand for more income came with the opportunity to buy apartments. Staff needed to accumulate downpayments for units in SZU's new housing development in downtown Shenzhen. More than any other factor this explains teachers' disengagement.

The rise in research output in 1994-1995 resulted from several factors. First, there was a catch-up after the period of non-publishing. Articles that could have been written in past years were sent to publishers in 1993 and later. Second, the university and municipality had increased wages and overall remuneration so in the early 1990s teachers no longer had to generate as much income through extra teaching and side-businesses. Third, housing downpayments were completed in 1991; few teachers were burdened by loan payments. Some had no loans to replay; others had established income flows to take care of the payments. Fourth, the departure of the Wei-Wu administration brought the perception that promotions would be decided more on academic criteria and less on political grounds. Publications were supposed to play a larger role in promotion considerations, so teachers started publishing again. Fifth, the university was receiving more upper-level funding for research. This research, in turn, caused academic papers to be written, something that was often a requirement of the grant itself. Finally, President Cai Delin instructed teachers to publish in order to improve the university's research record as it prepared for the 1995 SEdC accreditation. This last factor appears to be the most powerful influence on teachers' output. In other words, teachers published because they were told to do so. This implies that they could have been publishing all along, but had instead chosen to disengage from research.

The university initially attempted to separate research from teaching. Except for Architecture, institutes and research arms were set up separately from teaching departments. This conforms to the pervasive Soviet pattern that is often followed in China, which separates the two functions of the academy. Yet, traditionally in China teaching departments have had teaching-research offices attached to them. Most of the research in these types of units concerns teaching, but there is no restriction in this regard. During the Luo years, when the university experienced a severe staff shortage, departments were discouraged from setting up separate research units because such efforts would spread too thinly the limited personnel departments had. The separate research institutes that were set up, however, were usually not funded. The problem of lack of research started to be addressed in 1988 as the Luo administration put into place monetary incentives to encourage departments to procure outside grants. These initiatives, however, were put on hold after Luo was fired. A few years later, his successors, in attempting to encourage research, mandated that teaching-research offices be set up in each teaching unit. By that time teachers had already disengaged, so the effect of this policy was limited. In any case it was merely a structural change.

In virtually all teaching units at SZU, research was applied, not theoretical. In this regard, Chemistry was often lauded as a model which other departments should follow. The division between academic research and practice was not always distinct. In Architecture's case, practice was what the department was about. But much of SZU's applied research was, in fact, income-generating activities that had little to do with research per se. The extent to which it can even be called research is questionable. Should the development and marketing of a toilet bowl freshener be placed under the rubric of scientific research? What about setting up pager communication systems?

How does SZU's research compare with that at other Chinese universities? SZU has not been included in any published listing, as far as I am aware. One 1997 listing examined a number of variables, including money earmarked for research, human resources involved, publications and awards. The study took into account the differences between social and natural sciences and developed a formula to correct for the fact that the latter is more competitive in publishing, with a resultant lower quantity. The list of the top 100 Chinese research universities does not include SZU.[297] According to the author, SZU placed 150.

Teacher disengagement involved more than just their quitting research. Teachers also began to disengage from extra-curricular activities associated with teaching. A certain amount of participation was required: teachers had to show up for weekly meetings that sometimes involved campaigns such as tree planting and rubbish removal. They had to take part in the inter-departmental sports contests that were held each season. Participation that was not mandated, however, was rare. In contrast with what occurred during the school's early years, few teachers after 1989 worked as faculty advisors with student organizations. Few volunteered to be student tutors, functions that were eventually assigned to political staff once it became clear that teachers would not take on these jobs, regardless of the pay. The Psychological Counseling Center was closed, leaving its teacher volunteers without an avenue of participation. Students became aware of faculty disengagement; from the late 1990s their respect for teachers dropped. They became aware that their teachers were not enthusiastic about teaching, as evidenced by their poor class preparation. This is one of the reasons students became bored with their classes, a subject examined in the next chapter.

---

1. Sources: SZU yearbooks. Majors that changed names but not content are listed together, as noted:
   A: 1993: International Accounting; 1994-6, Public Accounting;
   B: 1991, Economic Law;
   C: 1991-2, Hong Kong/Macau Law; 1993, Taiwan/Hong Kong/Macau Law; 1994-5, Compatriot Law; 1996-7, Law;
   D: 1993, Industrial/commercial Management;
   E: 1992-3, Chinese Secretary; 1994-6, Han Language and Literature.
2. Sources: SZU yearbooks. Majors that changed names but not content are listed together, as noted:

A: 1992-7, Applied Computer;
B: 1993, International Accounting; 1994-7, Public Accounting;
C: 1991, Economic Law;
D: 1993, Industrial/commercial Management;
E: 1992, Information Processing; 1993-5, Economic Information Processing;
F: 1993, Structural Engineering;
G: 1991, Precise Mechanical Engineering; 1992, Mechanical Electrical; 1993, Electrical Mechanical Engineering; 1994-5, Mechanical Electrical;
H: 1991-3, Manufacturing Automation; 1994-5, Industrial Automation;
I: 1991 in Architecture Dept.; 1993, Design, in Architecture Dept.
J: 1994-7, Management Engineering.

3. Arts students take Chinese, mathematics, English, politics, history and geography. Sciences students take Chinese, mathematics, English, politics, physics and chemistry.
4. Sources: SZU yearbooks. "In" figures represent actual enrollment reported for the freshmen class. "Out" figures are based on lists of graduates for the same class. Δ represents the difference in number between enrolled and graduated students. An unknown proportion of the "out" relates to students' leaving for study abroad.
5. Zhao, "View of how the market economy affects higher education," 1997.
6. This survey, which provided data for the author's dissertation, was conducted as the final step of an exit procedure for graduating students. All students were required to complete the forms before they could receive their diploma. The survey, therefore, represents almost the universe of graduates, rather than a sample. The differences in responses are all statistically significant. The difference between Architecture, the most satisfied majors, and Chemistry, where the least satisfied students studied, is 29% (or 16.3 percentage points). The degree to which these and other differences are significant (as opposed to statistically significant) is a judgment left up to the author and reader.
7. Source: *1994 Yearbook*, pp. 277-94.
8. Source: *1994 Yearbook*, teaching staff identification photographs.
9. Source: *1994 Yearbook*, pp. 277-94.
10. Source: *SZU Academic Compilation (1983-1993), 1994 Yearbook,* pp. 134-61. Research includes articles, books and patents, each counted as one unit of output.
11. Source: *1994 Yearbook*, pp. 277-94. Rank #1=professor/senior engineer; #2=associate professor/engineer; #3= lecturer/associate engineer; #4=assistant (*zhu jiao*).
12. Sources: (1989)—1993 graduates survey; (1992)—AAO enrollment computer printout, 8 September 1992; (1993)—AAO enrollment computer printout, 4 October 1993.

13. Sources: SZU yearbooks. Name lists were provided for students who received bachelors degrees and those who received only certificates because they failed to meet bachelors degree requirements. The more recently established departments of Public Administration and Design reported their first fail rates, for students who enrolled in 1993, as 12% and 9%, respectively.
14. The colleges included Teachers, Adult Education, Arts, Sciences, Economics, Law, Fine Arts, Architecture and Civil Engineering, Management, Electronic Information, Control and Material Engineering, Golf Sports Management, as well as the Science and Technology Institute and the Social Sciences Institute. See "Plan for SZU college system," *1997 Yearbook*, pp. 17-21.
15. See Figure 4.3. A high portion (38%) of 1993 Architecture graduates—those admitted in 1988—thought that their education was *too* practical; they ranked behind only Math (40%) in this view and considerably above the average response (25.5%).
16. Only 19% responded favorably to the statement: "I prefer to be alone than tag along with my friends," well below the 26% school average. In terms of individuality, Architecture ranked eleventh of the 13 departments.
17. Architecture students ranked fourth (29%, compared with the university average of 24%) in favoring the statement "Money is the most important thing in a job."
18. *Brief # 420* (17 April 1995).
19. *Brief # 212* (7 July 1992), "Architecture department students win bid to design projects," *Shenda Tongxun*, 1993, no. 20, p. 10. This was also reported in the *1993 Shenzhen Municipal Yearbook*, p. 415.
20. *Brief # 230* (24 October 1992).
21. *Brief # 340* (1 April 1994).
22. *Brief # 411* (27 March 1995).
23. *School of Architecture Shenzhen University* [brochure], March 1994.
24. The others were Economics and International Finance and Trade.
25. The others were Signal and Information Processing, Optical Electrical Technology, Electronic Information Flow, and Bio-Chemical New Materials. Total funding was ¥600,000.
26. *Brief # 167* (12 March 1992), *Brief # 176* (2 April 1992).
27. "Architecture," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 196.
28. *Brief # 565* (July 1996).
29. Huang Xinbai, "Introduction to Shenzhen educational work, abstract, 5-8 July, 1983," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 163.
30. Source: Computed from SZU yearbooks. Senior ranking includes professors/senior engineers and associate professors/engineers.
31. "Architecture Department," *1986 Yearbook*, pp. 35-6.
32. *Brief # 391* (9 January 1995).

33. See, e.g., *Brief # 369* (14 November 1994).
34. "Architecture Department teachers and students design works exhibit in Shenzhen and Guangzhou," *Shenda Tongxun*, 1992, no. p. 18, 19.
35. *Brief # 309* (29 October 1993).
36. Robert Taylor, "China's environmental development will have global impact," retrieved May 1996, *http://www.montclair.edu/Pages/Publications/Insight/BackIssues/Insight022696/Stories.html*.
37. *Brief # 475* (20 October 1995), *Brief # 464* (22 September 1995).
38. Luo Zhengqi, "Implementation and contemplation of reform: looking forward to SZU's fifth anniversary, April 1987," *1987 Yearbook*, p. 87.
39. "Architecture," *1988 Yearbook*, p. 45.
40. "Architecture," *1991 Yearbook*, p. 107.
41. Retrieved from SZU homepage, August 1996, *http://www.szu.edu.cn*.
42. The others were Computer, Electronics, Foreign Trade, English and Accounting.
43. Luo Zhengqi, "Look at reform from the point of view of SZU's reform," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 81.
44. "1991 work summary, 14 January 1992," *1991 Yearbook*, p. 37.
45. *Brief # 185* (15 February 1992).
46. *Brief # 450* (30 June 1995).
47. Students responded to the question: "How well do you use your field of study in your job?" The average score among 1993 graduates on the 5-point Likert-type was 2.9 (1 = very poorly…5 = very well). Chemistry scored the lowest, 2.1, and Architecture the highest, 4.0.
48. Architecture, 3.2; Chemistry, 3.1; average, 2.8.
49. Luo Yunzhu, "Reviewing the department's three years' history," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, p. 193.
50. E.g., separate reports in the *1988 Yearbook*, both written by Luo Yunzhu, head of Chemistry, report the *benke* enrollment as 125 (p. 41) and 130 (p. 159). The latter figure appears in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, p. 193.
51. Dai Gesheng, "Reform and expectation of Applied Chemistry," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 127.
52. "Applied Chemistry," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 40.
53. "Bio-Chemistry Research Institute," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 48.
54. "Applied Chemistry," *1987 Yearbook*, p. 41.
55. Ying Qirui & Deng Jingtong, "Development strategy of science & technology of SZU from 1995-2101," *1995 Yearbook*, p. 156.
56. It also hosted the second international Chinese analytical chemistry conference, 1995. *Brief # 488* (17 November 1995).

---

57. Funded under China’s Seventh Five-Year Plan.
58. Reported in Deng Jingtong & Zhang Aixing, “Scientific Research Office,” *1989-90 Yearbook*, pp. 95-6. Since blood carrying HIV does not pose a harm to health when exposed to air, most any liquid disinfectant at 2% density could make the same claim.
59. Dai Gesheng, “Reform and expectation of applied chemistry,” *1986 Yearbook*, p. 127.
60. Deng Jingtong, “On the management mode of university’s research,” *1988 Yearbook*, pp. 101-3.
61. Luo Yunzhu, “Applied Chemistry,” *1991 Yearbook*, p. 127.
62. Sources: *SZU Academic Compilation (1983-1993), 1994 Yearbook, 1995 Yearbook, 1996 Yearbook, 1997 Yearbook*, pp. 207-10.
63. Shao Yifu built the reputation of Hong Kong movie star Jackie Chan. He is also known as the man who turned down Bruce Lee’s idea of creating the *kung fu* movie genre, refusing to offer the martial arts luminary more than a small salary. Bruce Lee, whose life was cut short, went on to become a cult legend; Shao Yifu, nevertheless, became wealthier.
64. “Employment certificate for Professor Luo Yunzhu, 10 July 1987,” in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University’s Reform Path*, 1988, p. 75
65. The other departments were Foreign Language, International Finance and Trade, and Economics, all departments known for having students with discipline problems.
66. *Brief # 601* (13 November 1996). The use of “study representative” at SZU was unusual. The term is usually reserved for secondary schooling.
67. Dai Gesheng, “Reform and expectation of Applied Chemistry,” *1986 Yearbook*, p. 127.
68. *Brief # 388* (30 December 1994).
69. Cai Delin, “Speech at 1995 work meeting,” *1995 Yearbook*, p. 17.
70. Li Daiyun, “Brief introduction to the Chinese Department over the past three years, December 1986,” *1986 Yearbook*, p. 123.
71. This is the arrangement followed by Nanjing University’s Department of Chinese Language and Literature.
72. *Brief # 324* (28 December 1993).
73. “Devoted to cultural exchange; interview with Hu Jingzhi, SZU professor and doctoral tutor,” *Shenzhen Tequ Bao* (26 May 1997), 21. See also, Hu Jingzhi, “Not regretting spending the rest of my life at SZU,” *Shenda Tongxun*, 1993, no. 22, p. 10.
74. *Brief # 324* (28 December 1993). Hu’s study of Twentieth Century western literature won a national book prize. See, *Brief # 546* (13 May 1996). This work reflected the research of his graduate students, as Hu himself did not read western literature, except in translation.

75. Retrieved from SZU homepage, August 1996.
76. "International Culture and Media Department," *1988 Yearbook*, p. 26.
77. *Brief # 291* (11 June 1993).
78. *Brief # 401* (3 March 1995).
79. *Brief # 402* (6 March 1995).
80. "Public Media," *1988 Yearbook*, p. 157.
81. *Brief # 546* (13 May 1996).
82. *1986 Yearbook*, p. 31.
83. Retrieved from SZU homepage, August 1996.
84. Retrieved from SZU homepage, August 1996.
85. *Brief # 325* (30 December 1993).
86. *Brief # 601* (13 November 1996).
87. *Brief # 628* (8 January 1997).
88. *Brief # 298* (8 July 1993).
89. *Brief # 163* (3 March 1992).
90. *Brief # 615* (13 December 1996).
91. E.g., "Lecture on Chinese culture" in *Brief # 613* (9 December 1996).
92. *Brief # 228* (20 October 1992).
93. *Brief # 602* (15 November 1996).
94. *Brief # 180* (14 April 1992).
95. "Battle hero Shi Guangzhu awarded as 'excellent youth of the 1980's'," *Shenda Tongxun*, 1990, no. 8, p. 27. The award was based on a survey conducted by the *Shanghai Youth Paper* and 20 Shanghai universities.
96. *Brief # 388* (30 December 1994).
97. Chen Hong, "Girl writer at 16," *Bosom Friend (Zhiyin*, Wuhan), November 1997, pp. 14-6.
98. Luo Zhengqi, "Speech at 1987 school opening ceremony," *1987 Yearbook*, p. 14. Chef Fang's current whereabouts are unknown to the author.
99. *Brief # 337* (22 March 1994).
100. *Brief # 187* (30 April 1992).
101. The removed head, Luo Yuanxiang, professor of civil engineering, had worked closely with Luo Zhengqi as one of the latter's two presidential consultants.
102. Yu Pingjing, "Civil and Structural Engineering," *1989-90 Yearbook*, pp. 75-6.
103. A few others held both positions concurrently: the Chemistry head in 1993; Mechanical Engineering, Design, Economics, and Public Administration heads in 1994; Public Administration, Economics, Mechanical Engineering and Design in 1995.
104. Yu Pingjing, "Civil and Structural Engineering," *1991 Yearbook*, pp. 119-22.

---

105. Yu Pingjing, “Structural and Civil Engineering,” *Shenda Tongxun*, 1991, no. 12, pp. 18-9.
106. *Ibid.*; Yu Pingjing, “Stress graduate design though cooperation education,” *Shenda Tongxun*, 1992, no. p. 18, 16.
107. Yu Pingjing, “Civil and Structural Engineering,” *1992-93 Yearbook*, pp. 177-9. The same format was also followed by the Departments of International Finance and Trade, Economics, Law, Electronics, Math, and Physics as well as the Audio/visual Center.
108. *Brief # 233* (31 October 1992).
109. “Civil Engineering,” *1995 Yearbook*, pp. 132-133.
110. Retrieved from SZU homepage, August 1996.
111. *Brief # 180* (14 April 1992).
112. Retrieved from SZU homepage, August 1996.
113. *Brief # 326* (4 January 1994).
114. Chen Hao, *New thoughts, new explorations and new patterns*, 1989, p. 104.
115. General Affairs Office, *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 179.
116. *1997 Yearbook*, p. 175.
117. *Brief # 368* (11 November 1994).
118. *Shenzhen gaodeng zhiye jishu xueyuan*.
119. Retrieved from SZU homepage, August 1996.
120. Zhang Minru, “Facing the special zone, facing reality,” in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University’s Reform Path*, 1988, p. 187.
121. Sources: SZU yearbooks. Statistics was called Economic Forecasting and Statistics in 1989 and 1990; The *zhuanke* accounting course in 1986 was for *daipei* cadre.
122. Zhou Xiuquan, “Economics,” *1991 Yearbook*, p. 96.
123. E.g., *Brief # 170* (19 March 1992), *Brief # 205* (18 June 1992), *Brief # 271* (25 March 1993).
124. The firm’s announcement in the language of an advertisement, complete with office location and phone, appeared in *Brief # 405* (13 March 1995).
125. Xie, “Yu Guangyuan becomes SZU’s honorary professor,” *Shenzhen Tequ Bao*, 26 January 1994. Yu did not mince words in this article, saying SZU faced too many system limitations and criticizing its lack of “deep research” into educational philosophy.
126. Retrieved from SZU homepage, August 1996.
127. *Ibid*.
128. Zhang Minru, “Economics Department,” *1988 Yearbook*, p. 27.
129. See Zhang Minru’s quotation, text cited in note 52, Chapter Two, p. 87, above.
130. The SEZ Institute changed its name to Special Zone, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau Research Institute in 1995: *1995 Yearbook*, p. 206.

---

131. Shi Bowen, "Research," *1988 Yearbook*, p. 100.
132. Huang Weiping, "Conclusions from SZU on SEZ higher education," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 138.
133. Wu Zukun, "Expectations of the Electronic Engineering Department," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 129.
134. *Ibid*.
135. *Ibid*.
136. In the course of business, Yang developed *quanxi* with the following units: State Science Commission, SEdC, State Natural Science Foundation Commission, National Defense Science and Industry Commission, Ministry of Mechanics and Electronics, Guangdong Science Commission, Guangdong Higher Education Bureau, Shenzhen Municipal Government, Shenzhen Science Commission, Shenzhen Education Committee, Shenzhen Personnel Bureau.
137. "Employment contract for Yang Shuwen," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, pp. 79-81.
138. Bao Youli, "Electronic Engineering," *1991 Yearbook*, pp. 115-8.
139. *Ibid*.
140. "Table of personnel who went abroad for training," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 196.
141. This is discussed in Chapter 6.
142. Retrieved from IBM homepage, August 1996, *http://www.IBM.co.jp/IBMGCG/IBMPRC-E/Newsfeed/9512/951218.htm.* All other reports on the gift rounded the donation to $500,000.
143. Retrieved from SZU homepage, August 1996.
144. Yang Shuwen, "New Technology Research Center," *1991 Yearbook*, p. 186.
145. Source: *SZU Academic Compilation (1983-1993), 1994 Yearbook,* pp. 134-61; *1995 Yearbook*, *1996 Yearbook*. Research includes articles, books and patents, each counted as one unit of output.
146. Tan Zaixi, "English learning and teaching in China's Shenzhen Special Economic Zone." Unpublished paper, 1993.
147. Sin, "University to be built in Shumchun," 1983.
148. "New proposals for SZU's reform and innovation, 25 September, 1984," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 168 (italics added).
149. "Second proposals of SZU's reform and innovation, 10 July 1986," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 172; "Regulations on teaching reform and improving teaching quality, 4 September 1986," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 61. This policy was shared with a national audience via Chen Hao, *New thoughts, new explorations, and new patterns*, p. 117.
150. Luo Zhengqi, "Lunch speech on department heads' present missions, 19 October 1987," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path,* 1988, p. 41.

151. Di & Xu, "Adapting itself to the market economy," 1993. Similar point is made in Chen Xiaobo, "Create three first-rates," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, p. 156.
152. Luo Zhengqi, "23 September 1987 notice on distributing *Office English*," *Shenda Tongxun*, 1987, no. 2, p. 19.
153. "Liang Xueming employment contract," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path,* 1988, p. 81.
154. Lei Congli, "Basic research on reform in foreign language, January 1987," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 113.
155. Liu Yingkai, "Educational Utilitarianism: where goes higher education?" 1998; Ruan Wei, "What kind of university should SZU be made into?," *Shenda Tongxun*, 1993, no. 4, pp. 23-5.
156. Public English was considered a less demanding course and it generated .9 credit (average course equaled 1 credit) in computing teaching load: "Work load for teachers, July 1992," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 346. In contrast writing courses earned 1.4 credits, but repeated classes on .6 to .8 credits.
157. Liu Yingkai, "Educational utilitarianism: where goes higher education?" 1998. Curriculum timetable is Table 7.3.
158. Retrieved from SZU homepage, August 1996.
159. In presenting statistics on ranking and placements, categories are not necessarily unique. In other words, fourth place may mean #4 out of several hundred, or it may mean placement in the fourth level, which might include dozens of institutions. This is the first of several caveats issued in this section regarding the use of the data that have been gleaned from SZU publications.
160. Pan Yanming, "Learn English, train eligible *rencai*," *Shenda Tongxun*, 1987, no. 2, p. 19.
161. "Academic Affairs Office," *1987 Yearbook*, p. 73.
162. "Regulations," *1988 Yearbook*, p. 182.
163. "Ten-year development plan and eighth five-year plan," October 1991, *1991 Yearbook*, pp. 11-8.
164. "Foreign Language Department pays special attention to teaching, CET Band 4 test achieves great success," *Shenda Tongxun*, 1991, no. 15, p. 8.
165. "Major points of SZU work report, 30 April 1992," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 25.

---

166. Source: *Shenda Tongxun*, 1998, no. 40, pp. 7-8. Excellent rate applies to those who scored above 85%. Other data from the yearbooks give information on the Band 4 passing rate for groups of test-takers, mixing together different years of entering students:

Entering class	pass-rate	excellent rate
1985	22.7	
1986	50.4	
1985-1987 (in 1988)	39.5	
1989 (by 2nd year)	71.4	
1990 (by 2nd year)	85.9	
1990-1993 (in 1994)	75.0	8.4
1990 (by graduation 1994)	90.9	11.4
1991 (by 4th year)	87.0	16.0
1992 (at 3rd year)	86.7	13.7
1993 (at 2nd year)	67.5	14.9

Sources: *1988 Yearbook*, p. 58; *1991 Yearbook*, p. 138; *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 206; *1994 Yearbook*, p. 38, 58; *1995 Yearbook*, pp. 57-8; *Brief # 361* (24 October 1994).

167. "Comprehensive evaluation of students, May 1992," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 119.
168. "Regulations on awarding bachelors degree," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 278.
169. Source: *Shenda Tongxun*, 1998, no. 40, pp. 7-8. Excellent rate applies to those who scored above 85%. Other data from the yearbooks give information on the passing rate for groups of Band 6 test-takers, mixing together different years of entering students:

Entering class	pass-rate	average score
1987	7.8	
1989	32.9	42.8
1990	25.0	60.1
1991	34.0	53.9

Sources: *1992-3 Yearbook,* p. 206*; 1994 Yearbook,* p. 38, 58.

170. *Shenda Tongxun,* 1998, no. 40, pp. 7-8. Earlier data presented by the public English teaching staff shows steady improvement. Pass rates for various years were reported as: 1988, 48.9%; 1989, 58.4%; 1990, 60%; 1991, 71.2%, 1992, 86%. See "Teaching reform of college English," *in Collection of Excellent Teaching Results*, 1993, p. 15. These data, of course, conflict with those presented in Table 4.13.
171. Sources: *1987 Yearbook,* p. 73; *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 206; *1994 Yearbook,* p. 38

---

172. Highest score was 84.5, by Chen Cuiting, a gymnast in the Seoul Olympics, who entered International Finance and Trade as a "special recruitment" in 1991. When she entered SZU, he did not know here ABCs, according to Liang Guilin, *1994 Yearbook*, p. 254.
173. "Foreign Languages Department pays special attention to teaching, CET Band 4 test achieves great success," *Shenda Tongxun*, 1991, no. 15, p. 8.
174. Beijing University Graduates Job Assignments Situation Survey Group, "Survey on Beijing University's graduates job assignment situation," 1990, p. 71.
175. These data were take from a computer printout dated 4 October 1993 and reflect the scores at the end of the two-week recruitment period. They are different from the official yearbook figures presented in a previous chapter. The differences are discussed in a later chapter.
176. In 1987 feedback in night school English courses showed weak teaching and a disappointment by students that the English they learned could not be used in their jobs: Liao Yuangeng, "Adult Education," *1987 Yearbook*, p. 54. A report three years later complained that FLD frequently changed its teachers, sometimes in the middle of a course: Liao Yuangeng, "Part-time *zhuanke* college," *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 85.
177. Wu Zewei, "Speech on school teachers conference, 26 June 1990," *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 39; Cai Delin, "On teaching work," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 49.
178. Ruan Wei, "Commodity economy and foreign literature teaching," *Shenda Tongxun*, 1990, no. 10, p. 29.
179. Tan Zaixi, "On the development prospects of the FLD," *Shenda Tongxun*, 1990, no. 10, p. 29.
180. These events are discussed in detail in Agelasto, *University in Turmoil*, 1998.
181. *1997 Yearbook*, pp. 189.
182. Zhang Minru, "Training high level *rencai* in modern economic management, December 1986," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 121.
183. Sciences track recruits scored 739 and arts 741, compared with university average of 682, 705, respectively: *1988 Yearbook*, p. 68.
184. Average score on the English component in 1998 was 721 for International Finance and 718 for International Trade majors.
185. Test of English as a Foreign Language, the test required of foreign students by U.S. colleges and universities.
186. Source: 1993 graduates survey. Percentages are rounded.
187. This precise point is made by sociologist Daniel Bell in his 1960s study of the curriculum of Columbia College. Bell defines discipline as "a group of analytical concepts ordered into a body of theory and applied to a subject matter. Thus, economics is a discipline, while international trade or national-income accounts are subjects." Bell, *The Reforming of General Education*, 1966, p. 31.

188. Gong Liping, "International Finance and Trade," *1988 Yearbook*, p. 29.
189. Retrieved from SZU homepage, August 1996, http://www.szu.edu.cn.
190. Gong Liping, "International Finance and Trade," *1988 Yearbook*, p. 29.
191. *Brief # 204* (16 June 1992).
192. *Brief # 499* (18 December 1995).
193. *Brief #447* (23 June 1995).
194. *Brief # 386* (26 December 1994).
195. *Brief # 610* (2 December 1996).
196. E.g., *Brief # 176* (2 April 1992).
197. "Guangdong Province on the report to State Council on the founding of SZU, 26 February 1983," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 159 (italics added).
198. Li Zepei, "Law Department's five-year development," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, p. 184.
199. Li Zepei, "Reform legal education and training," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 109.
200. *Ibid*.
201. "Law Department," *1988 Yearbook*, p. 31.
202. Li Zepei, "Reform legal education and training," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 109.
203. "Law Department," *1988 Yearbook*, p. 31.
204. "Academic achievements of Law Department in 1989," *Shenda Tongxun*, 1990, no. 9, p. 45.
205. Li Zhongwu, "Law Department," *1989-90 Yearbook*, pp. 57-8.
206. Li Zhongwu, "Law Department," *1991 Yearbook*, p. 93.
207. *1994 Yearbook*, p. 216.
208. *1987 Yearbook*, pp. 228-9.
209. Feng Shicong, "Reforming the traditional teaching system," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, p. 178.
210. Source: Feng Shicong, "Reforming the traditional teaching system," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, p. 178.
211. Literally, at the starting point.
212. Feng Shicong, "Reforming the traditional teaching system," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, p. 184.
213. "Like the dancing bird: the Hong Kong class" (12 October 1995).
214. *Brief # 372* (21 November 1994).
215. The *Shenzhen Shangbao* account reported that 4,000 students had been included in the program, which is a seven-fold exaggeration. It reported that 155 students had graduated, which is also an incorrect figure.
216. Bei, "SZU under the governance of Cai Delin," 1996. This article is discussed in Agelasto, *University in Turmoil*, 1998.
217. The course's full description including program structure and entrance requirements appeared on the HKMA homepage—
http://www.hk.super.net/~hkma/course24.htm, retrieved October 1996.

218. Cheng Bin, "Guidance and practice for senior management personnel graduate class," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path,* 1988, p. 197.
219. See Yu Zhongwen, "Educational reform is a complex, systematic project, December 1986," *1986 Yearbook,* pp. 99-100. In this article, the Party vice-chair restricted himself to non-political issues, commenting on the need to improve teaching quality, correct the lack of research, absence of SEZ-related teaching materials, and poor teaching management. He was critical of inflexible teaching content, restrictions on students' choosing majors, uniform teaching methods, and the excessively clear division between arts and sciences majors.
220. Yu Zhongwen, "Management Department," *1989-90 Yearbook*, pp. 59-60.
221. Chen Guoquan, "Management Department," *1991 Yearbook,* p. 97.
222. *Zhao ling xi gai,* literally morning order, evening change.
223. *SZU Academic Compilation (1983-2993), 1994 Yearbook, 1995 Yearbook, 1996 Yearbook, 1997 Yearbook.*
224. Chen Guoquan, "Management," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 165.
225. Chen used the idiom from *The Three Kingdoms*: being physically in the Cao camp but the heart is in the Han camp.
226. *Department of Management, Shenzhen University* [booklet], August 1993.
227. Feng Shicong, "Management," *1994 Yearbook,* p. 102.
228. *Brief # 402* (6 March 1995).
229. *Brief # 401* (3 March 1995).
230. Retrieved from SZU homepage, August 1996.
231. "Management Department, "Vivid socialist education lessons," *Shenda Tongxun*, 1992, no. 19, p. 15.
232. It arranged for 30 students to visit Huanan Teachers University, Guangzhou, to listen to a talk on the measures that institution was taking in its effort to join the 211 Program. *Brief # 425* (28 April 1995).
233. *Brief # 246* (5 December 1992). One of the speakers was a professor from "Hamburger University." The item in the *Brief* did not place the institution's name in quotations, thus endowing this institution (where McDonald's managers are trained and employees learn to flip hamburgers) with legitimate university status.
234. *Brief # 265* (4 March 1993), *Brief # 339* (29 March 1994), *Brief # 442* (12 June 1995). Winners came from Math, Adult Education and Management.
235. *Brief # 303* (21 September 1993).
236. "Management Department," *1995 Yearbook*, p. 123.
237. *Brief # 373* (23 November 1994).
238. "Applied Math," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 38.
239. Liao Keren, "Soft Science," *1988 Yearbook*, p. 37.

---

240. Soft Science, “Major development according to social demands,” *Shenda Tongxun*, 1990, no. 9, p. 22.
241. Retrieved from SZU homepage, August 1996.
242. Liao Keren, “Soft Science,” *1991 Yearbook*, p. 112.
243. *Brief # 230* (24 October 1992).
244. *Brief # 267* (11 March 1993).
245. *Brief # 298* (8 July 1993).
246. *Brief # 619* (23 December 1996).
247. In 1993 9 of the top 10 winners came from Electronics. In 1995 the second year Transportation Economics Majors achieved a 100% passing rate.
248. *Brief # 365* (3 November 1994); *Brief # 375* (28 November 1994).
249. Gao Lisheng, “Mechanical Engineering,” *1988 Yearbook*, p. 44.
250. Zhao Yijun, “Mechanical Engineering,” *1986 Yearbook*, p. 107.
251. Gao Lisheng, “Mechanical Engineering,” *1991 Yearbook*, p. 129.
252. “Mechanical Engineering,” *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 112.
253. Retrieved from SZU homepage.
254. *Brief # 619* (23 Dec. 1996); *Brief # 330* (18 Jan. 1994); *Brief # 390* (6 Jan. 1996).
255. For the 1995 accreditation, PE was classified as one of five public teaching departments. The others were Art Teaching/Research Office, Moral Education, Social Sciences and the Computer Center.
256. Since about 1987, departments have been listed in a standard order: Chinese, Economics, IFT, Law, Management, FLD, Public Administration, Architecture, Mechanical Engineering, Electronics, Math, Civil Engineering, Physics, Chemistry and PE. For administrative purposes each department was assigned a number (e.g., Chinese 001, FLD 006, Architecture 008) which was made part of student’s identification numbers. This ordering was more or less followed when department reports are presented in university publications.
257. “Provisional regulations on tutoring work at SZU, 19 September 1989,” *1989-90 Yearbook*, pp. 235-6.
258. “Physical education regulations, 30 March 1993,” *1992-93 Yearbook*, pp. 284-5.
259. The idiom used had appeared in old-fashioned propaganda: *jiayu huxiao, renren jiezhi*, literally family talks, family knows, everybody knows.
260. Ma Yaoqiu, “Review and thoughts on physical education reform,” *Shenda Tongxun*, 1995, no. 29, p. 10.
261. Hu Xiaoyin, “On SZU football teaching reform,” *Shenda Tongxun*, 1994, no. 24, pp. 33-4.
262. Huang Wenjie & Ma Yaoqiu, “Review of SZU’s physical education work of 1989,” *Shenda Tongxun*, 1990, no. 8, p. 25.

263. This ranked seventh but the total number of participating universities was not disclosed in the PE 1991 annual report: *1991 Yearbook*, p. 132.
264. Criticism was general; specific names were not mentioned: *1991 Yearbook*, p. 132.
265. Ma Yaoqiu, “On the development tendencies of higher physical education,” *Shenda Tongxun*, 1995, no. 30, p. 9.
266. *Brief # 242* (24 Nov. 1992), *Brief # 320* (9 Dec. 1993), *Brief # 376* (2 Dec. 1994), *Brief # 493* (3 Nov. 1995), *Brief # 244* (1 Dec. 1992).
267. “Creation/invention part-time job award, 9 July 1987,” *1987 Yearbook*, p. 156.
268. “Sports awards, 9 September 1988,” *1988 Yearbook*, p. 191.
269. “SZU revised scholarship regulations, December 1989,” *1989-90 Yearbook*, pp. 204-5.
270. The others were New Energy, SEZ Economics, New Technology, Life Sciences, Bio-Chemistry, Petroleum Research, and Hong Kong Law. Only the first two were considered to have adequate fixed staffing: Chen Kangnian et al., “Scientific Research Affairs Office,” *1991 Yearbook*, p. 141.
271. Retrieved from SZU homepage, August 1996.
272. “Optical and Electrical Technology Engineering Department,” *1988 Yearbook*, p. 39.
273. Retrieved from SZU homepage.
274. The other highlighted courses were Political Theory, Public English, Advanced Math, and Computer. Courses selected for special funding included the above as well as courses in Chemistry and Public Administration as well as the support services of the A/V center.
275. Wang Jiansheng, “Applied Physics,” *1991 Yearbook*, p. 123.
276. *Ibid*.
277. Source: “Report to Shenzhen city regarding SZU accreditation, 23 November 1995,” *1995 Yearbook*, p. 45. 1994 Physics and 1994 Electronics were cited by SZU as “excellent” classes according to test results.
278. “Applied Physics,” *1994 Yearbook*, p. 115.
279. “Applied Physics,” *1995 Yearbook*, p. 138.
280. *1991 Yearbook*, p. 141; *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 209.
281. The other two were International Software Development and the Communications Technology Research Institute.
282. This case, in which Microsoft sued Shenzhen University, is covered in Agelasto, *University in Turmoil*, 1998.
283. Retrieved from SZU homepage, August 1996.
284. Wang Yusheng, “Joint Institute of Applied Nuclear Technology,” *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 138.
285. Open days were the afternoons of September 25, 27 and 28.

286. Guo Yongxian, “Public Administration,” *1991 Yearbook*, p. 104.
287. *Ibid*., 106.
288. Retrieved from SZU homepage, August 1996.
289. Guo Yongxian, “Public Administration,” *1991 Yearbook*, p. 105.
290. Guo Yongxian, “The only way out is reform and innovation,” *1986 Yearbook*, p. 115.
291. “Public Administration,” *1986 Yearbook*, p. 35.
292. Guo Yongxian, “The only way out is reform and innovation,” *1986 Yearbook*, p. 115.
293. Maria Jaschok, “Chinese educational reforms and feminist praxis,” 1998.
294. Bob Adamson, “Modernizing English language teacher education,” 1998.
295. Presumably, per capita research output dropped, also. Per capita figures are available for teaching departments but not for research institutes (where staff size data are missing). SZU expanded its professional staff at a somewhat steady pace by 63% from 1986 to 1995; research output rose 178%, in a roller-coaster fashion with most of the climb in 1994-1995.
296. Sources: *SZU Academic Compilation (1983-1993), 1994 Yearbook, 1995 Yearbook, 1996 Yearbook* (excluding SZU Teachers College). 1993 data were not available. Tabulations by Cai Jianming. Data from the 1997 *Yearbook* report 582 items of output, an improbably 66% rise over 1996. For the 1997 listing the definition of research was expanded to include newspaper articles and material published in conference proceedings. Eight articles by an individual who no longer taught at SZU were included. Thus, the 1997 data are not comparable with those tabulated in previous years.
297. Wu Shulian, “Chinese university accreditation,” *Higher Education Accreditation of China*, no. 4 (1997), pp. 1-6.

Story 9: Student Xie Zhongwen, four treasures of the study

*In old China, scholars cherished the four treasures of the study (*zhi, mo, bi, yan*), which were paper, inkstick, brush, and inkwell. When I thought about college, I too wanted to grow up to cherish the four treasures. I had won a calligraphy prize in middle school and my Chinese teachers said I showed real talent. They encouraged me to study ancient poetry, but my scores were not good enough to get me into one of the good schools up North. So I had to settle on Shenda. My brother, who was a pioneer at Shenda and had graduated in one of the first years, told me I better study business. "You ever heard of a rich poet?" he asked.*

My Shenda was not the same school my brother had known. He had gone before "the we-are-not-allowed-to-mention event" and by the time I arrived, new leaders were trying to make Shenda into a Party school. Of course, I am a Cantonese and we don't care about politics. Anyhow, some of the best experiences I had were in the first few weeks before classes, when we were in military training. I met good friends, who would become my drinking and smoking buddies for the next four years. Alcohol and cigarettes were some of the new treasures of my study.

I had been brainwashed by my brother, who had heaped praise on his dedicated teachers and the school's leaders. The Shenda I went to was a much different place. The teachers did not know our names, and we did not know their names. We used to take turns skipping class. When teachers called roll, our friends would yell out "present" when our name was called. In a political studies class, the teacher gave us attendance slips on our way out of class. We would go through the line twice, undetected, so we could collect the slips for our absent friends. We could borrow notes from our girlfriends and copy them so we would know what to study for the exams. Usually, a week was enough time to spend cramming for exams. We only failed courses we were allowed to fail and still get a degree. Almost all my friends had two and only two failures, for three meant you could not get a degree.

For most of the semester we went out with our friends, often to the Maqueling intersection, just off campus near the student dormitories. We often went there for a midnight snack and would come back late if we were planning to skip the morning classes. The old men who served as guards for our dorm went to bed early, and they did not mind us getting in late as long as we did not wake them. Sometimes we would climb over the fence, *but often they just left the gate unlocked. We always gave them cigarettes or* bai jiu *(white lightening). As we became seniors, some of us would spend the night with our girlfriends in the girls' dorm, and we would have to wait until noontime to leave the building so not to arouse the suspicion of the old women who guarded the girls' gate.*

When I came to Shenda [1991], like almost all my classmates, I was a virgin. But in my first year, some of the older students in our department took us to Maqueling and teased us about not having had a sexual experience. Often, Maqueling was frequented by prostitutes and many of the women were willing to do virgins free if they thought they could get repeat business. The beds in the back rooms of the Maqueling restaurant are the graveyards of the virginities of many of my classmates.

I was appointed monitor for my class because I had a higher score than the other boys in my department. At first I was proud to be monitor, but then it turned out that the department head wanted to use me to force my classmates to become involved in politics. From an upper classmate I learned that the leader would treat me well if I made sure that my classmates pretended to be Lei Feng, and if I reported to him who the troublemakers were. I was told I should join the Party. None of us liked the department head, who had been appointed by the university president supposedly because he was a dragon [long]. He was one of the worst teachers we ever had. He used a textbook that he had written, and it was one of the worst textbooks we every had. We nicknamed him "Da Chong" [big worm]. I asked to quit the monitoring job and I was told that I could not quit. It was an appointment for my life at Shenda. Anyway, I did quit and this caused me a lot of grief. Da Chong would not accept my resignation, so I just ignored all the assignments. After a tree-planting afternoon in which none of the class showed up and Da Chong lost face with the president, I was replaced with a more obedient student.

Before I graduated, I had found a job with an export company through a friend of my brother. During the probationary period, my performance was highly rated. However, when it came time to sign the contract, I was told that I was not needed. I had my brother's friend check this out and we learned that Da Chong had gone out of his way to tell the company I was irresponsible and should not be hired permanently. My brother's friend had to intercede on my behalf.

After we had our graduation ceremony in which the top leaders—the bosses of Da Chong—praised themselves for all their good deeds, we went out with our department for a banquet. Da Chong and his co-workers were *all toothy smiles, although they knew we did not like them and we knew they did not like us. Other departments took their students to fancy restaurants, but we went to one of the student canteens which had been set up to serve us and students from another department with cheap leaders. Uncharacteristically, they gave us all the beer we could drink, which might have been a mistake. We could drink a lot of beer, having four years of practice. So, as the meal went on, Da Chong realized that this was going to cost him more money than any* guanxi *with us was worth, so they cut off the flow of beer. We didn't like that. Somehow a bottle broke, perhaps by accident. Well, we just let a lot of beer bottles fall to the floor accidentally. While, we still had something left in our glasses, we gave a final toast. Long live Shenda! To the four treasures of our Shenda study:* tang, yan, jiu, and tao. *In other words, chocolate, cigarettes, wine and condoms.*

5. Pedagogy

As noted earlier, SZU operated what were called the Three Classrooms, referring to classroom instruction, part-time jobs, and extracurricular activities. The most important of these, at least as judged by students' time allocation, was the first classroom. Second-year Foreign Language students in 1992, for example, had signed up for an average 35 hours per week in class (25 hours were mandatory). Juniors were taking 32.5 hours, while first-term seniors usually saw fewer than 20 hours. Students in other departments took even more hours. The published *required* classes for Management majors who entered in 1992 and 1993 are presented in Table 5.1. Students who chose to take electives would acquire additional hours.

Classes met over five weekdays plus Saturday morning, and they spanned two hours (Saturday classes ceased when SZU conformed to the state-mandated five-day work week in 1995). Excluding breaks, instruction involved two 50-minute sessions, but classes in the third morning period were almost always cut short to allow students to rush to the canteens, a practice which was subjected to constant criticism by the Academic Affairs Office during each of SZU's administrations.

Table 5.1: Hours of required classes, *benke* Management majors entering 1992 and 1993[1]

		1992	1993
1st year			
	1st term	32	28
	2nd term	30	29
2nd year			
	1st term	29	26
	2nd term	23	28
3rd year			
	1st term	31	33
	2nd term	32	40
4th year			
	1st term	24	28
	2nd term	8	8

In a sense, students in Chinese higher education are treated like state employees. Their "job" is to study and prepare to become valuable *rencai* in socialist construction. Until the educational reforms of 1993 went into effect, most universities charged little or no tuition, and most graduates were assigned jobs as cadres with state-run companies or in government offices. In the pre-reform uniform system, curriculum and pedagogy were also standardized. Specializations, under Soviet influence, had their curricula set by the SEdC or ministries. Textbooks used to teach railroad hydraulics in Wuhan, for example, were the same as those used in Guangzhou. Pedagogy, although not standardized by state edict, had become effectively standardized through a historical development largely influenced by cultural factors. Classroom instruction varied, of course, by the nature of the individual teacher and the type of course, but in general, undergraduate education was textbook-based and exam-oriented. In the sciences track, most institutions lacked sufficient laboratory equipment to afford students the opportunity to experiment. They had to be content watching an instructor demonstrate. In cases where funds were so limited that not even the teacher could demonstrate, videos had to substitute. In the arts, the lack of funds also helped to define the nature of instruction. In the earlier days of the People's Republic, only the teacher had a textbook (perhaps one in Russian) from which to teach. Reading from the book, thus, was a logical pedagogy. There was little alternative. By the mid-1980s sufficient textbooks existed so that the lecturer did not have a monopoly over teaching materials.

Problems such as lack of money for textbooks or laboratory equipment/materials never really influenced SZU's teaching, although the latter may have had a negative impact on staff research. From the beginning, SZU's authorities were determined to create a modern university with modern teaching methods. The yearbooks were filled with the term *jiaoxue gaige*, teaching reform. This was a catchall phrase that encompassed curriculum reform, textbook reform, scheduling reform, credit system development as well as issues of pedagogy. This last element—the "toughest nut to crack" in the words of one teacher—remained more or less intact in a shell resistant to all but minor denting.

Despite the fact that students purchased textbooks, many teachers in the arts at SZU continued to run classes in the old fashioned way, lecturing (but now from textbooks that students themselves had bought). To a great extent this was the dominant mode of instruction in Foreign Language and the business departments; it existed but held minority sway among teachers in Chinese and Law. The worse teachers (in the students' opinion) would read right from the text; the better teachers would base their lectures on subjects covered by the text, which they used in a supplementary fashion. The best teachers, again in the view of students with whom I had conversations over my six years at SZU, would largely ignore the text. Some would provide reading lists. The best teachers were those who made learning interesting, in other words, those who kept the students from being bored. It is not surprising that students reported that a sense of humor was one of the most important characteristics of a good teacher.

The university administrations and the department leaders themselves campaigned against the type of lecturing methods referred to as *man tang guan*, literally "whole class inculcation," and *zhu ru shi*, literally "fill in style." The Management Department for one included the following statement in its Basic Requirements in Teaching Management:[2]

> Class teaching should stick to the principle of having only 'little but essential' content and should employ methods of enlightenment, case study and class discussion which are interesting and vivid.

The reason SZU teaching style remained largely unreformed, therefore, was not due to lack of stated intent.

SZU employed an exam-directed type of learning. Students were assessed by final exam, although homework, participation, and mid-term exams could be factored in to compute the final grade (but never more than 20-30%). Exams were almost always based on assigned texts, and prepping for exams meant understanding, or at least being able to replicate, material from the text. Almost no classes at SZU required original essays from students. Out-of-class work entailed reviewing texts in advance of lectures, but almost never did it require writing essays based on thought and/or research. Essays were required in some courses, but they were aimed at getting students to reproduce materials available in the text. For seniors the graduation thesis or design, as required by the SEdC, offered an opportunity for original work. This was the case in Electronics and Architecture, especially. In other departments it was often a mere exercise of reformatting others' ideas into a student's essay. Teachers took on 4-5 thesis advisees and met with them once or twice in a group. Students received little individualized attention, and the thesis defense was perfunctory.

Take-home examinations were not permitted at SZU; few teachers allowed term papers to substitute for examinations. Exams had to be sat for, at a specific time and location. This influenced students' class behavior. They rarely asked questions in class. When they did raise their hands, the purpose was to get further explanation from the teacher. Most questions that were asked had answers, and a good teacher was one who could provide the correct information. In other words, questions *should be* answerable. Confucius, arguably the greatest teacher in Chinese history, himself encouraged questions in this fashion. This was not the Socratic method, where questions to students served the purpose of developing the students' reasoning, logic and overall thinking ability. Teachers operating in the tradition of Socrates might ask students questions that cannot generate definite answers. Socrates would not have fit into the teaching and learning environment of SZU.

Among SZU teachers there was a general awareness that their pedagogy lacked imagination and in many cases failed to keep students' attention. This failing varied in degree by departments, but the problem was most acute in business and Foreign Language. Some teachers were intent to change their teaching style, however. Pei Quanzhong, an associate professor who taught international finance and banking, wrote on pedagogical reform in an article entitled "On the 'Dialog' Style of Teaching" that appeared in the university's internal journal in 1990.[3] Pei argued that his pattern of teaching varied from the traditional methods used in China in which students did not participate in class. Instead, Pei prepared students by giving them questions and reference materials. During discussions, he divided students into groups to promote questioning and dialog. Some students raised very difficult questions, and Pei tried his best to give satisfactory answers. Respond to the student immediately, he advised; don't spend time mulling over the question. Be patient with students who are nervous; don't ridicule students or laugh at their mistakes. Pei encouraged students to keep questioning until they got satisfactory explanations. He also permitted students to ask questions unrelated to the particular topic under discussion, and students could comment on each other's courtesy, style and organization of speech. Using these elements, Pei reported he never had cases of students sleeping or day-dreaming in class or creating disturbances. In his article, Pei explained that teachers had to be well-prepared; they must fully understand the material when using this style and must relate instruction to the standard textbook. Letting students participate, he admitted, did not lessen teacher work load but rather made it heavier.

To the Western educator, Pei's remarks might appear a bit basic, something right out of Teaching Methods 101. But in China, not only is this approach rare, but writing about the approach has also been rare. Both the approach and writing about it are becoming more frequent, however. Since the Open Door policy of the late 1970s, Chinese teachers have been exposed to western teaching methods as they have watched visiting overseas experts and expatriates employed as "foreign teachers." Some teaching staff have gone abroad for advanced degrees or as visiting scholars. Those who have returned have carried back to China information on what might be called "the Western approach." The two different approaches to pedagogy, described as "teaching-based model of learning" and "inquiry-based model," are described as thus in a World Bank publication:[4]

> The teaching-based model was popular in Europe and in America when education was viewed primarily as a process of transmitting knowledge and facts to a large number of people in a short time. Today, a country such as China, which faces the difficult task of training a large number of people in a short period of time in order to achieve its modernization goals, may still favor the teaching-based model. Although this model remains useful for transmitting factual knowledge, wherever great stress is now placed on understanding, it has been replaced by the inquiry-based model.

It seems fair to generalize that China uses the teaching-based (and teacher-based) model of learning, but the pedagogical picture is far more complex. Western observers have begun to note various positive aspects in the learning process in Confucian-heritage cultures (CHC).[5] Classrooms in CHCs provide good teaching and learning environments, including:[6]

> an emphasis on student activity, with much cooperative and other group work;
>
> warm classrooms/other learning climate, interpreting ‘warm’ as appropriate to the culture;
>
> high cognitive level outcomes are expected.

At the primary school level, for instance, several teachers are often assigned to a single class, and teachers can give individual students specialized attention. Students spend years mastering the writing of Chinese characters; memorization is a mainstay of the pedagogy, but memorization deepens and develops understanding.[7] Classes in secondary school are larger; the pedagogy remains uniform. But when CHC learners—at least in the case of research subjects in Hong Kong—move on to tertiary education, they initiate and self-structure a type of collaborative learning that has a positive effect on overall learning.[8] Nothing in CHC secondary education poses an insurmountable hurdle to keep students from becoming critical and creative thinkers at the university. This was borne out in a study of Singapore-educated students who went to Australia for university. These students, while continuing to maintain the high achievement orientation that characterizes CHC schooling, were able to adapt in order to meet the demands of a new educational environment, which included a de-emphasis on grades. These students became at least as active in tutorials as their native Australian counterparts.[9] Although the studies just cited do not use PRC students as subjects, their findings in so far as they relate to CHCs in general make at least two important points for Mainland educators. First, they suggest that primary and secondary schools in Chinese societies produce individuals with strong fundamentals for future learning. Second, respect for education and a strong teacher-student relationship are admirable features of an education system in which teachers develop close relationships with their students, relationships that often last a lifetime.

When PRC students arrive at university, pedagogy has been firmly ingrained. Mentoring relationships begin anew, especially among students who wish to pursue graduate studies. Shenzhen University was certainly a different case. At SZU, teachers were too busy with side-businesses to provide much mentoring, and few students were interested in graduate study (at least not in China). Classes in the business fields were large (70-100 students); no seminars were offered. The case method, which itself is appropriate for business courses, promotes inquiry-based learning;[10] but cases were rarely used in business courses at SZU. Overall SZU teaching was not closely monitored. The SZU Academic Affairs office was too preoccupied with administrative matters (room arrangements, examination scheduling, record maintenance, and the like) to be able to devote time to such a thorny issue as pedagogy. Reform—or rather announcements suggesting reform—in pedagogy most often came in the form of platitudes, directives or generalizations. Rarely were specifics provided; never were guidelines or rules issued. Rather, educational authorities were content with dismissing the standard pedagogy with a derisive characterization like “duck-filling type” (*tian ya shi*).

Experiments in pedagogy

Pei’s contribution, cited earlier, to the debate was unique among articles by teachers in SZU publications. Among a few of SZU’s expatriate teachers, however, a pedagogy more consistent with that practiced in Western countries existed. The next part of this chapter discusses several innovations in English language teaching that involved both Chinese and western faculty. Several courses will be examined: Oral/Conversational English, Listening, Writing and CECL (Communicative English for Chinese Learners), an innovative course that integrated reading, writing, listening, speaking and translation (the Five Abilities).

Oral English

Native English speakers are employed to teach Conversational English in most Chinese Universities. As a relatively wealthy institution, SZU hired about a dozen foreign teachers each year, most of whom taught in the Foreign Language Department. Conversation was a required course for English major students during their first two years, and students wanted ("demanded" in the words of a former department head) foreign teachers for these courses. The use of expatriate staff at SZU will be examined in the next chapter; suffice it to say here that these courses varied greatly in quality, as did the expatriate teachers themselves. No ESL credentials were required of expatriate language teachers; there was no guideline as to what the course was supposed to accomplish, what the students were supposed to learn, and no assigned textbooks or uniform class plan. Teachers, most of whom had never before taught in China and many of whom had never taught anywhere, had to "wing it." After hiring its teachers, the FLD would say only: "Get the students to speak in class, to be more active." The pedagogy of FLD did not encourage students to speak in classes taught by Chinese staff; conversation was allocated, indeed confined, to the Oral English courses. Despite their often lack of rigor (or perhaps because of it), these courses were generally liked by students, for they served as exposures to western culture. For most Chinese students, these courses were the first personal experiences they had had with people of a different race and culture. In anthropological terminology, the course was an introduction to "the other."

The first task for most Oral English teachers was to ensure that the students were interested in the course. A field of educational theory called megacognition suggests that students who are interested in a subject learn better than those who are uninterested or even bored. To maintain interest, conversation courses at SZU were often characterized by games, role playing, simulations and other active exercises. Gaming involved the teacher's presenting a situation and then dividing the students into smaller discussion groups. An example:[11]

> Tomorrow one million eggs will be delivered to the class. Your group will be receiving the eggs. What will you do with them?

Students would work out the problem in groups of four or five people. Sometimes students chose their own groups; more often, teachers distributed certain students—the best and the weakest—in ways so to maximize participation.

Another technique involved role-playing through skits. Students were given a brief handout and assigned a play to perform in the next scheduled class. They could rehearse the play by themselves at home but were not permitted to memorize parts. Each student had to be prepared to play all roles. An example of an assigned skit:[12]

> Mary and Lynn are best friends. But Mary has a secret. She has just broken Lynn's favorite vase from the Ming Dynasty. Lynn finds it missing and accuses her husband (played by the teacher), but eventually Mary confesses.

Such a technique required the teacher's active participation, something with which most Chinese teachers in the FLD felt uncomfortable.

Keeping students interested was a necessary but not sufficient part of the conversation teacher's job. Several teachers attempted to make the course more challenging than the "free talk" that characterized many classes managed by foreign teachers. In these teachers' opinions, quantity of conversation—the directive given teachers by the FLD—was no substitute for quality. Students at SZU, perhaps influenced by the Hong Kong media, spoke a type of English, commonly known in China as "Chinglish," that might be characterized as grammatically sloppy. China, of course, has its own English dialect, just as Alabama, Australia or Germany, for example. Chinglish is a sub-standard dialect of standard Chinese English. In Chinglish, inattention is paid to subject-verb agreement, pluralization, tense and pronoun gender. Although native English speakers tend sometimes to flaw their grammar, they rarely utter the type of mistakes that Chinese learners are prone to make. Chinese is a language that functions within rules that do not pay excessive attention to subject-verb agreement, pluralization, tense and pronoun gender—all items built into Romance and Germanic tongues. Thus, native speakers of English cringe when they hear the likes of: "Many girl goes home yesterday to sell his newspaper." Such an exaggerated example serves to illustrate common mistakes. Normal speech patterns of students entering SZU were not so bad as this example, of course, but they still included about one mistake per two sentences. To correct this, teachers would tape-record students' classroom conversations. Students were taped in unrehearsed conversations and then given the tape to take back to their dorm and transcribe. The typed transcription was to include exactly what the students had said, mistakes and all. They then corrected their mistakes in grammar and syntax, noting the type of mistake. Through this process, students began to realize that they constantly dropped the letter *s* from verbs as well as plural nouns. Finally, the teacher reviewed the transcripts, comparing them with the tapes, and made additional corrections when appropriate. In this way, individual students were able to spot their problems. Corrections and comments were made privately so the students would not be embarrassed in front of their classmates.

Using a tape-recorder in class in this way did not fit into the standard pedagogy of the FLD, and several Chinese teachers who were advised of the technique never employed it. Tape-recorders, they said, were to be used only for listening classes, not for conversation. One teacher who had earned a Ph.D. overseas agreed that students needed to speak more proper English, but the thought of having to listen to students' recordings and correct transcriptions was too time-consuming a task to be appealing. SZU teachers, in general, were reluctant to deviate from standard pedagogy in even the most minor way.

Composition

According to FLD promotional materials, writing was one of the Five Abilities that SZU English majors acquired. Writing, however, was a particular ability that Chinese teachers refused to teach. No fixed-staff (i.e., PRC teacher) was ever assigned to teach writing over the history of the department. Perhaps a half-dozen of the Chinese teachers in the FLD had sufficient English writing skills to teach the subject, but none was willing to commit to reading student essays. For the purpose of computing work load, writing courses were given 1.4 times the weight of normal courses without homework. Nonetheless, Chinese faculty members saw this compensation as inadequate for the drudgery associated with reading student essays. One teacher, who had studied abroad, explained:

> Our students can memorize, not analyze. They copy from others. Why should I read their essays when, if I really want to, I can go to the original source. Anyway, it is too much work. I have my own interests to think about.

Generally, teachers of foreign language at SZU were required to do little preparation for class. With rare exceptions, they spent no more than one hour per week preparing for *all* their courses. In addition, none of these teachers had written much in English since they had completed their graduate theses. Few teachers in the department published their research in English. For these reasons, there was no writing course required in the English major curriculum until the department was six years old. Before then writing had been taught only once, resulting in a disaster. The first composition teacher in the department chose teaching materials that resembled an American elementary school exercise book suitable for pre-teens. Students wrote their compositions on lined sheets in the exercise books, which they were to hand in to the teacher who would return them corrected. The SZU students considered this a condescending pedagogy not befitting young adults like themselves; their rebellion forced the teacher to abandon the procedure. Being a native speaker, of course, does not necessarily mean that one can write well, not to mention teach writing. In fact, unskilled foreign teachers tended to make very bad writing teachers.

In the early 1990s, several foreign teachers designed a writing sequence, which the FLD adopted. For subsequent years, the task of teaching writing fell to these and other foreign teachers. The sequence covered the first three years of English major study. (Students also took writing in their senior year, but the course was taught by the same foreign teacher who had used the pre-teens exercise book. That course, which was mostly devoted to writing business letters and resumes, was not taken seriously by senior students. When they were assigned essays to write, they merely recycled assignments from their previous, more rigorous courses or copied them from the encyclopedia.) The writing sequence developed by the two foreign teachers followed the general pattern used in American primary and secondary schools. Students started from the basics. They reviewed parts of speech and learned to diagram sentences. They practiced writing sentences and reviewing grammar, using American textbooks that were widely available in China.[13] Homework was assigned from exercise books on practical grammar usage, in which students learned to spot and correct mistakes.[14] A typical homework assignment might include 100 sentences to be corrected, for example, on misplaced modifiers or punctuation for independent clauses. Students then moved on to paragraphs and essays.

A variety of strategies used by writing teachers are widely known to ESL teachers in China. They include delayed copying, guided sentence-making, sentence transformations, sentence building, dictation-composition, cloze-test writing, linking words and phrases into a new passage, class composition on the chalkboard, strip-essay writing, pair group writing, composition through adaptation, composition through translation, précis and composition through pictures.[15] Experience has shown that successful teachers tend to be those who can design topics which students find interesting. Assignments like “My narrow escape,” letters of complaint to real or imagined authorities, or writing from other people’s points of view proved successful at SZU.[16] Students were required to word-process their assignments, using spell-checkers, grammar-checkers and a Thesaurus.[17] The Computer Center allocated class time for writing courses.

Grammar was a major part of writing class. FLD taught grammar to freshmen, but the course was theoretical in nature and did not involve student exercises, primarily because the teachers did not want to assign homework, fearing that they would have to correct it. The FLD students, therefore, lacked a practical grasp of grammar. Thus, grammar was made a part of writing classes, to the objections of the FLD leaders, who kept reminding the foreign teacher that expatriates were hired to teach writing, not grammar, which was a separate course. “We Chinese can teach grammar ourselves,” one leader commented.

To correct another major deficiency among ESL students, the writing sequence included homework on idioms and phrasal verbs. The FLD employed students to word-process several exercise books, which were mimeographed and sold to students, much to the dismay of the school’s printing office which did not relish such gargantuan jobs.[18] Correcting students’ mistakes has received much attention in the literature on how to teach writing. One FLD teacher used the Josephson method, which requires students to number each word of their essays.[19] The teacher marks (but does not correct) mistakes. A special form classifies sixty types of common mistakes (no topic sentence, improper article, wrong preposition, etc.). On that form, the teacher notes the numbers of the words that contain mistakes with the corresponding type of mistake. For example, if word # 25 is misspelled, the teacher jots #25 in the space for misspelled worlds. Using this method, the average 300-word essay took about 10 minutes to mark. Students then corrected their mistakes and returned the essay for a final mark (The teacher did not “grade” the essay until the student had made corrections, which served as an incentive for students to figure out their mistakes).

Having mastered writing fundamentals, students advanced to the upper level writing course which was offered in the third year. This course taught the students the fundamentals of research writing. First, students undertook directed research in which a topic was assigned and several newspaper articles were provided. Students were required to integrate the ideas from the articles into their own essays.[20] For the remainder of the course, students turned in monthly 1,000-word term papers on topics of their own choosing. Initially, access to research materials proved an impediment to students’ research. Although not primarily a research library, the SZU library still contained many useful sources (*New York Times, Time, Newsweek, Washington Post, China Daily, Readers’ Digest*, to cite a few). In the days before CD-Rom and WWW, the SZU library lacked even a single periodical guide to English-language publications. The job of finding articles relevant to student's chosen topics fell upon the teacher, who himself indexed relevant articles from the library's collection. The FLD had been given thousands of books and journals, many of which were donated by Hong Kong scholars. These were also indexed. Over several years FLD amassed its own research library that included a set of *National Geographic, Far Eastern Economic Review, and Asia Week.* Over time a computerized index (which students could themselves search in the Computer Center) contained over 1,500 citations to available articles. Fortunately, students invariably chose a narrow range of sociological topics to write on. The teacher on average was able to guide each student to three or four magazine articles, to chapters from textbooks or anthologies, or to journal papers relevant to his or her term paper topic.

In a sense, the writing sequence was only as good as its teachers. Few foreign teachers were qualified to teach the courses, but in the view of FLD leaders any foreigner was deemed capable of teaching writing. In one case, a Taiwan-born Chinese-American was assigned to teach the first year writing course. He lacked confidence, rightly so, in his own writing ability. He chose to ignore the teaching plan described above, instead lecturing on writing, Chinese history, and his life as an overseas Chinese. For an entire term he gave his students not a single writing assignment. His students, scared by their upperclassmen into believing that a replacement teacher would "enslave" them to homework, did not complain. Not coincidentally, these students produced the worse performance on the unified test for English majors in FLD history (Their performance on the writing component brought down their scores). In part because of their poor showing, the writing sequence was altogether abandoned the following year. From then on, teachers were instructed to run classes in which the students sat at their desks writing on assigned topics. Even though students were bored, the classes were orderly; the leaders of the FLD were pleased.

Listening and culture courses

Pedagogical innovations occurred in other courses taught by expatriate teachers. The Listening class had traditionally included a set of lessons based on tapes marketed under the name *Step By Step*. Listening was a course that many FLD teachers liked to teach, for it usually entailed just operating a language laboratory. The course involved virtually no teaching. English language majors performed well on the listening component of standardized exams, and the leaders of FLD believed that *Step By Step* was adequate, given the students' supplemental exposure to Hong Kong English language media. One foreign teacher disagreed. She had been issued extremely scratchy tapes, filled with background static, that were difficult for even a native speaker to understand. Produced by SZU's Audio/visual (A/V) Center, they were copies of copies of copies…Referring to the course as "sleep by sleep," she instead developed a complete 18-week course that catered to individual student's needs. Having collected interesting tapes and books-on-tape from Hong Kong, at her own expense, she was able to provide students with tapes that reflected their listening abilities. This course received the most enthusiastic student endorsement of any course ever taught in the department and earned the teacher a ¥1,000 bonus for excellent teaching performance by a foreign teacher, one of only two such awards that had been given to expatriate teachers in SZU's first 12 years. When this teacher left the FLD, she handed over the class plan and her collection of tapes to two Chinese fixed staff who were assigned to teach listening the following year. Neither of these teachers incorporated any of her course into their teaching; one admitted that such a course would be too time-consuming to teach. Instead, the teachers continued to use *Step by Step* whose very scratchiness and static were praised because they "forced students to listen more carefully."

Several foreign teachers constructed courses on American society and culture that reflected an anthropological perspective. These courses were lecture in format but the teachers attempted to maximize participation. One teacher broke down the class into smaller discussion groups and seminars. Using a variation on the Socratic method, another teacher called on students, referring to wallet-sized photos each had provided. Another teacher supplemented teaching materials with clippings from news periodicals, constructing his own reading lists. The pedagogies used in these courses are not much different from what many Western secondary and tertiary teachers might employ, yet they were unique for SZU, where teachers employed few innovations that departed from the standard one-way lecture.

Communicative English for Chinese learners (CECL)

In 1990 the FLD adopted an innovative core curriculum for students in the first two years of the English major. The program was called CECL, standing for Communicative English for Chinese Learners. Prepared by a team headed by Professor Li Xiaoju of the Guangzhou Foreign Languages Institute, CECL had been developed with the help of funding and personnel from the British Council. Most English major curricula in China consist of five separate components: extensive reading, intensive reading, listening, conversation, and writing, along with supplemental courses in grammar, linguistics, literature and translation. CECL combined the major components into an integrated arrangement.

CECL had been trialed at the Guangzhou Institute for several years and by 1990 was available in a set of 12 books, which included two volumes for each of the four semesters, plus four accompanying teacher handbooks.[21] Each book was divided into teaching units that covered two weeks each. CECL employed a student-centered approach, and the teacher's manual included an extensive introduction to acquaint the teacher to theories and methods of teaching that did not characterize standard language teaching pedagogy in China. First, CECL used the communicative approach, as opposed to the grammar-translation method or rote learning usually employed in ESL courses in China.[22] The various lessons included modern-day topics that students would find interesting. Reading materials were taken from recent publications, both Chinese and foreign. Second, CECL abandoned the teacher-centered approach, instead making the student the center of the class. Furniture had to be rearranged so students could directly face one another. The teacher was no longer at the center of class, literally or figuratively. Several times during a single lesson, students paired off to do exercises that a perambulating teacher monitored. For class exercises, the instructor's manual offered the teacher a variety of suggestions on how to conduct class, employing techniques similar to those discussed in the above section on oral English. Teachers were encouraged to prod students to ask questions and take over discussions. Third, the books contained homework, which included oral drills as well as written assignments. About one-third of student's time was to be devoted to out-of-class work. Fourth, the components were integrated and were not divided into discrete class-long periods, according to a fixed schedule. Listening, for example, might occur before speed reading drills but after oral exercises one week, but vice versa the next. The components flowed together; scheduling varied according to the needs of each unit. Effective CECL teaching, as experienced in Guangzhou, became team teaching. Teachers met several times a month to discuss the course and modifications were always in progress.

On the advice of a SZU foreign teacher, the head of FLD agreed to use CECL. Not himself trained as an ESL teacher, the department head accepted this new strategy without a full awareness of what it involved. After spending only a few minutes examining the textbooks, he accepted its usefulness primarily because the course had been developed by the prestigious

Guangzhou Institute, Guangdong's key language institute—FLD's main rival in terms of recruiting students. Several of the best teachers in the department were approached by the department head to teach the course; each refused, realizing the amount of work that would be involved. Finally, two relatively new teachers were assigned to teach the course. Neither, of course, had taught CECL before, but both were serious teachers with high levels of proficiency in English. They examined the books in the summer prior to the course's initiation.

As a course name, CECL did not appear on the freshmen's class schedules. Rather, students had the same schedules as previous classes: 6 hours of grammar-translation, known as intensive reading; 2 hours extensive (speed) reading; 2 hours listening; 2 hours writing; 4 hours of conversation with a foreign teacher; 3 hours video; plus a pronunciation course for the first term and a grammar course for the second term. CECL, taught by a single teacher for each of two freshman sections of 20 students, was scheduled into the six hours of intensive reading and two hours of listening. The listening class was assigned to one of A/V's language laboratories every Tuesday, despite the fact that the CECL lesson plan did not arrange a specific day for listening. Students were still required to take the extensive reading, writing and conversation courses although CECL also covered these areas. (Some of the teachers involved in these courses attempted to coordinate their activities with the CECL assignments). Freshmen's military training had cut the first semester short by one month. In order to finish the first semesters' books on time, each unit of CECL had to be compressed and completed in 1½ instead of two weeks. CECL assigned tests at the end of each unit and exams at the end of each book. SZU, however, assigned mid-term exams and final exams at specific weeks, for which CECL was forced to conform.

If these structural problems were an annoyance, CECL pedagogy proved a more difficult hurdle for teachers, with the major problem being the transition from teacher-oriented to student-oriented learning. The teachers had had no training for teaching CECL; for the first several weeks they felt uncomfortable and frustrated with the new method and realized that they were having problems. In the third week of classes, the two dispirited teachers went to the Guangzhou Institute (two hours away by train) where they visited classes, watched CECL teaching and talked with CECL teachers. They came away enlightened and refreshed. They returned to SZU with a confidence that was quickly reflected in their teaching.

Table 5.2: CECL results, first semester 1990-1991

	average	std. dev
CECL exam	75.4	7.8
reading	79.1	7.1
oral	75.4	7.8
listening	70.1	10.8

On the standardized exam given at the end of for the first semester, students performed well, about five percentage points below the students in Guangzhou. This probably reflected only the fact that the institute recruited students who scored 5% above SZU students on the English component of the college entrance exam. In other words, SZU CECL students were keeping pace with their Guangzhou counterparts. Listening was the FLD student's major weakness, so *Step by Step* (with non scratchy tapes) was introduced in the next term. Students were relatively content with CECL. Some grumbled about the amount of homework; others were still reluctant to speak in class, but all in all they were satisfied (see Table 5.2).

In the fall of 1991, CECL was expanded to include the next set of texts for the students who had moved on to the second year. A new freshman class started with the first course. One of the initial CECL teachers remained with the course and was joined by an enthusiastic, Hong Kong educated, experienced teacher. They taught the course much as it had been taught the previous year. The second year was taught by two of the FLD's most senior faculty members. One was a dedicated teacher who liked the CECL innovations; he taught his section in a serious manner. The other teacher, who at the same time was put in charge of the entire CECL curriculum, announced to the students at the beginning of the semester that he was teaching CECL only because he had been assigned to do so. He said he disagreed with the communicative approach and intended to integrate the CECL materials into an intensive reading framework. Furthermore, he said that he disagreed with teachers monitoring one another's classes ("No one will tell me how to teach"), so the bi-weekly CECL teachers conferences that had existed the prior year were abandoned. Still, teachers gave each other support through informal mechanisms. Despite the director's distaste for the course, CECL operated for that year largely unchanged; students remained satisfied.

The next year, however, the teacher who wanted to transform CECL into intensive reading was appointed deputy head of the department in charge of all English major teaching. He proclaimed this would be the last time the course would be offered at SZU. This teacher further amended the second year course to bring it more in line with standard intensive reading courses.

The FLD assigned a new teacher to teach the first year course. The newcomer was a Ph.D. holder from a key Chinese university. His field was literature, not ESL; he had had no experience teaching, and for various reasons (including sexual advances he made to students) he received little respect from the class. He taught the freshmen CECL students for 12 hours a week, attempting to use the course materials but not being able to understand, let alone master, the CECL method. A British Council CECL consultant who came to monitor CECL's progress in the FLD attended this teacher's class and characterized his teaching as a "disaster." When the department head was informed of this assessment, he said that new teachers should be given certain slack; the semester had already begun, replacing the teacher, however incompetent, would cause him to lose face. (In fact the newcomer had been hired by the department head through *guanxi*, so his replacement would cause the department head, himself, to lose face). The freshmen students endured CECL under the newcomer for the entire year. They were the very students who had the non-writing instructor from Taiwan, and as a conversation teacher the non-innovative foreign teacher who had once used the preteen writing workbook. (Her conversation course used similarly juvenile materials.) Thus, no solid English language foundation ever developed in that year's class; not a single member of the class passed China's uniform exam for English language majors that was taken in their junior year. The class was, in fact, the weakest in FLD history, despite the fact that their entry test scores had been relatively high. Their curriculum and its pedagogy were unchallenging; from almost the start they disengaged from learning English. In fact, these students were so disgusted with the FLD program that several of them went back to their secondary schools specifically to advise seniors not to choose FLD. The entry level exam scores for the following year dropped below those of the Chinese Department, for the first time in SZU's history.

To sum up, CECL was both a success and failure in the FLD. At times, especially in the first year, the program worked well. Three key elements were present in its teachers: enthusiasm, dedication and competence, leading to full engagement of those teachers into their teaching. But some or all of these elements were lacking in the course's subsequent development; had they been present, perhaps the course would not have been judged a failure, as measured by poor student test scores, and teachers' and students' disengagement.

Cooperative learning

A type of learning present in North American education from kindergarten to graduate school is called cooperative learning. Basically, students take on classroom or homework assignments in small groups. Cooperative learning allows for discussion, an exchange of views and the management of intellectually conflicting ideas.[23] Its advocates contend that the pedagogy "promotes a greater use of higher-level reasoning strategies and critical thinking than do competitive or individualistic learning strategies."[24] Chinese society generally values harmony over conflict and this extends to the classroom (where unfortunately harmony also contributes to student passivity). Nevertheless, cooperative learning rarely exists at any level of education in China. CECL attempted to incorporate group work in classes, but the SZU teachers generally dispensed with homework assignments that used this method. There was too much resistance from students, and the instructors themselves were not familiar with the teaching techniques that accompany students' group work.

Cooperative learning was employed by an expatriate teacher in a research writing class. Sixteen students were each given a different book about Chinese who lived abroad. The teacher had acquired single copies of novels and personal accounts such as Maxine Hong Kingston's *Woman Warrior* and *China Men* and Amy Tan's *Joy Luck Club* and *Kitchen God's Wife*.[25] Before reading the novels, students selected a term paper topic of their individual choosing (e.g., leaving a spouse behind, remittances to the motherland, growing up bicultural/schizophrenic, discrimination on two continents, etc.). In their term papers students were required to cite illustrations from as many of the books as possible. Rather than read each book, they were encouraged to share information. Their first drafts generally relied on only their own book and perhaps the one given to a close friend or roommate. Cooperative learning did not kick in until students were forced to revise their papers and resubmit a draft that used more sources. Some students required three or four drafts before completing the assignment to the teacher's satisfaction. In the end a great amount of sharing had occurred, and this experience in cooperative learning seemed successful.

Cooperative learning is an example of yet another teaching technique that troubled SZU teachers as well as students. Its difficulty as a teaching strategy per se was only one reason why it was avoided. Various cultural, political and structural features of higher education, all discussed below, were also involved. In terms of pedagogy in China, competition is generally more highly valued than cooperation. In her study of secondary schooling during the Cultural Revolution, for example, Susan Shirk found less cooperation in academic study than in labor or extracurricular activities.[26]

> Study was organized individually, with no collective goal; the stakes also were higher—university selection was in large part based on academic records. Furthermore, the structure of educational selection and job assignment placed classmates in direct, face-to-face competition with one another.

Just as at SZU, more emphasis was placed on competition, as achieved through individual, not group, activity.

Creativity

If pedagogy in Chinese education is considered a hard nut to crack, then creativity is a virtual rock. To start with, creativity is a subject of Western, not Chinese study; it generates little substantive research in the PRC. Even in the West, it is an amorphous concept. It has no commonly accepted definition, and there are no easy ways to measure it. Theories from a sub-field that educators call Philosophy of Education have come up with little careful analysis. Any mere pondering on creativity itself might tend to be considered creative, in the absence of an understanding of creativity among so-called theorists in the field. In the case of China, there exists little writing, either theoretical or empirical, about creativity in Chinese education, and there seems to be nothing that would resemble a "Chinese approach to creativity." That is not to say, of course, that creativity does not exist in China, either in modern day society or in its traditional culture. Indeed, feudal China saw inventions such as paper (including toilet paper), moveable type, the compass and gunpowder long before they appeared on the European continent. Some claim that Chinese society changed from being innovative to being non-innovative and that the change occurred when Confucian philosophy became dogma.[27]

Neither my purpose here nor my expertise allows me to develop a fully flushed-out theory of Chinese creativity. Yet, it seems important to recognize that creativity may mean something different in a culture that so greatly differs from that of the Western world. As a consequence, creativity in the context of Chinese higher education may be different from what exists in universities in other societies. This section explores some of the issues surrounding creativity at SZU, but first Western research on the concept is briefly examined. Then the importance of the individual versus that of the collective is explored. Finally, building on the previous section, I will suggest the structural changes that might enhance critical and creative thinking in learning at SZU.

Western research approaches to creativity

Critical and creative thinking are subjective concepts. As with the terms *intellectual* or *pornography* or *culture*, definitions for creativity vary to such an extent that the art of definition largely rests with the individual user. It becomes almost a matter of taste. In a sense, the definition of creativity also depends on the approach taken—the discipline in which one is ensconced. Westerners who study creativity usually come from one of three fields, and the literature any given group cites generally does not overlap with the references from the other groups. Researchers from all three groups have much to say about how one generates creativity or teaches creative thinking.

If the word *thinking* is used with reference to creativity, it is likely that the user is grounded in philosophy. Throughout the history of Western civilization, philosophers have commented about creativity.[28] More recently, Matthew Lipman has produced a body of work that deals with teaching philosophy to children.[29] He links creative with critical thinking and shows how they support each other in order to produce higher-order thinking. He makes the point that creative thinking is governed by the context of the inquiry taking place. Furthermore, he attaches an importance to the environment and points out that many of the obstacles to introducing thinking in school curriculum are conceptual in nature.[30] Favorable conditions, such as competent teaching, adequate curriculum and the formation of a community of inquiry are needed.[31]

Another group that researches creativity includes psychologists (mostly cognitive psychologists and their number-crunching relatives, the psychometricians) who tend to discuss creativity in terms of intelligence and giftedness.[32] The pioneering work in this area comes from J. P. Guilford,[33] who separates creativity from intelligence, the latter which represents convergent thinking, i.e., providing the correct solution according to intelligent reasoning. Guilford’s view is that creativity includes divergent thinking, which occurs when one can develop different solutions to a particular problem. Another major contribution comes from E. P. Torrance who developed tests to measure creativity.[34] Educational psychologists have begun to view creativity as including various components—both divergent and convergent thought as well as total immersion in a particular field, high intrinsic motivation and cultural and social acceptability.[35]

The third group of researchers are developmental psychologists, as exemplified by Howard Gardner.[36] A prolific author who is best known for his theory of multiple intelligences,[37] Gardner shares with philosophers the view that creativity is context-oriented. He disputes the validity of creativity tests, however, and in his own research substitutes a historiometric approach for the psychometric tradition.[38] While philosophers relate creativity to the *process* of thinking, Gardner ties the concept more to output.[39] In his study of seven recognized creative geniuses, he identifies two shared traits: affective/cognitive support and total sacrifice in pursuit of their work mission.

Although no universally accepted definition of creativity emerges from the literature, Gardner's offering will suffice for the purposes of this volume:[40]

> The creative individual is a person who regularly solves problems, fashions products, or defines new questions in a domain in a way that is initially considered novel but that ultimately becomes accepted in a particular cultural setting.

Creativity and Chinese education

To note that creativity does not generate substantial research in China is not to say that creativity is ignored by Chinese educationalists and observers. In philosophical ponderings, intellectuals often applaud independent thinking:[41]

> Teaching must concentrate on training the students' ability to practice and work independently and on cultivating their creativeness. Teachers should help the students strengthen their basic knowledge, extend their scope of specialized knowledge, and should constantly improve their teaching methods.

Individualized teaching is also praised.[42] Pedagogy should produce in the student "a capacity for self-directed studies, adeptness in problem-solving, organizational and managerial skills and innovativeness (or a budding creative ability)."[43] At the same time, Chinese observers note that exam-directed schooling characterizes Chinese education and prevents creativity.[44] Western-educated observers agree:

> The content of the examination became the content of schooling. What was intended to be a means to an end became an end in itself. This perverted form of education produced generations of scholars and intellectuals who possessed a very limited range of knowledge, shared a narrow worldview, squabbled over words, and were too concerned with antiquity to think creatively or act independently.[45]

> The strong emphasis on testing and student evaluation has furthermore led to a very exam oriented type of teaching also in secondary education focusing on easily testable knowledge at the expense of problem-solving, creativity and practical skills.[46]

Contemporary Chinese educators are also concerned about the lack of creativity among students, something which is perceived to adversely affect the country's modernization and development. Some advocate radical reform:[47]

> The predominant goal of teaching and learning must be changed from transmitting knowledge to training ability so that one can adjust to the rapid development of science and technology and can accept, digest and apply newly emerging ideas. This goal requires that teachers consciously set aside old habits and use an elicitation method in classroom teaching. One half of the class period should be used for instruction and the other half for discussion. Only in this way can the quality of teaching and learning be improved...To obtain such objectives, the old and 'closed' educational system must be changed to an 'open' educational system, that is, a creative education which mainly develops students' intelligence and creativeness. Its characteristics are four: (a) to change from mono-teaching to a combination of teaching, research and production so as to make the teaching system multiple; (b) to change a 'closed' type of class to an open one so as to bring the 'second channel' (activities outside the classroom) into the teaching system; (c) to change from an approach dominated by teachers to one in which student learning predominates and the teaching role is a guiding one; (d) to change from passing on knowledge to developing intelligence so as to seek integration of knowledge and intelligence.

Generally, many feel that education should at least require students to grasp basic knowledge and to possess capable work skills, creativity and the necessary ability for conducting public activities.[48] Indeed, one of the arguments in the 1980s in support of the abolition of job assignments was that the centrally managed system failed to treat people as individuals and the very concept of job allocation prevented graduates from using their talents and impeded their creativity and spirit.[49] As part of a general overhaul of human resources planning, general education has been advocated.[50] As graduates experience competition in a more open job market, work-units recruit on the basis of more than just high marks; graduates must show interpersonal skills, organizational ability, creativity, an ability to express themselves well, adaptability to the social environment and the ability to make independent judgments.[51] But in the view of many Chinese educators, graduates lack independence and decision-making abilities. They are seen as passive, their creativity is restrained, and their potential cannot be developed.[52]

Given educator's concerns with how to foster creativity in higher education, why did SZU's pedagogy remain as it did? Part of the answer lies in how the individual fares in Chinese culture and in education in particular. CECL and the courses developed by expatriate teachers, as discussed above, tried to maximize the importance of the individual. Indeed, English language students in China, according to one study, prefer individual class work.[53] Foreign teachers see the need, especially in China, for teachers to learn how "to free the strengths and creative energies of the individual, how to frame a social environment wherein the individual is free to experiment, to err, to try again, and to fail again—without losing face, no less being expelled form school or jailed or worse."[54]

The individual in Chinese culture

Cultures differ along various continua. An inter-disciplinary theory, called not surprisingly Cultural Theory, has developed over the last several decades to suggest that two phenomena in particular define cultures.[55] One is called *groupness* and concerns individuals and their participation in the collective. Societies, for example, which are thought of as hierarchical score high in groupness. In contrast, societies whose members are characterized as individualistic tend to rate low in groupness. The other important phenomenon for defining a culture is the degree of *classification* that exists within a given culture. Hierarchies have high levels of classification whereas a society that is fully egalitarian would be low in terms of classification. Thus, these two phenomenological factors combine to create four groupings: (I) high classification, high groupness; (II) low classification, low groupness; (III) high classification, low groupness; and (IV) low classification, high groupness. This first grouping comprises individuals within a hierarchy. Their society is highly classified and within each class exists high collectively. Confucian societies are generally thought of as highly hierarchical. The second category, in contrast, represents societies that are individualistic. Both attributes—hierarchy and groupness—are low. People (and by extension cultures) who fit into category III are fatalists. This would be the case in caste-based societies where individuals are born into a classification and remain there throughout their lives. Their individuality is of no consequence. Category

Figure 5.1: Cultural Theory



[a] Western higher education
[b] Chinese higher education

IV includes egalitarians. Everyone is equal; the collective rather than the individual is important. These groupings are represented in Figure 5.1.

Higher education, insofar as it reflects the values of the larger society, is placed in Figure 5.1's quadrant (I) for China and quadrant (II) for Western systems. Chinese society is often stereotyped as collectivist and anti-individualistic. David Y.F. Ho, a leading cross-cultural psychologist and an expert on the Chinese patterns of socialization, reports that:[56]

> Traditionally, great emphasis was placed on obedience, proper conduct, moral training, and the acceptance of social obligations, in contrast to the lack of emphasis placed on independence, assertiveness, and creativity.

Ho has noted in other research that the degree of Chinese collectivism varies over its five major components: achievement, values, autonomy/conformity, responsibility and self reliance/interdependence. Achievement, the component most associated with education, is the only one of these that merits characterizing Chinese culture as predominantly collectivist as well as anti-individualist.[57] Educational programs in Mainland China, according to Ho, place a stronger emphasis on achievement motivation than elsewhere, including Taiwan:[58]

> Efforts are directed towards training children to become active, self-reliant, competent, intellectually critical, and achievement oriented...Co-operative ef-

> forts by members of a group toward achieving collective goals are emphasized more than individual competitiveness.

Certainly, collectivism can be seen in the hallways of SZU, where students in a certain class (year and major) take their courses together in a single group. They move in herd-like fashion from period to period, classroom to classroom. (One Australian observer equated these migrations with sheep who graze from paddock to paddock.) The issue of collectivism in education, however, deserves to be explored beyond this agricultural metaphor. Chinese education combines both collectivism and individualism, just as do the world's other educational systems. Chinese education is individualized in the sense of having competition for university entrance, but it is non-individualized in the sense that instruction is virtually the same for all students of a major. Yet, at SZU instruction did not generally incorporate co-operative learning or research paper writing; pedagogy was quite collective. It has been noted that elsewhere in China, university students prefer to present group work (which of course includes individual contributions) as a group so that individuals are not put on the spot. This may have been the case at SZU. In any case, the examples of innovations presented above which emphasized the individual over the collective were unusual at SZU.

Education in China is not directed towards creativity. It is focused on giving students knowledge, not teaching them to think. Furthermore, subjects that lend themselves to individual interpretation and expressions (literature, history, arts, etc.) have been tightly controlled and politicized by the state since at least 1949, and perhaps for centuries. In China, one first acquires knowledge and skills, and only after that should one attempt to be creative. Thus, according to psychologist Howard Gardner, the dominant educational assumption in China is that basic skills are fundamental and must precede any efforts to encourage creativity.[59] The western approach, in contrast, is quite the opposite. There is nothing wrong with children's composing their own music or art pieces; experimentation is encouraged. The focus is on the individual, which is why Western (higher) education is placed in quadrant (II) of Figure 5.1. But in China skills are learned collectively. One learns to write characters properly—aligned perfectly on sheets of paper filled with boxed squares to serve as guide—before one develops an individualistic calligraphy style. In other words, skills first, creativity later. Gardner points out that each approach has advantages:[60]

> The advantage of the Chinese way is that more of your students become proficient and make it to the goal line. The disadvantage is that they may have

> less to say or to show once they get there. The disadvantage of the American way is that many students never make it to the end or even get close. The advantage is that some who do go ‘all the way’ have very interesting and original things to say when they get there.

The Chinese education system, characterized by its steep pyramid, grooms those pupils with high test scores—a select few—to reach the goal line and go to college. It can scarcely afford dropouts among this élite, something that would indicate an inefficient use of scarce resources. Teaching for creativity might get in the way of learning skills and confound the system of advancement based on examination scores. In so emphasizing knowledge-based learning, Chinese education at all levels downplays creativity. Heidi Ross observed this phenomenon in classrooms in a Shanghai foreign language secondary school. There teachers were risk-averse, fearing that critical and creative thinking would bring with them “a price tag of unpredictable results, making both educators and pupils vulnerable to criticism of negligent divergence from officially sanctioned pedagogy.”[61] At that school, however, teachers were still concerned with teaching for creativity. There, “[t]he central pedagogical dilemma facing teachers was how to transform this pattern of rewarding predictable classroom discourse into the ‘independence,’ ‘critical thinking,’ and ‘creativity’ they desired in older students.”[62] SZU teachers lamented lack of creativity among their students, but they did not modify their own pedagogy to remedy the situation. Teachers who had emotionally disengaged from classroom teaching showed little concern over this issue.

In some cases, teachers actually thwarted students’ creativity. One senior wrote his graduation thesis comparing J.D. Salinger’s *Catcher in the Rye* with the works of contemporary Beijing novelist Wang Shuo. Wang, one of the most popular authors in China today, writes about youth alienation and, according to the student, can be regarded as China’s Salinger. The first draft of the student’s thesis was one of the most original essays I had seen from a SZU student, but the thesis advisor rejected the comparison, telling the student to write a “more basic” essay, just describing *Catcher in the Rye*. Too busy with his own projects, the advisor could not be bothered even to talk with the student; he was not interested in intellectual dialogue with any student. Although this example might illustrate an extreme case of irresponsibility, indifference generally characterized SZU’s teachers. For many of them, teaching was a chore; few allowed it to be a challenge. Few had time for creative students.

Concluding thoughts

Pedagogical reforms at SZU were handled almost exclusively within individual academic departments. The Academic Affairs Office was concerned only with the “nuts and bolts” of teaching management, including classroom scheduling, exam administration, the proper filing of teaching plans, etc. The AAO often monitored teaching through spot checks to guarantee that classes were held according to plan. An example from a 1986 report follows:[63]

> On Tuesday morning, April 16, the Academic Affairs Office sent out 12 *ganbu* [cadres] to monitor fourth period discipline in classrooms. There were 23 classes in session, with 888 students in attendance, and on the whole, classroom order was excellent. When the bell rang, the great majority of students quickly and quietly entered their rooms. Sixteen classrooms had very orderly atmospheres; six were just average; and one class was deficient in order. Most teachers paid attention to correctness, lectured with sincerity, and most students listened dedicatedly to their words, cooperating to make the learning experience lively. However, the following problems were discovered:
>
> - one teacher did not pay attention to proper procedure, lecturing while seated on a desk;
> - one teacher came to class two minutes after the bell, and one student was 20 minutes late;
> - generally teachers finished their lectures before the bell rings; in eight classes, teachers finished with less than five minutes to go; in one class, with five-to-ten minutes left; and in three classes, with between 15 and 20 minutes remaining in the period;
> - fairly many students—about 70 or so—wore slippers to class, which were very ugly to look at; one student wore an undershirt to class, and one student came in shorts;
> - there were also students who napped in class, ten with their heads resting upon desks, the longest for a half-hour, with the teacher saying nothing;
> - in most classrooms, after class ended, the lights and air-conditioning were not turned off, and the windows were not closed.
>
> Our school’s teaching environment, as mentioned, is quite good, but we have to go a step or two further…We urge all to self-consciously respect classroom discipline, and create an outstanding teaching atmosphere.

As this report illustrates, AAO was concerned with management issues, not teaching quality. The content of classroom teaching was rarely reviewed.

The university administration delegated responsibilities in curriculum design and pedagogy to department heads, who usually further delegated responsibilities to a sub-leader in charge of academics (as was the case with CECL as noted above). Concerns over teaching often had to take the back burner to other more pressing issues, many of which were political in nature. To a great extent, the upper levels of SZU did not interfere. The Luo administration believed that teaching would be improved by market mechanisms: if students were free to choose courses and teachers, they would select the best teachers, and the worst teachers would get no students. This hardly ever happened because, in fact, students' tight schedules permitted little flexibility. Luo and his associates also supported self-study. They encouraged students to register for a course, purchase the text, and study on their own for the exam. Self-study was acknowledged to be more productive than sitting through classes with uninspiring teachers. Students took this advice to heart. By the late 1980s, class attendance plummeted below 50%. Several of my students at that time were taking 70 hours of classes per week, enrolled in as many as three classes in a given time slot. Administrations that followed Luo abandoned the market mechanism, and class attendance was made compulsory.

Most universities in China have over the years operated teaching-research offices (*jiao yan shi*) at the departmental level. Teachers who teach sections of the same course work together on a unified plan. They often attend each other's classes for mutual monitoring. In SZU's early years, teaching-research offices were not set-up, reportedly because of insufficient personnel, as noted in the last chapter. Instead, teachers were encouraged to develop their own courses, and there was no need seen for teachers to work in groups. For one thing, since the school was small there were only a few cases where teachers taught sections of the same course (usually public courses such as English, Chinese, politics and PE). In the departments' annual reports published in the yearbooks, only Law in 1987 mentioned this type of mutual auditing by teachers. AAO introduced the concept of auditing in 1991, but it was primarily leaders at the department and upper level, not teachers, who were encouraged to do the monitoring. IFT, as noted earlier, in 1992 started to fine teachers who failed to monitor their colleagues. In 1993 the Chinese Department encouraged the auditing of new teachers by experienced teaching staff. That year saw the establishment of a 10-person Teaching Monitoring Office and a vice-president was hired solely for teaching (relieving vice-president Zheng of this portfolio.) All this was part of the preparation for the 1995 accreditation to show the SEdC that SZU was taking measures to improve teaching quality and management. Over the years departmental monitoring efforts in Foreign Language, Management, Electronics, Law and Social Sciences were praised in the *News Briefs*.[64] But it appears that efforts at peer review did little to change teaching quality. Monitoring was *pro forma* at best, and teaching quality remained low. Departments where students were relatively satisfied—namely Architecture, Law, Management and Electronics—and where teaching was perceived as above average remained so. No actions by the leadership affected this one way or the other. Departments were students were more dissatisfied continued to teach poorly.

Three departments—Architecture, Electronics, and Math—where students spent much time working on their own in laboratories or studios had among the highest student satisfaction levels in my 1993 survey. This seems to suggest that laboratory work itself made for a successful pedagogy, at least as defined by student satisfaction. Yet, departments with somewhat more dissatisfied students—Chemistry, Mechanical Engineering, Civil Engineering and Physics—also stressed laboratory work. Thus laboratory work by itself probably did not ensure a satisfying pedagogy. To be successful, lab work had to be integrated into a larger framework where class lectures were seen as useful and necessary by the students. This occurred in Architecture and Electronics. In the arts majors, only Chinese, Management and Law students were relatively satisfied with their classes.[65] In other arts majors—business and foreign language—students felt that they would miss nothing if they skipped classes. They felt no need to attend classes; they could study the material on their own. Why was the pedagogy in these majors so unsuccessful?

Students were most critical of the teachers who were perceived as not taking their classroom duties seriously. The example of one of FLD's translation teachers serves to illustrate. During class periods this instructor would assign students several passages to translate. While students sat at their desks translating the passages; the teacher left the classroom to attend to personal and administrative matters. He would return before the final bell and collect the papers. The following class he would hand the students back their papers with corrections. These corrections, according to the students, were minor and not very helpful. Students resented being treated like primary school pupils.

Instructors who spent most of their energy on side-businesses were seen by students as not giving proper respect to the students. The close relationships between student and teacher that have traditionally characterized all levels of Chinese education were absent in many SZU departments. Students felt abandoned and they responded to this rejection by, in turn, rejecting their teachers. On a number of occasions students told me that that they did not respect their teachers. Similarly, many teachers confided that they had little respect for their students, whom generally they considered spoiled little emperors (*xiaohuangdi*).

Another set of constraints that prevented pedagogical reform was structural in nature. A teacher shortage in the late 1980s required large classes in many SZU majors. In these situations teachers had little choice but to employ the one-way lecturing style. These courses did not have accompanying tutorials, which the lecturer or a teaching assistant would conduct. SZU had few teaching assistants and no certified graduate program whose students could serve as tutors. Even if adequate personnel for tutorials had existed, students' schedules were too tight to fit them in. Of course, lectures *ipso facto* need not be mere repetitions of the textbook. Certainly some teachers at SZU gave interesting, even inspiring, talks (in the Chinese Department especially). But most teachers did not. Their presentations put students to sleep. Few teachers were interested in changing their style of teaching; they had more important issues to worry about, such as how to earn extra income to augment their salary.

Real change can be daunting. Luo Zhengqi had encouraged teachers to take risks, once saying that when teaching experiments failed, the responsible teachers would not be penalized. There was no such assurance offered in the politicized atmosphere of the university in the 1990s. By then few teachers at SZU were motivated to try new ways of teaching. At that time student evaluations had become part of routine teaching management, and teachers became even more reluctant to take chances and make changes that might result in negative student feedback. The major instance of pedagogical reform at SZU in the 1990s involved the introduction of A/V technology. This "reform" encouraged teachers to use overhead projectors rather than the blackboard. The reform was heralded by the AAO as a "great advance" in classroom learning. Sadly, this suggests just how the office in charge of SZU's teaching perceived pedagogy. AAO acted as if the only element that needed to be changed involved technology, a structural element. Perhaps this was the only element they felt that could be changed.

The focus on the collective in pedagogical style at SZU limited creativity among individuals. This is not to say that individuals were not important. Quite the contrary. The university's very mission was to produce *rencai* for the Shenzhen SEZ. In this regard, the unit was the individual, not the collective. But in teaching style, the collective won out. Many students at SZU evidenced degrees of creativity, using Gardner's definition given earlier, but they did so outside the structured learning environment of the university. SZU's pedagogy itself did not generally provide a vehicle for critical and creative thinking. The *rencai* function of higher education in China is, of course, not *prima facia* inconsistent with an education that spurs creativity. In fact, Chinese educational reformers promote this type of education for China's future *rencai*:[66]

> …[students] should learn not just existing knowledge, but more importantly, their ability to discover new knowledge should be cultivated. Teachers should provide students with 'hunting rifles' to enable them to seek knowledge on their own, and not just hand over 'field rations' for them to eat. The aim of providing 'hunting rifles' is to train a vast number of specialized personnel who possess a high degree of intellectual ability and creativity.

Few SZU students, other than those in a few select majors (Chinese, Architecture, Electronics) were entrusted with such 'hunting rifles.'

---

1. Source: *Department of Management, Shenzhen University* [booklet, 1993], pp. 26-30. Both years offered Industrial/Commercial Enterprise Management; 1993 included Real Estate Management.
2. *Management Department, Shenzhen University, 1983-1992* [booklet, 1993], p. 21.
3. Pei Quanzhong, "On the 'dialog' style of teaching," *Shenda Tongxun*, 1990, no. 9, pp. 25-8. Whether Pei actually used the methods he wrote about is in doubt. None of his five former students interviewed said his pedagogy was any different from that of their other teachers.
4. Boisot, "Two models of learning," 1992, p. 25.
5. See generally Watkins & Biggs, *The Chinese Learner,* 1996. Although the data and findings presented in that volume concern CHCs outside the PRC, much appears relevant to teaching and learning in Mainland China.
6. Biggs, "Western misperceptions of the Confucian-heritage learning culture," 1996, p. 57 [typo corrected].
7. Marton, Dall'Alba & Tse, "Memorizing and understanding," 1996.
8. Tang, "Collaborative learning," 1996.
9. Volet & Renshaw, "Chinese students at an Australian university," 1996, pp. 205-20.
10. Lynn, "The case method," 1992.
11. These and other games are found in Sadow, *Idea Bank,* 1982. See also Heyworth, *Discussion,* 1984.

12. Outlines for other skits appear in Agelasto, “Roleplaying helps inactive students,” 1991.
13. Watkins & Dillingham, *Practical English Handbook*, 1982; Flynn & Glaser, *Writer’s Handbook*, 1984; Coats & Sandel, *Paragraph Writing*, 1986. Pirated copies of these and other texts were purchased by the FLD—actually the foreign teacher made the purchase and was later reimbursed—and resold to students. In the late 1980s before China had signed the international copyright convention, foreign language bookstores in China maintained backrooms to which foreigners were generally denied entry. In several cases, students made the actual purchases for the foreign teacher.
14. Watkins & Dillingham, *Practical English Workbook*, 1982; and Glaser, *Workbook for Writer’s Handbook*, 1984.
15. Zhang & Chen, “Techniques to teach writing,” 1989.
16. For ideas see Lui, “From craft to art, 1989,” p. 26; Runkle, “A technique to teach writing,” 1988.
17. See Agelasto, “Computers and academic writing,” 1993.
18. Howard, *Idioms in American life*, 1987; McPartland, *Take it Easy*, 1981; Walker, *Nelson Practical Book on Phrasal Verbs*, 1982.
19. Josephson, “Marking EFL compositions,” 1989.
20. This technique is described in Kehe and Kehe, “The pre-research paper research paper,” 1989.
21. Shanghai Publishing House for Foreign Language Education, 1988. A full issue of a journal published by the Guangzhou Institute of Foreign Languages was devoted to CECL. See *Research on Foreign Language Teaching in Higher Education [Waiguoyu gaojiao yanjiu]*, 1993, no. 6.
22. Li, “In defence of the communicative approach.” See also Penner, “Change and Conflict,” 1995.
23. Kuhlman, *Agony in Education*, 1994, 201-204.
24. Johnson & Johnson, *Learning Together and Alone*, 1994, pp. 57-8. Examples of creativity-generating techniques that involve cooperative learning may be found in “Synectics,” Chapter Ten, in Joyce & Weil, *Models of Teaching*, 1986, pp. 159-83; and Conroy, “Classroom management,” 1993, pp. 248-53.
25. Bezine, *Children of the Pearl*, 1991; Bezine, *On Wings of Destiny*, 1992; Bezine, *Temple of The Moon*, 1992; Chung, *The Incorporation of Eric Chung*, 1984; Kingston, *Tripmaster Monkey*, 1989; Kingston, *Woman Warrior*, 1977; Kingston, *China Men*, 1981; Lao, *Mr. Ma and Son*, 1991; Lee, *China Boy*, 1991; Liao, *The Lotus Blossoms*, 1953; Liu, *Two Years in the Melting Pot*, 1984; Mo, *Sour Sweet*, 1982; Tan, *Three Sisters of Sz*, 1989; Robinson, *The Chinese*, 1983; Spence, *The Question of Hu*, 1988; Tan, *The Joy Luck Club*, 1989; Tan, *The Kitchen God’s Wife*, 1991; Tan, *Letters from Thailand*, 1991; Theroux, *Fong and the Indians*, 1976; Zhou, *Manhattan’s China Lady*, 1992.

---

26. Shirk, *Competitive Comrades*, 1982, p. 161.
27. University of California, Berkeley, Chancellor Chang-Lin Tien made this point in an address at Hong Kong University, 19 December 1994. The speculation is also discussed by I-M. Liu, “Chinese Cognition,” 1986, p. 104. This seems to be a widely held perception although it has not been subjected to severe academic scrutiny. A vitriolic cultural critic contends Confucianism has strangled intellectuals’ imaginations and stunted their reasoning. See Bo, *The Ugly Chinaman*, 1992, p. 20.
28. Bo, *The Ugly Chinaman*, 1992, p. 20.
29. Lipman, Sharp & F.S. Oscanyan, *Philosophy in the Classroom*, 1980.
30. Lipman, *Thinking in Education*, 1991, pp. 174-182.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 212.
32. This is illustrated throughout the compilation by Glover, Ronning & Reynolds, *Handbook of Creativity*. See also Getzels & Jackson, *Creativity and Intelligence*, 1962.
33. E.g., Guilford, “Three faces of intellect,” 1959.
34. Torrance, *Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking*, 1966.
35. Biggs & Moore, *The Process of Learning*, 1993, Chapters Six and Seven.
36. Gardner, *Creating Minds*, 1993.
37. Gardner, *Frames of Mind*, 1985.
38. Gardner, *Creating Minds*, 1993, p. 20.
39. See also Perkins, “Creativity by design,” 1984.
40. Gardner, *Creating Minds*, 1993, p. 35.
41. Zhou, *Education in Contemporary China*, 1990, p. 369.
42. ____, “Education reform,” *China Daily*, 1985.
43. Zhu, “Institutions of higher education should readjust structure,” 1985.
44. Liu, “The significance of recent reforms for higher education,” 1987, pp. 162-71.
45. Lo, “State patronage of intellectuals,” 1991, p. 696 [footnote omitted].
46. Löfstedt, *Human Resources in Chinese Education*, 1990, p. 180.
47. Liu Wenxiu, “The significance of recent reforms for higher education,” 1987, p. 166.
48. Li, “On evolving aims of education and curriculum reform in Mainland China,” 1993, p. 7.
49. Huang, “A cursory talk on reform in job allocation,” 1993, pp. 109-14.
50. Liu, “New subject faced by higher education,” 1989.
51. Wang & Huang, “College students are facing the selection,” 1989.
52. Chen & Liu, “Deep thoughts on tertiary students job allocation,” 1992. Also, for the argument that Chinese students in the US should cultivate individualism, see Huff, “Science and civilizations east and west,” 1993, pp. 77ff.
53. Ford, *The Twain Shall Meet*, 1988, p. 50.

---

54. Woronov, *China through My Window*, 1988, p. 236.
55. Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky, *Cultural Theory*, 1990.
56. Ho, “Chinese Patterns of Socialization,” 1986, pp. 35-6.
57. Ho & Chiu, “Component ideas of individualism, collectivism, and social organization,” 1994, p. 154. This study involved an empirical analysis of over 2,000 popular sayings.
58. Ho, “Chinese patterns of socialization,” 1986, p. 86.
59. Gardner, *To Open Minds*, 1989, pp. 256-84.
60. *Ibid*., p. 250.
61. Ross, *China Learns English*, 1993, p. 10.
62. *Ibid*., p. 119.
63. “Report on classroom discipline, 25 April 1986,” cited in Pollack, *Civilizing Chinese*, 1997, pp. 269-70 [Author’s bracketed comment removed].
64. *New Brief # 464* (22 September 1995), *#595* (30 October 1996), *#342* (13 May 1994), *#204* (16 June 1992) and *#419* (14 April 1995).
65. This perception of student satisfaction in the Chinese Department derives from interviews, not survey results, as discussed in the previous chapter.
66. Feng, Zhang & Tao, “New thinking concerning the reform of higher education,” 1984.

Story 10: Hong Kong student Kennedy Ng

I came to Hong Kong from China when I was 15 years old, in 1978, just after the end of the Cultural Revolution. My family's name in Mandarin is Wu, but in Hong Kong our name was given the Cantonese transliteration, Ng, which is difficult for most Westerners (as well as Northern Chinese) to pronounce. It is a guttural grunt; I prefer Wu. When we arrived in the then British colony, other Mainland immigrants told me that I should have a Western name; about the only one I could come up with on short notice was Kennedy, after the American president who was killed the very day I was born.

Our family took a round-about route to get to Hong Kong. We were legal immigrants. Up until a few years before we arrived, Britain gave Chinese immigrants refugee status, which meant that anyone who could get across the border could stay. I came with my mother and sister. Our father followed in five years. He was a member of the CCP, a former soldier in the People's Liberation Army who had fought in Korea against the Americans. His paper work was delayed, we suspect because of his military service.

I was born in Beijing. My father's hometown is in rural Hebei; his father, my grandfather, had migrated to the western suburbs of Beijing just before my father was born. My dad grew up a peasant, working the fields with his family. In the late 1940s, during the winter when most farmers are forced by the weather to go on vacation, my father did errands for the PLA which at the time controlled Beijing's western suburbs. The peasants of China greatly respected Mao's army and my father became a communist even before he learned to read and write (which the army taught him). When the communists defeated the Nationalists, my father was allowed to enlist.

My mother is an overseas Chinese. At the beginning of the century, her family had moved to Indonesia from Fujian Province. In the early 1950s Chairman Mao and the Chinese leaders called on overseas Chinese to return to built a socialist China. My mother and her siblings heeded the call; she went directly to Beijing, where eventually she and my father met and got married. I think my mother became disenchanted with "socialist China," although she never talks about this. With all her overseas relatives, it was easy for my mother to emigrate to Hong Kong. She sought a better life not for herself but for us.

Was Hong Kong a better life? It was like a foreign country. I spoke no Cantonese when I arrived and all the rules (like standing in queue for the bus) were new and intimidating. As the elder male in the family, I shouldered the burden of being the provider. All of us worked so we could afford the privately-rented two-room apartment. Thus, before my sixteenth birthday, I was working 10 hours a day in a family-owned electrical appliance factory. I stayed there three years, and then went to work as a "hotel boy" in one of Hong Kong's swanky hotels. When we knew my father would be joining us, my burden was greatly reduced. I wanted to go to university. My primary and secondary education had taken place during the Cultural Revolution. I attended classes only three days a week. The rest of the time we went on social investigation; this education was valuable, but it did not help me in the subjects that were tested on the college entrance exam, mainly Chinese, history, English and geography. So I quit the hotel job and studied on my own for six months.

In the early 1980s Hong Kong had only two universities and a few colleges and polytechnic institutions. Only graduates of Hong Kong secondary schools could get into the local universities, because of the strict examination requirements. It was extremely difficult to get into one of these two universities. In fact, more Hong Kong young people attended universities in Britain, North America and Australia than in Hong Kong. Overseas Chinese like myself could attend Mainland universities if they scored high enough on the special exams that were given for these schools. My self-study, therefore, was geared to doing well on these exams. I scored high enough to entitle me to enroll in several including Jinan University, where my then girlfriend's father worked.

Jinan is a comprehensive university in Guangzhou and is known as the university for overseas Chinese because it enrolls several hundred compatriots from Hong Kong and Macau. Jinan was not an especially rich school; students, including compatriots, were charged no tuition or fees at that time. The buildings were in a state of disrepair, at least by Hong Kong standards. The dorms were crowded with six boys to a room; the dorms were so noisy that it was impossible to study in them.

One vacation in 1984, as I was returning from Guangzhou to Hong Kong, I dropped in on the new campus of Shenzhen University, which was still in the middle of construction. It had all new buildings and only two students to a dorm room. Then and there I decided that this school was for me. In September I returned to the Mainland, went to Shenda, produced my Jinan transcript and was immediately permitted to transfer in. Tuition *and fees amounted to ¥25, which was not much for someone like myself who had been working in Hong Kong for five years. Another benefit was that I was now closer to my family in Hong Kong, so I could travel back whenever I wanted.*

I stayed at SZU for three years, received a degree and then returned to Hong Kong, where I worked for a company for several years. I then went to the U.S. for graduate study. On reflection, I look back favorably on Shenda. My only regret is that the school leaders placed too little emphasis on teaching. Students were busy with their part-time jobs. Classroom teaching followed the traditional mode, just like in Jinan. My graduate education in American has emphasized critical thinking. Shenda provided me a basic foundation, as undergraduate education should, but as a student I was not encouraged to think critically. Only in that way can the talent of students be given full play.

6. Foreign things

This chapter explores SZU's association with things foreign, a topic covering exchanges with academic institutions outside China, the employment of expatriate teaching staff, and the use of the American credit system. China's relationship with the outside world is a major subject of scholarship and other commentary, much of it written by *waiguoren* (foreigners, literally "outside country people").[1] The "other" perspective is what anthropologists call *etic*, in contrast with *emic*—the way one views one's own culture. This entire volume takes the *etic* perspective by the very fact the author is an American-born Caucasian, not a China-born Han.

Insight into otherness is provided by anthropologist Jordan Pollack in his discussion of being a foreign teacher at SZU. He notes:[2]

> …the visiting foreigner is often thought to stand as a representative symbol for cultural otherness, to stand for alternative ways of life, both good and bad, in terms of which Chinese work to distinguish, and thus constitute, themselves. The foreigner stands conveniently, in popular as well as official discourse, both for what Chinese *want* to be and *don't want* to be, as they make and remake themselves. The foreigner thus embodies much that is to be emulated or avoided. In this capacity, the foreigner serves to help Chinese understand themselves, define themselves, imagine themselves.
>
> A faculty member made me aware of an aphorism, or *chengyu*, used frequently to summarize the approach authorities advised students, and Chinese generally, to take toward foreigners: *nei-wai you bie* ("inside is different from outside," and by implication calls for different treatment).

This was the common attitude held by SZU staff about foreigners on campus. It was illustrated by the head of FLD who was himself adamantly opposed to foreign intrusion into Chinese educational culture. He wrote:[3]

> …discrimination of insiders and outsiders, of in-groups and out-groups is essential in Chinese life. There is discrimination between Chinese and foreigners, between employees and a 'unit' and people outside it…To the Chinese, a colleague is a colleague, a friend is a friend, a foreigner is a foreigner. These are three different identities and roles, which are not to be scrambled…Friends are friends, insiders are insiders. All friends cannot become insiders. International friends have a long way to go to becoming an insider

> in China. If they are not too unjustifiably hopeful, they should not be too frustrated.

The previous chapter examined several curriculum innovations at SZU; all these had been developed by individuals who were either western-educated (in the case of expatriate teachers) or western-influenced (the British Council-funded CECL course). The "other" technology of those innovations was not eventually transferred to native Chinese teachers at SZU. Chinese staff, in general, did not adopt the methods and techniques espoused in these courses; some chose not to; others who sincerely wanted to use the techniques lacked sufficient ability through training. The innovations themselves were difficult to execute, risky and time-consuming. Departmental leaders at FLD, most of whom had spent time in Western universities, chose to terminate these courses, and they deemed the western-influenced pedagogies to be "inappropriate" for Chinese learners. The foreign teachers received a simple explanation: "You must be Chinese to understand."[4] The decision to abandon CECL in particular was somewhat ironic given that CECL was developed by Chinese scholars for use in China. Part of the reason that these pedagogies and curriculum changes did not have a lasting effect at SZU was that, as introduced by foreigners, they were considered "other." In some cases it was the agents, not primarily the content of the curriculum, that prevented the innovations from being accepted.

Decisions based on ethnocentricity and xenophobia are certainly not unique to SZU; they exist elsewhere in China as well as in other countries. Reforms since the Cultural Revolution have brought many alien ideas and notions through the Middle Kingdom's Open Door, and certain elements, simply characterized as foreign, especially trouble Chinese policy-makers. No lesser a personage than Deng Xiaoping realized this in his statement before the Twelfth Party Congress in August 1982:[5]

> We will unswervingly follow a policy of opening to the outside world and actively increase exchanges with foreign countries on the basis of mutual equality and benefit. At the same time we will keep a clear head, firmly resist corrosion by decadent ideas from abroad and never permit the bourgeois way of life to spread in our country.

In the view of many Chinese, the key issue, therefore, is separating the "good" foreign things from the "bad" ones. This is not a new concern. It has been around China for centuries, but has come to the forefront only since about the middle of the nineteenth century, with the rise of the Self-

Strengthening movement. The concern is summarized in the catch phrase, *Zhongxue wei ti xixue wei yong* (*ti-yong* for short), "Chinese learning for fundamental principles, western learning for practical application." China-watchers on education frequently cite the *ti-yong* concept.[6]

The phrase is attributed to Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909), a scholar/official at the end of the Qing Dynasty.[7] Zhang probably never himself used this exact term, but his philosophy of dualism advocated peaceful juxtaposition of the old with the new, substance with function, Chinese with foreign.[8] This balanced inequality "did not advocate complete coalescence of the two elements. Rather, the Chinese was assigned one course and the Western an adjacent course, and the two were to doubletrack indefinitely through the ages."[9] The *ti-yong* issue heated up around 1919 and the May Fourth era, as Chinese intellectuals realized the inescapable need for China to adopt the West's more advanced military technology.[10] Without this technology, China would continue to suffer humiliation at the hands of foreign powers and would remain the "weak man of Asia." Adapting Western practice to suit Chinese conditions has characterized the nation's higher education system for the past century.[11] This occurred at China's experimental university in Shenzhen.

The credit system

SZU's public relations materials which take the form of glossy brochures and leaflets have always mentioned the use of the credit system (CS) as one of the university's major educational reforms. It has served as a rallying point around which other reform policies were based. A 1985 brochure discussed the SZU CS as follows:[12]

> A credit system is practiced in the University to allow capable students to select more elective courses so that they may graduate ahead of schedule. The less capable students are permitted to choose fewer elective courses and may prolong their studies. Students are allowed to change their major course or transfer to other departments during their first years of study. Undergraduates are required to take, besides their major course, a minor one.

The credit system was mentioned in various favorable articles on SZU that appeared in the Chinese media as well as in edited volumes on education. One author reported that the arrangement emphasized student choice in that it allowed self-motivated students the flexibility to develop their individual programs.[13] It encouraged them to seek both specialized training as well as a broad knowledge structure. Students could ask exemption from courses if they could score over 70 on an exemption exam.

In general, a credit allocation system (*xuefenzhi*) is a form of curriculum design, a way for schools to specify the types and quantity of courses students take. Superficially, the system provides a method to count credits. A student who has obtained sufficient credits in certain required categories may then graduate. Such a system often allows students to move through university somewhat at their own pace in directions they themselves choose. The CS, however, is usually more than just a credit counting system. On a deeper level it addresses the structuring and content of education. What courses should be required? Which should be optional? How much self-direction should students experience in course selection? How far can students expand their knowledge beyond their specialty? In a national system like China's that requires students to select their majors even before college admission and that does not allow for changing majors, the structure of the CS may be extremely important, for it can provide "breadth" in education. Since the credit system is a distinctly American invention, its employment at SZU can serve as a case study of how the university adopted a foreign practice to suit its own needs.

History of the CS in China

The CS in China goes back to 1917 when Beijing University president Cai Yuanpei introduced it.[14] By 1927, "[t]he credit system was used to ensure that students had an exposure to a range of knowledge areas, and most had a general first year before following more specialized courses of study from the second year."[15] In 1929 the state education department required universities to adopt the CS. Such a system was also adopted in secondary schools, but was abolished upon the recommendations of a visiting League of Nations Mission of Education Experts in 1931.[16] The delegation, reflecting the European view of knowledge, had criticized the fragmentation of the curriculum brought about by the use of the credit system.

In the 1950s, as China followed the Soviet model of specialization, the CS was abandoned in favor of the academic year system (*xuenianzhi*), in which students go through their courses in a fixed group (*banji shoukezhi*). Students were admitted into fields of specialization, and they studied together a set of courses for a full year. The group took another set of courses each year until they graduated. This system was characterized by uniformity, as well as a narrowing of curriculum and a proliferation of majors/specializations and was not inconsistent with Confucian teacher-centeredness.[17]

With the reopening of universities after the Cultural Revolution, the CS was employed in China to replace the rigid curriculum of the Soviet model. In 1978 schools like Nanjing University, East China Normal College, and Wuhan University began readopting the CS.[18] Then, in 1983, after the Twelfth CCP Conference and a national education meeting, non-comprehensive universities began introducing the CS.[19] By 1986, over 200 schools employed it.[20]

American influence

The Chinese credit system, as a case of technology transfer, has its roots in the United States. This will be examined within the overall context of outside influences on Chinese education. During this century Chinese higher education has been exposed to three disparate influences: Confucianism, Sovietism, and Deweyan philosophy. The first two of these advocate planned curricula. While the Soviet model concerns itself mostly with content (emphasis on science) and structure (the academic year system*)*, the Confucian way strongly influences teaching methods. It focuses on teacher and text.[21] To a lesser degree aspects of European systems have also been adapted,[22] but in terms of the curriculum, and the CS in particular, only these three influences have been quite pronounced.

Chinese education has grown out of the Confucian tradition which, according to many educators, is still present especially in the form of teacher-centeredness.[23] This factor, of course, is an anathema to the CS, which lays an environment for independent study and focuses on the student who gets some degree of control in selecting his courses.

During the first four decades of this century, Chinese education came under heavy foreign influences which often tended to modify and even replace traditional education through “eclectic borrowing.”[24] Quite influential was the American education system and, especially, the philosopher John Dewey (1859-1952). According to one scholar:[25]

> A movement for educational reforms initiated and led primarily by scholars returned from the United States, many of whom had been former students of John Dewey at Columbia University, resulted in a higher education system in China very similar to American patterns. The curriculum was organized within colleges, which consisted of departments. A general first year pre-

> ceded the choosing of specialized courses of study, and the credit system was adopted to make sure that the student embraced a broad range of knowledge.

Visiting China twice, Dewey influenced a generation of Chinese intellectuals, among them Hu Shih, Chen Duxiu, Jiang Menglin, and Tao Xingzhi, who were looking for an alternative to Confucianism.[26] Specifically, Dewey's influence extended to curriculum issues that relate to CS design "with his emphasis on the Process of learning and the continuity of experience rather than on an unvarying curriculum..."[27]

Educators in the United States (as in China) are forever discussing curriculum development, pondering the issue of general education versus specialization, and philosophically examining the functions of the university. Much in the U.S. debate is relevant to China's curriculum concerns and education reform, although the overall structure, size, scope, purpose and operation of the American system vastly differ from its Chinese counterpart. First, three and half times as many accredited colleges and universities, excluding 6,500 vocational institutions, operate in the U.S. than in China, making the U.S. system about six times the size of China's in terms of enrollment.[28]

Second, American tertiary institutions serve a variety of purposes. Lately they have become vocationally oriented, and this is evidenced in their trend toward specialization.[29] The U.S. university plays an important role in a person's socialization because it transmits social values through the acculturation process.[30] Education is viewed as a means to develop one's cultural literacy.[31] In other words, universities are to provide intellectual pleasures, not just career tools.[32]

These larger goals, as presented by educators, are often considered more important than the mere acquisition of facts. The current period in American education gives greater significance to "interdisciplinary linkages, advanced learning skills, the clarification of personal values, and the broadening of student perspectives through the study of women, minorities, the disadvantaged, and international viewpoints."[33]

One of China's leading educationalists has added insight to this general versus specialized education debate. In explaining how "an emphasis on specialized education dovetailed with China's system of a planned state-run economy and bureaucracy," he points out that "general education of some form or other has always existed in China, even in periods of intense specialization."[34] At the present, however, the major objective of Chinese education at all levels is to serve modernization.[35] In universities, courses should serve jobs,[36] and some educators go so far as to argue that China needs specialists, not graduates with general education.[37] Students are expected to acquire the facts, knowledge and skills needed to move China into a modern state—the exact same operating premise at SZU.

In contrast with this pragmatic skills development approach, a prevailing view in American education believes that "[t]he end of education is not accumulation of knowledge but mental enlargement."[38] In contrast, traditional education in China, as discussed in the previous chapter, has been knowledge-based and exam-directed.

Historical development of U.S. general education

General education in the U.S. is *not* a response to today's current trend toward specialization. Indeed, it preceded specialization. For 200 years American universities had fixed classical curricula as education's major purpose was seen as training ministers and the élite.[39] In the mid-nineteenth century the curricula entered a second stage and became industrial-professional oriented, with "a de-emphasis on culture in the curriculum and an emphasis on useful knowledge and employment. The requirements for a major set the pattern for curriculum and these were influenced by manpower needs."[40] From 1960, a consumer era brought about a third stage and "more time for electives and there were more courses in the arts; more courses for non-majors in various fields; more part-time, extension, and evening courses; and more community service courses."[41]

Much in China's curriculum resembles American education's middle stage of development. Indeed, the post WW II period was one of strong economic growth for the U.S.. Currently, America's third stage resembles 'post development education,' at a time when the state has achieved sufficient economic development and when, one might argue, society has the luxury to let undergraduates focus past the basic skills-promotion aspect in favor of more general education.

Distribution system and general education

Given the comments of Chinese educators[42] who fear the *laissez-faire* nature of U.S. CSs, one might conclude that this type of academic free-for-all pervades American education. This is not the case. Only three percent of U.S. institutions allow for wholly elective courses. Another two per cent have a core curriculum. About 95% of curriculum designs in American universities specify distribution requirements "in which students are required to take a specified minimum number of courses or credits in several broad fields of study."[43]

> In a curricular distribution sense, general education is the approximately one-third of the collegiate four years that complements the one-third devoted to the major course of study and the other one-third that is related to the major area. It is the civilizing element.[44]

In the United States general education has evolved into a distribution system. Those who don't favor the system say:

> Most general education programs resemble a cafeteria line where one can enter at any point, choose foods that satisfy basic hunger as well as a dash of dessert or anything else that strikes an individual's whim, but without guidance about those foods that are necessary for a balanced diet.[45]

These distribution systems are often the result of political compromises between departments, and often no one, including the school's chief administrative officer, monitors or evaluates them.[46]

The American CS in China

Curriculum development is different in China in that much of the "civilizing element" of schooling is found at the secondary level. It is not the university's purpose to train 'general knowledge' students.[47] What then is left for the university? In a nation where only two percent of the total population make it to university, courses outside of one's specialty might seem a misuse of scarce educational resources. Not all agree. Some Chinese educators laud the cross-disciplinary curriculum approach for the tertiary level[48] or suggest that college courses should widen the vision of college students, help them understand their surroundings, care about society and solve their individual problems.[49] General opinion in China, however, still appears weighted in favor of specialization. The concept of general education that is fundamental to the structure of the American systems is not a sizable component of Chinese systems for Chinese educators.

Today, as part of educational reforms, most schools in China have adapted some form of the CS. As Suzanne Pepper explains:[50]

> The American credit system, previously criticized as a capitalist-style invention that reduces course work to commodity status, became an officially recommended antidote for the 'fixed' and 'dead' features of unified curricula and study plans. But in the early 1980s, the credit system was simply superim-

> posed upon the fixed teaching plan, and students still had little freedom of choice among courses. About 70 percent of all courses in any given major remained compulsory as before, and some of the electives could be selected only from among a few fixed choices. Students were granted some new freedom to select a limited number of courses outside of their majors and even their own departments. But they could not study at their own pace, another declared aim, because to graduate out of turn would disrupt the predetermined enrollment and job assignment plans. Administrators at three universities where the credit system had been introduced by 1980 acknowledged that it could not fulfill its promise so long as the unified curricula, enrollment, and job assignment plans remained basically unchanged.

Even with the credit system, the bulk of instruction remains fixed—most in core subjects, 20-25% in politics, language and sports, with only 7-10% in optional courses.[51] One Chinese academic categorizes CSs according to Chinese experience:[52]

- The planned CS, as seen in key universities in Beijing, Nanjing and Wuhan, includes required and optional courses in a ratio of 7:3, with no limit on optional courses.
- East China Normal and Jilin universities use a more traditional system with less flexibility, as students are not allowed to graduate early.
- Another type of system combines the two formats; the academic year system can be used for the first two years and the CS for the last two.
- The weighted CS, as illustrated by Beijing Aviation College, is all-inclusive and assigns different weights to different elements, such as for moral education and from work performed outside the classroom.
- The Special Zone CS allows for more freedom than the others.

Thus, the implementation of the CS in China permits enough flexibility to allow for a certain degree of experimentation among operating units. It classifies courses into: (1) required (*bixiuke*), which usually includes major, public and basic courses; (2) restricted-optional (*xianxuanke*) courses that are within the major, and (3) *renyi xuanxiuke* (abbreviated as *renxuanke*) courses that are cross-departmental optional courses. Academics disagree on how courses should be distributed between major and non-major subjects. Some suggest that required courses should constitute about 85% of total courses taken. Specialized courses account for the remaining 15%, in which elective courses are placed.[53] Others support the 7:3 ratio between required and optional.[54] Among optional courses, a suggested ratio of cross-departmental optional to restricted-optional is 2:1, thus allowing students to take most of their optional courses outside their major.[55] But at Jinan University in Guangzhou, where core courses take up 70-80% of all hours, the credit system appears not to allow students to take many electives; this has resulted in an imbalanced structure of knowledge.[56]

Advantages of the system as transferred

Compared with the academic year system, the CS offers a flexibility that better tailors to students' individual needs. Students can select the courses they want in the areas they desire to study. The academic year system is seen as too rigid. In contrast, students in the CS can move more at their own pace. Some can graduate early—175 of Nanjing University's 1978 class. Courses can be better coordinated and teaching hours reduced. Bright students can graduate earlier by taking more credits or by being excused from subjects they have already mastered. The top students at Jiaotong University and at a Wuhan polytech were exempted from class attendance to pursue independent study. On the other hand weaker students are allowed more time to study. Work and practical experience can be integrated into more flexible schedules.[57]

Allowing for double-majors permits students to study in related fields, as was the case at Zhejiang University.[58] Students can expand their knowledge beyond their specializations.[59] The CS also provides a mechanism for measuring overall student achievement. Students can be assessed according to grade-point averages where credit is computed according to the grades achieved in a course.[60] Also, teaching can be improved. Instructors can design optional courses that relate to students' specific needs and the demands of the work-place. The system encourages teachers to develop additional marginal and new subjects. CS adoption forces an overall examination of education and teaching methodology and promotes education reform. Finally, it can help develop a reasonable and instructive teaching plan, shorten teaching hours and encourage careful selection of courses.[61]

Problems with the system as transferred

Many Chinese authors have pointed out problems that may occur in a CS. Some students seek credits only for meeting graduation requirements, and they care little about what they learn. In order to get credit, students will choose easy courses, select courses blindly, or follow the crowd to popular courses. They will do only what's required to achieve the minimum passing grade, which is 60. This creates the "long live 60" phenomenon.[62]

Basic courses can be neglected. In this regard the *taotailü* is high for the U.S., but low for the academic year system. *Taotailü* is a term commonly used when discussing Darwin's evolution theory. It refers to those who don't survive, in other words, those who should be selected out. The term also refers to the elimination process for competitors in sporting events. Chinese educators use it to refer to students who don't master the minimum required knowledge, in other words, those who fail.[63]

The CS creates other problems. Knowledge may be only superficial; a student becomes a 'Jack of all trades, skilled in none,' lacking systematic knowledge. Not only will some graduates not be qualified, but the variation in qualifications among similar degree holders will be greater. Students will not get sufficiently specialized education to meet national needs. Student-teacher relations will deteriorate, as students will become too independent and not seek or follow faculty advice. Teachers face a greater burden, in defining student needs and in devising new courses to meet these needs. Finally, the system can become administratively chaotic, an academic free-for-all.[64]

SZU's credit system

The credit system was mentioned in Shenzhen City's first report on establishing SZU. In June 1984 Luo Zhengqi announced the decision to implement a credit system for the semester scheduled to begin on the new campus that September. By May 1985 SZU had become such an authority on the CS that it hosted a meeting on credit system implementation for its fellow Guangdong universities. It hosted a similar seminar in April 1994, participated in by officials from 50 tertiary institutions in the province.

The credit system played a major role in SZU's overall educational reform because it provided the structure (and indeed the legitimacy) in which to implement the concept of the Three Classrooms. Credits from work in all three classrooms went toward meeting graduation requirements. In addition to credits earned from classroom instruction—the first and primary classroom—students received credits for their part-time jobs (second classroom) and extracurricular activities (third classroom). In this way, the SZU system was unique among Chinese universities.

From 1984-1987 the SZU CS operated under a fairly confusing set of regulations which were intended to guide students, tutors and staff on how to compute credits.[65] Full-time *benke* students needed 460 credits for graduation (other interpretations in official university documents put the number between 450-480). Credit was given for passing the final exam; class attendance was not mandatory. Of all credits, 94% were to come from the first classroom, and 6% from practice and investigation. Students were encouraged to spend less time studying in formal settings, take more courses outside their major and even to shift majors and departments if they desired. According to SZU's reform proposals of 1986, classroom work was to be limited to 24 hours/week. These hours were divvied up as indicated in Table 6.1. Part-time jobs (the second classroom) earned students 12 credits, for a total of 180 hours; at least 45 hours of participation in extra-curricular activities were required, for three credits. The regulations, unfortunately, are not instructive on how exactly to convert hours into credits, and mathematical inconsistencies surface when computations are attempted. The Academic Affairs Office left interpretation and implementation to the departments, which computed students' credits in order to figure out who was to graduate when.

Table 6.1: SZU credit allocation by course type (percentage)[66]

	1986	1988	1993	1994
first classroom	94	90	100	100
of which				
required	70	<50	60-70	<80
restricted-optional	20	30-40	20-30	
optional	10	10-20	>10	>20
second and third classroom	6	10	-	-
of which				
short-term jobs		44		
military training		22		
part-time jobs		27		
third classroom		7		

1988 reform

A 1987 general report on SZU by an inspection team from the Democratic Association's national office alluded to student's lack of discipline "because of the credit system and optional courses." According to a university official almost a decade later, the late 1980s was a period which "over-emphasized quantity and students only pursued high credit numbers…and "long live 60."[67] Thus, a reform in 1988 attempted to tighten up the management of the

CS, while making it more flexible. Regulations specified the general tasks that were expected of the CS:[68]

> to make the educational system more flexible, so as to eliminate the restriction posed by four years' limit on accumulation of credits
>
> to give students more choices and freedom in choosing courses. Then they will be more active in their study. Furthermore, the credit system aims at widening the scope and rage of students' knowledge.
>
> to make the courses more practical and to combine practice and learning together, so students can choose courses that they are interested or expert in, or courses which are useful for their future jobs.

In stipulating exactly how to count credits—a deficiency in the previous version—the new regulations cut required credits by almost 29% (see Table 6.1). Some of this cut was an accounting manipulation as public courses such as politics and PE were moved from the required to the restricted-optional categories. Whereas the former rules had considered PE a required course, the new regulations defined it as a restricted-optional course because it allowed students to choose between tennis, ping-pong, and other sports. The PE requirement had not changed, just the category in which it was placed. Within first classroom credits, almost 10% (40 credits) were earmarked for a minor (90% of students were reported to have a minor in 1988[69]), 6% for the graduation thesis or design, and the remainder (84%) for the major (which also included the restricted-optional courses). The 1988 revisions omitted the wording from 1986 concerning the option to skip class, self-study, and pass the final exam. The new regulation, however, did *not* prohibit the practice; it just omitted it as a recommended option. In fact, in 1988, 10% of the students were reported to be taking over 70 hours of classes per week[70]—almost three times the 1986 recommended academic dosage of 24 hours. Compared with their earlier permutation, the 1988 regulations made the credit system more workable and somewhat simpler, but students still needed staff assistance to figure it out. The system included both *credits* and *credit units*, a distinction which is not clear in the wording of the regulations. To figure out the value of employment hours, for example:[71]

> If work-study is done during the term, 60-100 hours is equivalent to one credit unit—which means 3-5 credits. If work study is done during vacation, 120 hours are equal to one credit unit. This must be certified by the Work-Study Counseling Center.

In any case, not many students chose to graduate early: only a reported three in 1988 and 10 in 1989.[72]

Post-Tiananmen rectification

Within its first months in office, the Wei-Wu administration issued regulations to gain more control over student affairs management.[73] The rules acknowledged the existence of the CS with the sentence: "Our school practices the credit system." Omitted were sentences from earlier rules that had allowed students to change majors and departments. The new regulations included additional graduation requirements. There could be no failure in political or legal education courses for future degree holders. Students who failed to hand in over one-third of their homework or laboratory assignments received automatic fails. Whereas earlier rules had permitted students to study (i.e., accumulate credits) for up to seven years, the new edition did not actually address early or late graduation.

The regulations were rushed through (prepared within a month), and at first glance they appear not be well thought-out. Actually, they were the result of numerous meetings and much confrontation between professional staff and the new school leaders—in the vein of politician-versus-civil service skirmishes. The compromise that resulted did not so much state a clear policy, but rather it avoided specifically prohibiting the enforcement of pre-existing policy. Viewed this way, the new rules were a mild non-endorsement of the existing credit system, and its elements of flexibility. For the next several years, the CS remained in limbo. The *1991 Yearbook* failed even to mention it. In actuality, no longer were students allowed to change majors/departments or allowed to take double degrees. (This policy became retroactive and SZU refused to award double degrees to the graduates in 1991 who had fulfilled all requirements under the previous revision). Now, students found it increasingly difficult to get an instructor's permission to take courses outside their own departments, and few instructors would allow students to skip class and merely sit for the final exam, a far cry from the early years that encouraged students' self-teaching.[74]

The *1990 Student Handbook* indicated this directional change.[75] It mentioned nothing about the CS's previously stated educational goals of flexibility, independence and self-study. The emphasis was on counting the number of credits (now equal to weekly class hours): 25 required to be taken each semester and seniors took 20; no more than 30 allowed unless with permission. A discussion of majors, minors, double degrees, and elective courses

Figure 6.1: Optional courses as a percent of total offerings[76]



Table 6.2: Optional courses[77]

time period	total courses	% optional
fall 1986	320	13.8
spring 1987	314	10.5
spring 1990	317	20.2
fall 1991	455	7.0
fall 1991	365	9.0
spring 1994	393	13.7

was absent. Students were allowed to take public-optional courses freely and should take no less than one optional course each semester.

A number of factors account for why the school's new administration in 1989 changed the system. First, the Wei-Wu administration denounced all reforms associated with their predecessor.[78] Luo Zhengqi's ideas were considered *ipso facto* educationally detrimental. Each of his policies was required to undergo a thorough review before it could be re-activated. Second, at that time, there was a growing concern among faculty that students were not being properly educated. Many students did not attend class. According to my staff colleagues, those who attended were not as motivated as those during the school's early years. Many of the best students skipped class altogether. SZU had emphasized work-study in the form of the second classroom since the school's inception, but by 1990 many faculty felt that students' education was being supplanted by their business activities. The second classroom had become the first classroom.

Third, the CS posed some administrative problems because it required considerable staff time to manage students who constructed their own class plans. The school approved 32 shifts in majors in 1988,[79] a time-consuming procedure requiring numerous chops (official red seals). Computing the credits took thousands of staff hours. The shifts among majors and moves between departments produced complaints among faculty and administrators. Transferring students were creating one-way flows between departments. To illustrate, half the students admitted as Mathematics majors in 1985 transferred to the Management Department.[80] Quality was not guaranteed. For example, in September 1989 ten students passed an exam and transferred into the Foreign Language department. These students, for the most part, remained at the bottom of their class for their next three years of English study.

Finally, departments were not offering sufficient optional courses, and the most popular departments and courses became inundated with enrolling students. Optional courses are a key element of any credit system. Optional offerings varied at SZU from year to year, as indicated in Table 6.2 and graphically represented in Figure 6.1. One of the effects of the CS rectification was the elimination of elective courses, something which occurred by 1991. Thus, for the three years from 1990-1993 the underlying philosophy and mechanisms of the initial CS were virtually abandoned. The academic year system was instituted, in practice if not in written regulation.

1993 CS reforms

In June 1993 Cai Delin's administration promulgated new academic regulations.[81] These rules encompassed many areas of educational reform, including transfer from *zhuanke* to *benke*, probation, examinations, double degrees, double majors, minors and concentrations, and the establishment of a grade point mechanism. The rules, in their preamble, stressed the commonly enunciated virtues of the CS: flexibility, student and teacher activeness, competition and students' curriculum individualization. The rules permitted students to graduate early, and they could extend their studies an additional year or two if they earned a double degree. Discontinuing study was permitted. Students could drop out at most two times, and the accumulated leave time could not exceed four years. Students with high class ranking (top 15%) would be able to take double majors, or take a second degree in another department on completion of the first. Students could take a second specialty within a major (*zhu fu xiu*) or get a certificate for systematic study in a concentration. Also, schooling could be interrupted by one or two years at a full-time job. Students could choose to downgrade their status from *benke* to *zhuanke,* and other regulations allowed for movement in the reverse direction.

Concerning the CS, students were to continue to take a minimum 25 hours of class per week (20 for seniors), and no more than 30 hours, except with special permission. Required courses counted for 60-70%, restricted-optional for 30-20%, and cross-departmental optional for not less than 10%. This meant that students had to take at least 2½ hours of courses outside their own department, which really equated to four hours (two courses) since individual courses at SZU were each two hours long. Only classroom hours, not those from homework or second classroom activities, were counted for credit. Departments were given the authority to determine whether the required-to-optional ratio should be 6:4 or 7:3.

Figure 6.2: SZU credit system continuum, flexibility over time



On paper, the 1993 regulations attempted to reinstate some of the policies that the Wei-Wu administration had suspended, but they also left standing various policy modifications made from 1989-92: denial of credit for second and third classroom activity, the elimination of inter-departmental transfers, abandonment of self-study that permitted student truancy, and the prohibition of unlimited credit accumulation. These reforms received support from the municipal government, which listed CS reform among its ten measures for SZU,[82] after which it was frequently mentioned in speeches and reports by university officials.[83] In perspective, the 1993 SZU reforms brought the SZU CS relatively closer to, but still far away from, a *laissez-faire* model. CSs vary according to flexibility and may be placed on a continuum with the Soviet-styled academic year system and a *laissez-faire* system as end points (see Figure 6.2). Both the advantages and disadvantages mentioned below are more likely to be found as a CS approaches the *laissez-faire* paradigm.

The regulations were further amended in 1994 to allow students to take more required courses (up to 80%) and fewer optional (a few as 20%).[84] Maximum permitted course load was raised 17%. In addition, certain restrictions—e.g., placement in class standing—were eliminated in an attempt to expand the pool of candidates for double degrees and double majors. Limitations, however, were put on students who suspended their studies: permitted accumulated leave was halved to two years. Students were given five days to choose courses (down from 10 days). Despite official rhetoric to suggest otherwise, the sum of 1994 changes amounted to trying to push more students through, quicker. The university was trying to "market" double degrees and double majors. In terms of bringing in general education, the 1994 revision was a more restrictive system, in other words a conservative reform. The changes could be construed of as a liberal reform only in the sense that students were given more flexibility to take additional required courses or to attempt "doubles" for which they were possibly not qualified (as measured by class standing). At the time of this writing (1998), the extent that these regulations influence students' study is not known. It is unlikely, however, that they will have much effect. In the past, few students at SZU have chosen to increase their work loads in order to earn "doubles," and few had condensed their studies in order to graduate early. Only 44 students in the first seven enrolled classes were reported to have chosen to graduate early. Based on enrollment figures, this represents fewer than 1% of all students.

The CS underwent a minor tinkering in 1996.[85] Students were allowed to take more required (85%) and fewer optional (15%) courses. Whereas the 1994 rules had specified that part-time jobs and social practice should amount to 25-40% of total credits, this was lowered to 5-25%, further dismantling the second classroom. The new regulations removed some flexibility in terms of second degrees, no longer permitting students to take two degrees at the same time.

Language in the 1996 regulations required first-year students to take "generally 22" credits, rather than "at least 20." Return to study for students who had dropped out was less tolerated. The new rules permitted only three, not six, courses to be retaken, within one year, rather than within the two years allowed in the earlier regulations. Fewer credits were required for graduation—160-175 versus 170-180 for the four-year *benke* and 130-40 versus 140-145 for three-year *zhuanke*. In sum the 1996 rules made academic life both less demanding and less flexible for SZU students.

Educational issues raised

Insufficient optional courses, as noted above, plagued SZU's credit system. The lack of optional offerings happens often in Chinese tertiary education.[86] (In contrast, U.S. universities have an often confusing array of courses, sometimes with total courses offered outnumbering the total available faculty.[87]) In 1993, SZU opened only about a dozen public-optional courses to all students (see Table 6.3, next page). The most prestigious department, IFT, offered none. Other courses were open to non-majors, only with per-

Table 6.3: Public-optional courses actually offered by department, 1992-1993[88]

Architecture: painting pen and ink drawing, architectural drawing, photography, famous architects and masterpieces.
Chinese: Kejia culture, history of science, Taiwan/HK literature; I ching.
Civil Engineering: real estate management.
Economics: labor economics, accounting fundamentals, marketing.
Foreign Language: college English for non-majors, advanced English, Japanese, English literature, Canadian economic selections.
Law: introduction to law; foreign economic law; HK law; international law.
Management: management psychology, economic analysis, capital investment.
Mechanical Engineering: Japanese for science.

mission of the instructor. Most instructors, especially those in IFT, refused to allow non-majors to take their courses. In addition, the university did not publish a catalogue with course descriptions, so students were provided little information on which to base course selection. Departments did not provide educational counselors who could advise students on optional courses, double degrees, minors or concentrations because such information was not shared between departments.

The interdisciplinary nature of the credit system goes against the departmentalization of curriculum.[89] Compartmentalization in academia results in a lack of professional dialogue among teachers. A Fulbright Fellow who taught history at Northeast Normal University, in Changchun, Jilin Province, has noted that his Chinese colleagues "seldom talked with and frequently did not even know other faculty members teaching in the same general field but in different departments or units of the university."[90] This problem is not unique to Chinese tertiary, however. A study of Columbia University found that "departments in the university exist in inglorious isolation from each other, intellectually as well as organizationally," prompting its author, sociologist Daniel Bell, to fear "intellectual provincialism" and the specialization of knowledge.[91] On the administrative level, these problems of department turf tended to disable the CS at SZU. For example, in 1991, when IFT students wanted to study Japanese in the Foreign Language Department, they were charged fees. Subsequently, IFT instructors refused to let English majors enroll in trade and finance courses.

In 1994 the Foreign Language Department was approached about opening university-wide courses to be taught in English in the subjects of economics and business. Using U.S. college level texts donated by the Asia Foundation, San Francisco, these courses would be open to students with a sufficiently high level of English language proficiency. Academic Affairs opened the course and the Foreign Affairs Office agreed to allocate an expatriate teacher. Foreign Language, however, refused to include the course in its curriculum. As the assistant head explained: "We don't want students from other departments. If students want to take this course, they should have to pay fees to do it."

Departmentalization produces other problems. Students have reported considerable interdepartmental overlap and duplication in offerings between majors, especially in the areas of business, economics and administration/management. One student likened these courses to a "heap of loose sand." Overlap also existed within a major, as teachers within a department often would not coordinate their course offerings. One year's courses, however, were not necessarily prerequisites for the next. Logical progression eluded some course sequences. Sometimes, freshmen took the same courses as seniors.

A major adjunct to the CS as practiced in the U.S. is an advisory system. Because of greater flexibility and less administrative control, students in the American system possess much freedom of choice and have to make a lot of decisions: choosing a major/minor, selecting courses and choosing electives. Either a student must be self-directed or rely on expert advice. This advice usually comes from a professional course advisor, either a faculty member in the major department or someone who works out of the student affairs or dean's office. Advice may be offered by the individual advisor from the student's first arrival on campus. Individual faculty may also advise students, and fellow students, of course, provide help.

Since students have little choice in the academic year system, they do not need course advisors. When the academic year system is converted into a credit-based system, however, the course advising function is often not included. Chinese educators have commented that students need academic guidance counselors and should be provided the necessary information to choose courses.[92] After post-Tiananmen rectification, SZU lacked such a guidance system although one existed during the school's first years.[93] Departments were left to advise their own students and, in the absence of a course catalogue, they had little advice to offer. Few teachers were knowledgeable about courses offered across departments.

Given faculty-student detachment at SZU and the absence of knowledgeable advisors, students relied on their peers for help in picking optional courses, something consistent with the "importance of friends and classmates over that of teachers and political counselors in shaping the activities and decisions of college students."[94] SZU students, however, enjoyed only a small circle of friends and had little interaction with those outside their immediate circle. Since students took all their classes with their fellow majors and lived, ate and relaxed with them as well, they did not have easy access to information on optional courses; they generally relied on hearsay, not facts.

Conclusions on the credit system

The structure, but not intent, of the American CS was transferred to SZU. In the American setting, credit systems are a means for providing and coordinating general education. SZU has never purported to provide general education. The big omission in the school's curriculum rests in the social sciences, subjects which are also not taught in the Shenzhen secondary schools. In contrast, the American system requires college students to sample these fields via distribution requirements. For example, the University of Texas, San Antonio, in 1985 required students to take 12.5% of their credits in the social sciences, 7.5% from physical sciences and mathematics, and 15% in languages and culture. The remaining 37.5-50% were in the major and 16-20% in the minor.[95] In comparison, SZU allocated roughly 70% of the credits to the major, and 15% each to language and moral/political/physical education. Few courses in the social sciences were available.

Should those educated in the SEZ be exposed to sociology, psychology and other social sciences? Current education policy responds in the negative. In fact, SZU's general education included only two hours per week of physical education and four hours of required moral and ideological courses. The university's actual training of *rencai* revolved around specialties, not general education; but the associated rhetoric stressed other needs, as in the preamble to the 1993 reforms, noted above. Those regulations' requirement that students spend a minimum of 25 hours in class per week is an *ipso facto* denial of many of the preamble's goals. Spending so much time in class precluded independent study. Even if the pedagogy had allowed for the methods discussed in the previous chapter, students themselves could not have found sufficient time to prepare essays or term papers or do readings related to their courses. Furthermore, the goal of widening students' knowledge was contradicted by the fact that departments were not required to offer public-optional courses, nor were instructors required to admit non-majors to their classes. The stated goals suggested that education should involve more than cramming information and regurgitating it for exams. Yet nothing in the rules prodded faculty to give term papers, take-home essay-type exams or exam papers with a substantial essay component. The 1993 CS reforms, therefore, may be viewed as *necessary*, but not *sufficient* to reform SZU's closed system—one that transmitted knowledge but did not train ability.

In sum, the reform of the CS at SZU served only as one part of an overall educational reform geared toward flexibility. Other components were early/late graduation, changing majors, double degrees and double majors. Outside the larger context of educational reform, the CS was merely a way to manage students' schedules. Ten years after the credit system was initiated, it still remained under reform with the good intention of moving students from "You want me to study" to "I want me to study," as reported in the Shenzhen media.[96] The problems noted above have continued to impede reform and, in other words, sustained the need for perpetual reform.

Foreigners at SZU

"Foreigner" (*wai guo ren*) is a designation that covers persons who are not citizens of the PRC (either ethnic Chinese or members of one of the nation's 50-plus ethnic minorities). In common usage, however, the term excludes Chinese who live outside of the PRC. Residents of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau are considered "compatriot Chinese" (*gang ao tai tongbao*[97]); ethnic Chinese who live elsewhere in the world, including the U.S., are often referred to as "overseas Chinese" (*haiwai huaren* or *huaqiao*). For the purposes of this volume, the term *foreigner* generally uses the race-based definition that applies in the PRC.

The largest foreign presence at SZU, in terms of sheer numbers, involved visitors to campus. From 1984-86, 2,457 foreigners visited SZU. In 1987, 900 guests arrived from 21 countries. Some were individual visitors, but most came in delegations, with 52 educational groups accounting for 500 visitors. Over 1,100 foreign visitors came to SZU in 1988. The post-Tiananmen rectification saw a drastic decrease in visits by foreigners. In 1989 and 1990, SZU received 213 and 574 visitors, respectively. School authorities preferred small, officially-sanctioned delegations (they averaged seven people in 1990) and did not want random visits. Regulations issued in May 1990 informed all departments that receiving foreign guests without prior approval from the Foreign Affairs Office (FAO) was strictly prohibited:[98]

> If there is a need to invite foreigners or Hong Kong people for lecturers or research, work-units must submit the number of visitors, their identities, lecture content and other details. With the approval of the leaders, invitations can be sent out.

This particular provision was enforced with much discretion. The head of FAO, Zhang Ye, was a CCP member and former English teacher whom President Wei Youhai chose for the job. Zhang's decisions on who could lecture were based on subjective factors, which he chose rarely to explain; thus, some foreigners were allowed to visit, and others were not. For example, an American professor, who was widely published, was refused permission to lecture on "Trends in American Literature," with the explanation that literature as a subject lent itself to too much politicization (Zhang's own field was American literature!). Rectification's impact on visitors declined over time; in 1991 SZU received over 1,000 foreign visitors. During 1992-1993, about 2,400 foreigners visited SZU, of whom 768 came from overseas schools, including 603 students. In subsequent years, visits by foreigners leveled off to about 1,200 per year, with an average of two nine-person delegations visiting each week. To put this number in perspective, famous universities in China also report receiving 1,000 or more foreign visitors a year. But in the case of Beijing Normal University, for example, many of these 1,000 guests attended one of the 10 international conferences that the university sponsored that year. Most of SZU's foreign guests, in contrast, visit as tourists, rather than as scholars. Among the tourists have been over 90 principals of foreign educational institutions. The in-flow of foreign visitors is presented graphically in Figure 6.3.

Management over foreign affairs

The Guangdong expert group that initially recommended setting up a comprehensive university had suggested that only foreign-related majors (e.g., foreign-related law, foreign trade and finance, foreign language) be established. This idea was quickly modified by the municipality to include subjects like Chinese, engineering and the natural sciences, but the notion that SZU was to be closely connected with foreign things had been clearly established.[99] Almost from the start, the university encouraged a foreign presence on campus as a demonstration of its determination and commitment to educational reform. Functionally, foreign affairs work was run out of the President's Office with three or four fixed staff and several work-study students.

In 1986 the International Cultural Exchange Center was set up to take over foreign matters, which included handling foreign teachers and students, sponsoring conferences, arranging for foreign visits by SZU staff, research exchanges and relationships with overseas institutions, and inviting these institutions to offer training courses at SZU. The Center and the FAO were basically synonymous, in both personnel and function.

Figure 6.3: Inflow of foreign visitors[100]



After 1989, the SZU CCP Committee took over "important foreign affairs issues" and management of foreign affairs formally became one of the president's functions. For the first time, a full-time manager (Zhang Ye) at the department-level was appointed. In 1990 director Zhang wrote that in the past SZU had experienced "lenient management and chaos in foreign affairs."[101] Many school authorities dealt directly with foreigners and willfully did whatever they wanted: *duo tou dui wai*, multiple heads facing foreign. Thus from 1990, to ensure accountability, each work-unit in the university was required to designate one person in charge of foreign affairs work. Under Zhang's leadership, FAO expanded in many areas: overseas students, overseas trips by SZU staff, and exchanges with foreign institutions, which are discussed below. FAO staff in 1991 increased to five fixed staff, two temporary personnel and three work-study students. By 1993, there were six FAO staff, all CCP members. No other office could boast an equally high Party membership. In 1994 Zhang Ye left SZU to take a job with local government (he later went to Australia for doctoral study). His replacement was Tan Zaixi, the head of the Foreign Language Department who was forced to change jobs because of a corruption investigation. Under Tan, the FAO was formally renamed International Office; fixed staff expanded to eight, aided by five full-time personnel and two part-time employees.

The most visible on-going foreign presence at SZU took the form of overseas teaching staff and foreign students. Teachers from abroad were hired after the university moved to the new campus, and they numbered about a dozen per year. Overseas students were a later phenomenon. Through the 1980s, foreign students numbered fewer under twenty at any time; enrollment expanded so that by the mid-1990s, several hundred students (mostly from Japan, South Korea, and North America) were living at SZU while enrolled to study Chinese language.

Foreign students

Foreign students at SZU were of two types: private students and those in exchange programs. In the latter category, exchanges have taken place with several schools including Kumamoto University of Commerce (Japan), Central University of Central Lancashire (Preston, U.K.), Griffith University (Australia), Macau University, and a French commercial college. These exchanges were regulated by signed agreements. For example, the “sistership” agreement with Kumamoto, signed in December 1987, provided for both student and teacher exchange. Regarding the former, two students were to be exchanged annually. No tuition, accommodation or medical fees were charged either party, and academic credits were transferable between institutions. Although students paid their own air fares, SZU provided the Japanese students ¥180/month and the SZU students received J ¥70,000.[102] The first two students arrived in September 1988, after which the exchange became routine. The year 1988 saw the first of what was to become large-scale Kumamoto student visits. In December a 65-student group from the Japanese sister school visited with five teachers, stayed for several days and even played baseball with the SZU team. Thirty Kumamoto students visited SZU in 1991 and took several classes in international trade. That same year the exchange agreement was extended in perpetuity, amended so either party could withdraw after giving one year’s notice. The third group of SZU students had returned from one-year study by May 1992. They reported that they had adapted to the Japanese style of teaching within one or two months.[104] The Kumamoto exchange represented more foreign students than the other schools’ programs combined.

Figure 6.4: Foreign student enrollment[103]



Most foreign students, however, paid private tuition. The program at SZU started off informally on a tutorial basis, but as student numbers grew, formal classes were set up. Enrollment of foreign students is presented graphically in Figure 6.4. In its 1995 accreditation self-evaluation, SZU set a target for the year 2000 of taking 200 foreign students annually; it achieved that goal in 1997. This approximates the number of overseas students at Nanjing University or Shanghai University. (Other universities have even more foreign students—e.g., 600 at Beijing Normal, 400 Suzhou, 350 Fudan, 260 at Liaoning.) Besides teaching Chinese to overseas students, some foreigners who are already fluent in Chinese are enrolled in undergraduate or graduate programs in the Chinese tertiary system.[105] But by 1994 SZU had enrolled and awarded a bachelors degree to only one foreign student—a Sudanese in the Management Department.

From the start teaching foreign students Chinese at SZU was fraught with problems. First, there were no teachers trained to teach Chinese to non-native Chinese speakers. The FAO hired staff fluent in English or Japanese to be teachers, but not one of them (until 1994) had received instruction in how to teach Chinese as a second language. Second, students constantly complained that the FAO paid little interest to their studies and was only after their tuition and room rent. These concerns are reflected in the comments by René LeBlanc, in the ethnographic account that appears later in this chapter. A percent of tuition was retained by FAO for operating costs and bonuses for personnel. Indeed, the welfare of FAO staff was directly related to foreign exchange tuition—the office's side-business—and much effort was devoted to marketing, including advertising in Japan and Korea, the countries which by the mid-1990s supplied the bulk of students. Tuition, which had to be paid in foreign exchange, was valuable because it could be recycled to pay the expenses of SZU leaders who traveled abroad, an endeavor which, described below, required considerable cash. A year's tuition for Chinese language students in 1996 was US $1,800 and US $1,900 for a foreigner who wanted to be an SZU undergraduate. Daily room rates were US $4.25-6.00 for a double room (priced higher for air conditioning) and US $8.50 - 12.00 for a single. Tuition and accommodation prices were generally in line with what is charged foreign students at other Chinese universities.[106] The profit generated from foreign tuition, estimated by an insider to exceed US $200,000 in 1995, went into the president's discretionary fund; the payment was a private, non-transparent transaction between the FAO head and the SZU president.

The third problem in teaching foreigners was that many foreign students did not take their study seriously. Some students with ulterior motives were consumed with activities such as proselytizing or searching for a mate or sexual partner. Native English speakers usually found jobs on or off campus teaching conversational English. The Japanese students were the least serious, and most of them stopped going to class within several weeks of their arrival. Japanese universities, in sharp contrast with the country's secondary schools, are not demanding of their students; college life serves as a relaxing hiatus between high school and the workplace.[107] Many Japanese university students, even before graduation, have informal commitments from future employers for permanent jobs after graduation. While at university they hold down full-time jobs, from which they take an occasional break for a few weeks to cram for exams. Japanese students at SZU brought with them this academic non-work ethnic. They had plenty of cash and were enjoying Shenzhen's low cost-of-living (relative to Japan's, of course). Many Japanese students, who lived in the Chaoxi complex housing foreign teachers, stayed up late into the night, signing karaoke, playing cards, and drinking.

Another category of foreign student is the research scholar. SZU did not draw many foreign scholars who used the university as a base from which to undertake their research. A few academics had selected the university as their sponsoring *danwei* (work-unit), and they were usually associated with the SEZ Economics Institute. Most overseas scholars, however, preferred to use one of the universities in Beijing, Shanghai or Hong Kong, which offered better research libraries. Another disincentive was cost. Scholars who sought SZU sponsorship in 1993 were told by FAO that they had to pay US $3,000, an amount generally in line with what other Chinese universities charge. (In 1997, Liaoning charged $2,500, Nanchang $4,000, and Fudan, $4,800).

Foreign teachers

Overseas teachers such as Jane (see the ethnographic boxed story, next page) were never part of the regular SZU teaching staff because most fixed staff in Chinese *danwei* are required to be Chinese citizens; foreigners are excluded. For that reason, none of the statistical analyses in preceding chapters has included expatriate teachers in their computations. SZU's foreign teachers signed different contracts from their Chinese colleagues, were generally housed together in Chaoxi Building that was run exclusively for foreigners, and were precluded from participating in the management of teaching or student affairs. This situation occurs in all Chinese universities; in fact, an internal document circulated to university foreign affairs offices explains how and why foreign teachers should be treated differently from local staff.[108]

In the years before 1988, however, expatriates at SZU were somewhat integrated into the university. At that time, SZU hired four or five "foreign experts" (*waiguo zhuanjia*) annually along with a variety of short-term lecturers. These teachers were expected to teach courses for which there were no available SZU staff; exchange was designed to "build a solid foundation for SZU to establish and develop new subjects and extra-curricular courses."[109] A secondary benefit was that teaching in English could train SZU students to think in English. The hiring and management of foreign experts was handled by individual departments. Thus, Economics hired a specialist on political economics, Architecture hired a designer and an engineer, Law employed an American to teach American contract law, Hong Kong residents taught about markets and personnel management, and Foreign Language hired an anthropologist to teach culture and language. In these years the employment of full-time foreign experts was administrated by SZU, but the process had to conform to the regulations of the Foreign Experts Office of the State Council, which loosely oversaw policy. The SZU experts signed a standard contract drafted in Beijing. The agreement was similar to those in use throughout China for expatriates hired to work as teachers in universities or as consultants to government or state companies. Normally, the standard contract provided for a salary that exceeded that of

Box 6.1: Jane - young whirlwind

Jane is single, in her early twenties and loves her work. She plans to stay for a year to experience China and then move on. Not interested in a teaching or academic career, Jane holds a degree from a undistinguished American college. Jane works with students out of class, and has become good friends with them. They consider her a good oral English teacher because she is entertaining and makes class-time fun. Jane started teaching the day after she arrived in China; her department has given her no textbooks; she "wings it" not following a class plan. Individualizing instruction, she redivided her class according to student's ability and gives the better students more difficult assignments. The weaker students get remedial help. Sometimes she is fortunate to rely on materials left by previous teachers. Still, the department is not sure if Jane's students are learning anything. Since she does not know her Chinese colleagues or even the identity of the head of her department, she is unable to develop strong relationships with her colleagues. She finds China, especially the crowding, at times stressful; this stress is complicated by the fact she is romantically involved with one of her students.

Chinese colleagues (the amount varied from region to region), and part of it had to be paid in hard (convertible) currency, such as U.S. dollars. Experts were furnished accommodation above the local standard, that included a color television, air conditioning and a refrigerator. Most importantly, they also received an annual return air ticket to their home country, and an allowance for shipping baggage upon departure.[110]

The foreign experts hired by SZU before 1988 included several academics who were associated with American universities. A faculty member from Purdue University taught design in Architecture, and he was responsible for recommending the equipment that the department later purchased to set up a computer-aided design laboratory. An expert in the Economics Department taught bilingual economics courses—on international economic organizations, for example—for which there were no available SZU teaching staff. While at SZU, he collected data for a dissertation that he later completed at Columbia University. Another expert taught in the FLD; he too collected data for his dissertation, which was in anthropology at the University of Michigan. These three individuals were examples of foreign experts who, on the basis of training and scholarship, were on at least the same intellectual plane as their SZU colleagues. They were also integrated into school affairs. Some attended faculty meetings, and one provided editorial assistance to the

Shenda Tattler, the semi-weekly broadsheet of the English Club. They were accommodated among Chinese faculty, and their integration into campus life was aided by their familiarity with China, its language and culture.

After having taught at SZU for several years, these three experts returned to the U.S. around early 1988. At that time, the SZU administration stopped hiring foreign experts. In a move designed to demonstrate the university's autonomy from state control, SZU administrators decided to delink the school from Beijing and the modest amount of oversight that had come from the Foreign Experts Bureau. When the three foreign experts left, the hiring of new staff provided a convenient opportunity to downgrade the level of expatriate staff from foreign expert to foreign teacher. At that time, foreign teachers in China generally received less salary than foreign experts and were usually not given return air tickets or a baggage allowance. They were not expected to be experts in academic disciplines, but rather native English speakers who could teach oral English. In early 1988, SZU hired three expatriates. All three accepted foreign teacher terms, an act that assured the university that it no longer needed to provide the incentive of expert status in order to attract foreign teachers. Two of the newly hired teachers, who had enjoyed expert status in Shanghai, longed to move close to Hong Kong, and they were willing to accept less favorable terms. The other new teacher, a proselytizer, was willing to accept whatever terms SZU offered. Often, English teachers in China receive supplemental funding from religious organizations in their home countries; salary from the Chinese university is not a major concern to them. Over the years, about half of SZU's expatriates received this type of support; the FAO in one instance even negotiated several teachers' contracts with a religious service organization in Hong Kong.

In 1988 more departments opted for a foreign presence, hiring in total 15 foreign teachers. Representatives of the State Council's Foreign Experts Bureau visited campus in October and gave their approval of SZU's method of managing foreign teachers. FAO acknowledged in its 1988 report that "foreign teachers had been helpful in improving students' English levels" and the presence of foreign teachers was mentioned in the 1990 recruitment brochure given secondary school seniors. But departments themselves were generally not pleased. According to the Physics Department's annual report, for example:[111]

> in the beginning students were interested [in the class taught by the foreign teacher], but then because of improper teaching methods, many students, especially those with poor oral abilities, dropped out. So the department as-

Box 6.2: Jim - pensioner

Jim thinks of himself as an old China hand. He has been a wholesaler of stuffed toys from China for a dozen years. Now a pensioner, Jim and his wife decided to retire to Shenzhen, where he still does a little business on the side. He teaches several management courses he designed himself. Yet, he is frustrated because his promised textbooks have not yet arrived from Beijing. The levels of English among Jim's students vary widely. Many in the class understand little of his lectures. He assigned research papers but, after students protested to his department head, was forced to give an exam. Rather than a multiple choice exam, he gave students take-home essay questions. Again the students protested and the department told the students the exam would not count. "This isn't higher education," he complains. Jim also teaches some conversation courses which resemble "free talks" with no structured curriculum whatsoever.

> signed a Chinese teacher to assist and improve teaching content; the method and result improved.

Problems such as those encountered in Physics and indeed *all* departments employing foreign teachers happened for various reasons. The fact that inexperienced, non-professionals were hired to teach English as a Second Language (ESL) was not an issue that the university addressed. Instead, a structural solution was imposed: foreign teacher management was put under the auspices of the FAO.

Edgar Porter in his monograph *Foreign Teachers in China* explores the motivations of individuals who come to the Middle Kingdom to teach. Through surveys and interviews for his dissertation, Porter discovered that teachers in Beijing in the late 1980s came to China primarily "to experience China." Most were not educators or scholars, but neither were they proselytizers. SZU in the years from 1988-1994—a period over which 33 foreign teachers worked at the university—received very few academics or scholars. Sixteen of the 33 were primarily interested in "experiencing China," and nine had come to China for missionary work. Over the period studied, fewer than 20% of SZU's foreign teachers had been trained to teach ESL. During these years I, myself, taught; I, too, had come to China for the experience and, like many of my colleagues, had had little teaching experience before my arrival (I had taught several planning courses while I was a graduate student).

The foreign teachers at SZU were equally divided between men and women. About 75% of them were unmarried; there was always at least one family with children. SZU teachers came primarily from the U.S., U.K., and Australia; about one-third could converse in Chinese; and for about half of the teachers, SZU was their first experience in China. Only nine considered themselves professional teachers (five of whom were actually retired teachers). There was a mismatch between foreign teachers' skills and their teaching assignments. For example, a Survey of Economic Magazine Articles in Foreign Trade was taught not by an economist, but rather by a registered nurse! Accountants taught English in the Chinese and Economics Departments. A Taiwan-born American, as mentioned in the previous chapter, attempted to teach composition in Foreign Language. The most extraordinary mismatch involved a famed linguist—himself a former student of Noam Chomsky—whose major teaching assignment in the FLD was to teach video. This was not a class in film criticism, however. The students requested that the teacher not discuss the films, just operate the VCR. This Chomsky protégé, who himself had developed internationally recognized linguistic theories and while teaching at SZU had attracted 80 scholars to a lecture he gave at Hong Kong University, spent four afternoons a week watching English language feature films with his Chinese bride and his students. When told of his underemployment, the FLD head replied that the department already had too many linguists for too few courses and that there were no available Chinese teachers to operate the video equipment. (Students could not be trusted to watch movies without a teacher present).

The SZU standard contract for SZU foreign teachers required them to spend twelve hours per week in the classroom, and either party could terminate on 30 days notice. No return airline ticket or baggage allowance was provided; teachers were charged rental for their dormitory room (amounting to 20 m^2 per person before 1991, 40-60 m^2 afterwards), and although they had to pay rental on furniture (including television, refrigerator and air conditioner), a monthly subsidy more than covered both room and furniture rental. Base salary was the highest for foreign teachers in China, but since remuneration excluded ticket and allowance, it was lower than what most foreign experts in the country received. Contractual base salary for three ranks in selected years appears in Table 6.4, page 399. Full professors were required to hold a Ph.D., regardless of field, and associate professors had to have masters. Lecturers had to have completed an undergraduate degree. Academic experience and ability, however, were not usually considered at

Box 6.3: Dr. Roberts - professional teacher

Dr. Roberts, whose spouse works on a two-year contract in a local company, is an American secondary school teacher by training. He teaches composition and literature. Roberts has taught elsewhere in Asia and feels he is more successful than he would be back home. "The students here are brighter...and they don't carry guns." Dr. Roberts (the students do not use his given name) is considered demanding and has a deserved reputation for strictness. "Sometimes it's like teaching primary school," he jokes. Since his wife's salary is enough to support their family, he is financially able himself to provide all the resources he needs for teaching. For example, when he needed textbooks, his wife's company air mailed them to China. Because of family obligations (The Roberts two children go to a local international school) Dr. Roberts spends almost no time with students out of class. He is considered a bit of an "old fogey" who does not relate much to Chinese culture. He and his wife live a Western lifestyle among the local ex-pats—in China, but in a world outside China.

the time of hiring. Rank (and thus pay) was based solely on academic credentials, which were often not verified.

The figures from Table 6.4 do not include a ¥1,400 travel bonus, departmental bonuses, or a monthly SEZ cost-of-living adjustment, which when added together could easily double one's salary. Thus, the contractual salary under-reflected real pay, the amount deposited directly into a staff member's university bank account. For example, my draft contract in 1994 (I actually worked my final year without a formal contract) stipulated a salary of ¥2,535. The same document specified a starting salary of ¥1,750 for my rank, associate professor. My pay stub—a thin strip of paper scissored off from the FLD computer print-out—for June 1994 reported a gross payment of ¥5,602, which included a ¥1,000 "other" amount, which was a subsidy to offset apartment rent (¥169.20) and furniture rental (¥312). The remaining "other" was due to a cost-of-living adjustment, although this was not provided for in the type of contract foreign teachers signed.

In addition, individual teaching departments could choose to supplement foreign teachers' salaries. Some departments gave their expatriates cases of soft-drinks or a "liquids bonus" for the hot months. FLD usually gave its overseas hires an annual bonus of ¥1,000 and a gift box of Nescafé and Coffeemate. Architecture, however, in effect paid foreign teachers the equivalent of what a foreign expert would command elsewhere in China. A baggage allowance was provided upon departure, and supplemental bonuses (the department's profit-sharing plan) amounted to the price of a return air ticket

Table 6.4: Expatriate salary (in ¥)[112]

contract year	professor	associate professor	lecturer	annual rate of increase	annual rate of inflation
1988-1989	1,200	1,000	800	-	-
1989-1990	1,600	1,400	1,000	.33	.25
1990-1991	1,600	1,400	1,000	0	-.03
1991-1992	1,800	1,575	1,175	.12	.01
1992-1993	2,000	1,750	1,350	.11	.07
1993-1994	2,000	1,750	1,350	0	.20
6-year average				.11	.10

home. Architecture continued to hire its own foreign experts; they were never put under FAO jurisdiction and were not included in SZU-sponsored activities for resident foreigners. Unlike FAO which did not get involved in foreign teachers' professional or personal lives, Architecture manifested concern in various ways. The Department arranged and funded teacher's conference participation and once, when one of its foreign teachers became ill, Architecture staff made home visits and took over grocery shopping chores until the teacher recuperated. At various times, staff from other departments also took it upon themselves to befriend or come to the aid of needy foreigners, tasks not undertaken by FAO itself after 1990. By 1996, an expatriate associate professor in Architecture had a net salary of around ¥6,500 (accommodation and furniture were provided free). In contrast, lecturers in other departments reported salaries of around ¥3,000 a month, raised in early 1996 to ¥3,400.

For two academic years, SZU hired English teachers through the Project Trust, an organization in Scotland that placed British teenagers into teaching positions around the globe. These volunteer teachers possessed only secondary education and were taking a year off to teach before they entered a U.K. university. From 1990-1992 SZU hired six Project Trust volunteers, whose teaching quality, maturity, and adaptability to China varied greatly. All in all, neither SZU departmental administrators nor the students of these volunteers evaluated them as effective teachers, although one was rated by her students as the best teacher they had. That particular teacher had developed and used several of the innovative teaching methods described in the previous chapter. In contrast, other volunteer teachers failed to prepare at all for class; several had psychological problems, as perceived by their students, and one went drinking with her students at night and often canceled her

Box 6.4: William - preacher

William is a devout evangelical Christian, sponsored by his hometown congregation to spread the Word of Christ in China. An optician by training, he teaches a required listening and reading course in the English Department. In his 40s, William will remain in China as long as his church supports him and he feels he is successful. His teaching department provides textbooks—part of a set curriculum—which bore both him and his students. Since William teaches one section of a required core course, if his department changed texts for William, it would have to change texts for the other sections, which are taught by Chinese staff. Thus, William's complaints have gone unaddressed; rarely can he even find anyone in his department who speaks English. Still, William's department and his students are pleased with his teaching. He brings characteristics of an informal Western style. He, himself, is dissatisfied with his teaching, but his sub rosa *missionary work is proceeding smoothly.*

classes with them during the day. Despite the program's problems, the FAO was pleased with it, for each of the volunteers cost the university only about one-third as much as a regular foreign lecturer. In 1992, the Guangdong Higher Education Bureau, in response to a directive from the SEdC, required that all foreign teachers employed in Chinese universities be university graduates. Future Project Trust volunteers, thus, had to be assigned to teach English in Guangdong high schools.

Rectification and beyond

Regulations issued by SZU in 1990 centralized the hiring of foreign teachers. Departments, who had previously located, hired and paid expatriates on their own, were required now to take teachers provided by Foreign Affairs. (Several departments skirted these regulations, including Architecture, as noted above.) The FAO hiring process was assigned to the handler of foreign teachers, a young staff member who, when hired, had had no academic experience and little experience dealing with foreigners. Hiring expatriates entailed his sifting through scores of resumes and decisions were often based only on the submitted photo or the recommendation of a SZU leader. Little regard was paid to the prospective teacher's academic background or experience; credentials were never checked, and referees never contacted. (One hired teacher claimed the title "Dr." despite apparently never having earned a Ph.D.[113])

During the rectification period, FAO was primarily concerned with foreign teachers' behavior. The overall policy was reflected in Zhang Ye's 1990 report:[114]

> On one hand, we should provide careful services to [foreigners] so that they perceive the friendliness and hospitality of the Chinese people. On the other hand, we should have them understand that Chinese policies, regulations and customs of Chinese people are to be respected during their stay on this piece of land [SZU]. Those foreigners who raise offensive political issues and proselytize and violate school regulations should be seriously handled. Foreigners should not enjoy illegal privileges in school which even Chinese people do not enjoy. We should totally change the situation of the past of not controling their behavior. Within legal confinements, foreigners should have freedom to do all sorts of things.

One small incident at SZU in 1990 had escalated into a diplomatic matter involving the Foreign Ministry of China and the U.S. State Department. On the first anniversary of 4 June 1989, a teacher displayed on the exterior of his front door a piece of black silk with the Chinese character *dian*, meaning "respectful grieving." The foot-square sign was removed from the door by the FAO staff member known as "dragon lady." When questioned, the foreign teacher demanded back his sign, which had been interpreted by FAO as a denunciation of Chinese domestic policy, specifically government action taken to quell the student protests of the previous year. SZU reported the incident to the upper levels; eventually the Guangzhou U.S. Consulate General was contacted by Beijing. The teacher and the FAO never had substantive discussions on the incident; his property was not returned. The teacher completed his teaching for the term and the Foreign Language Department arranged his teaching plan for the autumn term. A few weeks before the new semester was scheduled to begin, however, the teacher was informed that his apartment had to be immediately vacated for his successor. In this way, he was told that his contract was not being renewed.

In about a half dozen cases over the years, foreign teachers at SZU were fired in a similarly abrupt matter. Reasons for dismissal were often implicit, rarely explicit. Several firings seemed related to proselytizing and others to teaching quality, but many concerned personality conflicts between the foreign teacher and his/her department head. In several cases, students' complaints led to the school's decision not to rehire teachers, but more often than not, student complaints were dismissed. For example, an elective course taught by a foreign teacher was canceled when no students selected it. The teacher had earned a reputation as dull and tedious, but she was favored by the department head. Subsequently, the department assigned the teacher to teach the same course as part of the required curriculum. The very students who had rejected the course as an elective one year were forced to take it as a requirement the next. In another instance, a single student complaint regarding teaching methods was used as justification for dismissing a foreign teacher. In sum, firing decisions by departments and FAO were made by individual leaders based on evaluative criteria that remained unstated and seemed to many observers to be nonexistent.

Foreigners at SZU operated under different rules and conditions than Chinese staff. A quote from Tan Zaixi, the FLD head who was to succeed Zhang Ye, is insightful for it raises many of the issues facing foreign handlers:[115]

> When foreigners come to China to teach, because the cultural atmosphere is different and social and ideological system is different, it is inevitable that they have some conflicts with us. Based on my several years experience studying in the U.K. and working with westerners and my understanding of western culture, I have gradually developed a whole set of methods working with foreign teachers. In arranging their work and helping them solve problems, we are always full of enthusiasm and consider them part of our family, treated the same as Chinese teachers, especially not letting them have a sense of being discriminated against by Chinese people, and provide all sorts of conveniences for them, especially assigning a young teacher to be the foreign affairs secretary. *However, after all, they are foreigners.* In many respects we have to separate them from Chinese teachers, for example in terms of politics. But in terms of work plans we do not give them freedom to willfully arrange courses and change teaching content. If they want to change teaching content, change teaching locations or ways of examination, written reports are required. They have been working hard and accomplished some achievements. The university gave two of them awards of excellence several years in a row.

The phrase “separate but equal” sums up how FAO and department heads wanted to treat foreign teachers. FAO attempted to make foreign teachers feel special as its 1993 report stated:[116]

> We try our best to create a good condition for foreign students and teachers, so they do not feel much inconvenience although far from home…we send cakes and birthday cards when foreign teachers have birthdays. When foreign teachers got sick, we sent them to hospital with delicious food…All foreign teachers work hard and are well prepared before class and are popular among

> students and teachers of their respective departments. Teachers with foreign nationalities have been an important force in the teaching team at SZU and have contributed much to the improvement of SZU's English level. Good performance in Band 4 would not have been possible without foreign teachers job and the job of the FAO.

Only a few foreign teachers, in fact, taught Band 4 students, a fact that appears to have escaped FAO, at least as implied in the above quotation. In general, school authorities were ignorant of what and how foreign teachers taught. Their overall teaching was not supervised in a methodical way. Foreign teachers were included in the paper loop (class plans had to be filed, exemption from exams requested, grades turned in on time, etc.), but their performances were not evaluated in terms of substance. In fact, in 1993 the FLD head was unaware that a course described in the plan as European Geography was actually World History. The substantive content of courses did not matter as long as foreign teachers showed up at the assigned classrooms at the appointed times. Department heads took notice only if students raised specific complaints. As transient staff (average stay 1.7 years), they did not figure in departmental management, and their input was usually of little consequence. Most of them, who were English teachers and not scholars, had no interest in the research of their colleagues. As noted earlier, the few courses designed by foreigners never became permanent fixtures. The FLD, in assigning foreign teachers a special liaison, further isolated them from their Chinese colleagues. The liaison, a young teacher preoccupied with stock market investments and a new wife, failed to inform the foreign teachers of departmental activities such as outings or banquets. He was characterized as "clueless" about FLD foreign teachers, according to several under his management.[117] Effective communications between expatriates and the FLD department rarely existed.

When Tan Zaixi took over FAO's helm, the emphasis shifted away from foreign teachers to other areas. The university sought to increase the number of foreign students and the foreign exchange their tuition generated. Another development involved exchanges with foreign universities, especially the "twinning programs," discussed below. By 1995 foreign teachers had, in budgetary terms, become a bargain. Although their ¥5,000 average monthly salary was about 50% greater than that of the average SZU teacher, they did not receive the hidden housing or welfare subsidies that the municipal government provided to SZU fixed staff. These subsidies could well average ¥5,000 per fixed staff member per month.

Foreign teachers in China overview

In general foreign teachers in China enjoy a love-hate relationship with their job and often with Chinese culture itself. The varied individuals' stories of SZU's expatriate staff which I collected over six years appear to mirror what has been published in several narratives by former teachers who worked elsewhere in China.[118] Take the following quotations, for example:

> It was clear that I was being watched, not for security reasons but for sport…Xenophobia, racism, rumor, and collective mistrust were deeply rooted elements of Chinese society…resigned myself to the fact that wherever I went in China, people would stare at me and try to practice their English on me…At times I felt like a walking target, and though English was my language, and though they had to struggle to keep from tying themselves up in their own sentences, the Chinese seemed to hold all the power in these encounters.[119]

> Like a circus animal, you are an object to be handled, fed, exercised, amused, but isolated and watched. You are expected to perform your act, whether teaching or doing business, then go back into your reasonably comfortable cage for the night. You will be groomed and tended for the next performance but not allowed to stroll around the grounds or cause trouble among the customers. You are special. You get more hunks of meat, and your more commodious cage is cleaned and serviced. But, try to behave like a human being and leave your Barbarian cage, and the handlers will grab their whips, will send out dragoons to fetch you back and discipline you. The [foreign affairs office's] whole purpose in life is you. Your whole purpose in China is to escape from them unless, of course, you enjoy being a circus animal. Simply because you are called a Barbarian is no reason to act like one. Barbarians obey orders; humans don't.[120]

> 'Free talk' involved relentless, vigorous conversation of absolutely no import that drove me to near-madness.[121]

> It's the same at every level from planning courses to requesting paper: protracted negotiations, stalling, then everything happens in a rush; the clash of our 'go get 'em' culture which wants things done by yesterday, and the slow but sure Chinese method which wants things done in their own good time and according to the rules, which seem to be partly subconscious social codes, partly a very creaking bureaucracy, mainly the fact that no-one seems prepared to take responsibility for anything in case they get it wrong.[122]

But every criticism—the hate element—is offset by a pleasure—the love element. The same four authors write:

> I thought little of the Chinese university, but I was impressed by its affectionate, respectful, hardworking students. I told the group of engineering students that most of all I was impressed with the remarkable patience and good-naturedness Chinese college students maintained in the face of adversity. Each day passed was a day endured for them, and they passed their days without a murmur—without a thought—of dissent.[123]
>
> Those twenty-five [students] (and my other classes - all) are among the most delightful, curious, and intelligent human beings I have ever encountered. They are a teacher's dream; they are what I went to graduate school to find. They are not sophisticated; they have never travelled, have seen nothing; they have read and mastered everything put in front of them—but books are almost unavailable in China: no foreign exchange, old cultural xenophobia, sexual puritanism, Marxist dogmatism—the reasons are numberless. But those students want to read—to think (though no one has encouraged them)—to know.[124]
>
> My students told me again and again that if I ever wanted to see them I could walk into their homes any time of day or night. 'But what if you are busy?' 'It doesn't matter! If you come, I won't be busy anymore!' 'But what if you are asleep?' 'Then wake me up!'[125]
>
> I am always touched by the warm and natural affection that the students seem to have for one another and by the supportive nature of a close community where you never have to struggle with a task on your own…[126]

At SZU, as well as at other institutions, students provided teaching's saving grace.

One major difference between SZU and most other Chinese universities, however, was that from the beginning there was never a concerted effort by SZU leaders to isolate and encage the foreign experts, who basically fended for themselves in terms of the matters of every day life. This was a marked contrast with other places in China, such as in Hangzhou, where Naomi Woronov lived in the Hangzhou Hotel for a time, while teaching at Zhejiang University. Guards at the gate, she reported, intimidated students as well as her colleagues, who needed signed and sealed letters from the FAO if they were to visit her. Isolation in Wuhan around 1984 took another form. Charles and Jill Hadfield, who taught in this heavily industrialized city in central China, wrote:[127]

> …all our meals have taken place behind screens, even in the campus dining room, where we are not allowed to go and queue up at the main mess hall with staff and students, but have meals served to us in a small dining room separated from the main one by a folding hospital screen. This image of The Screen has become a symbol in my mind for the elaborate measures taken to insulate the foreigner from ordinary Chinese life.

Re-accommodating SZU foreign teachers

Before 1991 about half of SZU's foreign teachers had lived in staff housing, occupying rooms on the third floor of a six-floor single-room dormitory, Yunpeng. The rest had lived in a newer dormitory, Chaoxi, which was set apart from other staff buildings. In its 1989 report, SZU's Security Office recommended that all foreigners, teachers as well as students, be assigned to a single building and that anti-theft devises (e.g., window bars, gates, etc.) be installed and that security personnel be earmarked for foreigners.[128] This did not happen until 1991 when SZU's Chinese staff who lived in Chaoxi were evicted to make room for foreign teachers relocated from Yunpeng, as well as foreign students relocated from campus hostels. Chaoxi was newly renovated and teachers were allocated more spacious accommodation. FAO told the foreign teachers that the Shenzhen government had required SZU to house foreigners together. This was not true; SZU had itself recommended the move to the city government; relocation was primarily intended to improve the management of foreign teachers. The reason was admitted in the SZU *1991 Work Summary*, which reported that "the old situation of foreigner's living scattered and being hard to manage has changed."[129] Because of its location and layout, Chaoxi Building could allow for better monitoring of teachers and their visitors, but there is little evidence that this occurred. Visitors were not required to sign in; there was no restriction on overnight guests. Only the most blatant case of proselytizing resulted in disciplinary action. From 1988-1991 one teacher ran three congregations: one downtown, another in the nearby town of Nantou and the third on campus. Students would come to his apartment to sing hymns and pray in the evenings. The teacher had been warned by FAO over three years, but he had continued to preach as well as to baptize converts (using the bathtub). Public Security had discovered the teacher's activities in a province-wide investigation of unsanctioned religious activities (China requires that all religious activities be part of state-approved churches) and issued an expulsion notice, giving him and his family (which included a wife, three children, his sister-in-law, and his wife's parents) three days to pack and leave China. Ironically, foreign teachers learned about the impending expulsion even before FAO. We were informed a week in advance by a student whose father worked for local government. Although Public Security initiated and handled the matter, SZU nevertheless took credit for expelling the teacher, boasting that the university "had proposed to relevant departments to send him away."[130]

Evaluating foreign teachers at SZU

Department head's evaluation of foreign teachers at SZU was not structured, but rather it was impressionistic. Using the ethnographic cases presented in boxes in this chapter, an impressionistic evaluation might rate all the teachers positively:

> Jane makes learning fun and the students enjoy speaking English with her. Jim, an old China hand, exposes his students to information he has acquired from years of experience in business. In following the mandated curriculum, William performs exactly as his department wants. Dr. Roberts, a professional teacher, gets the most out of his students.

Another evaluation of the same individuals might rate them all negatively:

> Although they enjoy themselves, Jane's students learn little of value in her unstructured course. The English level of Jim's students is so low that they learn little in his class. William's students remain unchallenged by mediocre teaching materials. Dr. Roberts' students find both him and his course rather tedious and have lost interest in learning English.

The point made here is that different subjective evaluations based on identical data can be quite contradictory. Although both of the above assessments raise valid points, they do not substitute for methodical evaluation. Both provide incomplete and misleading analyses. A more systematic and rational evaluation framework is required. Some of the variables identified in the above cases relate directly to the teacher and his/her course while other factors remain outside the control of the teacher or department. All factors, however, contribute to the success or failure of the individual's teaching. These factors fall into four categories: the first two of which address what the teacher teaches and how s/he teaches it; the latter group includes factors not of the teacher's doing, e.g., requirements and constraints imposed on the teacher by the department, the university or the larger environment.

Teacher-specific variables relate to the qualities of the individual teacher. Jane was young, dynamic, inexperienced, stressed, a mediocre intellect, and in love. Jim was an old China hand, frustrated because he overestimated students' abilities. William obediently followed the rules (except for the anti-proselytizing regulations) as he strove to help his students spiritually and academically. Dr. Roberts, a trained teacher, tried to challenge his students but was detached from them.

The way teachers and their courses interface with their academic departments make up *department-related* variables. Jane received no guidance from her department; her oral English class was a required conversation course, the content of which was always left up to the individual instructor. Little more was required of her than to attend class and turn in grades based on a final exam. Jim taught advanced courses that did not fit into the department's curriculum. William's courses were coordinated with other courses in his department. Dr. Roberts' class was in his department's class plan, but he provided his own teaching materials.

Figure 6.5: Variables affecting foreign teachers' effectiveness


teacher specific
department related
effectiveness
systemic features of education system
exogenous environmental factors

Departments set the quality of foreign teachers' students, especially their English-language abilities, and this was usually beyond the control of the teacher. Sometimes, an instructor was permitted to give an elective course and thus able to control entry to the class. Usually, however, a teacher was assigned an entire class (all third-year computer majors, for example) and s/he had little control over the range of their abilities. Departments could also decide whether expatriates taught regular students (those admitted through the standardized admission tests) or whether they were assigned classes of fee-paying students and auditors, whose English level was often very low.

Certain factors rest on a different plane, beyond the control of the teacher or his/her academic department. These are *education system* variables that result from university directives, SEdC regulations or the culture's educational norms. Often the exam-based, rote-learning characteristics of traditional Chinese education which is "organized to inculcate conventional ideas and a passive orientation to knowledge"[131] conflict with the teaching style of Westerners. For example, in dividing her students according to ability, Jane met opposition from her department. "All students should be treated equally," she was told. Jim wanted to assign students term papers and a take-home final. His students, however, who were required to sit in class for thirty hours per week, could find little time for independent study. In contrast to Jane and William, Dr. Roberts used a classroom style more closely resembling the native teachers. He taught grammar through repetition and exercise work. His literature course was really literary history—the memorization of facts about important Western authors and their works.

A final set of factors that affects the success of Western teaching at SZU has little to do with classroom activity. Rather, certain environmental factors serve as *exogenous* variables, which are not greatly affected by the teacher, academic department, or even the university. These factors influence the teacher's level of satisfaction and environmental comfort. Young Jane's teaching was affected by stress. Likewise, Jim could not reconcile his expectations of China with reality. William constantly had to balance his missionary zeal with restrictions placed on him by Chinese law, which prohibits proselytizing.

The educational system and the exogenous factors described above, that lie outside individual teachers' control, illustrate how these outside elements vary from teacher to teacher. Jane's department left her alone, gave her no text. Her course was part of the departmental sequence for majors, but every year a new instructor taught it differently—no continuity in texts, assignments or class plans. Accordingly, there was no consistency in what was learned. William's department was at the other end of the involvement spectrum. He was given texts and a teaching plan and his course content was the same as his Chinese colleagues taught. Unfortunately, William's western style of teaching was inappropriate for the course. In contrast, the course that Jim taught was not part of a regular curriculum. It was taught because Jim was available to teach it. Without Jim, there would have been no course. His difficulty in getting books was a problem his department was unable to overcome. Dr. Roberts solved the textbook problem by buying them himself, not an unusual solution for Western teachers in China.

To sum up, these variables are greatly entangled. A fair and honest evaluation requires a framework that shows an understanding of their interrelationships. Impressionistic evaluation, which was the only evaluation that existed for SZU's expatriate teachers, was inadequate in this regard.

Whether SZU enjoyed competent teaching from its expatriate staff over the years is not possible to ascertain, given the absence of adequate evaluation. An informal survey in 1990 asked junior English majors to evaluate their English language teachers, both native and expatriate. They expressed dissatisfaction with both groups of teachers. In terms of expatriates, the most common complaint was that the foreigners treated them as primary-school children and failed to challenge their intellects. One student expressed the views of her classmates in describing most courses taught by foreign teachers as "insulting our intelligence." Another student noted that Chinese faculty members, themselves, did not consider SZU's foreign teachers on the same intellectual plane.

Even if SZU managed to hire competent teachers, there was no incentive for them to stay. Merit-based promotions were not available (ranks were assigned according to the level of education obtained) because, as noted, only in 1990 and 1991 did any foreign teacher receive merit rewards based on performance, but the contract provision allowing for such merit awards was scrapped the following year and replaced by an automatic bonus, an unearned award given to each foreign teacher at completion of the annual contract.

At SZU evaluation scared foreign teachers. To some, especially to the risk-averse, evaluation meant criticism. Suggestions for improvement were interpreted as personal reprimands. Many teachers, especially those who lacked confidence, didn't want new ideas thrust at them. Some considered old curricula and dated textbooks like family—not to be discarded. For academic evaluation to be successful, the very concept must first be accepted. If the intended beneficiaries of evaluation—teachers and administrators—are hostile from the start, the chances are good that the process cannot be successful.

In sum, successful overseas teaching is influenced by a variety of elements, involving personality traits, cultural sensitivity, excellent teaching skills, and knowledge of the subject being taught.[132] Many factors that affected Westerner's teaching quality at SZU were beyond the control of the individual instructors. These included how well a course meshed in the departmental curriculum, whether suitable texts were available, and whether the English level of the students was adequate. These factors varied greatly from teaching situation to teaching situation. Any fair evaluation of individual expatriate teachers would have to take this variation into account. The use of models, as discussed next, failed to be an effective substitute for systematic evaluation. In general, SZU's FAO was not concerned with quality among its expatriate teaching staff; the office at the very least failed to realize that, in regards to teaching, “not all foreigners are experts.”[133]

Model foreign teachers

Models (such as honest Abe Lincoln) are a standard means of instruction in moral education. China’s most famous model, Lei Feng, was often brought out by SZU authorities during the semi-annual ideological education drives. SZU also used foreign teachers as models, mostly as exemplars for their foreign colleagues. Anthropologist Pollack explains:[134]

> Officials sought to preempt the occurrence of problems [caused by resident foreigners] with a time-tested method, used on Chinese themselves, for gaining relative control over people’s conduct. By providing foreigners with examples of worthy behavior…, authorities hoped to regulate their activities and minimize the negative effects of their involvements. Through rather diffuse channels, our hosts provided us with the rules of the game as they would have us play it. Our task, we were expected to realize, was to transform ourselves into living analogies of the proffered models.

Pollack elaborates on the case of a particular foreigner who worked at a Shenzhen hotel…“a favorite subject of Chinese journalists…[who was] written about and interviewed on more than one occasion.” This model “often said quotable things—the right kinds of things—which Chinese officials would, in the best of all possible worlds, have every foreign resident also saying (if not genuinely thinking) in their respective working contexts.”

Shenzhen journalists found a similar model among SZU’s foreign teachers. One particular SZU foreign teacher was singled out by both the FAO and the local media for special attention. Her picture appeared numerous times in the local press, often around the time of National Day, Teachers Day, or Women’s Day. An article about her appeared in a national newspaper in July 1995. When *Shenzhen Tequ Bao* launched a special English language edition in 1997, she was pictured as one of a handful of carefully selected foreigners. Although she herself did not read or write Chinese and knew little about Chinese culture, she provided an endorsement that was included as the forward of a bi-lingual dictionary of Chinese idioms edited by the head of Foreign Affairs. Her statements in the press provided a litany of quotes. In *China Daily*: “respecting old people means so much here. We respect the youth in our culture.” “Chinese students are diligent and quiet. They write well. But they’re not as talkative and active as students I have taught in Canada.”[135] In *Shenzhen Commercial Daily:* “I don’t want to leave; Shenzhen is just like my home…I live happily here. Students are diligent and nice; colleagues are friendly. Many of my former students are working at their proper positions. I am contributing my own bit to the development of this city. I am proud of this city."[136]

FAO chose this teacher as a model for various reasons. She was purely an English language teacher and did not teach any subjects that might have created turf wars with her colleagues. In the words of a Chinese colleague, she "was not an intellectual threat to us." Her lecture style was quite similar to the predominant pedagogy practiced in the FLD, where she taught. Although students gave her poor evaluations, they never complained to department leaders. She was accepted as a fixture, and she taught courses that no Chinese teacher was willing to teach. Unlike younger foreign teachers at SZU, she did not socialize with students and rarely met with students outside of class. Most importantly, she did not concern herself with educational matters or issues relating to SZU, and she gladly took whatever teaching duties she was assigned. For being a model teacher, she was rewarded with a light teaching load: a weekly average of six hours, although the contract called for double that amount. Although this teacher never fell from FAO's grace, her contract was not renewed in 1998 because of a SEdC directive that prohibited foreign teachers from teaching more than five consecutive years.[137]

Two of the teachers referred to earlier—the proselytizer and the man who displayed the *dian* poster—at different times had each served FAO as models, that is until their falls from grace. Both had been selected by FAO as the foreign teacher best suited to represent and speak on behalf of the expatriate community at the annual banquet given to campus foreigners.

No selection as model teacher, however, was more ironic than the choice of Ottavio Angotti, who taught at SZU using several names, including Ottavio Ponte and Pan Yiqiao (both Ponte and Qiao mean bridge, Yi stands for Italian). In 1994 Angotti was chosen by FAO to represent his colleagues at a "Foreign Friends Evening" buffet/karaoke hosted by SZU.[138] Angotti, who taught juniors for two years in International Finance and Trade, remained a mystery to his foreign colleagues because he gave different foreign teachers bits from his past which, when put together, never computed. The mystery was cleared up in June 1996 when Angotti's picture appeared under a banner headline in a Hong Kong English language newspaper. The headline read: "Swindling banker fled to China: Fraudster taught finance at Shenzhen University." A smaller picture of the SZU administration building was captioned: “Idyllic retreat: Shenzhen University provided the ideal hiding place for fugitive Ottavio Angotti.[139]

Angotti, a man of charm, flair and persuasion who belonged to a prominent family in Italy (his father had been a senator), wooed over the FAO. According to press accounts, he was hired immediately after “he showed up on the university’s doorstep and presented himself as a scholar and businessman in international finance.” As per normal, FAO did not bother to check his credentials or references.[140] Had they done a background check, they might have discovered that Angotti’s last job had been chairman, president and chief executive officer of Consolidated Savings Bank, a tiny thrift bank in Irvine, California. The lender operated for only two years before it was closed down by federal regulators in 1986. After a 11-day trial, Angotti was convicted in May 1993 by a federal jury in connection with a loan scheme to steal more than U.S $1.6 million through fraud.[141] The thrift’s failure cost the U.S. taxpayers $43 million, which went to repay depositors. While awaiting sentencing, Angotti was dropped off at a San Diego hospital for cancer tests. He jumped bail and disappeared.[142] At the time he also faced indictments for loan fraud and money laundering involving a separate thrift. In that case Angotti’s 37-year-old older son, Antonio, was convicted and sentenced to 41 months in prison for conspiracy, money laundering and making false statements to obtain a $480,000 loan on a condominium in a project his father was developing. The elder Angotti was captured 19 June by Interpol officers as he tried to cross into Hong Kong. He was using his real name and an Italian passport. Aged 60 at the time of his detainment, Angotti remained in a Hong Kong prison cell until November when he either waved extradition or agreed to be extradited.[143] The article on his run-in with the law noted that:

> Angotti fought the investigators furiously and blamed their interference for causing the bank to go bust. At one point he even taunted regulators by standing for election to a seat on the local branch of the regulatory board.
>
> Federal regulators claimed in a lawsuit that Angotti made death threats against them during their probe of the banking scandal—a charge he denied in a 1989 interview with *Playboy* magazine.

Angotti’s sudden and mysterious disappearance from campus was not publicly acknowledged by FAO until it was reported in the Hong Kong newspaper (The FAO head had the article containing the Angotti arrest story removed from the SZU library). A FAO handler is quoted in the news article as saying: “We are very unhappy he has disappeared. He has designed the final examinations for July and we need him to grade the papers.”

Figure 6.6: Foreign exchange types



Academic exchange

SZU’s academic exchange with foreign educational institutions developed through several stages, as displayed graphically in Figure 6.6. Each stage supplemented, rather than supplanted, the previous one, and there were no firm temporal boundaries between them.

Trips abroad by SZU leaders were felt necessary to show respect for (give face to) institutions with which SZU wished to develop relationships. As a new university seeking foreign exposure, SZU needed to send its leaders out to learn from the experiences of these institutions. Over time these schools were repeatedly visited by delegations of successive SZU leaders. The average annual cost of delegation travel over SZU’s history was an estimated US $100,000, some of which was picked up by Shenzhen government when municipal officials were included in the entourages. Reciprocally, the foreign institutions sent their own leaders to SZU for visits, and this gave SZU face. The stated purpose of many of these trips was to negotiate and sign letters of understanding and exchange agreements with the foreign universities. In 1991, FAO drafted eight agreements or memoranda with foreign universities. These signings reaped a public relations bonanza. After SZU signed an agreement with the Hong Kong Polytechnic, for example, reports appeared in both Hong Kong’s pro-China media (*Wen Hui Daily* and *Da Gong Daily*), the then colony’s more independent press (*Xianggang*

Shibao, Ming Bao, and Chengbao), as well as the China's state-controlled *Overseas Chinese Daily (Huaqiao Ribao). Macau Daily* reported on SZU's agreement with the University of Macau in late October. In 1992-93, SZU signed 16 cooperation agreements and memoranda, of which 10 were formal agreements, two letters of intention, three memoranda, and one draft agreement. By 1995 SZU had executed over 30 agreements with overseas and compatriot educational institutions in the U.S, U.K., France, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, Canada, Hong Kong and Macau.

The second stage, discussed in greater detail below, involved the travel of lower-level leaders and high-ranking teachers who were permitted to go abroad to present papers at conferences or for research/training. In the third stage SZU students were sent to overseas institutions as part of "twinning programs" in which courses were taken both at SZU and the foreign institution. The course work led to certificates or degrees being issued from both institutions. Not all agreements led to substantive arrangements. Take the case of Griffith University, which is located outside Brisbane, Shenzhen's sister city in Australia. On 19 October 1991, the principal of Griffith visited SZU and signed an exchange agreement. Within two weeks, SZU was visited by a seven-person delegation from Brisbane, headed by the city's mayor, which was touring the SEZ. After that, several scholars from Griffith resided at SZU while they collected data for their research, but there were no other substantial developments in exchange between the two universities, although delegations continued to be exchanged at the rate of two every three years.[144] (In 1991 Brisbane received about one delegation from the PRC every week, the major attraction being a local koala reserve where tourists could pet and be photographed cuddling the fuzzy marsupial.) In fact, most of SZU's exchange agreements with foreign institutions did not yield substantive results. Most activity did not go beyond the delegation exchange and banqueting stage.[145]

Leadership delegations

SZU leaders initially went abroad in delegations to inspect and observe how overseas universities operated. These trips also provided opportunities to develop the university's enterprises. Luo Zhengqi headed a delegation that traveled to the U.K. and Italy for 19 days in August 1987. Accompanied by the general manager of the Reflective Materials Co., and SZU's director of procurement, Luo and his team undertook market research and project negotiation. Luo visited Japan in December to pave the way for an exchange with

Kumamoto Commercial College. During the same summer Vice-president Ying Qirui also toured Italy as a member of a delegation of Chinese scientists who saw Paloma University and various electronics enterprises. The other vice-president, Zheng Tianlun, visited the U.K. for 13 days along with the head of the Law Department, who was interested in establishing a relationship with the University of London.[146] In 1988 the university sent out five official delegations, which visited U.S., Japan (Zheng), West Germany (Luo), U.K./France (Ying) and Australia (Luo). These trips lasted two weeks on average. Additionally, nine staff presented papers at international conferences that year.

In early December 1988 SZU hosted reciprocal delegations from both the University of Central Lancashire (known then as Lancashire Polytechnic) and Kumamoto. Leaders from both institutions planted trees of friendship in an area near to the SZU administration building designated as Friendship Forest. Agreements regarding faculty and student exchanges were also re-consummated, this time on Chinese soil. The head of SZU's Institute on SEZ Economics visited Kumamoto in December 1990, three years to the day from when Luo had first visited. Another university leader, Yu Zhongwen, who had served Luo as deputy CCP secretary and then rallied behind the post-Tiananmen leaders, spent part of 1989 and 1990 in Japan for training. Wu Zewei, SZU's CCP secretary, and Vice-president Zheng visited the U.S.S.R. before the fall of communism; delegation travel in 1990 continued at the pace of two trips per leader per annum, but it went largely unreported in SZU publications.

In 1991 the FAO organized three "big scale" delegations to travel abroad. Zhang Bigong, head of the CCP's propaganda office and a leading force of SZU's under-50 generation who was being groomed to become vice-president, was part of a nine-member delegation which toured the U.K and France for 16 days in May. The group was headed by Shenzhen's vice-mayor in charge of education. Universities such as Lancashire and Manchester that had previously been visited by the now discarded and disgraced leader were revisited by his politically correct successors, who sought to confirm SZU's desire for a continuity in international relations and delegation travel. Party secretary Wu, a member of the delegation, reported on the trip in an article in *Nanfang Daily*, a CCP newspaper, Guangdong's equivalent to *People's Daily*.[147] Wu, who over his career had written scores of articles for the Party press, reported that the team had been successful in overcoming the situation in which "foreign friends had stopped cooperating with China because of vicious propaganda from anti-rational forces abroad."[148] In October, SZU hosted a delegation from Kumamoto, which came to modify and ratify, as noted earlier, the existing cooperation agreement. The visitors took the opportunity to visit Shenzhen's newest theme park, Cultural Villages, as well as the new securities exchange market.[149] President Wei led a delegation in December of the same year that toured the U.S., coast-to-coast, visiting schools such as Connecticut State University and California State University, Fresno, for banquets and agreement signing ceremonies. In June the following year, Wei, accompanied by Ying and FAO staff, visited Japan to check up on the Kumamoto exchange. They also visited other Japanese universities and several corporations, including Epson Company, which had earlier donated computing hardware to SZU. They stopped by to visit the president of the Chinese University of Hong Kong on their return.[150]

One of the largest and most ambitious delegations traveled to the U.S. for 22 days, beginning 17 April 1993. Central government regulations limited university staff to two foreign trips a year, and by mid-1993 SZU leaders had used up only part of their quota. The new president, Cai Delin, felt obliged to visit the same universities that had hosted his predecessors, despite various problems facing his new administration. (Over his tenure, Cai would spend a full month away from campus, primarily in Europe, North America and Australia.) In April and May of that year five university officials took in 10 American cities, visiting or revisiting schools such as Edmonds Community College (Seattle), Fresno State, University of Montana (Missoula), and the University of Toledo. The trip raised concern at SZU because so many university leaders were away during a time of crisis (they had left six weeks after one campus murder and were away for the 4 May murder involving 11 students). To explain (and justify) the trip to the campus community, the leadership published an article in the university's internal journal written under the pseudonym Wu Ren (five people), which mentioned the significance of celebrating the University of Montana's anniversary and touring various cities, which were located near the schools visited.[151] Nevertheless, the next month Zheng Tianlun headed a four-person delegation to the U.K. and France to renew acquaintances and revisit institutions with which he was well acquainted as well as to introduce new SZU cadres to their Western counterparts.

Despite teacher and staff concern about leaders' not attending to their duties on campus, delegation travel continued. For example, from 9-28 May 1995, Cai accompanied by his protégé Tan Zaixi, took a tour of the American West Coast (Edmonds, Stanford, San Jose State) and prestigious institutions in the East (Harvard, Yale, MIT, St. Johns, George Washington Uni-

Table 6.5: 1996 travel abroad by the SZU community[154]

travel purpose	individual groups	persons
international conferences	33	47
academic visits	39	80
exchange relationships	53	135
international exhibits	4	15
training	2	5
funded study	24	24
self-paying study	129	212
total	299	753

versity).[152] For three weeks in October, 1995, SZU's deputy Party secretary, accompanied by the FAO head and others, visited the usual places (Lancashire, Manchester, Paris, etc). That trip, like most of the trips that leaders took, occurred during the school term.[153] Actually, fall 1995 was an exceedingly busy time as the university prepared for the SEdC accreditation and several student exchange programs experienced crises and required special attention. SZU staff complained that these leaders' extended absences caused delays in carrying out school affairs.

In 1996 53 groups, involving 135 people, went abroad for the purpose of discussing exchange relationships (see Table 6.5). This exceeds the number of individuals who went to international conferences, for training, and for academic visits, combined.

Teacher travel

In 1992, SZU reported processing documents for 323 trips abroad, including to Hong Kong. Perhaps an estimated forty of these involved delegation travel led by top level leaders (president, vice-president, CCP secretary, and deputy secretary) who were accompanied by department level leaders and FAO staff.[155] The remainder (283) involved cadres who journeyed to Hong Kong and Macau, students and teachers who left SZU for overseas study, as well as teachers who went abroad to deliver papers at conferences. Reported data do not hint at how the number was split, but the third category was clearly the smallest. In 1992 the university did not fund conference travel except for leaders, and most ordinary teachers themselves did not have the means to support academic efforts by themselves. Staff, however, could afford a few days in Hong Kong or Macau, and several units organized trips for staff to these territories, which required only a travel permit, not a passport (the former being a less bureaucratic procedure). Student/teacher emigration for study probably accounted for as many as 50 people in 1992.

The following year, 510 staff went out for work, study or inspection. Student/teacher emigration may have actually dipped for 1993, but staff travel to Hong Kong and Macau expanded. The number of travel documents processed in 1994 declined to 445, which included 35 staff who were sent for training or study. According to 1995 data, SZU staff made 717 trips out of China, 286 of which were for business or conference presentations. That number included 431 trips which staff paid for themselves. In addition, 12 teachers and seven students were sent abroad to study at public expense; two teachers and 62 students went abroad as private, self-paying students (excluding the 56 students who were in joint exchange programs).

As incomplete as these data are, they indicate several trends. First, ordinary teachers in the mid-1990s began going abroad to attend conferences. The university by 1995 had sufficient funds to cover the transportation, conference fees and accommodation for any teacher who had a paper accepted for presentation at an international conference, provided that the trip was approved by the department head and did not interfere with the teacher's assigned tasks. Second, students and teachers continued to emigrate for the purpose of study. By the mid-1990s many of the teachers who had wanted to emigrate for study had probably already done so; and many of SZU's more recent hires already possessed higher degrees or, in the case of recruited "dragons," held high ranks even without advanced degrees. Nevertheless, the outflow continued. Even if the rate of departure had remained steady for SZU students—and there are some indications that the national craze of foreign travel had tapered off as China's economy steadily developed in the mid-1990s[156]—given that the university's student population had declined, a decrease in emigration would be expected. Apparently, the opposite occurred. Third, more staff were going to Hong Kong and Macau, and an estimated half of SZU's fixed staff and two-thirds of its teachers had been to one of the two territories.

Story 11: René LeBlanc, foreign student

The general emphasis at Shenzhen University was on money. I arrived at 5 or 6 in the evening on a Sunday in November, and bright and early Monday morning there was a knock on my door. It was the woman I later learned was called Dragon Lady. She told me to go immediately to the Shekou ferry pier and exchange all my money into Hong Kong dollars so I could pay her tuition and room rent for the next semester. Everything seemed to be about money; I was not given so much as a "hello" for welcome. The Dragon Lady told me how much I would be charged if I wanted to use the kitchen for foreign students, how much I would have to pay for using the washing machine, how much a ride into Shenzhen would cost if I wanted to hire the car owned by Foreign Affairs, the cost of meal tickets, etc. I felt more like an object that was giving them hard currency and that is why my barbarian presence would be tolerated. Of course, when they learned that my European university was interested in setting up an exchange program in China, they melted a bit. Instead of being downright hostile, they were just pleasantly rude. That's how I would characterize the Foreign Affairs Office over the six months I lived at Shenda.

It was always hard to get anything from Foreign Affairs, even to get answers to simple questions. But when they wanted something—like my translating an article from one of the half dozen European languages I spoke—they were all smiles and gifts. I soon learned to avoid the second floor of the Administration Building [where Foreign Affairs was located]. Always they found me, and I never knew immediately if they were coming to give or to get. Did they want something from me, like money or passport for their recurring paper processing? Or did they want to give me something, like a box of stale mooncakes as a token of their appreciation. I could never turn down gifts, as much as I wanted to. To reject a gift in China is seen as an insult. I saw how they treated foreign students (and even some foreign teachers) who were not held in their favor. The wrath of Confucius could not have been stronger! But to take a gift, such as a plastic bag of apples or oranges, enslaved me to future obligations. Gifts were considered downpayments for tasks to be assigned sometime later. It was a vicious circle that could never be broken.

They clearly did not care about my academic advancement. I had studied Chinese for several years at university, and they could not figure out what to do with me—that is, once they had taken my money. So they *first put me in an advanced class, with Japanese students whose written Chinese was better than mine, but whose oral abilities were inferior. We had to memorize Chinese jokes and recount them the next day in front of the other students. After several weeks of this, they removed me to the beginner's class. The Japanese, I was told, said my Chinese was not up to their level. In any case, I was relegated to a class of all Caucasians [those discussed below], like myself. After a short time, I stopped going to that class, which had material I had covered years before. Nobody ever bothered to come and ask me why I quit classes or if anything was wrong. They just basically left me alone, figuring that they had their money so I could do what I wanted. After three months, I moved off campus to a local village and hired a tutor and studied Chinese on my own.*

I moved off campus for another reason. My classmates—the Caucasian ones—were not in China to learn Chinese. Rather, they were here on a mission, sort of a personal crusade from God. They were in the Middle Kingdom to bring the Truth to the Chinese masses, starting with converting the intellectuals (a group that included college students), who in turn could preach to the peasants. Raised Catholic myself, I certainly have nothing against God, but I do not subscribe to the inculcation of religious beliefs on others, something that is more widespread in the United State than in Europe. The very first night I was at Shenda, I met one of "the Christians" as they were called by both themselves and others. I was trying to figure out how to get water from the kaishui, *the sometimes working hot water machine from which Foreign Affairs removed a pad lock during its operating hours (8 a.m.-9 p.m.). Such a boiler is an inseparable part of one's life in China. A woman, Josey, volunteered her assistance, and we got to talking. About 40 seconds into the conversation, she asked: Are you a Christian? I was taken aback. Never in my life had I been asked that question, and I was not sure how to respond. I was baptized and I still take the Holy Sacrament and go to confession on occasion, so I figured that for her purposes I qualified as Christian. After I went back to my room, a group of ten men and women invited themselves in, happy to see another of their own kind. Most were so-called foreign students, but some were foreign teachers (the university did not mind them preaching as long as they appeared on time for their classes and never questioned school policy). Immediately, they told me how lucky I was to be in Shenzhen and how easy it was to smuggle in Bibles. An older, big-boned lady joked about hiding Bibles under her skirt. It did not take long for me to realize that I had been mistaken: by "Christian" Josey, and the others as well, specifically meant* *non-Roman Catholic, proselytizing, Bible thumping Protestant evangelist. It took us only a few minutes to sort out our religious differences. After that, they clearly thought of me as a lost soul and as way too liberal, a label I got simply because I was European. It hurt me to see how they would prey on empty Chinese minds—those who are young and intelligent, but have a void because of the way their country is run. All these Christians could do was to grab on to that and fill that void with their own beliefs. They would especially seek out young men and women who had had failed love affairs; they were most vulnerable. Several of the Christian men were looking for Chinese wives to take back to the States.*

Being a foreigner, I was in demand as a teacher. Regular foreign teachers were always quitting before their contracts were up, so most of the native-English speaking students studying Chinese doubled as teachers (which gave the Christians access to the students). Like almost everyone else, I taught as well as studied. Even after I had dropped out of formal classes and moved off campus, departments hired me to teach English conversation. Other Europeans had been hired to teach German and French to Shenda teachers, but I had arrived too late in the term to pick up such a lucky assignment.

.

Twinning programs

Joint programs with other universities were identified at the top of this section as the third phase of foreign affairs work at SZU. The exchange with Kumamoto University of Commerce, which was discussed briefly above, for over a dozen years had permitted about 15 SZU students and teachers, including FAO staff who served as Chinese teachers, to spend six or more months at the Japanese sister school. Delegations have been exchanged each year in both directions. The program had started with sending one SZU student every other year, but by 1991, the rate increased to sending one per year. The Kumamoto exchange was uncomplicated: students from one university resided in the other for a year where they took language courses as well as regular business courses if their second language skills were adequate. In the mid-1990s SZU took another approach toward exchange. Large scale twinning programs were developed with three universities: University of Central Lancashire, U.K.; Edmonds Community College, Seattle; and Victoria University of Technology, Australia. This are discussed in detail below.

Over the years several other exchange arrangements have come and gone, largely unreported in SZU's publications. For example, neither the yearbooks nor the internal journal mentioned a program in which Charles Sturt University (CSU) sent students to study at SZU in 1995. According to information on the CSU website, part-time students from Hong Kong were to take course work on the SZU campus and were enrolled in a masters program in Applied Science (Information Studies) at CSU, an Australian university. SZU's role was to[157]

> provide administrative and tutorial support for the students while CSU will provide the distance education materials. The research component of the course will utilise supervisors from both CSU and Shenzhen University ensuring students have access to research expertise from international and local levels.

Initially 18 part-time students, who were Hong Kong residents but believed by CSU staff to be SZU graduates, entered the program. They were to have face-to-face teaching weekends conducted at SZU, and they would receive credit for their study at SZU. After beginning the program, seven students transferred into another more computer-oriented CSU course, for a masters in Information Technology, designed to meet the needs of practicing information professionals. Of the remaining 11 students (as of September 1997), only two were enrolled in the original library science program, which was in fact being phased out by CSU. According to Australian staff familiar with the program, a second intake planned for February 1996 was stopped because Guangdong Province never approved it, although it is unclear why provincial approval was necessary since SZU involvement seemed limited to providing a facility and perhaps a teacher. (SZU has occasionally offered library science courses as part of adult education). The SZU-CSU exchange falls under the rubric "offshore education;" in their most developed forms these exchanges involve Australian universities' setting up entire campuses in foreign countries. Offshore programs are becoming increasingly popular in Australia, for they generate revenues that help to make up the shortfall caused by government's decreasing investment in higher education. Critics of these programs contend they churn out degrees rather than dispense knowledge; it is not clear to what extent the CSU-SZU exchange did either.

Lancashire

Besides the Kumamoto exchange, SZU's most enduring and steady relationship was with Lancashire, involving in travel alone about 30 SZU staff in some dozen delegation trips. The relationship started at the highest levels, with Luo's visiting the U.K. in summer 1987, and the Lancashire principal's calling in at SZU that October, followed by a six-person team in December the next year. In May 1990, the cooperation exchange agreement was extended to run to the end of 1995, the clause that had restricted exchange to certain engineering subjects was removed, and the exchange was increased from two to three students each year. SZU and Lancashire executed agreements in April and November 1991 during reciprocal visits, and again when the Lancashire principal visited in September 1992. By 1994 SZU had sent five teachers for short-term stays at Lancashire. Included was one who returned to SZU to become associate dean in Electronics, but the rest did not return to China. One went to the U.S. and another stayed in the U.K., both for graduate study. Two ended up in Singapore. Students started to be exchanged from 1989. A Lancashire undergraduate went to SZU, and two SZU Electronics majors went to Britain for a year. When the first students sent to Lancashire refused to return to China, FAO director Zhang made a special trip "of persuasion." He was unsuccessful; both students stayed in the U.K. upon completing their studies at the sister school. In 1991, places for two additional SZU students were opened at Lancashire, this time for six months study. Interested students had to sit for an English exam and then be interviewed by a Lancashire representative. The interview process (which weeded out a SZU leader's daughter who did not even speak much English) selected two able students for a year at Lancashire. These students returned to Shenzhen when their study ended, but afterwards they both returned to the Lancashire to pursue doctoral study. Both completed Ph.Ds at Lancashire and have remained abroad.

In the early 1990s SZU and Lancashire undertook a "twinning" program which works as follows. Undergraduates were admitted to SZU as special *benke* students. They were to take their first two years at SZU and then another year at Lancashire. At the end of the program they would receive bachelors degrees from both institutions. Programs of this nature took several years to arrange, for they required prior approval of the SEdC. Details of the program were worked out between various parties at Lancashire and members of SZU's Electronics Department, to which all the student and teachers in previous Lancashire exchanges had been attached. Although Electronics was aware of Lancashire's curriculum and general situation, it could find no existing SZU program on which to model its new program. The Management Department had since 1987 offered a certificate program in conjunction with Hong Kong Management Association, but this program was quite different from the Lancashire proposal as the former was for adults who came to SZU once a week, and the latter was for full-time undergraduates residing on an overseas campus. Without a model, Electronics relied heavily on Lancashire, which itself had had only limited experience at that time with offshore programs.

At the same time Electronics was planning to operate a one-year applied computer night course with National Computer Centre of Singapore (NCC).[158] Students who successfully completed the course would receive a professional certificate and would be encouraged to sit for NCC's exam, which would be given in China. Hong Kong Polytechnic promised to accept students who held these certificates for a degree program in information technology. The NCC program charged ¥6,000 (US $700) tuition, was intended to draw its students from Hong Kong, and was scheduled to begin August 1994. English was the medium of instruction for both this and the Lancashire program. SZU's FAO was only peripherally involved in either of these endeavors. The NCC program never developed.

The Lancashire twinning arrangement received SEdC approval in November 1992. This approval was necessary because *benke* students in a Chinese university—SZU—were to be given credit toward their SZU degree for courses taken in universities outside of China, and the SEdC reviewed such arrangements on a case-by-case basis. The first intake of 43 students arrived at SZU September 1993.[159] Students took an entrance exam and had to show proof of Guangdong residency. Tuition was œ1,250/HK $15,000 (US $1,925) per year. Students were warned that if they failed a single course during their two years at SZU, they would not be permitted to proceed to Lancashire. As the program progressed, Lancashire took a hands-on approach, working closely with Electronics in designing the program, providing curriculum/syllabus and sending textbooks, arranging for teachers (including ones sent from the U.K.), and assessing various elements. Students were made aware of Lancashire's involvement right from the opening ceremony. For the second intake in 1994, for example, Lancashire officials personally handed out Lancashire school badges to the new class. They also presented awards to the excellent students from the previous year's intake. In 1995, the third class was enrolled. Out of 24 students from the first class who had successfully completed the program, 21 got visas for the U.K., for which they departed on 16 August 1995. By that year the program had become routine; the fourth entering class was being recruited for 1996, and 22 students went to Lancashire in September of that year. The program received favorable press coverage in Shenzhen.[160]

The program's 50% attrition rate is attributable to the low quality of intake as well as to the rigor of the program. The English abilities of almost half the students when they entered were not up to standard. No matter how hard they studied, two years of instruction at SZU proved insufficient for them to obtain the English level required by Lancashire. Generally, the students, who mostly came directly from Shenzhen secondary schools, had not achieved sufficiently high entrance scores to enroll in SZU. A few students had higher scores because, in fact, they were enrolled in SZU's *zhuanke* courses before they shifted to the Lancashire program. Generally, for those students who went to Lancashire, the program was viewed as a success. Upon completion of the Lancashire courses, some of the students stayed in the U.K. for further study.

Edmonds

Several years after the Lancashire program got underway, SZU launched a twinning program with Edmonds Community College, Seattle, Washington. Contacts were initiated when Edmond's dean of international services contacted a Malaysian Chinese who, in turn, introduced the dean to someone at

SZU who, in turn, introduced him to SZU's FAO. Representatives of Edmonds, founded 1967, informally visited SZU to discuss an exchange relationship that would involve SZU's students' finishing off their study at Edmonds. The Foreign Language Department expressed no interest in such a program so Edmonds turned to SZU's Chinese Department, whose department head, Zhang Bigong, was immediately enthusiastic. The Chinese Department, of course, did not specialize in English teaching and, in fact, only a very few of its teachers were fluent in English. The department, however, had run a Chinese-English Secretary major for some years, and it had always stressed the importance of English as a second language. The department, as noted in Chapter Four, was one of the most innovative at SZU, constantly revising its major structure and searching for new educational frontiers. FLD's refusal opened the way for the Chinese Department to expand its horizons beyond the country's borders.

The Edmonds course was approved by the Guangdong Higher Education Bureau on 6 September 1993, and formally inaugurated in an opening ceremony 24 November which was attended by the chairman of the Edmonds Board of Directors. Recruited students took an entrance exam (in Chinese and English) on 1 December and classes began later that month with 40 students enrolled in four majors: Advertising, Public Relations, Tourism and Secretary. Later students were added in Finance and Accounting. Like the Lancashire course before it, the Edmonds twinning program advertised for students in the local media (and was even publicized among overseas Chinese).[161] The program was different in nature from Lancashire's in that it did not end with a bachelors degree, and thus it did not come under SEdC overview. It was supervised by provincial and municipal authorities. Students would study at SZU for 1½ years and top off their course work at Edmonds for six months. In brochures and press accounts, several major points were made. Students had to pass all their exams at SZU before they could go to Edmonds. If they completed the two years, they would receive a *zhuanke* certificate from SZU and the equivalent junior college "associate degree" from Edmonds. Enrollment was expected to be around 30 students. Students would come from three main sources: immediate secondary graduates, transfers from SZU *zhuanke* programs, and others who had taken jobs immediately upon completing secondary school and now wanted to go to college. Tuition in the program was set at ¥40,000 (or about US $900 per term) for the two years, and total costs ran about US $3,000 per year. Admission to Edmonds required students to obtain a 500 score on TOEFL, which is basically equivalent to a low pass on Band 4. The flyer and newspaper advertisement said that a student, upon successful completion, could transfer to an American college as a junior. SZU reported that the program had been "filed" with the U.S. Embassy, Beijing, and with the Guangzhou consulate.

At first the Chinese Department alone operated a rather compact Edmonds twinning program, including handling students' tuition and fees. After the first intake, FAO became heavily involved in the program, and two additional departments—Economics and IFT—were permitted along with Chinese to enroll students. About 200 students, the majority female, were enrolled among the three departments over the program's three-year history. They were not regarded as regular SZU students; for example, they were exempt from SZU's required courses, such as physical and moral/ideological education. Edmonds stood firm on the 500 TOEFL requirement, despite protests from FAO which wanted to lower the threshold score to 475. In April after a year and a half of study, students applied in a group through FAO for their U.S. visas. They were told by FAO to sit tight.

The program hit an impasse when the U.S. consulate in Guangzhou initially refused to issue study visas to the first group of students who had completed the course. Consular officers argued that the program did not involve a legitimate undergraduate or graduate degree, as required for student visas; furthermore, Edmonds twinning had never been sanctioned by the U.S. government. In other words, "filing" was not deemed equivalent to being sanctioned. U.S. State Department representatives routinely deny Chinese nationals permission to study in the U.S., often citing "unlikely to return to China" as a reason. In general the granting of visas appears to rely heavily on the discretion of consular officers (two must concur on a denial), and many Chinese view the process as quite arbitrary ("If this is your rule of law, I prefer China," I was once told). Clearly from the start, the publicity on the Edmonds twinning program had told students they did not have to return to China, at least not immediately, if they were able to transfer to a four-year college to complete a bachelors degree.

In September, the Guangzhou consulate agreed to grant visas to the students. Given political intervention, about-faces in policy implementation at the lowest levels of American foreign policy are not rare. In general, members of the U.S. Congress are given a direct channel for communicating their constituents' complains to the State Department. It is unclear to what extent and at what level Edmonds intervened, but intervention seems the only plausible explanation for why consular officials issued visas three months after their initial, adamant refusal. SZU gave Edmonds two weeks notice (after

SZU had purchased air tickets) to prepare for receiving the students. The community college sent its staff scurrying to arrange for teachers, class schedules, room assignments, and students' accommodation. Thus, in fall 1995, 32 students from the first Edmonds class were sent to Seattle for six months. They were assigned to live with host families, who they paid US $400/month for room and board.

In approving the visas, however, the consulate informed both SZU and Edmonds that it was requiring SZU to submit a letter within six months stating that 100% of the students had returned. Unless such a letter was received, the consulate declared, no further visas would be issued to students in any future Edmonds twinning program. The first group of students completed their studies and graduated from Edmonds on 20 March 1996. Holding private Chinese passports, each of the students, with Edmond's help, succeeded in transferring to a American college to complete the degree. All had been able to revise their F-1 visa status, with the help of the university they were transferring to. Not one of the students returned to China, despite the fact that SZU had given the SZU teacher who accompanied the students instructions to bring them back. The teacher was powerless, for the students' visas gave them the right to transfer to other U.S.-based programs. Thus, the Edmonds twinning was suspended after 100% of the first intake *failed* to return to China within the required six months. From the beginning, no one really believed the students would return in the time specified. A rumor circulated around SZU that one of the Guangzhou consular offices had wagered $100 that the students would not return, and none of his colleagues had taken him up on the bet—even at 100-to-1 odds!

Was Edmonds twinning a success? The program at SZU used course materials identical with those on the home campus. One teacher who gave a test that was equivalent to one used in Accounting 101 at Edmonds reported about the same passing rate as classes on the home campus. Students were required to maintain a 2.5 GPA, pass six five-credit courses, plus an additional two PE credits. Early in the program some students failed to reach the necessary English level. Edmonds' visiting language teachers managed to weed out those students who failed to attend class. The remainder tended to be motivated. Many had been working for a few years and were more mature than the normal undergraduate. The students who remained in the program produced acceptable results. About half of the entering class went to Edmonds, completed the program, and then transferred to undergraduate programs around the U.S. (e.g., Utah, New York, Washington, Tennessee, Minnesota, Oregon). Since 32 students—eight from IFT, seven from Economics, the remainder from Chinese—finished their studies in the U.S., the first intake of 1993 can be regarded as completing the program successfully. In 1994 the program's scale was reduced. Instead of 120 students, only 60 students were admitted. The number of majors was cut from four to two. Another 109 students (120 by plan) entered in 1995. After the first intake, no class would continue their studies abroad, despite the fact that a few students in 1995 successfully completed the SZU leg of the program and scored over 500 on TOEFL. They were denied visas to the U.S. Their failure to go to Edmonds tainted the program's success.

As suggested in the above accounts, the Edmonds exchange was not administered as smoothly as the Lancashire twinning program. The latter had direct involvement from a continuous group of individuals, in the Electronics Departments of both SZU and Lancashire, who had developed a working relationship over several years. Edmonds twinning was not managed by a single person or even a single group of people, at either end. FAO had different individuals overseeing the program during its short life, and often the leaders who made important decisions were out of China when decisions were required. None of the managers shared information with his successor. Teachers from Seattle flew in for month-long stints, each bringing in an individualized pedagogy, course materials and instructions from the home office. Students were given conflicting information. At one point, students in IFT and Economics were told that they could not get a certificate from SZU if they failed to meet the TOEFL requirement (Only 27% of IFT students had scored over the required 500). Yet, this condition was not in the signed agreement with Edmonds. Some students had been told that those who passed all course work would get a SZU certificate and that those who passed TOEFL would be eligible to study in the U.S. These difficulties arose, in part, because the program was rushed through. Whereas with Lancashire an entire year passed between SEdC formal approval and intake, the Edmonds program had only fifteen weeks between provincial authorization and the beginning of classes.

The implicit goals of the Edmonds program were more financial than academic. At the beginning there seemed to be an understanding among participants that the Edmonds twinning program would not require a very high form of academic instruction, taking as it did students who had not achieved sufficiently high college entrance exam scores to enter SZU *benke*. The Edmonds president, who had been in office 15 years, had built Edmonds into an institution characterized by international exchanges. It operated on different campuses around the globe, including one in pre-earthquake Kobe, Japan.

At the time SZU was being approached, the Kobe program, like other exchanges in Japan, suffered from the high cost of doing business in Japan (especially given the low value of the U.S. dollar versus the Japanese yen). It was being forced to downsize. The Edmonds president saw market potential in China, which was probably the major reason the SZU program was initiated. But in mid-course Edmonds changed the ground rules covering the program. This supportive Edmonds president retired, and his replacement was not enthusiastic over the Shenzhen twinning arrangement. Edmond's new management team, which included a half dozen personnel, wanted to refocus and upgrade Edmonds academically, away from its exchange ventures. The team insisted that exchanges adhere to the same administrative standards (documentation, financial accounting, etc.) applicable on campus and that exchange students in the programs achieve the same standards as used at Edmonds. Thus, Edmonds refused to waver on issues like language standards, despite FAO's complaints that the U.S. partner was violating an implicit agreement.

By 1995 it was apparent to both parties that the program would be short-lived. Visiting SZU in fall 1995, the new Edmonds interim president agreed with SZU that Edmonds would continue to send teachers for the students already in the pipeline. Future classes were not contemplated. SZU orally agreed to a number of items, such as book purchase, testing requirements, and especially SZU's remitting US $40,000 to Edmonds, as per agreement, by 30 November 1995. This visit, let alone the agreement, was not reported in either the SZU *1995 yearbook* or the *News in Brief*. Although FAO staff have privately acknowledged that the meeting had taken place, officials said it was merely ceremonial and disputed whether any understandings had been reached. SZU welcomed the arrival of new teachers from Edmonds; all other points would have to be renegotiated. One SZU staff member was quite blunt: "We just agreed to these terms so we could get your teachers. If we hadn't said yes, we couldn't get the foreign teachers." Furthermore, the ESL Placement test, which SZU had agreed to give, was delayed because the university was in the middle of the SEdC accreditation. Actually, FAO wanted to abandon the test altogether. According to one participant in the negotiations: "Correspondence was minimal, understanding vague, contact marginal."

Management of the program by the SZU partner was in a perpetual state of disarray. The vice-president in charge of foreign affairs delegated responsibility to lower levels. Academic Affairs wanted no part of the program. In its 1995 recruitment summary, AAO even mislabeled the program. It referred to it as "Edmonds *daipei zhuanke*," improperly suggesting a formal arrangement in which employers were paying the students' fees. Both AAO and FAO took the position that the program was administered by the three academic departments in which the students were formally enrolled. FAO's role was merely to handle the foreign exchange, in which regard it was exceedingly efficient in collecting students' tuition, but rather inefficient in making contractual payments to Edmonds. Students belonged to three academic departments, none of which communicated with the other. For example, as the first class was applying for transfer to Edmonds, students were required to submit valid copies of their transcripts to Edmonds. The departments refused to provide the transcripts directly to the students. ("They cannot be trusted.") They did not coordinate this simple task between them and, instead of giving the transcripts directly to the Edmonds staff person who was in residence at SZU ("Could she not be trusted?"), each department insisted on express mailing its students' transcripts to Edmonds. Another example of non-cooperation between departments involved textbooks. Texts, as agreed upon in the contract, were SZU's obligation, but none of the departments agreed to pay for foreign-printed texts. One department was willing to buy a single copy and mass produce it by photocopying, but the Edmonds representative refused to permit copyright violation. Thus, the students went without textbooks, pages were parsimoniously photocopied, and funds set aside for copyright payments. Eventually, texts arrived from the U.S.

Victoria University of Technology

The Lancashire twinning program had been initiated and executed by Electronics; Edmonds had been started by Chinese and then taken over by FAO. In 1995 these exchanges were receiving high praise by SZU leaders; on their heels came a twinning program with Victoria University of Technology (VUT) in Melbourne, Australia. VUT, whose origins go back to 1915, is an amalgamation of several sub-university tertiary campuses. Initial contacts between SZU and VUT were made in 1993, and details for the twinning arrangement were flushed out when a SZU delegation visited Melbourne in early 1994. A formal agreement was signed in July, and the first students started classes in the autumn. The program had an even quicker start-up than Edmonds, about six working weeks, given that SZU staff do not work during the summer break. Unfortunately, advertisements were not placed in the newspapers until late July, *after* secondary school students had already decided on university preferences at the time of taking the college entrance exam.

The VUT program was developed by Tan Zaixi when he headed FLD, and he retained control of it after he was appointed FAO head in 1994. In scope and scale, the VUT exchange was to be SZU's most ambitious international undertaking to date. The exchange operated under a new set of guidelines, drawn up in response to the problems, identified above, that existed in the Edmonds twinning program. In November 1994—a year after both the Lancashire and Edmonds programs had begun—SZU issued its first regulations on managing joint courses with foreign universities.[162] The purposes of these courses were stated:

> …to promote international higher education exchange, to learn from foreign universities their teaching content, teaching methods and management so that SZU's education gets closer to international education, to build up a good international image of SZU, to improve subject development, to raise the educational level of SZU, and to speed up training of internationalized applied *rencai*.

The new rules required that any SZU office or department interested in running twinning programs first needed formal university approval, based on the recommendations of a "foreign-related joint course leadership group" which was presumably composed of personnel from the relevant departments. Furthermore, all students enrolled in these programs were to be regarded as regular SZU students, implying that they would be subject to the same admissions requirements as *benke* or *zhuanke* entrants, and be required to take university-wide moral/ideological and physical education courses. FAO coordinated the programs, and it oversaw all contact with the foreign institutions and supervised the preparation of agreements. AAO was put in charge of recruitment, student affairs management and teaching quality review; General Affairs took care of students on-campus housing, and the teaching departments had responsibility for textbooks, teacher training and the management of students. In terms of funds distribution, 10% of income after expenditures was to be remitted to SZU, with the remainder staying with the teaching department, which had to pay for all the costs of running the course.

In initiating the VUT program, SZU planned four majors: International Accounting, International Banking and Finance, English and Real Estate Development/Management. These were covered by the departments of Economics, IFT, Foreign Language, and Civil Engineering, respectively. An advertisement which appeared in local newspapers explained the twinning arrangement.[163] A foundation program was to be run at SZU for the first two years; then students "satisfying certain conditions" could continue their studies in their majors at VUT. At the end of the program they would receive bachelors degrees from both SZU and VUT. Students who completed only the first leg of the program would be awarded a certificate of graduation from both institutions. Two types of applicants were sought: 1994 graduates from Shenzhen secondary schools who had taken the national college entrance exam and secondary graduates from earlier years. Both groups had to take an oral English exam, and the latter group was required to take exams in English, Chinese and mathematics. Tuition was set at US $2,500 for each of the first two years at SZU and US $6,000 for each of the two years in Melbourne. This was considerably more than the annual tuition set for Lancashire (US $1,925) or Edmonds ($1,800). This income were to be divided 60-40 between SZU and VUT. The Australian partner was to cover the costs of a full-time resident staff member at SZU as well as short-term fly-in visits from VUT staff in each discipline taught. The fly-in arrangement was similar to what VUT used in its programs in Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia. When the students moved to VUT, VUT was to pay the salary of a SZU teacher who supervised the students in Melbourne.

Despite its high tuition costs and the uncertainty of students' being able to study in Australia, recruitment in August 1994 drew 138 applications for 120 places.[164] According to FAO's 1995 report, "in order to guarantee the students' quality, we only recruited 70 students who were the best." [165] Thus, 71 students (one was admitted in year-two through a back door) were selected in two majors only—26 Accounting and 45 Banking; English and Real Estate were dropped.[166] The twinning program was formally launched on 21 October 1994 in an opening ceremony attended by SZU's vice-president who held the foreign affairs portfolio and a representative from VUT. The students' status was not the same as a regular SZU or VUT student; they held a unique status apart from SZU undergraduates, but in most respects they were treated as degree students; for example, they were given access to the library and computer center and lived in the student dormitories.

Curriculum and management

During their two years at SZU, twinning students took 23 hours of classes in eight business subjects:

> micro- and macro-economics, business statistics, business computer applications, accountancy introduction, accounting information systems, business communication, management and organizational behavior.

The Accounting and Banking majors had virtually identical curricula, but the two groups took most of their classes separately, their teachers coming from the department they had enrolled in, either Economics or IFT. Students also took other courses such as Australian Studies as well as various ESL courses, including business English, writing, listening and intensive reading. The last two SZU subjects, not designed by VUT, were taught by Foreign Language staff, who also taught other ESL courses to the students. In total, students had about 30 hours of classes per week (two-thirds lecture, one-third tutorial) and were expected to spend another 25 or so hours on out-of-class work. As with Edmonds, textbooks were by original agreement the responsibility of SZU. For reasons of practicality, this burden was assumed by the Australia partner except for English language teaching materials, which SZU provided. Courses were to equate with offerings on the Melbourne campus. Classes were assigned to regular classrooms, which unfortunately were not equipped with overhead projectors (which would have required special payments to the Audio/Visual Center). Two hours per week were reserved for computer laboratory tutorials; for other computer use, students had to use the student center, where functioning computers were not always available. The Accounting class had 27 students, "sufficiently cohesive in spirit to be manageable as a single class," according to one observer. The Finance class, however, enrolled 35 students with a wide variance in English language ability. For year-one the class was split into two sections, but these were recombined in year-two because IFT reportedly did not want to pay FLD for extra English teachers.

Another managerial problem related to structural differences between the SZU and VUT systems. Passing for SZU students is set at 60 points, but 50 points at VUT. The setting of exams follow different procedures at the two universities. The seriousness of exam proctoring and the penalties/tolerance for cheating varied considerably between SZU and VUT. Overall credit requirements for moral/ideological and even physical education were different.[167] Differences also existed in decision-making structure, degree of transparency and accountability, as well as general cultural differences between Australia and the PRC. In hindsight, transplanting a VUT curriculum to the SZU context appears to be a task that demanded more than the six weeks preparation that occurred.

The twinning program suffered severe internal inefficiency because the exact same curriculum was being taught independently by two sets of teachers from different departments. There was little coordination between the departments in terms of sharing teaching load, formulating teaching plans or providing collegial support. The most serious example was the "case of the young teacher who did not teach her allotted course for the first month because her colleague from the other department had simply neglected to pass on the teaching materials sent from Australia."[168] Communication between SZU teachers and VUT course developers was hampered because SZU refused to allow the SZU teachers access to e-mail. Even sending faxes proved difficult. Visits by fly-in teachers were relatively infrequent, and they provided an insufficient amount of time to address problems caused by the previous months of non-communication. Coordination at the university level was not much better. SZU preferred that VUT not deal directly with the students. After the offers to study in Australia had been formally made, for example, SZU insisted that it, not VUT, be the ones to inform the students, thus enabling FAO to charge the students fees for processing their visa applications.

Teachers

For the most part, courses were taught by SZU staff, using VUT teaching materials. Each local teacher was assisted once during the two years by a fly-in teacher from VUT, who taught usually for two weeks. In all, some 19 SZU teachers served as instructors in the twinning program over the two years. The high number of teachers relative to courses (19/13) stems from the fact that Economics and IFT did not share teachers; an identical course would be taught by two separate teachers—one from each of the departments—who did not coordinate their teaching. In addition, five classes underwent a change in staff in mid-semester (two teachers lacked specialized knowledge or experience; two quit SZU; one left to take up an off-campus consultancy). The teachers were, for the most part, young and inexperienced. Ten of the 19 were in their first teaching year at SZU, and six of these had no previous teaching experience. Just like most new recruits to SZU's teaching team, these individuals had virtually no say in what courses they taught. They were assigned heavy work loads and given courses that more senior teachers refused to teach. The twinning program was not standard fare at SZU; thus department heads gave it low priority in staffing. One teacher in the twinning program, for example, had 27 contact hours per week. Some of the teachers were competent in the fields they were assigned to teacher; others were not. The deputy head of FLD assigned "a young woman with no teaching experience and absolutely no knowledge of Australia" to lecture on living and studying in Australia.[169]

Students

The 71 students in the program came from both inside and outside Shenzhen. Some lived in other provinces, having been informed of the program by Shenzhen residents. One was the nephew of a SZU vice-president, admitted into the program at the beginning of the second year, in violation of the very policy his uncle had formulated. Almost all students had been attracted by what was *perceived* to be a guaranteed Australian visa; the spending of family savings on foreign education was seen as a worthwhile investment. For most of the students the twinning program was just the means to that end. Given the high costs of tuition, many of the students' families made sacrifices in pursuit of this objective. One student, whose parents ran a retail outlet, let their store's inventory dwindle in order to amass sufficient money to enroll their daughter into the program. Entering the twinning program, without a guaranteed Australian visa, was a risky endeavor that incurred opportunity costs. By entering the SZU twinning program, students effectively removed themselves from ever going into Chinese higher education as *benke* students. If they wanted a Chinese tertiary degree in the future, they would have to enter as adult students, taking the standardized adult higher education entrance exam.

The recruiting of students was handled by AAO. VUT staff observed but did not actively participate in the interviews. As one professor explained in a report to VUT:

> The interview process lasted about 10 minutes per student and involved a brief discussion, followed by the students reading a brief passage in English. It was clear that a large number of them had little comprehension of what they were reading and only one of the students I interviewed was able to engage in any significant conversation about the passage which she had read. A small number were not able to answer basic questions about where they live, how old they are and what their interests are.

The Australian observer, who himself had grave doubts about the students' second language competence, noted that among the SZU staff, no one seemed greatly concerned with students' poor performances on the entrance test.

The level of English demanded of these students was, in fact, greater than what was required of most regular *benke* students, including English majors in their first year or so (few SZU courses other than ESL used English-language texts). When the twinning students had completed their two years in July 1996, an English language exam was given. The English ability of many of these students was extremely poor, much poorer than their achievement levels in many of the business courses. Given that such high English standards were required, it now seems reasonable to have expected students to have had even more difficulty in the VUT program. In hindsight, the threshold language requirement should have been that associated with passing Band 6, a feat that only one-third of SZU's *benke* students could accomplish *at the time of graduation*, after more than 500 hours of classroom instruction..

Assessment

A consultant's 74-page evaluation, employing survey research and ethnographic techniques, examined the SZU-VUT twinning program, including student and teacher satisfaction with their various courses at the end of the two years of course work.[170] Some courses, such as accounting, computer applications, business statistics and even micro-/macro-economics, were not adversely affected by student's generally low levels of English. Tests often called for numerical answers or consisted of multiple choice and fill-in-the-blank type questions. Students in these courses, for the most part, could produce favorable exam results after exposure to the standard SZU "chalk and talk" pedagogy, with many of the courses being taught in Chinese (essential vocabulary translated to English). Nor did these courses, except for accounting, presuppose a significant experience or awareness of Australian culture or business practice. The other two business courses—business communications, and management and organizational behavior—were of a quite different nature. Each required familiarity with Australian culture, high English language skills, and a classroom culture which "should be interactive, practice-oriented, exploratory." These conditions were not met and, thus, both courses were viewed by the students, SZU teachers and Australian program staff alike as unsuccessful. These courses required a pedagogy that went beyond the mere knowledge transfer function of education. VUT describes the management and organizational behavior course as follows:[171]

> The aims of this subject are to provide students with an understanding of organisational behaviour and management theory; to *assess critically* the underlying values of these theories; to *assess critically* the utility and application of the management practices informed by these theories in the Australian context; and to *analyse critically* the values of Australian managers concerning behaviour in organisations and to evaluate the effectiveness of these assumptions.

Many of the reasons the local teachers were unable to develop a critical pedagogy to accomplish the goals set forth by the course designers from VUT were explored in the previous chapter. They include lack of teacher training, the teachers' burdensome schedules and the absence of mutual support among colleagues and succor from departmental leaders. These teachers' inexperience in college teaching and students' low English levels only served to compound the matter.

There is one point to which almost everyone agrees: that the language ability of many of the students was below that necessary for successful completion of the course and advancement to VUT. Low language ability was indeed the reason given by SZU for not enrolling a second intake in 1995. That decision, which was accepted by the VUT side, in effect suspended the program. It also meant there would not be sufficient tuition fees to cover the costs of VUT's resident coordinator at SZU, and in fact the coordinator was removed after the first year.

According to FAO the decision to suspend intake resulted from SZU's inability to persuade the Guangdong Higher Education Bureau to permit advertising prior to the college entrance examination (given the second week of July every year). Early advertising was seen as a way to improve the quality of the intake, although there is only a questionable basis for this assumption. Guangdong authorities did not accede to SZU's request for one major reason: provincial bureaucrats were still smarting from SZU's earlier attempt to pull off the VUT training program without seeking provincial approval. In order to start the program in fall 1994, FAO had not sought Guangdong's permission for the twinning program. Regulations state that all degrees awarded by Chinese tertiary institutions that include course work taken in institutions outside the PRC must be approved by the appropriate upper levels. Twinning students who went to Melbourne would be taking courses whose credits would count toward the SZU degree. Shenzhen municipality easily approved this arrangement, but such approval was, in fact, not the city's to give. Thus, through its advertisement, SZU had promised to award a degree that it had no authority to award. When Guangdong education officials learned about this, they became "more annoyed with SZU than usual," according to one informant. Even if SZU had made amends for its previous error in protocol, it was unlikely the province would ever give its blessing to the VUT exchange. Therefore, SZU suspended the program, regardless of the language level issue.

The first year's intake was allowed to complete the SZU part of the twinning arrangement. In July 1996, 58 of the 71 enrolled students sat for the course-final exams. Eight of these students gained six or more passes in the eight business courses and were deemed to have adequate English language levels to be offered admission to VUT's Bachelors in Business program. In addition, 23 students passed their business subjects but had a lower level of English. They were offered entry into a specifically-designed VUT course that would result in a TAFE (Technical and Further Education) diploma. Another 23 students, whose English levels were even lower, were admitted to a general TAFE diploma course that was to be preceded by additional ESL training. Four students were given no offer whatsoever by VUT. SZU had pushed for those students who lacked English language proficiency to take a third year at SZU which would have allowed them presumably to attain high enough standards so they could go to VUT. Probably for financial considerations, VUT rejected this idea. Thus, in summer 1996 the VUT twinning students found themselves in the same position as their Edmonds colleagues had been a year before: they were waiting for visas, in this case from the Australian embassy in Beijing.

Australian context

In the mid-1990s Australians were debating the wisdom of its immigration policy that admitted non-Caucasians. By 1996 Pauline Hanson, a politician who advocated lower Asian immigration, was the focus of much press comment. The issues, however, did not put forth a new debate. Actually, at the turn of the century, Australia had adopted a "White Australia" policy, which was not officially renounced until Gouch Whitlam's Labour government took office in 1972. Arguments from earlier periods (some would say the vestiges of racism) were resurfacing in the mid-1990s debate. Although this discussion did not apply directly to SZU-VUT twinning arrangement, it loomed heavily in the background.

Until the late 1980s higher education in Australia was greatly subsidized by the state. Throughout the 1990s, however, the Australian government was requiring universities to find an increasing portion of their funding by themselves. Tuition from foreign students (which was set higher than that for citizens) assisted tertiary institutions in this time of fiscal crunch. By 1997, 100,000 foreign students in Australian tertiary were adding Aus. $2.5 million a year to the nation's economy. In the first six months of 1997, the Immigration and Multicultural Affairs Department issued another 100,000 visas to foreign students (some were renewals).[172] Not many of these students were from the PRC, but in this regard China was seen as a market with high growth potential. In 1995 Australia issued Chinese students about 1,000 visas; the number increased to 1,500 in 1996. Immigration officials enforced more stringent language requirements on PRC nationals. This policy had been introduced in the early 1990s when "thousands of Chinese who had arrived in Australia to undertake short English-language courses had overstayed their visas and become illegal immigrants."[173] In 1997 about 3,000 foreign students were overstaying their visas, but the Chinese overstay rate was no longer in the top 10, although it was still above the international average. The higher language requirement for Chinese, however, was not abandoned as the overstay rate lowered.

At the end of May 1996 the Australian embassy in Beijing issued visas for eight SZU students to complete the twinning program; at the same time it denied entry to 22 of the students who had applied to continue the twinning program by registering in VUT's TAFE course.[174] Those SZU students would be allowed to enter the regular curriculum, only after they had achieved sufficient language fluency. VUT officials denounced the Australian government's decision as being discriminatory against the TAFE diploma course and for implying that TAFE studies were less legitimate than higher education tracks.[175] Australia was foolishly foregoing much foreign tuition, they contended.[176] In retort, an immigration spokesman said that VUT "went off without doing their homework" and that the visa requirements had been in effect for several years.[177] The issues here were complex. VUT had set up the exchange program on the basis of immigration regulations that allowed students to get a visa without first getting the requisite score on TOEFL or an equivalent test *if* the students had successfully completed an associated diploma course in their home country of at least 12 months duration taught by Australian staff who guaranteed the attainment of an adequate English level. The issue centered on whether the SZU twinning program was the type of course specified in these regulations. VUT thought it was; Australia Immigration disagreed. From the start, the FAO presumed that students could be granted Australian visas without a prior English test and assumed that VUT would not disqualify anyone who successfully completed the course. This line of belief led the FAO to take an almost cavalier attitude toward students' English level. As it turned out one student entered the VUT course with a TOEFL score of over 600; another took TOEFL on his own account before completing the VUT course, and these two got their visas not by virtue of having done well in the course but because they had adequate TOEFL scores. The remaining students were required to sit for a TOEFL equivalency test. VUT sent over a teacher for two weeks in December 1996 to coach the students. The remaining six students who matriculated in Melbourne were those who gained adequate language test scores and had done sufficiently well in their other exams to be accepted by VUT into year-two of the degree program.

In fact, the VUT-twinning was not the only SZU arrangement affected by this Australian policy. A smaller exchange with sister school Griffith University, outside Brisbane, involved four students scheduled to enroll in a TAFE program at that school. They were also denied student visas. To add insult to injury, one journalist reported that certain (unnamed) British officials had contacted SZU to offer places in the U.K. to the rejected Australia-bound hopefuls.[178]

The most positive spin that can be given the SZU-VUT twinning program is to suggest that it served as a learning experience, both for students and teachers, as well as for the institutional partners. More often, however, participants and observers characterized the program with terms like "catastrophe," "nightmare," or "scam." Some lessons were undoubtedly learned by both partners. First, programs of such ambition and expense require considerable planning if they are to serve as foundations for longer-term commitments. Second, exchange programs at SZU will likely be negatively affected by the same factors that adversely affect education at the university: outdated and inflexible pedagogy, excessive teacher work loads, lack of departmental coordination, an over-emphasis on the financial benefits of side educational businesses, and SZU's unwillingness to stand by its contractual obligations.

Conclusions on the twinning programs

How did the performance of the twinning programs measure up to the goals set in the 1994 regulations? Did SZU learn from foreign universities? Was it able to improve teaching methods and management so that SZU education moved closer to the international norm? Did it improve subject development, raise SZU's overall educational level, or speed up the training of "internationalized applied *rencai*?"

The twinning programs had a negligible effect on the university's curriculum or pedagogy. None of the teaching methods or textbooks was transferred to SZU courses. SZU's management style and decision-making process also seemed resistant to foreign influence. Of the three programs discussed above, Lancashire was generally considered the most successful in reaching the goals stated in the regulations. The Lancashire twinning arrangement was still on-going in 1998. In contrast, VUT was considered the least successful. The SZU campus community assessed Edmonds somewhere in between success and failure, given that only its first-year students went abroad.

Managerial factors, more than others, appear to account for whether a twinning program accomplished its goals. Planning for Lancashire was deliberate, and the program ran smoothly. Planning for Edmonds was put on a faster-track; in its haste FAO failed to follow proper procedures with the U.S. government and misrepresented the program to the recruited students. In a sense, the VUT program was pushed forward so quickly that it flew off the track; it was derailed for all the reasons mentioned above. If Lancashire had been planned like VUT, it too would have likely failed. If VUT had been planned like Lancashire, it may well have succeeded. In sum, when twinning programs were taken away from a single department (Electronics or Chinese) and managerial decisions were assumed by FAO, the programs failed. Hastiness caused recruitment of lower quality students. But to explain VUT's failure solely in terms of student quality is to raise a red herring, for student quality was in fact a function of poor management. If only low quality students are available then a program should be canceled before it is ever started. With sufficient time and planning, the VUT program might have recruited qualified students; Lancashire and Edmonds did just that.

Concluding thoughts

The three areas of foreign input that have been examined in this chapter raise serious doubts as to the effectiveness of foreign intervention into SZU education. The American credit system in the SZU context was merely a transfer of sorts. At SZU a credit system served as only a credit counting system; it did not achieve its intended goal—fostering general education. The impact of foreign teachers on SZU's overall curriculum and pedagogy has been marginal, at best. In reality, foreign teachers provided only foreign window dressing to SZU; their educational contributions were minimal. Many were much more effective as religious proselytizers than as educators. The thousands of visiting academics who came to SZU arrived as tourists, not scholars. For most of them SZU was just a tourist spot, not much different in kind from Splendid China, Window to the World or the Cultural Villages, which are all located on the Shenzhen-Nantou highway, a few kilometers east of SZU toward downtown Shenzhen. The official delegations that traveled between SZU and overseas institutions were estimated by one SZU official to cost SZU about US $100,000 each year. The primary beneficiaries of these trips were the individual travelers. The university as a whole reaped limited benefit in terms of scholarly exchange. The twinning programs that grew out of this delegation travel, themselves, provided overseas study opportunities for several dozen students and teachers. Few of them have returned to China. The number of these individuals who will likely return later in their lives and contribute to the nation's modernization is unknown. They, as individuals, will certainly benefit from a foreign experience. To what degree China as a nation benefits is uncertain. Whether SZU benefited from foreign influence is highly doubtful. All that can be said for sure is that foreign relations cost a lot of money. A most cynical—and sadly not inaccurate—comment is one from an ordinary SZU teacher who, admittedly, had not herself been afforded the opportunity to travel overseas at public expense. The twinning relationships, she said, served primarily to justify a decade of delegation travel by SZU leaders and senior cadres.

---

1. To cite but one example which applies to Chinese higher education: Hayhoe, *China's University and the Open Door*, 1989.
2. Pollack, *Civilizing Chinese*, 1997, p. 257.
3. He Daokuan, "Chinese Privacy" [in English]. An abridged, Chinese version of this paper was published in *Journal of Shenzhen University 13*, no. 4, 1996, pp. 82-9.
4. Or "*dangran, bu tai xiguan zhongguo shenghuo*," "of course, you are not familiar with the Chinese way of life."
5. Cited in Hayhoe, *Contemporary Chinese Education*, 1984, p. 206.
6. Pepper, *China's Education Reform in the 1980s*, 1990, p. 11; Pepper, "Post-Mao reforms in Chinese education," 1991, p. 9; Bastid, "Servitude or liberation?" 1987, p. 12; Abe, "Borrowing from Japan," 1987, p. 65; Han, "The development of the economics of education in China," 1987, p. 24; Ross, "Foreign language education as a barometer of modernization," 1992, p. 241.
7. Fairbank & Teng, *China's Response to the West*, 1979/1954), p. 50, 164-74; de Bary, Chan & Tan, *Sources of Chinese Tradition 2*, 1964, p. 82; Wang, *The Chi-*

neseness of China, 1991, p. 287.

8. Ayers, *Chang Chih-tung and Educational Reform in China*, 1971, p. 152, 160.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
10. Yu, "The radicalization of China in the twentieth century," 1993, p. 122.
11. See Hayhoe, *China's Universities, 1996.*
12. *Shenzhen University* [bilingual brochure, April, 1985, citation in English], p. 7.
13. Lu, "Advancing Shenzhen University reform," 1985.
14. Cao, "Reexamination of the credit system and suggestions to perfect it," 1992.
15. Hayhoe, *China's University and the Open Door*, 1989, p. 16.
16. Hayhoe, "The evolution of modern Chinese educational institutions," 1984, pp. 40-1.
17. Orleans, "Soviet influence on China's higher education," 1987, p. 187.
18. Cao, "Reexamination of the credit system and suggestions to perfect it," 1992; Sun, "Why the credit system meets cold reception in China," 1990; Lou, "A probationary implementation of the credit system," 1987.
19. Lou, "A probationary implementation of the credit system," 1987.
20. Cao, "Reexamination of the credit system and suggestions to perfect it," 1992.
21. Yen, "Foreign language teaching in China," 1987, p. 48.
22. See Hayhoe & Bastid, *China's Education and the Industrialized World*, 1987.
23. Mao, "Stubborn tradition," p. 15; Yen, "Foreign language teaching in China," 1987, p. 53.
24. Bastid, "Servitude or liberation?," 1987, p. 14.
25. Du, *Chinese Higher*, 1992, p. 4-5.
26. de Bary, Chan & Tan, *Sources of Chinese Tradition 2*, 1964,
27. Bell, *The Reforming of General Education*, 1966, p. 24.
28. The U.S. Department of Education 1994 data on type of institution and enrollment:

	USA		China	
type	number	enrollment (in millions)	number	enrollment (in millions)
public 4-year	605	5.8	982	2.4
public 2-year	1,036	5.3	83	.1
private 4-year	1,610	2.9	na	na
private 2 year	437	.2	na	na
total	3,688	14.2	1,065	2.5

Sources: Min, "China," 1997, p. 41; U.S. Dept. of Education, 1995.

29. Westmeyer, *A History of American Higher Education*,1985, p. v, 121.
30. Miller, *Major American Higher Education Issues*,1990, p. 123.

31. Hirsch, *Cultural Literacy*, 1988. Although this book focuses only on pre-university education, its thesis seems to apply to higher education as well.
32. Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind*, 1987, pp. 338-9.
33. Miller, *Major American Higher Education Issues*,1990, p. 76.
34. Wang, “The concept of general education in Chinese universities,” 1993, p. 357.
35. Cui, “New target for educational reform,” 1993; China State Council & CCP, “Guidelines for reform and development for Chinese Education,” 1993.
36. Wang, “Common trend and existing problems in the current tertiary institutions curriculum reform,” 1990.
37. Sun, “Why the credit system meets cold reception in China,” 1990.
38. Westmeyer, *A History of American Higher Education*, 1985, p. 101.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 111
40. *Ibid.*, p. 117.
41. *Ibid.*
42. Cheng, “Synopsis of experience from the credit system,” 1986; Guan, “A preliminary discussion of some questions concerning the credit system,” 1986; Sun, “Why the credit system meets cold reception in China,” 1990.
43. Miller, *Major American Higher Education Issues*,1990, p. 121.
44. Miller, *Ibid.*, p.119.
45. Miller, *Ibid.*, p. 126.
46. Miller, *Ibid.*, pp. 126-7.
47. Lou, “A probationary implementation of the credit system,” 1987.
48. Wang, “Common trend and existing problems,” 1990.
49. Fan, “New ideas on the reform of curriculum for the 21st century,” 1993, p. 33.
50. Pepper, *China’s Education Reform in the 1980s*, 1990,” p. 137.
51. Henze, “Higher education,” 1984, p. 127. Compare this with Table 6.2.
52. Lou, “A probationary implementation of the credit system,” 1987.
53. Yang, Lin & Su, *Higher Education in the People’s Republic of China*, 1988, pp. 176-7; Zhou, , *Education in Contemporary China*, 1990, p. 441.
54. Lou, “A probationary implementation of the credit system,” 1987; Guan, “A preliminary discussion of some questions concerning the credit system,” 1986.
55. Cao, “Reexamination of the credit system and suggestions to perfect it,” 1992.
56. Chen, “From a follow-up survey of the graduates,” 1993.
57. See Cheng, “Synopsis of experience from the credit system,” 1985; Guan, “A preliminary discussion of some questions concerning the credit system,” 1986; Wang, “Common trend and existing problems in the current tertiary institutions curriculum reform,” 1990; Gan, “Quest for characteristics of credit system in our country,” 1990; Wang, “Credit system: pros and cons,” 1986.
58. Gan, “Quest for characteristics of credit system in our country,” 1990; Cheng,

"Synopsis of experience from the credit system," 1985.

59. Wang, "Common trend and existing problems in the current tertiary institutions curriculum reform," 1990.
60. Fang, "Humble opinion on the reform of grading and evaluation," 1985.
61. See Cao, "Reexamination of the credit system and suggestions to perfect it," 1992; Cheng, "Synopsis of experience from the credit system," 1985; Guan, "A preliminary discussion of some questions concerning the credit system," 1986; Lou, "A probationary implementation of the credit system," 1987; Wang, "Common trend and existing problems," 1990.
62. See Cao, "Reexamination of the credit system and suggestions to perfect it," 1992; Gan, "Quest for characteristics of credit system in our country," 1990; Guan, "A preliminary discussion of some questions concerning the credit system," 1986; Wu & Liu, "Tentative search for the construction of a credit system," 1986.
63. See Cao, "Reexamination of the credit system and suggestions to perfect it," 1992; Gan, "Quest for characteristics of credit system in our country," 1990; Guan, "A preliminary discussion of some questions concerning the credit system," 1986; Lou, "A probationary implementation of the credit system," 1987.
64. See Cao, "Reexamination of the credit system and suggestions to perfect it," 1992; Guan, "A preliminary discussion of some questions concerning the credit system," 1986; Sun, "Why the credit system meets cold reception in China," 1990; Wang, "Credit system: pros and cons," 1986.
65. "Regulations on teaching reform and improving teaching quality, 4 July 1986," *1986 Yearbook*, pp. 61-4.
66. Sources: *1986 Yearbook*, p. 62; *1994 Yearbook*, p. 219; *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 272.
67. Chen Guanguang, "Credit system reform," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 211.
68. "Credit system regulations, 15 October 1988," *1988 Yearbook*, pp. 180-3. They also appear in Chen, *New Thoughts, New Explorations, and New Patterns*, 1989, p. 96.
69. Wang Kelai, "Career counseling" in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's reform path*, 1988, p. 249.
70. Chen, *New Thoughts, New Explorations, and New Patterns*, 1989, p. 97.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
73. "Student affairs management regulations, revised October 1989," *1989-90 Yearbook*, pp. 198-203.
74. Chen, "The structure and characteristics of management at Shenzhen," 1988, p. 20.
75. *1990 Student Handbook*, p. 30.

---

76. Sources: same as Table 6.1.
77. Optional courses exclude restricted-optional in all calculations. Sources for calculating percentages: Yang Jinbiao, "Review of SZU credit system," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 197; *1986 Yearbook*, pp. 188-93; *1988 Yearbook*, pp. 149-55; *1991 Yearbook*, pp. 263-77.
78. This abandonment of reforms is discussed at length in Agelasto, *University in Turmoil*, 1998.
79. Chen, *New Thoughts, New Explorations, and New Patterns*, 1989, p. 101.
80. *Ibid*. Interdepartmental flows are suggested in Table 4.3, p. 163.
81. "Credit system implementation measures, 25 June 1993" in *1992-93 Yearbook*, pp. 272-6; *Selected Collection of Administrative Regulations in Shenzhen University*, pp. 88-97. The rules, as revised 5 April 1994, are reprinted in *1994 Yearbook*, pp. 219-23; *SZU credit system* [student handbook], July 1994, pp. 1-10.
82. *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 61.
83. "SZU 1994 work focus, 9 March 1994," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 10; Cai Delin, "SZU's reform and development," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 27; Yang Jinbiao, "Review of SZU credit system," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 197; and Chen Guanguang, "Credit system reform," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 211. Note that CS reform was not in the list of Cai Delin's Ten Measures for Comprehensive Reform.
84. *1994 Yearbook*, p. 220.
85. "SZU credit system implementation, 16 July 1996," *1996 Yearbook*, pp. 217-21.
86. Wang, "Common trend and existing problems in the current tertiary institutions curriculum reform," 1990; Cao, "Reexamination of the credit system and suggestions to perfect it," 1992.
87. Westmeyer, *A History of American Higher Education*, 1985, p. 116.
88. Source: Departmental secretaries, June 1993.
89. Wang, "Common trend and existing problems," 1990.
90. Pearson, "The Fulbright Experience," 1997, p. 8 [footnote omitted].
91. Bell, *The Reforming of General Education*, 1966, p. 67, 152 ff.
92. Wu & Liu, "Tentative search for the construction of a credit system," 1986; Cao, "Reexamination of the credit system and suggestions to perfect it," 1992, p. 39; Guan, "A preliminary discussion of some questions concerning the credit system," 1986;
93. Chen, *New Thoughts, New Explorations, and New Patterns*, 1989, p. 98; Wu & Cao, "How has the political and ideological work concerning students been reformed in SZU?," 1986.
94. Rosen, "Students and the state in China," 1992, p. 178.
95. Westmeyer, *A History of American Higher Education*, 1985, pp. 118-9.
96. Qiu & Xie, "Shenzhen University implements credit system," 1994.

97. Representing literally Hong Kong (as in the *putonghua* Xiang Gang), Macau (as in Ao Men), and Taiwan. *Tongbao* stands for "born of the same parents" or compatriots.
98. "Foreign affairs management regulations, 22 May 1990," *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 186.
99. The foreign attraction is otherwise evidenced by the fact that from 1983-1994 13.5% of SZU teachers quit SZU to go abroad, presumably for study.
100. Sources: SZU yearbooks, various years.
101. Zhang Ye, "Foreign affairs," *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 173.
102. Luo Zhengqi, "Speech on Kumamoto sister-school agreement, 10 December 1987," *1987 Yearbook*, pp. 202-3.
103. These figures were published in Foreign Affairs Office reports in SZU yearbooks. The Arts College gave different figures in "Arts College development plan, 1997-2000," *1997 yearbook*, pp. 143-52: 93 foreign students (1994), 107 (1995), 255 (1996), 256 (1997) and estimated 270 (1998), 280 (1999), and 300 (2000).
104. "SZU and Kumamoto Commercial University enter into a long term cooperation and communication agreement," *Shenda Tongxun*, 1991, no. 15, p. 27.
105. Two university cater to compatriot students: Huaqiao and Jinan. The latter enrolled 2,577 compatriots in 1997, or about one-quarter of its FTE.
106. See Cleverley, "An Australian look at China's export education," 1997. Also, according to universities' homepages, annual tuition to study Chinese in 1997 varied: US $1,500-2,000 Liaoning, $2,500 Fudan, $1,500 Nanchang. The $7/per day room rate for a double at SZU compared with $6 Nanchang, $3-4 Liaoning, $7 Hunan, $3.50-8.00 Fudan (depending on building age and location).
107. Urata, "A Comparison between the Japanese and U.S. Evaluation Systems in High Education, " 1994; Johnstone, "Trouble in Leisureland," 1989.
108. The document is reproduced in Porter, *Foreign Teachers in China*, 1990, pp. 131-88.
109. *1986 Yearbook*, p. 25.
110. Several standard contracts are reproduced in Porter, *Foreign Teachers in China*, 1990, pp. 124-30. See also Woronov, *China through My Window*, 1988, p. 72.
111. *1988 Yearbook*, p. 40.
112. Inflation rates are taken from: *1996 Shenzhen Statistical Yearbook*, p. 294. The 1991-1992 figures are based on recollection.
113. The library at her university indicated no registered dissertation; no thesis was recorded with University Microfilms, Inc. Having once hired her, however, FAO was reluctant to admit their mistake and lose face; the

teacher was allowed to retain the rank of professor.

114. "Foreign Affairs," *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 173.
115. Tan Zaixi, "Foreign Language Department," *1991 Yearbook*, p. 103. Italics added.
116. "Foreign Affairs Office," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 235.
117. For example, at the start of the fall 1990 semester, the liaison was looking for the teacher who had been let go for the *dian* sign incident. He wanted to confirm the dismissed teacher's class schedule and did not even know that the teacher had been fired. From then on he acquired the nickname "clueless."
118. Saltzman, *Iron and Silk*, 1986; Hadfield & Hadfield, *Watching the Dragon*, 1986; Woronov, *China through My Window*, 1988; Mahoney, *The Early Arrival of Dreams*, 1990; Holm, *Coming Home Crazy*, 1991; Kretschmer, *An American Teacher in China*, 1994.
119. Mahoney, *The Early Arrival of Dreams*, 1990, p. 290, 161, 177.
120. Holm, *Coming Home Crazy*, 1991, pp. 195-6.
121. Salzman, *Iron and Silk*, 1986, p. 60.
122. Hadfield, *Watching the Dragon, 1*986, p. 46.
123. Mahoney, *The Early Arrival of Dreams*, 1990, p. 282.
124. Holm, *Coming Home Crazy*, 1991, p. 201.
125. Salzman, *Iron and Silk*, 1986, p. 35.
126. Hadfield, *Watching the Dragon, 1*986, p. 103.
127. *Ibid*., p. 7.
128. Security Office, *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 109.
129. "1991 work summary, 14 January 1992," p. 40.
130. *Ibid*.
131. Paine, "Teaching and modernization in contemporary China," 1992, p. 188.
132. See Herman & Bailey, "Recommendations for teaching overseas," 1991.
133. This was the title given to a letter to the editor of *China Daily* in which the author quotes a Chinese student as saying: "I have lost four years because we had teachers who just played the guitar and sing and did not know how to teach." Carducci, "Not all foreigners are experts," 1994.
134. Pollack, *Civilizing Chinese*, pp. 60-1. Parenthetical phrase omitted.
135. ______, "Foreign experts share their talents," 1995, p. 9.
136. ______, "Shenzhen is my hometown," *Shenzhen Commercial Daily* (19 February 1996).
137. The reasoning behind this memorandum (which foreign teachers in Beijing labeled the 'deadwood decree') was to force China's long-term resident foreigners to return to their home countries in order to renew their native language skills, i.e., picking up the latest idioms and cultural conventions. Thus, in 1998, SZU refused to renew the contracts of two foreign teachers

who had each been teaching at the university for 10 years.

138. *Brief #387* (28 December 1994).
139. Beck, "Swindling banker fled to China," 1996; Lo, "Campus gave perfect cover for fugitive," 1996.
140. Ironically, the SZU Security Department in its 1995 report (prior to Angotti's exposure) stated that it had investigated the backgrounds of foreign teachers, foreign students and other foreign-related people: *1995 Yearbook*, p. 214.
141. Granelli, "Jury convicts ex-Irving banker of fraud," 1993.
142. Granelli, "Arrest order issued for missing ex-S&L official," 1993.
143. Granelli, "Fugitive O.C. banker agrees to return," 1996.
144. SZU sent several students to Griffith in the mid-1990s for a year's study.
145. This appears to be the case with other Chinese universities. Universities have substantive exchanges with very few of the numerous universities with which they have signed agreements (e.g., Nanjing University, 70; Nankai University, 108; Guangxi University, 60; Central South University of Technology, 180; Shanghai University, 56).
146. *Shenda Tongxun*, 1987, no. 1, p. 25.
147. *Nanfang Daily* (12 July 1991).
148. Wu Zewei, "A trip to Britain," *Shenda Tongxun*, 1991, no. 15, p. 28.
149. "SZU and Kumamoto Commercial University enter into a long-term cooperation and communication agreement," *Shenda Tongxun*, 1991, no. 15, p. 27.
150. *Brief #203* (13 June 1992).
151. Wu Ren, "A visit to the U.S.A.," *Shenda Tongxun*, 1993, no. 23, p. 34.
152. The trip, scheduled to coincide with the release of SZU 1995 Document 121 which indicted Tan Zaixi for embezzlement, afforded the head of FAO the opportunity to be off campus in order to avoid some loss of face.
153. "A visit to university in U.K.," *Shenda Tongxun*, 1995, no. 31, p. 20.
154. "Foreign Affairs," *1996 Yearbook*, pp. 181-2. Overseas travel declined in 1997 with the arrival of a new SZU leadership team who were modest in their life styles. Total visits abroad for 1997 numbered 517, a 31% decrease: "Foreign Affairs," *1997 Yearbook*, p. 269.
155. Two trips for each of four SZU leaders on five-member delegations.
156. Wei Feng, "The great tremors in China's intellectual circles," 1993, p. 68.
157. *http://www.csu.edu.au/division/pubrel/vol4no8/s4.htm*, retrieved 18 July 1997.
158. "SZU and Singapore joint program with British National Computer Centre 'Certificate in computers' course, recurring advertisement," *Shenzhen Shangbao*, spring 1994.
159. Xie, "SZU exploring new modes of education with foreign cooperation,"

1993. Included in the group were nine compatriots, presumably from Hong Kong.

160. *Ibid.*
161. *Ibid.*; Lu, “SZU to implement general reform,” 1994.
162. “Regulations on managing joint courses with foreign universities, 9 November 1994,” *1994 Yearbook*, p. 214.
163. *Shenzhen Tequ Bao* (28 July 1994), p. 12.
164. This was agreed upon in the SZU-VUT Addendum to the Memorandum of Understanding, July 1994.
165. *Brief # 360* (21 October 1994) reported 79 students admitted out of 130 applications. This figure remained valid for several weeks until the program administrators checked their accounting and realized the actual number was 71.
166. At the beginning of the program’s second year 62 students were enrolled (35 Banking, 27 Accounting). Of these three withdrew before final exams and one simply disappeared, so 58 completed the course.
167. Although SZU insisted during negotiations that students’ timetables included moral and physical education courses, these were never taught to the VUT students.
168. Millar, *The VUT/SZU Foundation Program*, 1996, p. 47.
169. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
170. *Ibid.*
171. *VUT Faculty of Business Handbook*, 1996, p. 72 [italics added].
172. Maslen, “Visa blitz stymies student boom,” 1997.
173. *Ibid.*
174. Middleton, “Chinese students refused visas,” 1997.
175. Austin, “Visa refusal white-anting TAFE: uni,” 1997, p. 3.
176. Maslen, “VUT in student visa row,” 1997, p. 3.
177. Armitage, “Uni battles Ruddock over ban on business students,” 1997.
178. Maslen, “Visa blitz stymies student boom,” 1997; Maslen, “VUT in student visa row,” 1997; Maslen, “Visa pain for eager Chinese,” 1997. Some students eventually ended up at Queens College, Dublin.

Story 12: Yang Fang, as told by Cao Zhichang

[This is an extract of a story that appeared in a local Shenzhen newspaper[1]]

I will tell a story about a boy from the time before he took the college entrance exam until after his graduation. I start with his college life, then reflect back to the time before his education.

A Law Department student Yang Fan and his college classmate Zhu are lounging on the lawn and discussing Yang's having failed Customs Law and the fact that he must take a make-up exam. Zhu laughs rather than comforts him because Yang always studied very hard. Yang feels he has been wronged. He talked with the associate professor who taught the course. Yang says his exam answer was based on the work of a professor at China's University of Law and Administration. Yang says he went deeper than the course teacher, but the teacher did not buy this argument. The professor kept silent, then commented: "I correct the paper based on my own lecture material, but you only went to one of my classes." Yang was so angry and asked: "Wasn't the original purpose of Exploration University to train students with pioneering and creative minds? If I blindly embrace the knowledge given by others, how can original ideas emerge?" Student Zhu disagrees: "It's useless for you to work so hard. Follow me and I will teach you business." So they went to the Green Dream Karaoke, but they did not go in because the admission price had risen. Yang did in fact fail the exam. He had gone to the department head, who sympathized with Yang's view because he was more open-minded. But the department head could not help. He was caught up in his own battle with Yang's law professor and he lost. Yang believed that if the dean had won, he would have passed the course.

Discouraged, Yang let Zhu eventually teach him about business, so that Yang earned ¥1,000. Later Zhu set up another business. He smoked a drugged cigarette given to him by his business partner, who robbed him and then beat him up. Yang Fang visited him.

Before Yang took the college entrance exam, he had a girl classmate named Binbin [ice-ice]. She was not good at English and her father, who headed the county court, asked Yang to tutor Binbin in English. He worked hard and Binbin improved. They fell in love. Before they filled out the college preference forms, they discussed their university choicse. Yang chose Law and Binbin Chinese, both at Golden Hill University, a key university. The Law Department was more competitive, so Yang did not get in, *but Binbin entered Golden Hill's Chinese department. Yang was stuck with his second choice: Exploration University. Binbin's father's attitude changed; he was promoted to a provincial job; he did not want Yang to bother his daughter any more, because the father had already gotten what he wanted.*

In his four years at university Yang Fang has earned more than ¥20,000 in business, and he also does a good job in study because he has developed the skills of exam-taking. He had failed the earlier one, despite hard study. Now, he does not have to study and his time is freed up to do business. Yang has many job choices because of his good academic record. But his friend Zhu has problems finding a job. Student Zhu has developed good skills in business but has a poor academic performance. So Zhu asks Yang to introduce him to Binbin's father so he can help him find a job. Yang says: "Although the SEZ and provincial capital are very attractive to me, I hope that I can return to my hometown where bamboo and plum blossoms exist and where I can contribute my skills in law and business before my soul is further corrupted by money and unhealthy phenomena." According to Student Zhu, Yang was still mis-directed. "But I like being mis-directed and I want to make the decision to go back to my hometown before I become like everyone else in Shenzhen."

7. Output

Whereas throughput in education examines process, output in an institution of higher learning more concerns product. This takes various forms. There is staff research, which primarily includes articles and books published as well as items patented. Figures for research, as provided by SZU, are reported in Table 7.1. There is also non-scholarly output, which includes consultancy or the marketing of products that are developed (e.g., chemical compounds, building designs/blueprints, mechanical instruments, computer software). Vis-à-vis students, output takes the form of *rencai*—graduates who have been trained to contribute to China's economic development.[2]

Departures

Staff and students who leave SZU may also be viewed as an output. Over its first dozen years SZU lost about 30% of its teaching staff, virtually all voluntary departures for reasons other than retirement. Data on student departures are less transparent, for they are obscured by late enrollment that occurred outside the state-plan. Also, SZU after 1989 stopped keeping track of its alumni who left China. The university's first (and only) alumni directory showed that 5.1% of *benke* students who graduated from 1983-1985 had emigrated by 1990.[3] They came largely from Architecture (18.5% of the department's students), Foreign Language (17.4%), and Electronics (8%), with these three departments accounting for over half those who were reported to have emigrated. The peak emigration period appears to have been the early 1990s. For example, about 20% of the Foreign Language Department students who entered in 1987 had left China by 1995. In 1995 SZU processed passports for 62 current students, which represents 2.6% of *benke* students. All these statistics seem to suggest that from 5-10% of SZU's alumni over the university's history no longer reside in the PRC.

Research

Chapter Four, which described academic departments, relayed the extent to which research declined among various SZU teaching units. Data at the university-wide level, unfortunately, are not presented in university publications in a way that permits full time-series accounting. Personnel figures are suf-

Table 7.1: Reported research output[5]

social science

	papers		books	
	total	awards	total	awards
1983-'91/6	540	20	140	18
1983-'93/9	705	24	184	21
1994	205	1	28	4
1995	229	na	33	2
1997	350	na	27	na

natural science

	projects	papers	books	patents	awarded
1983-'91/6	na	na	na	10	37
1983-'93/9	103	252	14	16	54
1994	94	na	na	na	11
1995	na	na	na	na	2
1997	na	194	6	2	na

ficiently disaggregated for only 1987 and 1993-1995; the other years fail to note the exact number of professional staff in research institutes. In 1987 per capita research output was .34 items; in 1993, 1994, and 1995, the corresponding figures were .26, .69 and .59. This doubling of output over eight years was due in part to a three-fold expansion in the number of professional staff earmarked for research. Over these years the teaching staff also expanded. The ratio of full-time researchers to full-time teachers rose from 1:12 in 1987 to 1:5.4 in 1995 (see Table 7.2). (The SEdC's recommended ratio was reported to be 1:2.[4])

Table 7.2: Ratio of research to teaching staff[6]

year	researchers	teachers	ratio
1987	25	348	1:12
1993	49	394	1:8
1994	62	410	1:6.6
1995	85	462	1:5.4

Given SZU's substantial growth in teaching staff over those years, much of the increased per capita output must be attributed to teachers, rather than to full-time researchers. During the 1986-1995 decade the size of the teaching staff steadily increased; if per capita output had remained constant, research output would have nevertheless risen to reflect staff increase. This is not what happened. Figure 7.1 indicates that aggregate output peaked in 1989, declined for several years, and then rose after 1993. In the early 1990s, research output at SZU did not compare favorably to that of other universities in China, according to an analysis in a SZU staff study.[8] Using 1992 data for 522 Chinese universities similar to SZU—those offering *benke* and *zhuanke* programs in both the humanities and social sciences—the study found that SZU published 63 research papers in those fields, compared with the national average of 105. In the fields of science and technology SZU published 60 papers, compared with the national average of 114.

Figure 7.1: Total research output[7]



The dramatic rise in research output from 1993 to 1994 (284%) is due to something more than the addition of teaching and research staff. In major speeches and directives in 1993, President Cai implored teachers to undertake more research because, he said, publishing would be one of the criteria on which SZU would be judged in the 1995 SEdC accreditation. Staff carried out Cai's instructions to publish, probably sending to journals work that they had left uncompleted during their non-productive years. As a result, a most feverish research assault occurred in 1994, the year immediately preceding accreditation. Data on research per capita output for the four available years appear in Table 7.3.

Table 7.3: Research per capita output[9]

year	per capita output
1987	.34
1993	.26
1994	.69
1995	.59

The data presented above address only *quantity* and do not concern *quality*, which is a separate issue. Only about 8% of SZU's research output (see Table 7.4) appeared in international journals, compared to about 22% for Beijing University.[10] About one-third of all articles from 1986 to mid-1993 were published in SZU journals and magazines. In-house publishing often accepts a lower quality standard, and this is especially the case with the *Shenzhen University Journal* which published the work of *only* SZU staff. Most of the remainder of staff publications appeared in journals published by other Chinese universities or institutes. Research published in the PRC journals, however, generally does not meet levels of international publishing.[11] Submissions are often accepted on the basis of relationships; independent refereeing seldom occurs.

Until 1988 SZU leaders viewed research as a function separate from teaching. This thinking, ironically, was out of harmony with the national reform strategy that attempted to integrate teaching and research as a way to "upgrade curricula, improve instructional quality, and raise the scientific level of research work."[13] In contrast, SZU teachers were encouraged to undertake research on teaching, but they were not prodded to take on other academic research. For that purpose the university by 1986 had set up six research institutes. By 1988 only two of these had fixed staff (20 in New Energy and five in SEZ Economics). The remaining units had to rely on regular teaching staff who were permitted to work part-time at the institutes to help them execute their research agendas. In 1987 the university pleaded with the Shenzhen government for more research funding, noting that the quota for full-time researchers was only one-quarter of that recommended by the SEdC.[14] SZU's leaders felt the university was falling behind in research due to insufficient funding by the municipality. Apparently, the plea fell on deaf ears, and by 1988 it became apparent that the municipality was not going to fund the institutes to the extent SZU desired. The SZU leadership then instructed the teaching staff that they, not just the full-time research staff, were expected to undertake academic research. Published research would be the major criterion for promotion. Teachers were told that their endeavors were to emphasize the practical and that the revenue their research generated could be used to improve teachers' welfare. As noted in Chapter Four, Chemistry became the exemplar for applied research, developing such sundry products as dust-free chalk and anti-AIDS potions.

Table 7.4: Where research was published (1986-1993)[12]

where published	%
in-house (SZU)	33.0
elsewhere in China	58.8
Hong Kong/Taiwan	3.0
Foreign	5.0

The head of SZU's Science and Technology Center, which oversaw research, complained of there being "few academic achievements in areas that are badly needed in SEZ, such as agriculture, economics and industry. We have achieved little in the electronics field. Enterprises in Shenzhen do not have confidence in us and dare not entrust their research needs to us." Noting that some teaching departments did not even make a single application for state-level research funding, the director of research lamented that “teachers think it is more profitable to teach than to do academic research.” In addition, research was made difficult by the lack of laboratory equipment as well as the absence of graduate students who could serve as cost-effective assistants.[15]

SZU’s concern that *all* (not just *some* or even *most*) research be of the applied nature contrasts with what happens at China’s research universities, which encourage a mix of theoretical and practical research. In its official brochure, Beijing University, for example, says it “pays much attention to the transition of research achievements into actual production” and points proudly to the fact that 46.6% of its research output results in applications.[16] SZU did not present comparable statistics, but its leaders’ rhetoric suggested that a similar percentage would have been considered too low.

SZU aspired to improve its research output, but it did not wish to commit much of its own discretionary funding for this purpose. Instead, it adopted a set of different approaches. The Personnel Office drew up a mechanism by which departments could apply to the university for temporary funding for research staff. SZU would agree to take care of the salary for only six months, after which the teaching unit would have to pay salaries.[18] SZU also operated a loan program; from 1987-1988 the university signed 20 “reimburse and profit-sharing contracts” with teaching depart-

Table 7.5: Research funding[17]

year	research funding (¥)		source of funding (projects)			
	SZU-funded	upper level funding	SZU	state	province	city
1986	150,000	140,000	na			
1987	100,000	na	na	12	2	6
1988	100,000	260,000	na	5	13	6
1989	100,000	na	na			
1991	200,000	522,000	53	7	65	na
1992-1993	400,000	840,000	56	17	27	55
1994	500,000	1,615,000	na	6	18	12
1995	800,000	476,100		50 total		
1996	4,484,000	na	na			
1997	na	3,418,000	na	11	26	36

ments. For a one-year period, beginning March 1988, the university waived the requirement that departments pay part of their profits from research into the president's discretionary fund. It attempted to make side-courses less profitable. The *Shenzhen University Journal* was told to change its direction to propagate the research achievements of SZU staff. The academic journal was supposed to start taking advertisements and "become a commercial journal that propagandizes SZU and its research."[19]

Falling back on a time-honored Chinese tradition, SZU chose a model for the entire campus to observe: the New Energy Institute. This negative exemplar was given a "yellow card" for its slow performance and was assigned new leadership. Wang Lifang, who was appointed to turn the institute around, was told that if the institute's output did not improve within 12 months, it would be dismantled and taken over by the Reflective Materials Research Institute.[20] Wang had come to SZU in 1987 from the prestigious University of Science and Technology, Beijing (USTB), one of the premier research institutions in China. (In 1997 USTB employed 98 Ph.D. supervisors compared to SZU's one, and it maintained a steady research per capita output of .4). Research at USTB focused on applied science and engineering, but Wang had been frustrated there because "although some of my articles had attracted attention in a very small circle, I had no idea when they would be put into production." So he had decided to "jump out of the ivory tower and face the challenge the commodity economy posed to science and technology."[21] New Energy suffered from low staff morale because, according to Wang, unproductive staff who had been warned felt they had been wronged and then become depressed. Wang succeeded in turning the institute around. It marketed a fire retardant it had developed, and it acquired enterprise-funding to develop a solar energy powered fruit dryer. "We now pay attention to marketing and dare to lose face." For its turn-around, New Energy was designated an advanced work-unit at the state, provincial and city level in 1991.

By 1991 fixed assets for research totaled ¥16 (US $3) million (up from ¥3.6 million in 1986). These investment efforts to improve research, however, did not persuade ordinary teachers to change their ways. For the most part, teachers preferred to open training classes and side-courses rather than to take on applied research. This phenomenon sparked an on-going confrontation between the post-Tiananmen leaders and the teachers. By 1990 the Scientific Research Office (formerly known as the Science and Technology Center) was directing teachers to "pay equal attention to economic and social efficiency."[22] SZU's Communications Technology Institute and Life

Sciences Research Institute were praised for their marketing successes. Between the lines of the discussion, the importance of the institutes was seen to rest in their revenue-generating capacity.

After post-Tiananmen rectification the university in 1991 embarked on a new research strategy which focused on what it called "backbone units." Only five institutes were to receive special attention (New Energy, Communications Technology, New Technology, Life Sciences, and the International Software Development, Co., a IBM joint venture.)[23] Five others received fixed staff (SEZ Economics, Applied Nuclear, Bio-chemistry, Petroleum Research and Hong Kong Law). Other research units (Population, Higher Education, Comparative Literature/Aesthetics) received only formal approval; they were given no fixed staff. Borrowing from past rhetoric, the leaders told the campus community "to enhance ties between research and teaching and between research and application." University staff were directed to establish relations with enterprises in Shenzhen and to obtain at least one research project.[24] The general policy drive was consistent with the major purpose of university research units (apart from money-making), which was to serve as bridges for technological transfer between higher education institutions and enterprises.[25]

Published data in narrative reports by leaders did not clearly reveal the amount of research funding SZU received. Funding for projects that overlapped years was often reported in its entirely for each year the project existed, thus substantially inflating statistics (see Table 7.5). According to a summary report, by 1993 SZU had received 18 state-level grants (12 natural science, ¥1.1 million; six social science, ¥38,000), 49 provincial-level (14 natural, ¥1.16, 35 social science, ¥161,000), and four municipal grants for ¥80,000. SZU itself had funded ¥400,000 each for natural and social science. Thus, for SZU's first decade, research had been funded for about ¥3.3 million.[26] These figures suggest, as would be expected, that natural science projects were fewer in number but more expensive than social science research undertakings. Overall, grant recipients, as would also be expected, tended to be relatively higher ranked academics, mostly professors and associate professors. From 1992 the project funding lists indicated that many grants went to department heads, in areas in which they themselves had neither the time nor, in some cases, the expertise to tackle the research. They received funding in their capacity as leaders, not as researchers. In addition, top-level leaders (Cai and his vice-presidents Ying and Zheng) each had their names attached as principal investigators to projects in which they did no actual research, although they may have been consultants to the endeavors. It was in their names that funding was received.

Both external and internal research funding improved under Cai Delin, and various structural adjustments were made. One of Cai's Ten Reform Measures in 1993 addressed research structure. Three research technology groups were formed: civil architecture and construction; communication and electronics; bio-chemistry. Cai, through his inherited vice-president Ying Qirui, whose portfolio since 1986 had included research, continued previous lamentations: lack of a close relationship between teaching and research; research achievements not resulting in products; and researchers' lack of initiative in marketing their research. Referring to the Shenzhen Science and Industry Park, located just a few kilometers from campus, Ying employed an especially vivid idiom: *ji qian zhi sheng xiang wen, lou si bu xiang wang lai*—the two villages are so close one can hear dogs barking and chickens clucking but the people themselves do not visit each other.[27] The park's leadership, interviewed in 1992, revealed to me that their companies preferred to work with researchers from prestigious inland universities. SZU's teachers were viewed as less-serious minded than their inland peers.[28]

In the lead-up to the 1995 SEdC accreditation, Cai decided to use more than the usual rhetoric in an attempt to improve research. He took more direct control of research than had his predecessors, who had relied on their vice-presidents. Cai transferred the Chemistry Department head to manage SZU's Academic Research Office, whose staff were party cadres not scholars. This was the first time that an academic had been put in charge of research (before coming to SZU Ying had been a computer technician, not researcher), and the move indicated Cai's concern that SZU's continuing low research output would negatively affect accreditation. The new head reshuffled staff in the Research Office and prodded his academic colleagues across departments to seek research funds and encourage their own staffs to publish. As a result SZU realized substantial increases in upper-level funding, as indicated in Table 7.5. Research output also increased, as noted earlier. SZU reported that in 1994, 56% of teachers participated in some sort of academic research. This fell short of the nationwide figure, which can be computed at 72.1%.[29] Rephrased, teachers at SZU undertook about 30% less research than their counterparts at other universities in China. Still, in the university's first 11 years, it had received grants for 22 "8-63" or other state level projects[30] and 38 ministry/provincially funded projects. Altogether, phases of 141 projects had passed state level evaluations.[31]

In 1995 the Finance Office, for the first time, disclosed the status of SZU's Academic Research Fund, an accounting device that had not been included in previous yearbook discussions of university budgeting. The fund indicated the amount of research money that the university had received but which had not yet been expended (see Table 7.6). These data suggest that research at SZU operated annually at about a ¥2.5 million funding level. This was about average for a university of SZU's size and non-technical nature. For example, Yantai University, Shandong Province, is similar to SZU in age (1984), nature (comprehensive, 13 departments, 24 majors) and size (4,223 full-time students, 427 teachers). As reported on its homepage in 1997, Yantai had a ¥25 million investment in research facilities, and its research expenditures for 1996 were put at ¥2.7 million. In contrast, China's research universities substantially outpaced SZU and other smaller comprehensive universities in research. Hefei University of Technology, one of China's most famous research universities (and former work-place of astrophysicist/dissident Fang Lizhi) reported 1994's research funding at ¥42.2 million, more than 15 times that of SZU.

Table 7.6: Academic research fund[32]

	1994	1993
income	3,252,500	2,530,000
from SZU	500,000	400,000
from upper level & enterprises	2,752,500	2,130,000
income unspent		
from SZU	220,000	
from outside	1,302,400	

Story 13: Lu Bing, overseas student, clinic-basher

People sometimes ask me why I came to the United States to study. I have a stock answer: Because in China even the best university would only be a third-rate one in America. People in the States like that answer. It makes them feel that their country is superior to China, although I don't think most Americans need to find reasons to feel superior to China!

Really, just about anyone who graduates from Shenda can come to the States for graduate school. All you need is money—even if you are a virtual illiterate some school will accept you (and your tuition). In my case, my scores were good and my family could give me some money, but most of my tuition I had earned myself working in a Shenzhen export company for three years after graduation (I was one of very few business-women among Shenda graduates). In America you can pick up odd-jobs and part-time jobs—I made good money as a waitress in a high-class Chinese restaurant. At first I was afraid the immigration people might come in and grab me, but then all my friends told me that raiding Chinese restaurants violated my human rights and I had nothing to fear. I have since become a great supporter of human rights in America. If China gets human rights, we'll never get rich.

On one hand, I was well prepared for American education (I'm after an MBA). My economics, math, accounting skills are better than my classmates'. When we do group projects, I do all the word-processing and spread-sheet work. I help with organizing the group report but I leave the writing to others. On the other hand, Shenda did not prepare me well. I do fair on tests but very poorly on written assignments. Several of the teachers have given me low grades, and they comment "no new ideas" or "don't copy from the text." One teacher failed me on a term paper and made me redo it. Instead of rewriting it, I took a new topic and applied a Marxist approach to the theories he was teaching. He gave me a B- and said that I was being quite creative. Really, I thought I was being less creative, just giving the acceptable socialist line that any middle school student can do. I don't think the teacher knew much about Marxism. In future assignments I always applied Marxism, and only once did I get a low mark. That was from a TA who himself was a Ph.D. student originally from China. His comment: you don't fool me; I know what you are doing!

I miss China, of course. I want to go back holding an American MBA, working for an American company (that gives me a green card), with an

American-sized salary. Another choice is to go to Hong Kong, with a Hong Kong-sized salary and Hong Kong green card. The third choice is to stay in the U.S., get a green card and eventually citizenship. The fourth choice is to return to China and work in Shenzhen. When I went to the States I left behind a boyfriend. We still write and I have been too busy to even think about dating someone else. He wants to come to the U.S., but I am not sure he ever will. He's making too much money in Shenzhen.

I have a lot of good memories of Shenda, not many of them have to do with classes, which were really boring. The political courses were the biggest waste of time. But what I remember most about Shenda is the clinic. I will recount those nightmares.

I visited the clinic quite often because of hay fever or sinusitis. There was a period when I had to go weekly for shots. But I have a strong resentment toward the staff there. First, they try all they can to deter you from being transferred to another better-equipped hospital even if the medical treatment they provided was radically inadequate. I don't exactly know how the municipal health bureau allocated funds for medical reimbursements, but the head physician once told me that the annual quota per student or staff was a scanty ¥50. I have no way of telling whether he was lying. Since all the "people's hospitals" charge fairly and the students, faculty and staff referred from elsewhere will bring back receipts to get reimbursed, they discouraged people from doing this. The students, being at the most vulnerable position in the university community because of the absence of institutionalized grievance-redress procedures, fared worst. I remember almost getting into a fight with the deputy director of the clinic. After great reluctance, I was granted my rightful "privilege" of seeking treatment elsewhere; I brought back a bill for ¥45.30. But he refused to approve the part of the fee that was incurred by the purchase of an imported shot. When I demanded to see official documents that required patients to pay for the portion of medical prescriptions related to foreign-made drugs, he got angry and used abusive language against me. He arrogantly told me that if every student requested to see official documents, they could not get any work done (because of all the time entailed in meeting these requests?!!!) and that I was a "disreputable trouble-maker."

My boyfriend once broke his little finger, but the physician on duty failed to detect it. But the pain was so bad that we forced him to seek help at the Shekou Union Hospital. The physician there told him, even before an x-ray , that the finger was broken. The x-ray just confirmed his hunch. My boyfriend brought the bill for treatment (¥40) to the Shenda clinic for *reimbursement and he was told by the same shoddy doctor who had missed the diagnosis, "Since it is for such a small amount, why don't you just pay it yourself?"*

The prescriptions the students often get per visit are the cheapest possible stock medicine, costing ¥1-4 per bag/tube/bottle. There are, of course, tablets that cost ¥1 each, but they probably go only to the faculty or to important administrative officers with whom the clinic staff may eventually trade favors. Needless to say, some important personages would be well treated at the clinic, but they, again, probably don't bother going there since it is small and known to be no good. Moreover, I can easily imagine the physicians treating relatives or whomever they want to befriend who are not eligible for free medicine under the school system, by using students' names and ID numbers.

My diatribe does not obscure the fact that the clinic has done a lot of good in treating some minor ailments. But I dare say that no Shenda students have good things to say about the clinic.

Campus business and side-businesses

The previous section discussed teachers' disengagement from research. This section discusses teachers' going into business and examines the side-businesses that the university itself ran. In a sense, the running of non-academic-related campus enterprises was a way the university disengaged from what are thought of as the traditional aspects of the academy, those activities which involve teaching and learning. Spending time on campus enterprises, just like devoting energy to politics and delegation travel, took a large chunk of time out of administrators' schedules. That was perhaps one of the reasons that the thorny issues of pedagogy, as discussed in Chapter Five, never received much of the principals' attention.

The idea of an ivory tower set apart from the real world is not especially applicable to Chinese universities, certainly not to SZU. Universities in China are very much supposed to be part of the social economy. Given their prime directive to train *rencai* (talent), universities in China have organized their curricula into narrow specializations to serve the perceived short-term needs of the nation and have set up on-campus enterprises that turn research into production. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the state has encouraged institutes of higher learning to become "public entrepreneurs." This is not an attempt to wean Chinese universities entirely off the public purse. It is, rather, a move consistent with a world-wide phenomenon which "includes activating unutilized resources, inspiring and supporting nonroutine behavior, and helping government officials and members of the public to reorient and recombine material and human resources, thereby enabling the achievement of outcomes that had previously been impossible."[33] In China's case, the public entrepreneurial role of higher educational institutions is often left unstated. It does not usually appear in official policy and is avoided in analyses by the government's spokesmen from academia.[34] What is stated by the government is the mandate for universities to become more efficient, something that has resulted from increased budget constraints; it is accompanied by a trade-off: the state gives universities more autonomy.[35]

Almost every university in China is involved in some form of production and service delivery.[36] Cooperative arrangements with units of government allow universities to send research staff to production units. Hebei University of Technology (Tianjin), for example, has such arrangements with 29 cities and 23 enterprises. A small school like Ningxia University, which is

Table 7.7: SZU-affiliated enterprises[37]

enterprise name	notes
Architectural Design Institute	1992 quota: ¥400,000, remitted ¥500,000
Experimental Foreign Trade	1992: ¥1.2 million remitted
Culture & Science Service Co.	1992 quota: ¥300,000, remitted ¥900,000
Information Engineering Co.	
Yue Hai Men Hotel	
Experimental Bank	
Reflective Materials Factory	1993 production value ¥30-million
Shenying Mechanical Factory	
World Architecture Journal	closed 1990-1993
Experimental General Factory	closed by 1994
Labor service	sent workers under contract to HK, closed 1989
Translation Company	dissolved by 1989

about half the size of SZU, operates 23 school enterprises. Large scale technological institutions are especially well-suited for meshing with production. The homepage of the University of Science and Technology of China (Hefei) lists 16 affiliated enterprises, most of which are technology related (biomedical, electronics, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, etc.). Huazhong University of Science and Technology (Wuhan), which has three times as many students as SZU, operates seven factories and a number of enterprises. The University of Electronic Science and Technology of China (Chengdu) has 25 scientific enterprises under its umbrella. The Ocean University of Qingdao has undertaken 40 joint ventures with businesses. The China University of Geosciences (Wuhan) operates a drilling tool factory and an electroplating company. Xian University of Technology operates more than 30 high-tech enterprises and also houses several state-level testing centers. Institutions with business orientations have also established business ventures. The 28 enterprises of Zhongnan University of Finance and Economics (Hubei) provide legal, accounting, financial consulting and banking services. Other universities delve into areas that are outside their main educational direction. In 1993 Nanjing Normal University, whose main purpose is to train teachers and educational researchers, set up the Industrial High-tech Group Corporation "to realize the commercial transmission between teaching and research on one side and production and trade on the other."[38] In other words, it wishes to take advantage of the high-tech nature of the university and to develop marketable high-tech products. By 1995 the corporation had developed 18 closely-attached and 22 less closely-attached enterprises. They encompassed a wide scope: biological and chemical products, hologram printing, land grading and real estate assessment.

Illustrations of combining research and production come from no less an institution than the prestigious Beijing University. In 1986 several Beida teachers and computer center staff developed the Fangzhen laser typesetting system for Chinese characters. Marketed domestically and internationally through Beida's New Technology Center, the product grossed ¥300 (US $54) million in 1992.[39] Beida's Biology Department formed the Weiming ("not yet named") Biological Engineering Company to combine the functions of research, manufacturing, marketing and service. In its first deal the company netted ¥100,000 (US $18,000), which was reinvested and used to improve staff welfare.[40] Annually, the university's Pecan Company produces ¥60 (US $11) million in office automation equipment. In a major, especially symbolic move, Beida in March 1993 razed its southern wall, a 41-year-old 600-meter structure to allow for the building of a modern commercial street. Eventually, buildings were to cover 25,000 m^2, and the area would be called the Beijing University Hi-Tech Industries Development Circle.[41] The purpose of this construction was to take advantage of Beida's talent and location to attract Chinese and foreign new and high-end technology industries.

At about the same time, SZU experienced a similar wall-razing event along the western perimeter of campus. In 1993 the Culture and Science Service Company, a SZU-run enterprise, drained a small lake and tore down a 200-meter stretch of wall near the west gate. The wall and gate, which were only about three years old, had been constructed as part of the post-1989 rectification that had enwalled the campus. Dubbed "Science and Technology Street," a building was designed and constructed on stilts (after its completion the lake was refilled). The building then housed several dozen shops fronting on the busy Shekou-Shenzhen highway. The shops were expected to provide retail computer services that together would become a sort of electronics marketplace. That was not to happen; a computer market already existed in downtown Shenzhen. Instead, the stalls became occupied by small family-run snack shops and clothing outlets. In the lead-up to the 1995 accreditation, SZU attempted to change the character of the stores. University authorities ordered that the sign "Nanshan Cuisine Street" be removed and that the number of restaurants be reduced in favor of businesses related to culture, science and technology.[42] The owners of stores that were closed were to receive compensation. After the accreditation was finished, however, the street resumed its snack shop nature. By 1997 it had also become a popular location for small shops selling automobile parts and items for residential decoration/remodeling.

These several dozen shops located on the western perimeter of campus were not considered SZU-run enterprises; they were just tenants of a university-owned building run by the Culture and Science Service Company. In all, the SZU umbrella covered about a dozen affiliated businesses, which are listed in Table 7.7 according to size/estimated value. Some of these had relationships with academic departments, as discussed in Chapter Four. This listing, however, does not include services run by the General Affairs Company (which was known as the Life Services General Company in 1988) such as the canteens, clinic, bus service, sanitation, water/power, communications, property, furniture and gardening.

The university-wide post-Tiananmen rectification that so affected all aspects of SZU influenced the operation of SZU-affiliated businesses in several ways. While recognizing the economic importance of the enterprises and recommending their expansion, the new university leaders made an effort to set up a more clear organizational division between enterprises and the university's main function—teaching and research. At the same time, they wanted the work of the on-campus enterprises to be tied closer to SZU's teaching and research. After a multi-year review, 14 businesses were closed in 1991, and four were cut from the university altogether. Several of the businesses that were closed had been run by close associates of sacked president Luo Zhengqi, including the Ghost House, a famous campus eatery and art gallery.[43] The Experimental General Factory, which was set up in 1989, was also dissolved by 1994. Some of its enterprises (Reflective Materials and Shenying Mechanical) remained SZU-affiliates but were loosened from the university tether. Others (e.g., auto repair, furniture factory, printing) were absorbed under the General Affairs Office. As part of the wider rectification, more formal accounting procedures were instituted to ensure the university received its fair share of the companies' profits. In 1994 SZU prohibited personnel transfers from the enterprises to SZU teaching and administration units as a way to minimize demands on welfare subsidies. In total, by the mid-1990s there remained about 50 on-campus businesses. These included the enterprises listed in Table 7.7 which had fixed-staff quotas, about ten companies run by GAO, and about 30 businesses operating on university property (barber shops, markets, restaurants) that paid the university rent and contracted with SZU Security Office for protection.[44] In preparation for the 1995 accreditation, as noted earlier, many of the businesses in the latter category were closed.

SZU's enterprises congregated near the university's west gate, and they had almost no relationship with the teaching and research that occurred on center campus. The enterprises employed about 200 staff in 1993 (or about 20% of SZU's total). That year their fixed assets were ¥50 (US $8.7) million, 150% over 1991. Remittance payments and rents were reported at about ¥10 (US $1.7) million a year,[45] an amount equivalent to about 10-20% of the university's operating budget. It is unclear from the university's budgets how much of this remittance went to teachers or even entered the university accounts. The accounting was apparently included in an off-budget fund initially handled by the Enterprise Management Office and from which funds were turned over to the Finance Office to be dispersed to staff. Given ¥400 per month payments to about 1,000 SZU fixed-staff eligible for subsidy from the enterprise profits base, the university should have distributed about ¥5 million (US $600,000) in 1994. But enterprise remittances were reported to be twice that amount. The problem suggested by this arithmetic was an on-going concern of the Finance Office, which in 1991 even argued for the right to manage enterprise remittances itself. The SZU leaders, including vice-president Zheng Tianlun whose portfolio covered the enterprises, decided to leave remittance collection and distribution with the Enterprise Management Office. Despite non-transparent accounting procedures, some funds were earmarked to improve teachers' welfare, and subsidies were increased from ¥400 monthly to ¥600 (US $46-72) (US $230,000) in August 1995. The amounts are generally not reported in the Finance director's annual narrative financial statement. Among its duties in 1995, the Enterprise Management Office loaned ¥2 million to five enterprises and helped two companies expand their factories over 400,000 m^2. The same year it reclaimed 2,000 m^2 from an enterprise that owed SZU money. It was one of 13 SZU units to receive advanced Party designation in 1995.

To a degree, teachers' work in SZU institutes and university-affiliated enterprises supplemented the income they earned from teaching. These activities, in general, allowed faculty to complement classroom teaching with practical experience; as long as the moonlighting remained supplementary, it did not come into conflict with teaching duties. Enterprises and institutes, however, provided work for only a small number of teachers, perhaps no more than 10%. The major recipients were architects and, to a much smaller degree, teachers in Electronics and a few engineers in other fields. The rest of the staff looked elsewhere for part-time activities that could generate income, especially after 1988 when teachers were notified that they would need to supply a ¥50,000 downpayment in order to buy an apartment. In the

1980s SZU teachers realized that their salaries were far below those of other Shenzhen people holding university diplomas, not to mention those with graduate degrees. One full professor was "chagrined to learn that his salary was the same as that of his son, who was just out of college and working at his first job with a joint venture company in the Special Economic Zone."[46] By the 1990s, fresh SZU graduates were hired at salaries that exceeded those of their teachers.

Fortunately for SZU staff, the SEZ offered various types of part-time jobs for intellectuals. For the most part, these second jobs did not complement teaching and had less to do with applied scholarship than just making-money. Some teachers went into commerce, opening up retail outlets. Engineers, lawyers and business faculty took on consulting work. Other staff ran small factories. A number of foreign language teachers became fully engaged in translation work. The phenomenon of intellectuals going into business is called in Chinese "jumping into the sea of business"—*xia hai* (going down to the sea) for short. The situation has caught the attention of the Chinese media because, in part, it concerns the general issue of low salaries for intellectuals. A book entitled *Great Tremors in China's Intellectual Circles* published in 1993 by the Chinese Society Publishers focused on this phenomenon. Subtitled "An overview of intellectuals floundering in the sea of commercialism," the book itself is more a journalist than a scholarly account,[47] but it argues fairly convincingly that *xia hai* is extensive in Beijing and Shanghai universities. The book's anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that university teachers in China to a large degree are disengaging from teaching and research duties. *Great Tremors* recounts the tale of a professor, the Party secretary of the English Department of the Beijing Forestry University, who received notoriety for selling meat pies at the school's main gate. Other cases of *xia hai* involved professors from several of the capital's prestigious universities operating a flea market and one scholar who went door-to-door to sell copies of her recently published monograph. Many of the side-businesses appear, in fact, to be closely related to teachers' fields of expertise, including various "professor companies" that provide economic consulting services.

To what degree the *xia hai* phenomenon in Northern universities has caused teachers to de-emphasize their teaching is unknown. Clearly, this happened at SZU. From the beginning of SZU, over one-third of the teachers lived off-campus. By the completion of Shenda Village faculty housing in early 1993, almost all senior faculty had moved off campus into the new complex located downtown, a 30-minute compute from campus. Ordinary teachers were required to be on campus only during their assigned teaching hours or for any required departmental meetings (usually on Wednesday afternoons). Teachers did not keep office-hours, for ordinary teachers were not given individual offices. Instead, they were assigned in groups to rooms that included desks that covered two-thirds of the floor area. In any case, there was no need for office hours, for the standard pedagogy meant that all teacher-student communications could be contained within the classroom. This seemed to bother neither students or teachers. All in all, communication between teachers and students at SZU was minimal, and many teachers showed their supposed disciples little respect (see Story 5). Despite the negative effects of faculty disengagement, *xia hai* was often seen as a positive aspect—even a defining characteristic—of SZU. At the time of the tenth anniversary, for example, a leading higher education magazine published by the SEdC featured SZU for its cover story. Commenting favorably, an article referred to the remark of one teacher: "We are on the seashore and you cannot avoid getting your feet wet. Although we never formally go into the sea, almost everyone of us has the experience of walking in the surf."[48]

Xia hai implies teachers' going into business, and for this reason it is not the correct term to describe a major type of the money-generating activity undertaken by SZU teachers. From about 1988 to 1994 many SZU teachers taught in training classes that fell outside the officially approved teaching plan for SZU. They engaged in extra teaching, not business per se. The Wei-Wu and Cai administrations' concern with "random" opening of courses and awarding of certificates has been discussed elsewhere in detail.[49] On the one hand, the leaders were concerned about the educational value of these courses, but on the other, they appreciated the source of revenue. The side-business courses varied greatly in quality. One course that was administered directly by the Academic Affairs Office in 1993 was a joint undertaking with the Shanghai International Studies University (formerly known as the Shanghai Foreign Languages Institute), one of China's prestigious language schools. Teachers from that institution came to SZU and taught in a *zhuanke* program for fee-paying students. According to participants, the course successfully trained students at about the same level as other *zhuanke* English programs (e.g., Edmonds). That same year, the Foreign Language Department set up a program with the SZU Audio-Visual Center. It was not overseen by the AAO. About fifty students were enrolled in a two-year English learning curriculum, which was taught by two young, inexperienced teaching assistants, one who graduated from the FLD the previous year. Students were admitted without an entrance exam and they were permitted to enter at any time during the term. Students paid ¥1,200 (US $140) tuition each term for 24 hours of class a week for about four months. Thirty percent of the ¥56,400 (US $6,500) in tuition fees was remitted to the university. The remainder was split between FLD and Audio/Visual. The latter unit's total contribution consisted of providing a single classroom. Neither department took on substantial expenses in the program other than paying the two teaching assistants ¥20 (US $2.40) per hour. In fact, when the course ran short of text books to sell to the students, one of the teachers suggested a book be photocopied. Neither of the two departments would permit this expenditure (or even allow the copying to be done on the department's photocopier), and the students had to arrange for the photocopies themselves. Whereas AAO's course with the Shanghai institution was perceived at SZU as a serious undertaking by those involved, the FLD-A/V course was viewed by virtually everyone as a purely income-generating effort. SZU is apparently not unique in China for offering training courses that provide marginal academic education and are characterized as "scams" with little more substance than their "tantalizing advertisements."[50]

Student achievement

The boundaries in education between throughput and output are sometimes rather blurred, but for argument's sake, student performance will be considered here as an output (pedagogy is the corresponding throughput). Academic achievement takes several forms, most notably grades, which should lead to a graduation diploma. The phrase "achievement orientation" relates to students who work primarily for results (i.e., grades). Underachievement, in contrast, is a term that applies to students who perform more poorly in school than one would expect on the basis of their mental ability.[51]

American studies on underachievement

Most of the published studies on academic underachievement relate to U.S. secondary school students. A landmark study by Robert McCall in the early 1990s debunked a number of myths about who underachievers were.[52] Prior to that investigation, studies had not been especially rigorous in terms of methodology. McCall's study was based on a sample of over 6,000 secondary students in the state of Washington, and its methodology permitted comparisons between underachievers and their peers across a range of mental abilities, as measured by I.Q. tests. Some of the findings of the research that might be relevant to SZU students were:

> males were twice as likely to underachieve as females; underachievers came from all socio-economic classes; marital status of parent, number of siblings, birth order, family size and size/location of hometown were not relevant variables in defining underachievement; school counselors were not adept at identifying underachievers; underachievers had poorer self-concepts than their peers; they had markedly lower educational and occupational aspirations and expectations; they participated less in extracurricular activity groups and tended to date more extensively.

The underachiever at college became a fashionable topic for educationalists in the United States during the 1960s, with at least 23 studies that examined treatment programs for underachieving college students.[53] Articles appeared mostly in journals concerned with student counseling and psychology. At that time in the U.S. there was also a great deal of emphasis placed on intelligence testing. Students who tested high but did poorly in school were labeled underachievers. Educational psychologists and school counselors were called to address the needs of this group of problem students. As IQ testing fell into disrepute in the 1970s and 1980s, however, educators began to favor a more behavioral approach that paid attention to motivation. Most articles that later appeared in academic journals examined primary school and secondary school underachievers. The study of college underachievers went out of vogue. Nevertheless, one study from the 1970s is quite insightful for it identifies two separate clusters of college underachievers:[54]

> relatively practical, achievement oriented, conservative, controlled, science-oriented, adjusted, non-intellectual, traditional
>
> relatively theoretical, liberal impulsive, artistic, humanities-oriented, non-traditional, deviant, verbal.

In applying this model to SZU, it seems like the majority of SZU students appear to populate the first group: more practical than theoretical-oriented, achievement-directed (although not necessarily academic achievement-directed), conservative, adjusted, non-intellectual, traditional. No evidence suggests that many SZU underachievers diverged from this norm. Observation verifies that SZU underachievers fit the first, not second, category of the American study.

Some more reflection on underachievement in the American context may help in understanding what happened in SZU. American university admissions expanded in the decades following World War II until the baby boom generation flooded the tertiary sector. The stereotype (as portrayed in the movie *Animal House*) was the bright, but hedonistic ("gimme drugs, sex, and rock 'n roll") and extremely lazy student who could squeak through the higher educational system by cracking the textbooks a week or so before exams. He invariably attended a small, mediocre liberal arts party school. This stereotype had replaced the more positive stereotypes of achievers and overachievers of previous generations: the Great Depression East European immigrant making straight A's, on scholarship, working spare time in the family store. After WWII the stereotype became the returned GI, supporting wife and child, attending night school and achieving a diploma perhaps more through diligence than sheer intelligence. Using stereotypes serves a purpose but requires care. The stereotype should not be intended to represent the average, but rather the perception of the average. As an indicator of what can be defined as perceived reality,[55] it represents how a segment of the public is viewed by the public at large. Since 'the average' is not qualified by 'the standard deviation,' the representation alone cannot characterize the entire picture. At SZU underachievement was both perceived and real.

Underachievement at SZU

Given its multi-layered system of merit-based examinations which allows schools to stream students, China's education is very much achievement-oriented. The general consensus seems to be: the harder you work, the more you can achieve.[56] It is not surprising, therefore, that underachievement at university raises eyebrows because the public assumes that pupils who make it to tertiary education have sufficient intelligence to graduate. At noted earlier, however, about 20% of all SZU *benke* students from 1988-1991 failed to meet graduation requirements and had to settle for certificates rather than diplomas. Comparable statistics for other Chinese universities are not readily available, but conversations with various educators in China suggest that SZU's figure is way above the national average, which may be as low as two or three percent.

It seems to be commonly acknowledged at SZU that students fail not because they lack intelligence or are inept at taking tests. Why then do so many fail? The answer given by teachers whom I talked with over six years is that failing students did not try very hard; many just did not care. Many were willing to accept a mere passing mark (60%); many were willing to accept a fairly high risk of failure because the consequences of failure were not severe. As long as they made up their failed courses, all students could obtain a graduation certificate, which had about the same value in Shenzhen as a bachelors degree.

In general, underachievement in Chinese higher education is sufficiently present that a term has been coined: "long live 60" (*liushi fen wansui*). The phrase incorporates an idiom of extreme praise, traditionally reserved for the emperor who should live 10,000 (*wan*) years (*sui*). These "60-worshipping" students who squeak through with passing marks often show little interest in learning per se. They are not even interested in learning as an means of achieving a goal (getting a good job). They were unwilling to play the academic game, and consequently many of them often "achieved" more than the two permitted failed courses. Good grades were not seen as a prerequisite for getting a good job, either. Elsewhere in China, before job allocation was terminated in the 1990s, some students—especially those without well-placed connections in the job allocation process—were motivated to study, for high marks could well earn them a coveted assignment, such as one with a central-level ministry. Poor performance, in contrast, might mean they would be sent "to the grassroots," such as to a city in an undeveloped area or even sent to a rural region. This reward-punishment system did not exist at SZU. From its inception, the university had never practiced job allocation; even the first graduates in 1987 found jobs on their own. As more classes started to pass through, it became clear that SZU graduates were hired for various reasons; good grades served but as a single criterion for getting employed. After a few years, it became apparent that some graduates who had had poor grades were getting just as good jobs as those with high achievement. This occurred for a simple reason. The mid- to late 1990s was a period of high economic growth for the SEZ, and SZU graduates were in high demand. By virtue of their SZU enrollment, they all automatically possessed a Shenzhen residency permit (*hukou*); thus, they became more desirable than their peers from universities outside the SEZ—which meant all other universities in China. Companies and government agencies that hired Shenzhen *hukou*-holders did not have to worry, at least initially, about providing their new recruits housing (most had families or relatives in Shenzhen); they did not have to use up part of the precious quota they were allocated for *hukou* transferees into Shenzhen. All in all, it was just simpler to hire a SZU graduate. The employment system, in fact, abetted underachievement.

Employment after graduation

Training the SEZ's immediate *rencai* was SZU's *raison d'être*. In contrast with other universities, few of SZU's graduates went on for higher degrees. The university did not track it alumni and thus did not maintain reliable data on graduates who continue their studies. Nevertheless, for the 1995 accreditation it estimated that 42 graduates from 1992-1995 (or 1% of the *benke* and *zhuanke* graduates for those years) had become graduate students. Virtually all of these would have continued their studies abroad. Among graduates, 5-10% left China and another 5-10% chose to work outside the SEZ, usually elsewhere in Guangdong. Thus, 80-90% of all graduates remained in Shenzhen, participating in some way in the zone's development. This figure was confirmed by the 1993 graduates survey which indicated that 87% of the new graduates working at the time of graduation were employed in Shenzhen. Only 1.3% of graduates whose homes were in the SEZ worked outside the zone, yet 29.8% of those whose families lived outside the SEZ took jobs in Shenzhen. Graduating seniors begin to take jobs during their last term of study. After they return from the mid-year break, which occurs around the time of Spring Festival (Chinese New Year), seniors complete their graduation thesis or design. At the same time, they distribute resumes, apply for jobs and take interviews. Then they take jobs on a "practice" or trial basis. When the trial period is over—it often lasts six months—they sign contacts and arrange for the proper transfer of their *hukou* and *dangan*.

Because many students were working or at least preoccupied with finding a job before they completed their theses, the writing of the graduation paper was often not a serious undertaking. This is another instance in which the employment system (letting students work before they formally graduate) contributed to underachievement. In other words, students prone to underachievement may have been more serious if they had been forced to devote full time to their graduate theses/designs.

Dangan and hukou

The *dangan* (personal file) along with the *hukou* (residency permit) are types of geographic control, which itself is a vestige of China's half century experiment with communism. Although household registration has its origins in the Qing Dynasty, it became pronounced in the 1950s when the Chinese state implemented a policy to restrict urbanization by controlling the flow of peasants to cities.[57] The mechanisms of this policy consisted of *hukou*, food coupons, and the housing welfare benefits provided by a person's work-unit. The administrative policy persists to the present day, but it is no longer used as an effective tool for restricting population migration. For example, in 1996 only 29% of Shenzhen's residents held official residency, in the form of a *hukou*. A *hukou*, however, is still important, for without it, a resident in Shenzhen is not eligible for a marriage license, subsidized housing loans, the right to bear a child, or to send the child to school. SZU students who resided in the SEZ experienced no change in *hukou*. Full-time *benke* students whose families lived outside the SEZ received Shenzhen residency when they first enrolled in the university. They were put into SZU's collective *hukou* account. At the time of graduation, they had to go to the local Public Security Bureau and retrieve a chopped certification so that their *hukou* could be removed from SZU's account. Those who wished to remain in the SEZ with legal residence had to ask their new employer to include their *hukou* within the new employer's collective account (Not all employees, especially those who lacked *hukou* quota, agreed to this request). Or graduates could find a relative, or just friend, who would permit them to have the *hukou* attached to the family's account. When graduates got married, they had to set up their own individual *hukou* account, which could include spouse, child, and whatever other people the local Public Security Bureau permitted. Given a high amount of discretion among the individuals involved in the process, transferring *hukou* could require negotiations and *guanxi*, but it usually tended to be a smooth and inexpensive procedure, since it was so commonplace in Shenzhen.

Students' *dangan* recorded their university life, including grades, disciplinary record, student's annual self-assessment, with notations from the department head and CCP branch secretary, and materials relating to CCP activities. All Chinese, except the young, are supposed to have a *dangan*, a term which is often translated into English as *dossier*. This latter term has a rather negative connotation, which is not intended in the original Chinese. In any case, the dossier functions as a way for the state to keep tabs on the population.[58] At SZU, department-level leaders can submit positive as well as negative comments about students, something that might have given Student Xie (Story 9) a cause for alarm. The *dangan* was not an open file: it could not be viewed by the student. In fact, it could not even be perused by the potential employer, until after the student was hired and formally transferred to the work-unit. At that time, the student personally carried the sealed and chopped file and surrendered it to the work-unit. But the file could be used by school officials, like department leaders, class advisors or placement officials in the job search process. In a 1985 experiment conducted by Shanghai Jiaotong, class advisors were given access to the *dangan* so they could serve as a “bridge” between students and potential employers.[59] At SZU, however, the *dangan* was not used in the job search process. This was due to several reasons. The files were kept in a special locked office, and retrieving them required initiating a bureaucratic procedure that most leaders preferred to avoid. Obtaining the file was likely to incur costs on the seeker’s behalf in that s/he was likely to have to repay the favor at some future date. Second, career counseling at SZU ceased to exist after 1989; from then the job placement office provided no counseling, and no staff within the academic departments served as job advisors. Unlike what occurred at Jiaotong University, SZU abandoned the class advisor system—these so-called bridges—in the late 1980s. Third, examining the *dangan* was associated with political activity which, at SZU, was generally proscribed except for certain events, such as the point where student self-assessments were reviewed by leaders and then included in the files. The political process took place at specified times, by schedule—at the student’s university entry, during annual review and periodic special reviews, and prior to graduation. Thus, if a leader were to make a special request for a student’s *dangan*, his/her stated reasons and sub-surface motives could be examined. S/he would have had to make a formal request. According to one of my informants, political actions out of the ordinary were often suspect and had to be taken with great care. This caution was especially practiced by officials who lived through the “ten years of chaos” known as the Cultural Revolution.

When students were hired by state-run firms or government bureaux, they retrieved their *xuesheng* (student) *dangan*, which by that time was about a half-inch thick. Graduates who worked for private Chinese firms, joint ventures or foreign-funded companies made other arrangements for their *dangan*. At various times SZU has agreed to let the *dangan* remain in the university for a fee, payable when the graduate came to finally remove the dossier. Some graduates put their *dangan* with the Shenzhen Labor Bureau, also for a fee, reported by graduates to range from ¥800 and up per year. Other students found state-run companies willing to hold the *dangan*, even though the graduate was not actually working for the company. In these cases, fees were negotiated. In still other cases, employers agreed to pay the Labor Bureau for retaining their employee’s *dangan*. The *dangan* was important because it carried along with it *ganbu* (cadre) status, which was automatically conferred upon *benke* students upon graduation if they took public sector jobs. State employees who wanted to climb the career ladder

Table 7.8: 1994 Graduates Working at Graduation by Gender[60]

Working	Male	Female	Total	%
Unemployed	53.3	39.2	336	48.1
Banking/Finance	15.6	31.8	150	21.5
Real Estate/ Construction	7.4	7.5	52	7.4
Business/Trade	16.0	16.1	112	16.0
Government Bureau	7.7	5.5	48	6.9
number	443	255	698	
percentage	63.5	36.5		100.0

needed cadre status, as reflected in a *ganbu dangan*. Graduates who worked for governmental units or state-run companies, as well as those who filed their *dangan* with the Labor Bureau or inside state companies, retained cadre status. Most, if not all, SZU graduates who worked in Shenzhen treated their *dangan* as just described.

In a sense the *hukou* and *dangan* process also contributed to underachievement. The right to work in Shenzhen had nothing to do with academic performance. Whether holding a degree or not, a graduate could become part of the Shenzhen workforce if the *dangan* and *hukou* could be arranged. A job depended on those (except for some jobs in the private sector). In the newly developing labor market, SZU students were not guaranteed jobs. Under the old allocation system, however, students who underachieved were not likely to obtain good assignments. Poor grades could translate into poor jobs. This was not the case in Shenzhen. Students had little incentive to get good grades as far as job procurement mattered. This is due in part to the importance of relationships in the job hunt, a topic discussed below.

Where did SZU graduates work? The 1993 graduates survey found that 73% of the seniors worked for state-affiliated companies or government agencies, 11% in joint ventures, and 8% for companies solely foreign-owned. About half the students who graduated in 1994 had found jobs before commencement exercises. Graduates (1994) worked in businesses that dealt with finance, trade, real estate or in government agencies (see Table 7.8). Changing jobs often occurred. About 30% of the students who graduated in 1993 had taken a full-time job which they quit *before* they had even formally graduated from SZU. Once in the work-force, graduates tended, on average, to change jobs every 2-3 years for the first five years they were out of university. They found their initial jobs through a variety of channels (30% by campus recruitment; 22% by themselves; 5% by public advertisements, and 36% by introductions involving various amounts of *guanxi)*. Relationships were most important for landing jobs in state-run companies or government agencies.[61]

Public perception of student underachievement

The public saw SZU students on the whole as underachievers. This perception seems to be borne out by a damning article which appeared in October 1992 in the *Shenzhen Special Zone Daily,* the area's leading daily newspaper. Entitled "Mis-directed Yang Fang," it told the story of a Law Department student who had been diligent in high school, but whose pursuit of knowledge was corrupted when he attended university. The people in the story were misidentified; the school itself was called Exploration University, located by Bigfoot Lake. Historically, SZU's Wenshan (Knowledge Hill) Lake had been known as Smallfoot lake. There was little doubt that the account referred to SZU. SZU's Party secretary himself labeled the piece a "sarcastic and mean article."[62] The essay, which is extracted in Story 12 immediately preceding this chapter, explained student underachievement in terms of the rigidity of the education system and the students' preoccupation with doing business. There is no way to know if this perception was widespread, but a personal anecdote lends support to the validity of the perception.

As part of the research for my dissertation, I spent ten days in Shanghai where I visited various university job placement offices. One afternoon on the campus of the Shanghai International Studies University, I was walking with my assistant, then a senior at SZU. He struck up a conversation with two female students who offered their perception of SZU. The school, they said, was heaven for students, who lived in co-ed air-conditioned dorms, having to share a room with only a single roommate. They suggested that students spent much time dating (with a snicker to suggest sexual activity); they were not required to attend classes, could start their own businesses and make fortunes. In fact, SZU dorms were neither co-ed nor air-conditioned (but classrooms were both); two-to-a-room was normal; before 1989 class attendance was indeed optional; most students did work in part-time jobs, but few made fortunes. I cannot say if these women's misperceptions of SZU students were representative, but I have heard these stereotypical descriptions on more than a few occasions.

In conversations I have had over a decade with various Shenzhen people, the school has often been characterized as a country club, a four-year reward given to those who do well in high school. In this respect, it resembles tertiary Japanese education where "[most] of the university students have more interest in extra-curricular activities than real hardworking study...Their most important interest in school life is just to graduate."[63] Another indication of the public's negative perception appeared in a 1993 article from the *Shenzhen Legal Newspaper*,[64] a publication that may be described as somewhere between investigative journalism and tabloid exploitation. According to the article, SZU had "a first rate environment, third rate teaching and study management and ninth rate students." In their lengthy piece, the investigators reported that "only 80% of the freshmen bother to attend classes and for seniors the figure is below 50%...the library is 80% underused...learning how to make money and enjoy life is the students' key aim." Again, the accuracy of these views notwithstanding, they appeared to be valid as perceptions. In addition to reflecting public opinion, an article like this greatly shaped public opinion. The authors referred to "long live 60" as a "well known student phrase," noting that students believed that "good or poor study results will not bring a deserved profit." The *Legal Newspaper* saw student underachievement as one of the university's most serious problems.

SZU student underachievement

SZU's pre-1989 educational reforms may well have inadvertently encouraged academic underachievement. During the university's first six years, class attendance was optional. Students could become engrossed in the second or third classrooms. (Participation in employment or extra-curricular activities, however, may also be viewed as achievement substitution). Some diligent students enrolled for concurrent classes and studied on their own in order to pass the final exams. Less diligent students realized that they, too, could skip class. Since final tests were not very demanding, many students recognized they could manage a pass if they crammed during the few weeks before exams were given (Exam period was the final two weeks of an 18-week term). After rectification, attendance was made mandatory, but the Wei-Wu Administration's rules were often not enforced by teachers; absent students found ways to be counted as having attended classes (see Story 9).

Absenteeism in many Chinese universities is serious. *Great Tremors* called it “one of the outstanding problems in many institutions of higher learning today.”[65] Absenteeism, of course, relates to more than just whether attendance rules are enforced (which was SZU’s solution to the problem). It involves a broader phenomenon. According to *Great Tremors*, an inertia among some students sets in because the system is perceived to be “hard to enter, easy to leave.” Also, why study when an “iron rice bowl” is bestowed upon graduation? Some students are too busy with their part-time jobs. Other students are preoccupied with romance. Both of these situations occurred at SZU. One of my students sung in nightclubs and rarely made any of his morning classes. A female student became so paralyzed by a failed love affair that her parents eventually withdrew her from university for a year. But for each of these cases, there were dozens of students I knew who held demanding on-campus jobs and had a love life and still managed to attend class.

Before 1989, many students took part-time jobs, but there is little evidence to support the argument that even a sizable minority suffered academically because of their jobs. The situation at SZU in the 1980s appears to resemble today’s American campuses where many students work 10-20 hours a week. University students who get poor grades could well be achievers in extra-curricular activities/sports or successful in part-time jobs. Regarding the former, SZU students participation in voluntary campus associations mostly occurred before 1989 when dozens of clubs and societies dominated extra-curricular activities. In the 1990s almost all extra-curricular activities were channeled through Communist Party and Youth League mechanisms; but SZU students generally disliked this type of participation for it was too “political.” The *News Briefs* during the Cai years were filled with items about various departments sending students to old folks’ homes or to visit places of historical or political importance (such as the famous spot where opium was burned in the Qing Dynasty). But these generally were not voluntary activities; they were not something students “achieved.”

Great Tremors suggests a high degree of *xia hai* among tertiary students.[66] There is some evidence that this was an extension of the “overheated business management activities” that occurred in the late 1980s.[67] After Tiananmen, rectification probably curtailed business activities for at least a brief period. But, without politics to draw their attention as it had in spring 1989, students again became bored with studies and turned to business. Cases reported in *Great Tremors* concern Beijing students’ involvement in stock speculation, public relations work, commercial film-making, arbitrage in retail wear (buying jeans cheap in the provinces and selling them in the capital), or serving as business representatives for hometown enterprises. Moonlighting by actors and film-makers in Beijing's art institutes had become so pronounced that classes were desultorily attended. In contrast with the professor-selling-meat-pies case, much of the students' extra-curricular pursuit engaged their academic disciplines. An economics student was reported to have published eight books and more than 20 articles, and several computer students set up a consulting business. One student patented a formula for bleaching bamboo and sold the technique to over 100 manufacturers. Many students undertook home-tutoring, earning from ¥60 to ¥300 (US $10-50) monthly. The book also reports cases of students who had experienced failed business ventures or had been ripped off by employers and also discusses a student from a poor family who spent her spare time addressing and stuffing envelopes for four fen (¥.04 [US ½¢]) apiece. The *Great Tremors* section on student *xia hai* concludes with the case of a student at SZU:[68]

> Shenzhen has set up a stock market, which makes things very convenient for college students in Shenzhen and Guangzhou. Xiao Hua of the University of Shenzhen uses her father's stocks to do some petty speculating on that market. After several bouts she just about broke even. But when she starts to expatiate on the art of speculation she sounds like an expert. She has recently rented a house near the university and has hired someone to sit beside her fax machine and a direct-line telephone. Her mind is always elsewhere when she sits in class, and whenever the beeper on her belt calls, she hurries out to attend her 'important business.'

This case was probably unusual at SZU, but it certainly cannot be dismissed as extraordinary; it is indeed credible. The Shenzhen stock market opening in the late 1980s was immediately followed by a public frenzy due in part to the fact that an insufficient number of shares were made available for sale to the general public. Several hundred SZU students collected money from their families and stood in line with thousands of residents hoping to be selected in the lottery that had been constructed to distribute the quota to buy shares. In 1992 a riot broke out in downtown Shenzhen, sparked by annoyed residents who did not get into the quota lottery. Shenzhen's name appeared in headlines around the world. After the stock system was reformed to enable purchase by anyone who had the required money, student participation dwindled. Investment became limited to a few business majors and some other students (like those in the Chemistry Department) who were bored with

Box 7.1: Students Ding and Xiao, underachievers

Student Ding, through his father's connections, took a job with a state-run import-export company, a prestigious job, the envy of many of his classmates. In his first three years, the company has sent him to Australia for a trade fair; he wines and dines foreign buyers; he and his bride have been given an apartment; he has been able to obtain a good salary and bonus, supplemented by commissions paid by the foreign buyer. Yet, he was one of the weaker students in his SZU department, and he put in less and less effort until the last year, when he almost failed a course.

Student Xiao has worked for three companies, each successive moves up the prestige ladder he has defined for himself. Each job he found through relationships. He started with a municipal bureau, a desirable work-unit because of good benefits, pay, and possibilities for outside income. After working there for less than a month, the job he preferred came through, and he moved to an import/export company. After working there for two years, he moved into a position again with an agency in the municipal government, the employer he wanted from the start. He had earned acceptable grades at SZU while putting in considerably less effort than his classmates. He knew when to work (immediately before assignments were due; several weeks cramming for exams) and when not to work (the rest of the school year). Most of his four years were spent in non-academic pursuits, including organizing students who came from his native area. His college life, he admitted, was spent building relationships, something he expected to come in more handy in his future jobs than all the boring classes he sat through.

their studies and had plenty of time to follow the market. Only a few rumors circulated around campus about fortunes being made or lost, and those rumors concerned graduates, not students. Indeed, probably less than 20% of SZU students engaged in business, as defined by buying/selling or investing/speculating. Many students, in contrast, worked as home-tutors, employed by the parents of secondary school kids who were confronting examinations. SZU students did not resemble the general picture of their Beijing and Shanghai counterparts in *Great Tremors*. That book, for example, reports that beepers "chirped" on Beijing campuses and were held in 1993 by at least one-quarter of Beijing Cinema Institute seniors.[69] SZU students themselves did not start wearing pagers until about spring 1994; and then they were worn mostly by seniors, who were job hunting. Prior to that time beepers had existed among some staff and a few students, perhaps less than 5%. The university issued a notice in November 1991 prohibiting beepers in the classrooms and another notice in 1994 that reminded teachers not to carry paging devices to class.[70] By 1997, about 90% of all SZU students owned pagers. About half of the entering freshman class that year owned such devices, which served as a way to keep in touch with friends. Pagers used by students at SZU served less as business vehicles than as instruments to improve social life, a situation that appears different from the one that *Great Tremors* describes for northern China.

Neither business nor extra-curricular involvement in the 1990s seemed to preoccupy SZU students. Why then was there such low achievement? The overall 20% fail rate contradicts the students' high level of intelligence as measured by their upper percentile achievement on the college entrance examination. Perhaps the major reason was two-fold: underachieving students did not believe their study would be used in their future employment; and good grades were not required to secure a good job if sufficient *guanxi* could be found. Take the cases of two underachievers, Student Ding and Student Xiao, in Box 7.1.

Underachievement and *guanxi*

My survey of 1993 graduating seniors asked them for their class rank. As indicated in Table 7.9, the distribution does not reflect actual class ranking which should amount to 20% in each quintile. Instead, about two-thirds of the students who should have admitted to being at the bottom of the class elevated their standings when completing the questionnaire. Likewise, the top three-fifths of the class has 40% too many people. The accuracy of these data somewhat in doubt, Table 7.10 nevertheless indicates that those who reported they were in the bottom one-fifth and the bottom two-fifth in class rank score used the most *guanxi* in getting a job.[72] We may assume that those who admitted to being in the dregs of the academic vat must be telling the truth as they would have little reason to claim having poor grades if this were not the case. In the same vein, perhaps some of those who inflated their class standing might tend to lie about other things, such as using *guanxi*. Nevertheless, the highest *guanxi* apparently

Table 7.9: Self-reported class rank, 1993 benke graduates[71]

quintile	percent	frequency
top 1/5	30.7	134
top 2/5	30.7	134
top 3/5	26.1	114
bottom 2/5	9.2	40
bottom 1/5	3.4	15
total	100.0	437

went with those who got the poorest marks. Qualitative fieldwork confirms this finding.

For several reasons, the extent of the difference in *guanxi* use between achievers and underachievers may even be stronger than that reported according to class standings in Table 7.10. Some underachievers, like Student Xiao in Box 7.1, managed to get good marks and would not have appeared in the table as an underachiever. This particular student, for example, would reside in the top part of the class. Thus, Table 7.10 shows only the underachievers who scored low marks. Scoring high on *guanxi* use, Student Xiao would have brought up the average score. If students in the bottom ranks use more *guanxi* in the job search than achieving students, a finding confirmed by field research, then their self-placement in the upper portion of the class inflated the mean score of the top students. For this reason, *guanxi* use among achievers is probably *less* than that suggested in the table.

Table 7.10: Guanxi in job procurement, by class standing, 1993[73]

quintile	mean	std. dev.	cases
for entire population	5.2	3.1	389
top 1/5	5.0	3.2	122
top 2/5	5.2	3.2	115
middle 3/5	4.7	2.8	102
bottom 2/5	6.5	3.1	39
bottom 1/5	5.8	3.5	11

Scale: 0-12; 0 = least use of guanxi; 12 = most use.

Males made up about two-thirds of SZU’s *benke* students, and they were underrepresented in the top ranks in class standing (see Table 7.11). In other words, female students were higher achievers than their male counterparts. Female enrollment, as discussed in Chapter Two, was proportionally greater in arts departments which, perhaps not coincidentally, tended to have lower failure rates than science departments. All in all, female students at SZU tended to be more diligent than males, a finding not dissimilar to that reported for American secondary students.

Table 7.11: Class standing by gender[74]

standing	male	female	total	%
top 1/5	24.6	42.1	133	30.7
top 2/5	28.1	35.5	133	30.7
top 3/5	29.5	19.7	113	26.1
bottom 2/5	13.2	2.0	40	9.2
bottom 1/5	4.6	.7	14	3.2
column total	281	152	433	
%	64.9	35.1		100.0

Achievement is directly related to motivation, which can be classified into four types.[75] *Extrinsic motivation* occurs when students carry out academic work because of the consequences, in other words, to obtain rewards or to avoid punishment. The top students at SZU received scholarships during their stay at university. One person per homeroom class got the top scholarship of ¥250, several got smaller mid-range stipends, and about 40% of the students got the basic monthly scholarship of ¥80. Generally, these scholarships were not considered sufficient financial reward to change students' behaviors. "Shenzhen is a rich place. These scholarships can buy you one good meal, not much else," one student explained. Students could possibly be motivated to achieve high grades because some employers seek out the top students. They may ask applicants their class rank or seek recommendations which would provide that information. Few Shenzhen employers, however, requested this information of students; in most cases employers do not review transcripts until *after* the student is hired.

Another type of motivation, s*ocial motivation,* results when students try to please people who are important to them, such as parents. In the case of Chinese education, entry into university is such an accomplishment that, so long as one does not get expelled, remaining in school is sufficient to please most parents. Parents of SZU students, in any case, were not notified of students' grades, except when exams were failed, which happened less than 1% of the time.

A third category of motivation is known as *achievement motivation*, in which students compete against one another because it makes them feel good. This type, again, was not especially relevant to tertiary students at SZU. Students had experienced so much competition during their years of primary and secondary schooling that few chose voluntarily to compete when not forced to.

Finally there is *intrinsic motivation* which describes the situation in which students see the pleasure of performing the task to be more important than the outcome. They learn because they want to; they enjoy it. At all levels of learning, educators find this motivation to be the most desirable. My own teaching experience suggests that most SZU students were concerned with grades, and thus extrinsic motivation applies. Yet, I also found that students—whether high-, average- or under-achievers—learned most when intrinsic motivation kicked in.

For most of this book the discussion about students has concentrated on *benke* enrollees. The *zhuanke* students who were admitted scored lower than their *benke* counterparts on the college entrance exam (3% for English majors, 12% for Chinese, 17% for Finance). By this token, these students were either secondary school low-achievers or underachievers. Compared with the *benke* peers, SZU's *zhuanke* students pursued less rigorous academic courses, and more than a few tended to socialize more than study. This became apparent in the case of the May 1993 on-campus murder which involved students enrolled in *zhuanke,* not *benke,* programs prior to or at the time of the incident.[76]

The phenomenon of underachievement at SZU was not pronounced in the university's early years when *academic* underachievers could channel their energies into part-time jobs and extracurricular activities. Also, the Psychology and Behavior Guidance Center was able to help some students with their problems; counseling centers often provide the type of treatments American psychologists recommend to address the problem of underachievement.[77] As part of post-Tiananmen rectification, however, the Counseling Center was closed and the second and third classrooms were downsized and all but eliminated. Students in the 1990s became dissatisfied with their university experience, which was largely confined to the classroom. Many underachieved.

Concluding thoughts

This chapter has examined various types of university output in order to relate them to the general phenomenon of educational disengagement by SZU's teachers and students. The italicized story before the chapter, which in its full Chinese version appeared in a Shenzhen newspaper, seemed to attribute disengagement to students' dissatisfaction with their teachers' way of teaching. Students turned to business because academics at SZU was not satisfying. This is but one explanation of a very complex phenomenon. Teacher disengagement is at the heart of educational disengagement. The causal relationship (if one exists) is in the direction of first teachers, then students, not vice-versa. By the time the SZU administration faced the problem, the damage had already been done and could not be easily reversed. Assigning blame, however, is not instructive. But in sifting out the various ingredients that went into disengagement, fundamental questions remain: why did the SZU community disengage? Was it just a money problem? Would things have been different if teachers had been given higher salaries earlier, when they began saving up for downpayments on their flats? Or was disengagement just a problem of *anomie*? Some teachers were so upset with the politicization that submerged the university in the second half of 1989 that they threw in the towel (perhaps part of the reason that one-third of the teaching staff have quit the university during its brief history). Students, also, were traumatized with the post-Tiananmen depression which followed in the wake of pre-Tiananmen expectations. Students took out their anger in a more physical way that did teachers. When the former were forced to change dormitories as part of the implementation of new student management regulations (developed without their input), they trashed their dormitories, literally. Were the teachers also being destructive, only intellectually rather than physically? Student underachievement, this chapter has argued, is also related to structural features of the employment process. Students found that jobs could be secured through connections. A *hukou* and *dangan* were more important than a degree. Why get good grades when all that is needed is a solid network of social relationships?

While the precise causes of disengagement and their relative importance will never be known, the results were clear: student underachievement and a dramatic fall in faculty research output.

---

1. Cao, "Mis-directed Yang Fang," 1992. The author uses a pen name, which may produce a chuckle when heard (The surname sounds like a rude word used for intercourse, and the given name sounds like a character for hemorrhoids). "Yang Fang" also sounds like 'raise the sail.'
2. Another major university output is its reputation, in other words, how it is viewed by those on the outside. That subject, as well as corruption and evaluation, are discussed at length in Agelasto, *University in Turmoil*, 1998.
3. Computed from name lists in *SZU Alumni Directory* (May 1990).
4. *1987 Yearbook*, p. 168.
5. Source: *SZU Academic Compilation (1983-1993)*, p. 1; *Collection of SZU Academic Research Results* (June 1991); *1994 Yearbook*, p. 162; *1995 Yearbook*, p. 192; *1997 Yearbook*, pp. 254-6.
6. Source: SZU yearbooks.
7. Sources: *SZU Academic Compilation (1983-1993), 1992-93 Yearbook, 1994 Yearbook, 1995 Yearbook, 1996 Yearbook* (excluding Teachers College). Output for 1997 is excluded on purpose. For the explanation, see Endnote 296, page 325.
8. Zhou, "On the setup of the faculty of Shenzhen University," 1995, p. 103.
9. Source: SZU yearbooks. Computations include both full-time teachers and researchers (and exclude teaching assistants and non-professional staff).
10. *Beijing University*, 1993, p. 6.
11. See Zhong, "Chinese Scholars and the World Community," 1998.
12. Source: *SZU Academic Compilation (1983-1993)*. Only part of 1993 was cov-

ered by the 1,253 items reported.

13. Min, "China," 1997, p. 47.
14. See, e.g., "Comprehensive report to Shenzhen Municipality, 5 May 1987," *1987 Yearbook*, p. 168; "Report to Shenzhen municipality on SZU efficiency, 7 Oct. 1986," *1987 Yearbook*, p. 174.
15. Shi Bowen, "Research," *1988 Yearbook*, p. 100.
16. *Beijing University*, 1993, 33.
17. Sources: SZU yearbooks. Data in university publications were not consistently presented over time.
18. Wu Shulian, "Personnel management," *1988 Yearbook*, p. 107.
19. "Academic research minutes, 17 March 1988," *1988 Yearbook*, pp. 103-4. It apparently never followed this direction and retained the scholarly format *sans* commercial advertisements.
20. *Ibid*.
21. Wang Yifang, "Thoughts after the yellow card warning," *1988 Yearbook*, p. 115.
22. "Report of Scientific Research Office," *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 97.
23. "Keys of 1991-92 workplan, 10 October 1991," *1991 Yearbook*, p. 19.
24. "President's work report," *1991 Yearbook*, p. 30.
25. Yin & White, "The 'marketisation' of Chinese higher education," 1994, pp. 225-8.
26. Ying Qirui, "Research," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 297.
27. *Ibid*.
28. Interview, 14 October 1992.
29. Min, "China," 1997, p. 52.
30. Named for the date the research fund was inaugurated, August 1983.
31. "Self-evaluation report, 12 October 1995," *1995 Yearbook*, p. 52.
32. Source: SZU yearbooks.
33. Esman, *Management Dimensions of Development*, 1991, p. 41.
34. Min, "People's Republic of China," 1994.
35. See Neave & van Vught, *Prometheus Bound*.
36. For a general discussion, see Yin & White, "The 'marketisation' of Chinese higher education," 1994. Examples of university-based ventures in this paragraph are taken from WWW homepages.
37. Sources: SZU yearbooks.
38. *Nanjing Normal University*, 1995.
39. Wei, *The Great Tremors in China's Intellectual Circles*, 1993, pp. 44-8.
40. *Ibid*., pp. 71-2.
41. *Ibid*., pp. 72-3.
42. "Decision on further clearing out stores on campus, 17 October 1995," *1995 Yearbook*, p. 248.

43. This episode is covered in detail in Agelasto, *University in Turmoil, 1998*.
44. In 1993 the Security office reported signing fire-fighting contracts with 19 campus enterprises/factories and 27 *getihu* (independent businessmen) who ran stores and shops: *1992-93 Yearbook* , p. 228.
45. "SZU self-evaluation report, 12 October 1995," *1995 Yearbook*, p. 50, 61.
46. Pepper, *China's Education Reform in the 1980s*, p. 152.
47. Wei, *The Great Tremors in China's Intellectual Circles*, 1993. The book's influence went beyond its press run of 5,000 copies, for selected chapters were extracted in the major English-language journal that focuses on Chinese education.
48. Di & Xu, "Adapting itself to the market economy," 1993.
49. See Agelasto, *University in Turmoil*, 1998, Chapter 5.
50. Wei, *The Great Tremors in China's Intellectual Circles*, 1993, pp. 52-4.
51. McCall, Evahn & Kratzer, *High School Achievers*, 1992, p. 2.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 15-34.
53. Bednar & Weinberg, "Ingredients of successful treatment programs for underachievers," 1970, p. 2.
54. Lacher, "The life styles of underachieving college students," 1973.
55. Lincoln & Guba, *Naturalistic Inquiry*, 1985, pp. 81-7.
56. Stevenson & Stigler, *The Learning Gap*, 1992.
57. Cheng & Selden, "The origins and social consequences of China's *hukou* system," 1994.
58. Dutton, *Policing and Punishment in China*, 1992, pp. 222-6.
59. *China Education Yearbook 1988*, 1989, p. 218.
60. Source: 1994 graduates survey. Number of Missing Observations: 57; Chisq = 27.5, p<.001.
61. For more information, see Agelasto, *Social Relationships and Job Procurement by Graduates*, 1998.
62. *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 43.
63. Urata, "A Comparison between the Japanese and U.S. evaluation systems in high education," 1994, p. 4.
64. Tang, Li & Zhu, "Will Shenzhen University be as shining as before?," 1993.
65. Wei, *The Great Tremors in China's Intellectual Circles*, 1993, p. 25.
66. *Ibid.*, pp. 48-64.
67. _____, "Undergraduates as entrepreneurs," 1988, p. 6.
68. Wei, *The Great Tremors in China's Intellectual Circles*, 1993, p. 64.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 50. Data reported for the 1989 class, who were seniors when the book was written.
70. *1991 Yearbook*, p. 252; "Notice on SZU reaffirmation of teaching discipline, 20 April 1994," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 212.
71. Source: 1993 graduates survey. Data for 1993 *benke* seniors at time of

graduation. Missing cases numbered 110.

72. These data and the construction of the guanxi index are discussed in my dissertation, *Social Relationships and Job Procurement by Graduates*, 1998.
73. Note: Data for 1993 seniors who reported they were working at time of graduation. Total Cases = 547; Missing Cases = 158 or 28.9 %. According to a one-way analysis of variance, the differences between mean scores in two variable groups are significant at the .05 level: top 3/5 and bottom 2/5.
74. Note: Data for 1993 seniors who reported they were working at time of graduation. Chisq=33.5, $p<.001$.
75. Biggs & Moore, *The Process of Learning*, 1993, Chapters 6 and 17.
76. Zhang & Luo, “Thunderbolt on campus,” 1993.
77. Brown, “Effects of structured and unstructured group counseling with high and low-anxious college underachievers,” 1969.

8. Conclusion: misadventure in education

The history of Shenzhen University shows an increasing degree of disengagement from education on the part of teachers and students. This phenomenon is illustrated in the personal stories presented throughout this volume. To the outside observer, student Xie (story 9) and student Yang (story 12) might appear to be extreme cases of disengagement. In reality, their liberation from concerns for study that have characterized traditional students' involvement in education was commonplace at SZU. Even good students, as illustrated by the wife member of the bankers Deng (story 3), had little positive regard for SZU's standard pedagogy. Teachers also disengaged. Teacher Niu (story 4) and teacher Li (story 7) both went overseas for doctoral study; after completing their degrees, they remained abroad to pursue academic careers. Generally, teachers hired during the university's first five years were considered qualified. They cared for their students, often inviting them in groups into their homes for informal gatherings. This type of teacher started to disengage from teaching duties in the late 1980s. Many felt forced to moonlight in order to earn enough money to meet the downpayments of flats that were offered for sale. One-third of SZU's teaching staff, not including retirees, left the university's employ during the school's first dozen years. They were replaced by teachers who were perceived by the university community as less qualified because they were often hired on the basis of relationships rather than credentials. The earlier hired teachers had faced much competition (some 10,000 applicants for the first 200 positions). Many of these teachers grew disappointed when it became apparent in the early 1990s that SZU would not be teaching graduate students. Of course, not all teachers hired after SZU's first employment wave were of low quality. Teacher Zhang (story 8) was a rising star when he arrived at SZU. He, too, disengaged, choosing to work for a SZU-run enterprise rather than pursue a career of scholarly research. Teacher Han (story 5) was by domestic standards a competent scholar. Yet, he lacked a mentor who could instruct him how to teach; in response to his students' dissatisfaction with his pedagogy—the traditional "talk and chalk" variety—he turned away from students and devoted his full energies to his own interests. In general, teachers at SZU became dissatisfied with the quality of student intake. In terms of entrance examination scores, over 70% of the *benke* class admitted in 1989 scored over the threshold required of the province's key universities. By 1996 this figure had dropped to 33%. Teachers were forever commenting on the poor quality of their students. Not many SZU teaching staff I knew actually enjoyed teaching. For most of them teaching was merely a job from which they gained little satisfaction. This frustration was compounded by the fact that many of them were forced to teach training classes with low-quality students whose entry was not regulated by exam.

Students disengaged from study for various reasons. Many, especially those in the natural sciences, business and foreign language fields, found the traditional pedagogy stifling. Students from the late 1980s realized that they did not need good grades to get a good job. They perceived relationships to be more important than grades. In addition, they questioned whether what they learned would be relevant to the workplace. Some students were tempted by the opportunities the SEZ provided. During the Luo administration some students channeled their energies away from the first classroom into part-time jobs and extra-curricular activities. The doors to these second and third classrooms were closed by the Wei-Wu administration. From 1990 some students became engaged in economic activities such as home-tutoring, but it is not accurate to suggest that most students were preoccupied with business. Required to be in the classroom for 30 hours a week, students had only limited free time. Some studied on their own, but overall students curtailed reading. Per capita library circulation dropped from a high of 80 books/year in 1991 to a low of 40 books/year in 1993.[1]

Student and teacher disengagement was complemented by the changing nature of the university, as it moved away from being primarily about education to becoming a place where politics was in charge. This complex phenomenon is only briefly mentioned in this volume; it is the subject of a separate monograph.[2] Teacher disengagement was in part a response to perceived mal-administration by post-Tiananmen leaders who were seen as self-serving and corrupt. The affairs of Shenzhen University were tightly controlled by a small group of men and women, who included the top-level leaders (president, Party secretary), their immediate deputies and department heads. Ordinary teachers had little say in the running of their academic departments; ordinary staff had little control over decisions made by their superiors. Once the flats-for-sale scheme had been arranged, many teachers and staff started behaving as if they were no longer stake-holders. They left decisions entirely to the leadership. SZU's reputation began to plummet in the 1990s, and this decline in public approval further encouraged teachers to disengage. On more than one occasion I was told: "I'm only teaching here to get my housing." By the 1990s teachers were required to do little more than show up for classroom teaching and attend staff meetings several times a month. University leaders lacked the respect of rank-and-file staff. All this created a vicious circle. Teachers' disengagement gave more control to leaders. Leaders became more corrupt and self-serving. New staff were hired by department heads on the basis of relationships; factions formed throughout the university.

The data presented in this volume indicate a deteriorating educational quality as measured by inputs, throughputs and outputs. All in all, the academic nature of Shenzhen University was beset by a host of factors that conflated into a virtual conspiracy to undermine the traditional purpose of education: the enhancing of knowledge through teaching, learning and research. With politics in charge at SZU, educational issues took the back burner. So-called reforms such as the credit system and foreign exchange programs did little to improve quality and may, in fact, have taken time, energy and money away from more pressing needs.

The never-ending search for educational identity

One thing which has made SZU a fascinating case for study is the abrupt directional changes it experienced. With each leadership change, the university tried to take on a new identity. The first leaders attempted to create a semi-Western institution. Even the toilets in the teaching block were the sit-down type. The post-Tiananmen regime believed that many aspects of SZU did not meet their standards. They stenciled red encircled numbers on each campus residence building, a common practice in China. Previously, these buildings had only names (e.g., types of flowers/trees for student dorms, birds for staff housing). Another move to establish conformity entailed the erecting of a hundred ankle-high concrete posts that displayed environmental messages (Within several years most of these had been smashed by vehicles). One of Wei-Wu's most successful changes was replacing the feces-stained sit-down toilets with the hole-in-the-floor type, which proved to be considerably more hygienic. For the first part of the 1990s SZU experienced a severe identity crisis. By the third set of leaders—Cai Delin and associates—the university had lost its uniqueness and the SZU community seemed quite unsure of the future. Cai kept the traditional toilets and Wei-Wu's political apparatus, and he attempted to resurrect the credit system and other elements of Luo's educational structure. None of these much improved the quality of education. Cai was more concerned with reputation; he wanted

SZU to play in the big leagues, but the university lacked competent ballplayers. He attempted to improve staff quality by hiring so-called dragons (*long*), but many of these, in the eyes of the community, more resembled their homonymic opposites, *chong* (worms). Ordinary teachers, a large number of whom after 1990 had been hired on the basis of relationships rather than merit, were not top notch. They did not produce quality research; many did no research at all. The quality of students, as measured by test scores, had steadily fallen over the 1990s decade. Library circulation showed that students were reading less, at least until 1995 when students were told to take out more library books to impress the SEdC evaluators. SZU's facilities were certainly adequate—among the best in China—but its educational component did not inspire either students or teachers.

The most apparent feature of SZU over its history has been its wealth. The university was rich relative to other Chinese institutions; cash flowed with such ease that accounting was not deemed especially relevant. For those who had good relationships with the leaders, the money well never seemed to run dry. For example, the computer center was under more-or-less direct control of a vice-president. Rather than maintaining computers in the student computer center, the university simply replaced them every three years. In between purchases, maintenance was minimal. It was deemed too bothersome; when Computer Center staff were approached about malfunctioning machines, their standard reply was: "We are expecting new ones; why work on these?" In this regard, having adequate resources may well have contributed to many of SZU's problems. A poorer institution might have been more careful with its finances, more serious about stemming corruption, and more deliberate in weighing costs against benefits.

In their public statements, the leadership of SZU along with Shenzhen municipal officials all concur that SZU provides quality education. This view may well be shared by education officials in Beijing. No less a person than Chen Zhili, a top official at the SEdC, is quoted as saying that SZU's experience in improving its educational environment has been very successful. Chen, who visited the campus in 1997, said that the problems which the university once faced were common to other universities in China. Other state officials have heaped similar praise on SZU.[3] Unfortunately, the data and analysis in the present volume do not lend much support to such a positive appraisal.

SZU is making a great effort to receive official recognition as one of China's leading universities. Especially it wants membership into the Project 211 élite. This *fin-de-siècle* national project aims to create 100 world-class mega-universities in China for the Twenty-first Century. Those selected will be set aside for special funding. The drive for 211 membership was begun by Cai Delin in 1995 and has been assumed by his successor, Jiang Zhong, who took up her duties as SZU Party secretary in mid-1996. Jiang equates Project 211 membership with recognition of what she often calls SZU's exemplary quality. The Party secretary, who is a career Party manager, not a scholar or intellectual, runs SZU without interference from the university's nominal president. She reports that she has been pressured by municipal upper level leaders to "squeeze" SZU into the 211 Project.[4] Jiang says that the local government should add ¥300 (US $33) million to ensure entry into the élite project. Putting aside the issue of whether SZU deserves recognition as providing quality education, let's first look at a bottom-line question: what type of university should SZU become? What is the nature of the university?

Despite comments from many Chinese educationalists who support general education through comprehensive universities, institutions in China for the most part will remain specialized. SZU is a specialized institution. Finance and economics are what the Shenzhen SEZ is about. When Shenzhen requires engineers or specialized *rencai* in physics, math, English and Chinese literature, it can easily find them among the graduates of China's specialized or comprehensive universities. Given the zone's high salaries, the SEZ can recruit the best specialists in China. Thinking along these lines in a 1991 study, staff of the Shenzhen Education Bureau suggested that SZU abandon its attempt to become a comprehensive university in favor of providing a more technical and specialized education. A focus on business-related subjects and applied sciences is, perhaps, an idea whose time for reconsideration has again come.

The knowledge structure of SZU, as described in Chapter Four, defines it not as comprehensive university. It lacks the necessary diversity in professional staff, course offerings, and majors. It does not have the scores of specialties offered by China's comprehensive institutions. In the judgment of the campus community, SZU does business subjects and applied engineering relatively well. Its prestigious majors are in the fields of business (trade, finance, management, and to a lesser extent advertising, public relations and law) and applied engineering (architecture, computers, and to a lesser extent civil and mechanical engineering). Three departments—Physics, Foreign Language, and Mathematics—have their own majors but their more important function is as a service department, teaching students in other majors. If SZU wanted to establish an identity as a business/applied engineering institute, it could join the approximate 77 finance and economics tertiary institutions in China. Over time majors such as English language, Chinese Language and Literature, Physics, Chemistry, Mathematics could be phased out and their teachers transferred to the SZU Teachers College. In 1994 SZU brought the Shenzhen Teachers College under its umbrella and moved this institution onto the main campus. It will get its own building in 1999. This college, which trains teachers for high schools in subjects such as chemistry, physics, mathematics, Chinese and English language, provides the ideal work-unit to transfer SZU teachers made redundant in any shift from a pseudo-comprehensive university to a business college. Staff from some of the engineering majors could be relocated to the existing research institutes. Such staff relocation need not create undo hardship. An external review process could weed out inept teachers and cadres who were not initially hired on the basis of merit. The result of all these actions would turn SZU into the type of specialized institution which Shenzhen city officials had first envisioned in 1983, before staff from the Higher Education Bureau of Guangdong insisted that city leaders should build a comprehensive university.

SZU leaders spend much time on foreign travel to observe how overseas universities function. More relevant models are located much closer to home. SZU most resembles a school like the Guangdong Commercial College, also founded in 1983. With only ten departments with a total of 14 *benke* and *zhuanke* majors, it offers a curriculum similar to the business fields of SZU. Located in Guangzhou, the college accepts about 1,100 students each year, three-quarters of whom are in the *benke* program. Its total student population is about 5,000, expected to rise to 6,000 by the year 2000 and 8,000 by the year 2010. Other Guangdong universities are taking innovative approaches that might be instructive for SZU. Guangzhou University, founded in 1983, operates an international Accounting Major in cooperation with the University of New South Wales, Australia. Using Australian lecturers, all courses are taught in English on the Guangzhou campus. Unlike SZU’s twinning programs which have largely served as vehicles for emigration and delegation travel, the Guangzhou program takes place all in China. Its graduates receive a certificate that is internationally recognized, giving them a leg up in getting jobs with joint ventures or foreign-funded companies. The cost of the program, ¥ 35,000 (US $4,000), is only a small fraction of what SZU’s twinning courses with Edmonds and VUT cost. Another approach has been taken by two other institutions in Guangzhou. In 1995 the Guangzhou Institute of Foreign Languages merged with the Guangzhou Institute of Foreign Trade to form the Guangdong University of Foreign

Studies. The larger and more efficiently run institution has 1,400 staff and 6,600 students, two-thirds of whom are enrolled in *benke* and *zhuanke* programs. Although SZU lacks the prospects for a merger, the Foreign Studies University case serves as but one of many examples of innovative strategies used by Chinese tertiary institutions, especially those in neighboring Guangzhou, to cope with changing demands by society.

SZU's identity problem is one of several matters that deserved immediate attention when Jiang Zhong arrived in 1996 as the university's new principal. Even more pressing was the need to establish a corruption-free administration and work environment. With the retirement of Cai Delin, Jiang faced a more-or-less blank page. She revamped the university's financial system by placing tighter control over side-businesses and SZU-run enterprises.[5] She undertook a more serious effort against corruption than had her immediate predecessors.[6] But in the area of education, however, she left past policies unchanged. By training, Jiang is a manager/politician, not an educator. It is unclear whether she fully understands the issues that I have raised in this volume. The 1997 *Yearbook* which covers the first full year of her leadership, includes not a single educational initiative. The only substantial effort, the further development of the college system, was structural in nature. It is doubtful this is even a step forward.

From university documents, the rationale for the college system remains unclear. SZU is attempting to replicate the model used in other universities: central administration, faculty or college strata, and teaching departments. In a small university like SZU, adding a layer of administration which further separates the teaching departments from the university's administration appears unnecessary. Initially, it was believed departmental mergers would increase efficiency. One specific example was given me by several different staff in 1996. I was told that colleges would combine departmental libraries, which have always been small, and thus add to efficiency. A college would need one librarian, rather than several as is presently the case. Yet, this efficiency has not been realized. Insight comes from the 1997-2000 budget of the College of the Arts. Arts is an amalgam of the Chinese Department and the Foreign Language Department and includes two new departments whose staff came from FLD and Chinese: Public Relations (PR) and Public English Teaching. Arts wants to set up three separate libraries and to accomplish this task is requesting special funding. ¥200,000 (US $22,000) is sought for the acquisition of foreign language books, ¥1.8 million (US $200,000) for original foreign publications, ¥500,000 (US $56,000) for PR books, and ¥300,000 (US $33,000) for acquiring books, among other things, for a proposed Department of Tourism. This adds up to ¥2.8 million (US $311,000). It is questionable whether these books will improve teachers' research as most research in the social sciences in China does not use citations or references. Will students need to use these books? Probably not, because students are not required to write original essays, and the university library has proved adequate for their needs. It is doubtful students' graduation theses would incorporate materials from this collection unless teachers are willing to supervise them more closely and guide them through research materials. Building department libraries is a far step from the mid-1980s when Luo Zhengqi specifically refused to provide university funds for departments to stock their own collections. Departments should not have large libraries, he said, because for the sake of efficiency, books should be centralized. The college system, indeed, seems to be a step toward inefficiency, not efficiency. Informants report that some colleges, such as Arts, are plagued with the same sort of mal-administration that has characterized departments, such as Foreign Language. In some cases, inept administrators have moved up from department to college. This advance in administration manifests the Peter Principle—that staff rise to their highest levels of incompetence.[7] The college system is a structural solution, but for what problem? Certainly none of the ones raised in this volume.

A famous scholar in the field of Chinese education once commented that my research on SZU proves that scholarship cannot be bought. In other words, spending a lot of money, by itself, will not necessarily improve education. This point is apparently not understood by Shenzhen city officials. Somewhere in the neighborhood of US $1.5 billion has been spent on SZU in its fifteen-year history. The argument made by SZU leaders in 1988 is that the university could be improved, but only with more money. The problems facing SZU are not financial in nature. This book, I hope, has identified some of the university's more troublesome problems. Solving them requires more involvement than merely writing a check. It will not be easy.

---

1. This is discussed in Agelasto, *University in Turmoil*, 1998, p. 145.
2. See Agelasto, *University in Turmoil*, 1998, especially Chapters Six and Seven.
3. Favorable comments by Chen and other Beijing officials are referred to in a report by SZU's Party secretary. See Jiang Zhong, "Let's inspire enthusiasm, proceed to the higher stage," *1997 Yearbook*, pp. 37-41.
4. Jiang Zhong, "Let's hold hands, walk abreast, sacrificing for a common mission, into SZU's next brilliant era," *1997 Yearbook*, pp. 42-7.
5. A Financial Settlement Center was set up on 18 April 1997 to oversee all uni-

versity-run enterprises. See “Financial Settlement Center regulations,” 1997 *Yearbook*, pp. 279-80.

6. See “Disciplinary Inspection Commission work report,” *1997 Yearbook*, pp. 97-8.
7. Peter & Hull, *The Peter Principle*, 1969.

References[1]

SZU publications (in Chinese unless otherwise noted.)

*Collected Papers on Higher Education Research of Shenzhen University (*eds.) Higher Education Research Institute and the Academic Affairs Office,1995).

Collection of Excellent Teaching Results Prizes [*youxiu jiaoxue chengguo jiang huibian],* August 1993.

Journal of Shenzhen University [Shenzhen daxue xuebao]. Issued quarterly, rotating between humanities/social sciences and natural sciences.

Selected Collection of Administrative Regulations for Shenzhen University [SZU xingzheng guizhang xuanbian], ed. Chen Xiaobo (Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 1993).

Special issue for the third anniversary of SZU [*SZU san zhounian jinian tekan*], 1986.

SZU Alumni Directory (May 1990).

SZU Yearbook [SZU nianbao]. Issued for 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989-90, 1991, 1992-3, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997

SZU 1983-1988 [SZU 1983-1988].

Shenzhen University: Its First Decade (1993, bilingual pictorial)

Shenda Tattler. Publication of the English Club, 1986-1987, issued concurrently with *News in Brief.*

Shenda Tongxun. Issued quarterly. Issues 1-7 known as *Shenda nianbao tongxun*; Issues 14- include the name *Journal of Shenzhen University*.

Shenzhen University [bilingual brochure, April, 1985].

SZU Credit System [a student handbook], July 1994,

News in Brief SZU [Shenda jianxun].

Students' Handbook [SZU xuesheng shouce], issue annually.

Teachers' Handbook [SZU jiaoshi shouce], issued annually.

1996 Recruitment Introduction [Shenzhen daxue 1996 nian zhaosheng jianzhang]

---

[1] The abbreviation SZU is used throughout for Shenzhen University or *Shenzhen daxue.*

Publications concerning SZU (in Chinese)

Agelasto, Michael. “Maximizing the effectiveness of western English faculty at a Chinese university,” *Gaodeng Jiaoyu Yanjiu [Journal of Higher Education*, Wuhan], 1993, no. 4, pp. 88-93.

Agelasto, Michael. “What is important for improving library quality,” *Shenda Tongxun*, 1994, no. 24, p. 38.

Bei Aizhi. “Shenzhen University under the governance of Cai Delin,” *China Spring,* March 1996, no. 149, pp. 20-5, 3.

Cao Zhichang. “Mis-directed Yang Fang,” *Shenzhen Tequ Bao,* 11 October 1992, p. 13.

Chen Hao. *New Thoughts, New Explorations, New Patterns* (Beijing: Beijing Language Institute, 1989).

Chen Luhong. “Educational structure reform.” In Shenzhen Educational Science Research Institute, *Research on the Strategy of Shenzhen’s Educational Development* (Guangzhou: Guangzhou Educational Press, 1991), pp. 292-5.

Chen Xiaobo. “A symphony of spring breeze turns to rain,” *Shenzhen University Journal,* 1986, no. 3, pp. 16-24, reprinted in *Gaodeng Jiaoyu [Higher Education],* 1987, no. 1, pp. 31-8.

Chen Xiaobo. “The structure and characteristics of management at Shenzhen University,” *Gaodeng Jiaoyu Yanjiu [Journal of Higher Education],* 1988, no. 1, pp. 18-21.

Di Mei & Xu Yue. “Adapting itself to the market economy, reform and creativity: Shenzhen University’s experience of running the school under the condition of a market economy,” *Zhongguo Gaodeng Jiaoyu [Chinese Higher Education]* 1993, no. 9, pp. 12-4.

Huang Weiping. “The spirit of the Thirteenth Party Congress and SZU’s management system reform,” *Gaodeng Jiaoyu Yanjiu [Journal of Higher Education,* Shanghai Jiaotong University], 1988, no. 1, pp. 86-9.

Lu Xian. “Shenzhen University to implement general reform and has sought out new methods for international cooperation in education,” *People’s Daily* (overseas edition), 30 March 1994.

Qiu Gang. “A time when the dragons will swim in the big lake can be expected: A sketch of SZU’s recruiting professorial ‘dragons’ is the analogy for the professors recruited,” *Shenzhen Tequ Bao [Shenzhen Special Zone Daily],* 8 January 1994.

Qiu Gang & Xie Junwen. “Shenzhen University implements credit system,” *Shenzhen Tequ Bao,* 15 April 1994.

Shenzhen Educational Science Research Institute. *Research on the Strategy of Shenzhen's Educational Development* (Guangzhou: Guangzhou Educational Press, 1991).

Tang Yaping, Li Jianhua & Zhu Jianguo. "Will Shenzhen University be as shining as before? Reflections on May 4 murder," *Shenzhen Fazhi bao [Shenzhen Legal Newspaper*], 16 September, 1993, pp. 1-2.

Tang Cairu. *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path* (Shanghai: Tongji University Press, 1988).

Wu Xiaomin & Cao Changqing. "How has the political and ideological work concerning students been reformed in SZU?" *Guangming Ribao*, 19 April 1986, p. 1.

Xie Junwen. "Yu Guangyuan becomes SZU's honorary professor," *Shenzhen Tequ Bao [Shenzhen Special Zone Daily]*, 26 January 1994.

Xie Junwen, "SZU exploring new modes of education with foreign cooperation," *Shenzhen Tequ Bao [Shenzhen Special Zone Daily]*,12 November 1993, p. 1.

Xu Keao. "SZU is trying to be a first class university," *Shenzhen Shangbao [Shenzhen Commercial Daily]*, 7 January 1994, p. 5.

Zhang Yongjun & Luo Fangshi. "Thunderbolt on campus," *Shenzhen Tequ Bao*, 7 July 1993, p. 10.

Zhou Shizhen. "On the setup of the faculty of Shenzhen University. In SZU (ed.), *Collected Papers on Higher Education Research of Shenzhen University*, 1995, pp. 102-6..

Publications concerning SZU (in English)

____, "Foreign experts share their talents," *China Daily*, 30 May 1995, p. 9.

____, "Shenzhen students return with 'apprehension,'" *Hong Kong Standard*, 15 June 1989, p. 9.

____, "Shenzhen is my hometown," *Shenzhen Commercial Daily*, 19 February 1996.

Agelasto, Michael. "Cellularism, *guanxiwang*, and corruption: a view from within a Chinese educational *danwei*," *Crime, Law & Social Change 25*, 1996, pp. 265-88.

Agelasto, Michael. "Roleplaying helps inactive students," *English Teaching Forum 29*, January 1991, no. 1, pp. 32-3.

Agelasto, Michael. "Computers and academic writing," *Shenzhen University Journal*, 1993, no. 10, pp. 70-4.

Agelasto, Michael. *University in Turmoil: The Political Economy of Shenzhen University*. (1998, manuscript under review).

Agelasto, Michael. *Social Relationships and Job Procurement by Graduates: Case Study of a Chinese University* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hong Kong, 1998).

Armitage, Catherine. "Uni battles Ruddock over ban on business students," *The Australian,* 29 May 1997.

Austin, Mike. "Visa refusal white-anting TAFE: uni," *The Mail* [City of Maribyrnong], 4 June 1997, p. 3.

Beck, Simon. "Swindling banker fled to China," *South China Morning Post,* 30 June 1996, p. 3.

Granelli, James S. "Jury convicts ex-Irving banker of fraud," *Los Angeles Times,* Orange County edition, 13 May 1993, p. D-14.

Granelli, James S. "Arrest order issued for missing ex-S&L official," *Los Angeles Times,* Orange County edition, 19 June 1993, p. D-2.

Granelli, James S. "Fugitive O.C. banker agrees to return," *Los Angeles Times,* Orange County edition, 5 November 1996, p. D-1.

Guangdong Provincial Radio. "Plans formed for setting up Shenzhen University," *FBIS-CHI-83-052,* 16 March 1983, p. P1.

Lo, Alex. "Campus gave perfect cover for fugitive," *South China Morning Post* 30, June 1996, p. 3.

Liu, Yingkai. "Educational utilitarianism: where goes higher education?" In M. Agelasto and B. Adamson (eds.), *Higher Education in Post-Mao China* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1998), pp. 121-40.

Maslen, Geoffrey. "Visa blitz stymies student boom," *The* [Melbourne] *Bulletin,* 1 July 1997, p. 45.

Maslen, Geoff. "VUT in student visa row," *Campus Review,* 4 June 1997, p. 3.

Maslen, Geoff. "Visa pain for eager Chinese," *Times Higher Education Supplement* [London], 13 June 1997, p. 10.

Middleton, Karen. "Chinese students refused visas," *The Age* [Melbourne], 29 May 1997.

Millar, Geoffrey. *The Victoria University of Technology/Shenzhen University Foundation Program, Oct 1994-July 1996: Evaluation Report,* 9 December 1996.

Pollack, Jordan Ian. *Civilizing Chinese: Efforts in Spiritual Construction at Shenzhen University.* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1997).

Other references (Chinese)

_____, *A Collection of Social Development Achievements in Shenzhen 1979-1994* (Beijing: Beijing Statistical Press, 1996).

_____, *Shenzhen Municipal Yearbook* (Shenzhen: Shenzhen Special Zone Yearbook Press, various years).

Beijing University [booklet]. (Beijing University Publishing House, 1993).

Beijing University Graduates Job Assignments Situation Survey Group. "Survey on Beijing University's graduates job assignment situation," *Gaodeng Jiaoyu Luntan* [*Forum of Higher Education*, Beijing University], 1990, no. 3, pp. 39-47, 71.

Cao Xinshu. "Reexamination of the credit system and suggestions to perfect it," *Hebei Caijin Xueyuan Xuebao* [*Hebei Financial and Economics College Journal*], 1992, no. 2, pp. 34-9, reprinted in *Gaodeng Jiaoyu* [*Higher Education*], 1992, no. 6, pp. 40-5.

Chen Aijing & Liu Guohe. "Deep thoughts on tertiary students job allocation," *Fujian Luntan [Fujian Forum*-Social Sciences Edition, Fuzhou], 1992, no. 20, pp. 63-4, reprinted in *Gaodeng Jiaoyu* [*Higher Education*], 1992, no. 11, pp. 86-7.

Cheng Cang. "Synopsis of experience from the credit system of several domestic science and technological universities," *Gaodeng Jiaoyu Yenjiu* [*Higher Education Research,* Wuhan], 1985, no. 4, pp. 47-9, reprinted in *Gaodeng Jiaoyu* [*Higher Education*], 1986, no. 2, pp. 23-5.

Chen, Dan. From a follow-up survey of the graduates to see the quality of education of our school," *Jinan Jiaoyu* [*Jinan Education*], 1993, no. 2, pp. 29-33.

China State Council & CCP. "Guidelines for reform and development for Chinese Education," reprinted in *Zhongguo Jiaoyu Bao* [*China Education Daily*], 27 February 1993.

China. SEdC. *China Education Yearbook 1988* (Beijing: Peoples Education Press, 1989).

Fan Liyuan. "New ideas on the reform of curriculum for the 21st century." In C.C. Lam, H.W. Wong & Y.W. Fung (eds.), *Curriculum Changes for Chinese Communities in Southeast Asia* (Hong Kong, Chinese University Department of Curriculum and Instruction, 1993), p. 33.

Fang Yaomei. "Humble opinion on the reform of grading and evaluation after implementation of credit system," *Gaodeng Jiaoyu Yanjiu* [*Higher Education Research,* Wuhan], 1985, no. 4, pp. 42-6, 78, reprinted in *Gaodeng Jiaoyu* [*Higher Education*], 1986, no. 2, pp. 31-5.

Gan Liansheng. "Quest for characteristics of credit system in our country," *Gaodeng Gongcheng Jiaoyu Yanjiu* [*Higher Engineering Education Research,* Wuhan], 1990, no. 1, pp. 65-7, reprinted in *Gaodeng Jiaoyu* [*Higher Education*], 1990, no. 4, pp. 38-40.

Guan Fengao. "A preliminary discussion of some questions concerning the credit system," *Heilongjiang Jiaoyu Yenjiu* [*Heilongjiang Higher Education Journal*], 1986, no. 2, pp. 34-41, reprinted in *Gaodeng Jiaoyu* [*Higher Education*], 1986, no. 11, pp. 37-44.

Hu Ruiwen. "Educational development in China in the 1990s and the outlook after 2001," paper presented at the Conference on Chinese Education towards the 21st Century, August 1997.

Huang, Yuxiang. "A cursory talk on reform in job allocation for higher education graduates in our country," *Gaojian Yenjiu* [*Higher Education Research,* Sichuan University], no. 2, 1993, pp. 109-14.

Liu, Rongxuan. "New subject faced by higher education schools - competition in graduates' job settlement," *Jiaoyu yu Zhiye [Education and Occupation,* Beijing], no. 2, 1989, pp. 8-10, reprinted in *Gaodeng Jiaoyu* [*Higher Education*] 1989, no. 5, pp. 74-6.

Liu, Y. J. *Book of Major Educational Events in China, 1949-1990* (Hangzhou: Zhejiang Education Press, 1993).

Lu, Bingwen. "Advancing Shenzhen University reform." In Shenzhen Research Institute for Education Science (eds.), *Studies in the Education of the Special Economic Zone of Shenzhen* (Wuhan, Wuhan University Press, 1985), pp. 67-72.

Lou Yanchang. "A probationary implementation of the credit system and reform in higher education," *Gaodeng Jiaoyu Yenjiu* (*Higher Education Journal,* Wuhan], 1987, no. 1, pp. 42-7, reprinted in *Gaodeng Jiaoyu* [*Higher Education*], 1987, no. 4, pp. 40-5.

Sun Jianmin. "Why the credit system meets cold reception in China," *Shanghai Gaojiao Yanjiu* [*Shanghai Higher Education*], 1990, no 4, pp. 46-9, reprinted in *Gaodeng Jiaoyu* [*Higher Education*], 1990, no. 12, pp. 23-6.

Wang Weilian. "Common trend and existing problems in the current tertiary institutions curriculum reform," *Gaodeng Jiaoyu Yenjiu* [*Higher Education Research*, Wuhan], 1990, no. 3, pp. 54-9, reprinted in *Gaodeng Jiaoyu [Higher Education],* 1990, no. 11, pp. 26-9.

Wang Weilian. “Credit system: pros and cons,” *Guangming Ribao* [*Guangming Daily*], 2 May 1986, p. 3, reprinted in *Gaodeng Jiaoyu* [*Higher Education*], 1986, no. 7, p. 90.

Wang Wenge & Dongyou Huang. “College students are facing the selection of the society,” *Gaodeng Jiaoyu Xuebao [Journal of Higher Education],* Chinese Association of Higher Education, 1989, no. 2, pp. 11-3.

Wu Yigu & Liu Huayuan. “Tentative search for the construction of a credit system with Chinese characteristics,” *Wuhan Daxue Xuebao* [*Wuhan University Journal*], 1986, no. 4, pp. 30-6, reprinted in *Gaodeng Jiaoyu* [*Higher Education*], 1986, no. 8, pp. 22-8.

Yang Zhiling; Lin Bing & Su Weichang. *Higher Education in the People’s Republic of China* (Beijing, Beijing University Press, 1988).

Zhao Chaoxian, “View of how the market economy affects higher education through recent year’s national university entrance examination admissions,” paper presented at the fifth Conference on Chinese Education towards the 21st Century, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 19 August 1997.

Zhou, Li. *Manhattan’s China Lady* (Beijing Publishing House, 1992).

Other references (English or bilingual)

______, Education Reform, *China Daily,* 25 May 1985, p. 5, reprinted in Joint Publications Research Service-*China, CPS-85-065,* 1 July 1985, pp. 45-6.

______, “Undergraduates as entrepreneurs,” *Guangming Ribao,* 4 December 1988, p. 2, translated and reprinted in *Inside China Mainland,* 11 March 1989, no. 3, pp. 5-6.

Abe, Hiroshi. “Borrowing from Japan: China’s first modern educational system.” In R. Hayhoe & M. Bastid (eds.), *China’s Education and the Industrialized World: Studies in Cultural Transfer* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1987), pp. 57-80.

Adamson, Bob. “Modernizing English language teacher education.” In M. Agelasto and B. Adamson (eds.), *Higher Education in Post-Mao China* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1998), pp. 141-64.

Agelasto, Michael & Bob Adamson (eds.). *Higher Education in Post-Mao China* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1998).

Ayers, William. *Chang Chih-tung and Educational Reform in China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971.

Bednar, Richard L. & Steve L. Weinberg. "Ingredients of successful treatment programs for underachievers," *Journal of Counseling Psychology 17*, 1970, no. 1.

Bell, Daniel. *The Reforming of General Education* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1966).

Bastid, Marianne M. "Servitude or liberation? The introduction of foreign educational practices and systems to China from 1840 to the present." In R. Hayhoe & M. Bastid (eds.), *China's Education and the Industrialized World: Studies in Cultural Transfer* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1987), pp. 3-20.

Bezine, Ching Yun. *Children of the Pearl* (New York: Penguin, 1991).

Bezine, Ching Yun. *On Wings of Destiny* (New York: Signet, 1992).

Bezine, Ching Yun. *Temple of The Moon* (New York: Penguin, 1992).

Bian, Yanjie. *Work and Inequality in Urban China* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994).

Biggs, John. Western misperceptions of the Confucian-heritage learning culture. In D.A. Watkins & J. B. Biggs (eds.). *The Chinese Learner* (Melbourne: Australian Council for Educational Research, 1996), pp. 45-68.

Biggs, John B. & Philip J. Moore. *The Process of Learning* (Sydney: Prentice Hall, 1993).

Bo, Yang. *The Ugly Chinaman* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992, trans. Don J. Cohn & Jing Qing).

Boisot, Max. "Two models of learning." In T. King & J.P. Zhang, *Case studies of Chinese Economic Reform* (Washington: World Bank, Economic Development Institute Development Policy Case Series Teaching Cases, no. 2, 1992), pp. 24-30.

Brown, Robert D. "Effects of structured and unstructured group counseling with high and low-anxious college underachievers," *Journal of Counseling Psychology 16*, no. 3, 1969, pp. 209-14.

Cao Xiaonan. "The strategic role of faculty development and management." In M. Agelasto and B. Adamson (eds.), *Higher Education in Post-Mao China* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1998), pp. 29-58.

Carducci, Lisa. "Not all foreigners are experts," *China Daily*, 12 August 1994, p. 4.

Cheng, Tiejun & Mark Selden. "The origins and social consequences of China's *hukou* system," *China Quarterly*, 1994, no. 139, pp. 644-68.

China, SEdC. *1995 Educational Statistics Yearbook of China* (Beijing: People's Education Press), 1995.

Chung, Eric. *The Incorporation of Eric Chung* (New York: Workman Publishing Company, 1984).

Cleverley, John. *The Schooling of China*, first ed. (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1985).

Cleverley, John. "An Australian look at China's export education: Japanese degree students in Chinese universities," paper presented at the conference on Chinese Education towards the 21st Century, Hong Kong, August 1997.

Coats, Sandra & Mary Anne Sandel. *Paragraph Writing* (Englewood Cliffs: N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1986).

Conroy, J. "Classroom management: an expanded view." In C. June Maker (ed.), *Programs for the Gifted in Regular Classrooms* (Austin, TX: PRO-ED, Critical Issues in Gifted Education v. 3, 1993, pp. 248-53.

Crane, George T. *The Political Economy of China's Special Economic Zones* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1990).

Cui, Lili. "New target for educational reform," *Beijing Review 36*, 1993, no. 22, pp. 13-18.

de Bary, Wm Theodore; W.T. Chan & C. Tan. *Sources of Chinese Tradition 2* (New York: Columbia University, 1964).

Du, RuiQing. *Chinese Higher Education: A Decade of Reform and Development (1978-1988)* (London: Macmillan, 1992).

Dutton, Michael Robert. *Policing and Punishment in China: From Patriarchy to "The People"* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

Esman, Milton. *Management Dimensions of Development: Perspectives and Strategies* (West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1991).

Fairbank, John & Ssu-Yu Teng. *China's Response to the West - A Documentary Survey 1839-1923* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979/1954).

Feng, Zhi Jun; Zhang, Nian Chun & Tao, Xiu Chang. "New Thinking Concerning the Reform of Higher Education," *Liaowang*, no. 34, 20 August 1984, pp. 24-5, reprinted and translated in *Joint Publications Research Service, China*, CPS-84-076, 8 November 1984, pp. 57-8

Flynn, James & Joseph Glaser. *Writer's Handbook* (New York: MacMillan, 1984).

Ford, Donald J. *The Twain Shall Meet: The Current Study of English in China* (London: McFarland, 1988).

Gardner, Howard W. *Creating Minds: an Anatomy of Creativity Seen through the Lives of Freud, Einstein, Picasso, Stravinsky, Eliot, Graham, and Ghandi* (New York: Basic Books, 1993).

Gardner, Howard W. *Frames of Minds: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences* (London: Paladin, 1985).

Gardner, Howard. *To Open Minds: Chinese Clues to the Dilemma of Contemporary Education* (New York: Basic Books, 1989).

Getzels, Jacob W. & Philip Jackson. *Creativity and Intelligence: Explorations with Gifted Children* (New York: Wiley, 1962).

Glaser, Joseph. *Workbook for Writer's Handbook* (New York: MacMillan, 1984).

Glover, John A. Royce R. Ronning & Cecil R. Reynolds. *Handbook of Creativity* (New York: Plenum Press, 1989).

Guilford, J. P. "Three faces of intellect," *American Psychologist 14,* 1959, pp. 469-79.

Hadfield, Charles & Jill Hadfield. *Watching the Dragon: Letters from China 1983-1985* (London: Impact Books, 1986).

Han, Zongli. "The Development of the Economics of Education in China," *Canadian and International Education 16,* 1987, no. 1, pp. 23-32.

Hayhoe, Ruth. "The evolution of modern Chinese educational institutions." In R. Hayhoe, *Contemporary Chinese Education* (London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984),, pp. 26-46.

Hayhoe, Ruth (ed.). *Contemporary Chinese Education* (London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984).

Hayhoe, Ruth. *China's Universities, 1985-1995: A Century of Cultural Conflict* (New York: Garland, 1996).

Hayhoe, Ruth. *China's University and the Open Door* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1989).

Hayhoe, Ruth & Marianne Bastid (eds.), *China's Education and the Industrialized World: Studies in Cultural Transfer* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1987).

Hayhoe, Ruth (ed.). *Education & Modernization: The Chinese Experience* (New York: Pergamon, 1992).

Henze, Juergen. "Higher education: the tension between quality and equality." In R. Hayhoe, *Contemporary Chinese Education* (London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984), pp. 93-153.

Herman, William E. & Mary P. Bailey. "Recommendations for teaching overseas," *College Teaching 39*, 1991, no. 3, pp. 117-121.

Heyworth, Frank. *Discussion: Advanced role playing for EFL* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1984).

Hirsch, E. D. *Cultural Literacy* (New York: Vintage, 1988).

Ho, David Y.F. "Chinese patterns of socialization: a critical review." In M. H. Bond (ed.), *The Psychology of the Chinese People* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 1-37.

Ho, David Y.F. & Chi-Yue Chiu. "Component ideas of individualism, collectivism, and social organization: an application in the study of Chinese culture." In Uichol Kim et al. (eds.), *Individualism and Collectivism* (London: Sage, 1994), pp. 137-56.

Holley, David. "Quiet defiance, open despair and pursuit of a way out," *Los Angeles Times*, 10 December 1989, p. 6.

Holm, Bill. *Coming Home Crazy* (Minneapolis: Milkweed Editions, 1991).

Howard, Julie. *Idioms in American life* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1987).

Hu Ruiwen. "Chinese higher education: resource allocation and institutional restructuring," paper presented at the International Symposium on Reform of Higher Education Planning Management and the Socialist Economy, Haikou, November 1996.

Huang, He. *The Determinants of Institutional Effectiveness of the Senior High Schools in Shenzhen Municipality* (Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York, Albany, 1993).

Huen, Wai-po. "Household registration system in the Qing Dynasty: precursor to the PRC's *hukou* system," *China Report 32*, no. 4, 1996, pp. 395-418.

Jaschok, Maria. "Chinese educational reforms and feminist praxis: on ideals, process and paradigm." In M. Agelasto and B. Adamson (eds.), *Higher Education in Post-Mao China* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1998), pp. 165-88.

Johnson, David W. & Roger T. Johnson. *Learning Together and Alone: Cooperative, Competitive and Individualistic Learning* (London: Allyn & Bacon, 4th ed., 1994).

Johnstone, B. "Trouble in Leisureland," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 1 April 1989, p. 70.

Josephson, M. I. “Marking EFL compositions: a new method,” *English Teaching Forum*, July 1989, p. 28.

Joyce, Bruce & Marsha Weil. *Models of Teaching* (London: Prentice Hall, 3d ed., 1986).

Kehe, David and Peggy Dustin Kehe. “The pre-research paper research paper,” *English Teaching Forum*, April 1989, p. 41.

Kingston, Maxine Hong. *Tripmaster Monkey* (New York: W.W Norton, 1989).

Kingston, Maxine Hong. *Woman Warrior* (New York: Vintage, 1977).

Kingston, Maxine Hong. *China Men* (London: Pan/Picador, 1981).

Kretschmer, F.A. *An American Teacher in China* (Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey, 1994).

Kuhlman, Edward L. *Agony in Education: the Importance of Struggle in the Process of Learning* (London: Bergin & Garvey, 1994).

Kulander, Greg. “Agricultural University: Engines of Rural Development?. In M. Agelasto and B. Adamson (eds.), *Higher Education in Post-Mao China* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1998), pp. 165-88.

Lacher, Maury. “The Life Styles of Underachieving College Students,” *Journal of Counseling Psychology 20*, 1973, no. 3, pp. 220-6.

Lao, She. *Mr. Ma and Son* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1991).

Lee, Gus. *China Boy* (New York: Penguin, 1991).

Li, Fang. “On evolving aims of education and curriculum reform in Mainland China.” In C.C. Lam, H.W. Wong, & Y.W. Fung (eds.), *Curriculum Changes for Chinese Communities in Southeast Asia* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Department of Curriculum and Instruction, 1993), p. 7.

Li Xiaoju. “In defence of the communicative approach,” *ELT Journal 38*, 1984, no. 1, pp. 2-13, reprinted in Y.F. Dzau, *English in China* (Hong Kong: API Press, 1990), pp. 116-33.

Liao, San. *The Lotus Blossoms* (Singapore: Times Books International, 1953).

Lincoln. Yvonna S. & Egon G. Guba. *Naturalistic Inquiry* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1985).

Lipman, Matthew. *Thinking in Education* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

Lipman, Matthew; A.M. Sharp & F.S. Oscanyan. *Philosophy in the Classroom* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2nd ed., 1980).

Liu, In-Mao. “Chinese Cognition.” In Michael H. Bond, (ed.), *The Psychology of the Chinese People* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 73-105.

Liu Renjing. “College and university admissions: the rate of growth must be appropriate,” *China Education News* 7 April 1994, no. 1821, p. 1, reprinted in *Chinese Education & Society 28*, 1995, no. 6, pp. 7-13.

Liu Renjing. “Combining tracks for ‘publicly funded students’ and ‘self-supported students,” *China Education News* 5 April 1994, no. 1819, p. 1, reprinted in *Chinese Education & Society 28*, 1995, no. 6, pp. 17-23.

Liu, Wenxiu. “The significance of recent reforms for higher education.” In “Chinese Educators on Chinese Education,” *Canadian and International Education 16* no. 1, 1987, pp. 162-171.

Liu, Zongren. *Two Years in the Melting Pot* (San Francisco: China Books,1984).

Lo, Leslie N.K. “State Patronage of Intellectuals in Chinese Higher Education,” *Comparative Education Review 35*, 1991, no. 4.

Löfstedt, Jan-Ingvar. *Human Resources in Chinese Development. Needs and Supply of Competencies* (Paris: UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning, IIEP Research Report 80, 1990).

Lui, Yiyun. “From craft to art: how to teach composition,” *English Teaching Forum*, October 1989, p. 26.

Lynn, Laurence E. Jr. “The case method: an overview for Chinese teachers.” In T. King & J.P. Zhang, *Case studies of Chinese Economic Reform* (Washington: World Bank, Economic Development Institute Development Policy Case Series Teaching Cases, no. 2, 1992), pp. 12-23.

Mao, Yan. “Stubborn tradition,” *China Now*, 1991, no. 137, pp. 14-5.

Mahoney, Rosemary. *The Early Arrival of Dreams: A Year in China* (New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1990).

Marton, Ference; Gloria Dall’Alba & Tse Lai Kun. “Memorizing and understanding: the keys to the paradox.” In D.A. Watkins & J. B. Biggs (eds.). *The Chinese Learner* (Melbourne: Australian Council for Educational Research, 1996), pp. 70-83.

McCall, Robert B.; Cynthia Evahn & Lynn Kratzer. *High School Achievers: What Do They Achieve as Adults?* (London: Sage, 1992).

McPartland Pamela. *Take it Easy: American Iidioms* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1981).

Miller, Richard I. *Major American Higher Education Issues and Challenges in the 1990s* (London: Jessica Kingsley,1990).

Min, Wei-fang. "People's Republic of China: autonomy and accountability: an analysis of the changing relationships between the government and universities." In G. Neave & F. A van Vught (eds.), *Government and Higher Education Relationships Across Three Continents: the Winds of Change* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1994), pp. 106-127.

Min, Weifan. "China." In G. Postiglione & G. C.L. Mak (eds.), *Asian Higher Education: An International Handbook and Reference Guide* (Westport CN: Greenwood, 1997), pp. 37-55.

Min, Weifan. "Major strategic issues of Chinese higher education development for the 21st century," paper presented to the Conference on Chinese Education towards the 21st Century, Hong Kong, August 1997.

Mo, Timothy. *Sour Sweet* (London: Andre Dentsch, 1982).

Nanjing Normal University [booklet]. (President's Office, Nanjing Normal University, 1995).

Neave, Guy & Frans A van Vught (eds.). *Prometheus Bound: the Changing Relationship between Government and Higher Education in Western Europe* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1991).

Orleans, Leo. "Soviet influence on China's higher education." In R. Hayhoe & M. Bastid (eds.), *China's Education and the Industrialized World: Studies in Cultural Transfer* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1987), pp. 184-98.

Paine, Lynn. "The educational policy process: a case study of bureaucratic action in China." In Lieberthal & Lampton, *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China*, 1992, pp. 195-6.

Pearson, Samuel C. "The Fulbright experience: teaching and living in the PRC," paper presented at the Conference on Chinese Education towards the 21st Century, Hong Kong, August 1997.

Penner, Janice. "Change and conflict: introduction of the communicative approach in China," *TESL Canada Journal 12,* 1995, no. 2, pp. 1-17.

Pepper, Suzanne. *China's Education Reform in the 1980s* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Institute of East Asian Studies, China Research Monograph 36, 1990).

Pepper, Suzanne. "Post-Mao reforms in Chinese education: can the ghosts of the past be laid to rest?" In Irving Epstein (ed.), *Chinese Education: Problems, Policies, and Prospects* (New York: Garland, 1991), pp. 1-41.

Perkins, David N. "Creativity by design," *Educational Leadership 42,* no 1, 1984, pp. 18-24.

Peter, Laurence J. & Raymond Hull. *The Peter Principle* (London: Souvenir Press, 1969).

Porter, Edgar. *Foreign Teachers in China* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990).

Robinson, John. *The Chinese* (Philadephia: Banbury Books,1983).

Rosen, Stanley. "The impact of economic reform on Chinese education: markets and the growth of differentiation," paper presented at the Conference on Social Consequences of Chinese Economic Reform, Harvard, May 1997.

Rosen, Stanley. "Students and the state in China: the crisis in ideology and organization." In Arthur L. Rosenbaum (ed.), *State & Society in China: The Consequences of Reform* (Boulder: Westview, 1992).

Ross, Heidi. "Foreign language education as a barometer of modernization." In R. Hayhoe, (ed.), *Education & Modernization: The Chinese Experience* (New York: Pergamon, 1992, pp. 239-54.

Ross, Heidi A. *China Learns English - Language Teaching and Social Change in the People's Republic of China* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1993).

Runkle, Ron. "A technique to teach writing," *English Teaching Forum,* July 1988, p. 51.

Sadow, Stephen A. *Idea Bank: Creative Activities for the Language Class* (Rowley, Mass: Newberry House Publications, 1982).

Saltzman, Mark. *Iron and Silk* (New York: Random House, 1986).

Shirk, Susan. *Competitive Comrades* (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982).

Spence, Jonathan D. *The Question of Hu* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988.

Stevenson, Harold W. & James W. Stigler. *The Learning Gap*: *Why Our Schools Are Failing and What We Can Learn from Japan and Chinese Education* (New York: Summit Books, 1992).

Tan, Amy. *The Joy Luck Club* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989).

Tan, Amy. *The Kitchen God's Wife* (London: Fontana, 1991).

Tan, Bo. *Letters from Thailand* (tr. Susan Fulop (Bangkok: Editions Duan Kamol, 1991).

Tan, Kok Seng. *Three Sisters of Sz* (Singapore: Heinemann Asia, 1989).

Tang, Catherine. "Collaborative learning: the latent dimension in Chinese students' learning." In D.A. Watkins & J. B. Biggs (eds.). *The Chinese Learner* (Melbourne: Australian Council for Educational Research, 1996), pp. 183-204.

Theroux, Paul. *Fong and the Indians* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1976).

Thompson, Michael; Richard Ellis, Aaron Wildavsky, *Cultural Theory* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).

Torrance, E. P. *Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking* (Lexington, MA: Personnel Press, 1966).

U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Educational Statistics. *1992-1993 Digest of Education Statistics* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995),

Urata, Nobuchika. "A comparison between the Japanese and U.S. evaluation systems in high education," paper presented to the Conference on Indigenous Knowledge and Cultural Interchange: Challenges to the Ideal of the University, 23-27 May, 1994, Changsha, Hunan University.

Volet, Simone & Peter Renshaw. "Chinese students at an Australian university: adaptability and continuity." In D.A. Watkins & J. B. Biggs (eds.). *The Chinese Learner* (Melbourne: Australian Council for Educational Research, 1996), pp. 205-20.

Wang, Gungwu. *The Chineseness of China* (New York: Oxford, 1991).

Wang, Yongquan. "The concept of general education in Chinese universities." In Ruth Hayhoe (ed.) *Knowledge Across Cultures* (Wuhan: Hubei Education Press, 1993), pp. 348-58.

Walker, Julian. *Nelson Practical Book on Phrasal Verbs* (Hong Kong: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1982).

Watkins, David A. & John B. Biggs (eds.). *The Chinese Learner: Cultural, Psychological and Contextual Influences* (Melbourne: Australian Council for Educational Research, 1996).

Watkins, Floyd C. & William B. Dillingham. *Practical English Handbook* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982).

Watkins, Floyd C. & William B. Dillingham. *Practical English Workbook* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982).

Wei, Feng. *The Great Tremors in China's Intellectual Circles: An Overview Of Intellectuals Floundering in The Sea of Commercialism* (Beijing: Society Publishing House, 1993), translated in *Chinese Education and Society 29*, 1996, no. 6.

Westmeyer, Paul. *A History of American Higher Education* (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1985).

Woronov, Naomi. *China through My Window* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1988).

Xiao, Jin. "Vocational/technical education in Shenzhen, China: its interface with economic development." *International Journal of Educational Development* (in press).

Yen, Renting. "Foreign language teaching in China: problems and prospects," *Canadian and International Education 16*, 1987, no. 1, pp. 48-61.

Yin Qiping & Gordon White. "The 'marketisation' of Chinese higher education: a critical assessment," *Comparative Education 30,* 1994, no. 3, pp. 217-37.

Yu, Ying-Shih. "The radicalization of China in the twentieth century," *Daedalus 122* , 1993, no. 2.

Zhang, Feng Xing & Chen Shih Jun. "Techniques to teach writing," *English Teaching Forum*, April 1989, p. 34.

Zhang, Huaizhi. "Establish a high-efficiency system of higher education investment," *China Education News* (29 July 1994), reprinted in *Chinese Education & Society 28*, 1995, no. 6, pp. 31-6.

Zhang, Wei-wei. *Ideology and Economic Reform under Deng Xiaoping 1978-1993* (London: Kegan Paul, 1996).

Zhong, Wenhui. "Chinese scholars and the world community." In M. Agelasto and B. Adamson (eds.), *Higher Education in Post-Mao China* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1998), pp. 59-77.

Zhou, Yuliang. *Education in Contemporary China* (Changsha: Hunan Education Publishing House, 1990).

Zhu, Zhaozhou. "Institutions of higher education should readjust structure, management," *Liaowang,* no. 9, 4 March 1985, p. 41, translated and reprinted in *Joint Publications Research Service-China*, CPS-85-055, 6 June 1985, p. 68.

Index

Academic Affairs Office (SZU), 70, 71, 76, 81, 82, 84, 85, 134, 138, 210, 211, 307, 329, 334, 355-6, 358, 377, 385, 431-3, 437, 473
accreditation (SZU), 45, 67, 115, 279-80, 291, 297, 356, 418, 457, 469, 470, 498
achievement (student) , 474-90
  American studies on underachievement, 474-6
  public perception of student underachievement, 482-3
  SZU student underachievement, 483-7
  underachievement at SZU, 476-7
adult education (SZU), 60-5, 292, 302
Applied Nuclear Tech. Inst., 300-1
Architecture Dept., 127, 145, 169-80, 291, 393-4, 398-9
audio visual (SZU), 172, 229, 284, 286, 298, 341, 343, 358, 435, 473-4
Band 4. *See* English teaching.
Beijing (Peking) University, 126, 127, 139, 187, 369, 469
Cai Delin
  concerns over teaching, 138, 243, 473
  creating a teaching élite, 141-3
  policies, 42-50, 133, 381
  publishing mandate, 220, 457, 462
  research funding, 462
campus businesses. *See* side-businesses.
CCP (SZU), 172, 188, 202, 254, 256, 259-60, 270, 274, 283, 287, 292, 297, 302, 304, 306, 389, 479, 484
Chemistry Dept., 88, 132, 181-9, 236, 458, 485
Chinese Communist Party. *See* CCP.
Chinese culture
  Confucian-heritage cultures, 333
  foreigners' view of, 404-5
  the individual in, 13, 351-4, 350
Chinese Dept., 189-98, 356-8, 427-30, 443
Civil Engineering Dept., 198-205, 433
college entrance exam. *See* students.
computers (SZU), 222-3, 338, 498
Confucian-heritage cultures. *See* Chinese culture.
cooperative learning, 346
creativity, 294, 347-51
  creativity and Chinese education, 349-51
  western research approaches to , 348-9
credit system, 267, 288, 368-87
  American influence, 370-3
  American CS in China, 373-6
  educational issues raised, 383-6
  history in China, 369-70
  SZU credit system, 376-86
curriculum. *See* knowledge structure.
departments, teaching
  compartmentalization, 384-5, 435
  conflicts in, 196, 213-5, 225-6, 242-6, 295
  delivery channels, 268-70
  fail rates, 169
  individual agency importance, 305-6
  political work, 172, 188, 202, 216, 270, 274, 282
  practice vs. theory, 224-5, 232-4, 240, 243-5, 250-2, 255, 273, 275, 278, 295

  service function, 193, 233, 246, 260, 276-9, 286, 289, 292, 302, 499
  setting up, 127, 280
  student flows, 163, 278, 285, 293, 380
  See also CCP, knowledge structure, side-businesses.
Design Dept., 210-3
Dewey, John. 370-1
Economics Dept., 213-29, 237, 275, 393-4, 428-30, 433, 436
Edmonds College. *See* twinning.
education (SZU)
  achievement orientation, 476
  changing educational policies, 26
  concerns over teaching, 134
  creating a teaching élite, 141
  educational issues raised by credit system, 383-6
  output, 455
education
  in Shenzhen, 12-5
  motivation, 489-90
  purpose in China, 14, 329, 371, 467
  practicality, 165
  stratification, 48
  See also creativity
education, Chinese higher, 16, 67, 74, 499
  as public entrepreneurs, 467-8
  enrollment rate, 92 n. 5
  FTE, 61
  research, 462-3
  size, 371
  staff-student ratio, 104
  teacher ranks, 128
  tuition, 75
  underachievement, 477
  university admissions process, 60, 68-9, 75-7, 88
  xia hai, 472
Electronics Dept., 83, 88, 221-9, 237, 424-6, 443
English teaching (SZU), 229-41, 248, 276, 295
  Band tests, 234-9
  Communicative English for Chinese Learners (CECL), 341-5, 367
  composition, 337-40
  cooperative, 346-7
  listening and culture courses, 340-1
  oral English, 334-7
Finance Office (SZU), 463, 471
Foreign Affairs Office (SZU), 385, 388-92, 395-403, 406, 410-3, 416-7, 427-8, 430-4, 439, 441, 443
foreign affairs, 17-8, 242
  foreign students, 390-3
  foreign teachers, 393-414
  international exchange, 49-50, 414-8
  leadership delegations, 415-90
  management over, 388-9
  teacher travel, 139-40, 418-9
  See also Foreign Affairs Office, foreign things, foreigners, twinning programs
Foreign Language Dept., 229-46, 332-47, 357, 380, 384, 393-4, 397-8, 403, 412, 427, 433, 435-6, 473-4
foreign things, 202, 366-444
  credit system, 368-87
  exchange programs, 226, 415-8, 390
  delegation travel, 415-8
  foreign students, 269, 390-3
  foreign teachers, 366, 393-414, 390
  -inspired curriculum, 334-47, 367
  toilets, 497
  visitors to SZU, 176, 179, 187,

203, 220-1, 387-9
  See also foreign affairs, twinning programs, pedagogy
foreigners at SZU, 387-414
founding (SZU), 16, 388
full-time equivalent. *See* students.
General Affairs Office (SZU), 211, 286, 291, 433, 470
guanxi, 72, 256, 306, 345, 479, 482, 487-90
Int'l. Finance & Trade Dept., 71, 86, 237, 241, 247-54, 332, 383-4, 428-30, 433, 435-6
Int'l. Software Development Co., 461
knowledge structure (SZU), 159-310
  business focus, 16, 214-5, 219
  general education, 371-3, 386
  setting of majors, 19-22, 217, 182, 192, 195-6, 202-4, 223, 227, 232-4, 267, 276-8, 282, 288, 292
  specializations, 205, 214, 218, 251, 281, 371-3, 384, 467, 499
  vocationalization, 213, 233
  See also foreign, credit system; departments; and individual department listing
Lancashire Polytech. *See* twinning.
Law Dept., 254-65, 356, 393
Library, 286, 339, 496
Luo Zhengqi, 26-34, 127, 173, 180, 299, 303, 356, 358, 380, 470
  flexibility in education, 32-3
  expansive view of, 33-4
  focus on students, 26-32
Management Dept., 140, 266-75
management information system
Mathematics Dept., 145, 275-80
Mechanical Engineering Dept., 88, 280-5
media, 66, 269, 427, 433, 460, 472-3, 482-4
moral/political education, 287, 303-5, 379, 411
New Energy Inst., 460-1
part-time jobs. *See* students employment
pedagogy (SZU), 134, 247, 249, 253, 258, 329-59, 370, 438-9
  Chinese approach, 333-4
  exam-orientation, 288, 330-1, 349-50
  experiments, 334-47
  mentoring, 333
  old-style, 330-1
  practical nature, 18, 165, 224, 378
  Three Classrooms, 329, 376
  'western' approach, 332-4
  See also creativity, departments
Personnel Office (SZU)
Physical Education Dept., 285-92
Physics Dept., 88, 145, 292-301, 395-6
politics
  and recruitment, 89-91
  See CCP
Psychological Counseling Center, 28-9, 38-9, 490
Public Administration Dept., 301-10
Public Security Bureau, 407, 479
Reflective Materials Factory, 299-300, 415, 460, 470
research (SZU), 174, 185-7, 219-20, 228-9, 259, 271-2, 278, 281, 283, 289, 298-301, 302, 307-10, 455-63
  funding, 459, 461
  institutes, 458
  marketing, 184-7, 460-1
  practical, 458-9
  quality, 457-8
Security Office (SZU), 406
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, 11-2, 89-90
  dangan, 478-82
  employment & underachievement, 477-8
  English in, 229

  hukou, 478-82
  relations with SZU, 66, 68, 79-81, 88, 89, 91, 101, 105, 427, 439
  See also founding
Shenzhen University. *See* adult, credit system, education, foreign affairs, founding, English teaching, media, pedagogy, politics, research, students, teachers
side-businesses, 106, 135, 137-8, 149, 170, 177, 184-7, 203-4, 210, 224, 226, 228, 243-4, 252, 259, 268-73, 278-9, 285, 289, 334, 357, 460, 467-74
sports club system, 290
State Education Commission (SEdC), 45-6, 88, 289-90, 301, 399, 412, 425-7, 430, 456, 458, 498
  See also accreditation
Student Affairs Office
Student Council
Student Self-Disciplinary Committee, 258
Student Union
students (SZU), 58
  benke-zhuanke, 65-8, 87-9, 240-1, 307, 489-90
  cadre status, 480
  class rank, 487-8
  college entrance exams, 75, 83, 159-62, 199, 231, 239, 306, 432, 434, 439
  compatriot students, 69, 84-5
  comprehensive evaluation of, 47-8
  daipei, 67-8, 86
  discipline of, 33, 36-8, 46-7, 218, 252-3, 356, 377
  emigration, 124, 455
  employment after graduation, 20, 21, 478, 201, 181, 203, 218, 255, 267, 478-82
  employment while students, 29-32, 231, 378-9, 484, 486
  enrollment, 65-73
  fee-paying, 67-8, 86
  full-time equivalent, 61
  graduates, 69-71
  job practice, 176, 201, 221, 224, 232
  local versus non-local students, 79-83
  Luo’s focus on students, 26-34
  management of, 36-8, 46, 294-6
  parents’ education, 59
  parents’ occupation, 58
  politics and recruitment, 89
  public perception of underachievement, 482-3
  recommended and test-exempt students, 83-4
  satisfaction, 164-5, 247-51, 254, 267, 357
  scholarships, 489
  self-study, 379
  sports, 291
  staff-student ratio, 102-5
  student quality, 74-9
  study time, 229, 292, 378, 386, 484
  Three Good, 33, 285
  tuition (SZU), 73-4
  underachievement, 483-7
  See also achievement, pedagogy
teachers and staff (SZU), 101
  ability-qualification system, 120-3
  age, 107, 188
  and CCP, 140
  as tutors, 129
  awards & punishments, 147-8
  benefited by SZU businesses, 471
  cadre status, 108
  élite, 141-3
  employment contract system, 110-1
  expectations for teachers, 131-4
  departures, 455

  discipline, 134-7, 140
  disemployment, 112-5
  foreign travel, 139-50, 418-9
  irregular, 101-2, 130
  management of, 132-8, 271
  mobility, 124-5, 278, 455
  Professors Committee, 116, 132
  promotion, 221, 278
  qualification subsidy, 106-7
  ranks, 109, 175
  remuneration, 144
  researchers, 456
  staff-student ratio, 102-5
  sports, 291
  teacher team construction, 128
  teacher-student ratio, 129-30, 289
  teachers, 125-49
  work load, 134, 150, 218, 259, 278, 296
  work union, 133, 287
  1992 staffing reform, 123-4
  1988 personnel policy revisions, 114
  See also side-businesses, pedagogy, research
Technical and Further Education (TAFE), 440-2
Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL), 427-8, 430, 441-2
Three Selves, 27
twinning/exchange programs, 269-70, 423-43
  Charles Sturt, 415, 442
  Edmonds, 426-32, 443
  Griffith, 415, 442
  Kumamoto, 423, 390, 416-7
  Lancashire, 424-6, 443
  Victoria U. of Technology, 432-43
underachievement. *See* achievement.
Victoria University of Technology. *See* twinning.
Wei-Wu administration, 380
  concerns over teaching, 134-6, 243, 473
  education management, 40-2, 483
  dorm management, 34-8
  rectification under, 34